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1783-1946

By ROBERT M. RAYNER, B.A.

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1783-1946

BY

ROBERT M. RAYNER, B.A.

AND

W. T. G. AIREY, M.A.(N.Z.), B.A.(OXON)

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in the Examination Questions:

B	Bristol University School Certificate.
D	Durham University School Certificate.
CL	Cambridge University Local Examinations.
CWB	Central Welsh Board.
LGS	London University General School Examination.
LM	London Matriculation.
NUJB	Northern Universities Joint Board Examinations.
OC	Oxford and Cambridge Schools Examination Board.
OL	Oxford University Local Examinations.
UW	University of Wales Matriculation Examination.

PERIOD VIII

THE GREAT STRUGGLE WITH FRANCE

(1783-1815)

At the moment when this Period opens, Britain's fortunes were at the lowest point they had reached for centuries. A great coalition of European Powers, jealous of her conquests in the Seven Years' War, had enabled her American colonists to gain their independence, she had lost her self-respect, and was on the verge of national bankruptcy. Foreign statesmen judged that her greatness was at an end. Yet by the time the Period closed her position among the nations was higher and her wealth greater than ever before, and she had laid the foundations of another overseas Empire.

In the interim her long contest with France had culminated in two great wars. She entered upon the first to combat the ideas of the French Revolution; but the second was a war of self-defence against the greatest military genius in the history of Europe. That she emerged successful from the struggle was largely due to the fact that during these years she had the services of her most famous statesman, her greatest sailor, and her most successful soldier; but even more telling factors in the long run were the steadfast spirit of the nation and the rapid progress of the Industrial Revolution, which provided her with "the sinews of war."

CHAPTER LIII

EFFECTS OF THE LOSS OF AMERICA

1782-1784

§ 234. THE NADIR.—Let us sum up the political situation as it appeared to George III when the Capitulation of Yorktown

(October 1731) compelled him to accept the resignation of Lord North. From the moment of his accession in 1760 he had set himself to restore the power of the monarchy. He did not seek to deprive Parliament of the control over taxation and legislation which had been guaranteed to it by the Revolution of 1688-9 (N130); but he believed that the King ought to appoint the Ministers and have the general direction of policy. The great Whig families had taken advantage of the weak position of the first two Georges to take this control into their own hands. They had kept a hold over Parliament by means of "patronage"—the power of granting places and pensions—which those kings had placed in their hands as the price of their support. George III, being free from the danger of "Jacobitism," had determined to reverse all this. After ten years of struggle with the Whig "claus" (§§ 223-5) he had succeeded in placing in power a Prime Minister after his own heart—Lord North—a Tory who acted as his agent in conducting the Government, and used the "patronage" to ensure the support of a party of "King's Friends" in Parliament. If George and North had crushed the American revolt, their view of the Constitution might have prevailed indefinitely; but—partly by bad luck and partly by bad judgment—their rule had ended in disaster.

Though the Whig Opposition in Parliament had attacked the King's policy towards the Americans (as, indeed, they had attacked everything else that North's Government did or did not do), the nation as a whole had supported him throughout the quarrel; but when the war developed into a struggle with half the Powers of Europe, and dragged on year after year to the ruin of overseas trade and the doubling of the National Debt, public opinion had veered round. Even the "King's Friends," with their pockets stuffed with royal guineas, could no longer support the policy which had brought the country's pride so low. So North had to resign, and King George, to his bitter chagrin, was forced to call back to office the "Family Whigs" under Lord Rockingham.

§ 235. THE ROCKINGHAM WHIGS.—But the Whigs were no longer so powerful as they had been in the first decade of the reign. Their leader, *Lord Rockingham*, though a high-minded man, had never shown any capacity as a statesman, and his vigour was now sapped by ill-health. The dominant figure among them was *Charles James Fox* (1749–1806), a genial personality, a whole-hearted lover of liberty, and a brilliant debater, but a devotee of the fashionable follies of the day—hard drinking and high gambling (N179). The party was supplied with brains by *Edmund Burke* (1729–97), as ardent a Liberal as Fox, and a profound thinker on political questions, but a man with little practical experience of the business of government (N178). Lastly, there was a distinct group led by *Lord Shelburne* (1737–1805), who was a disciple of the late Lord Chatham, and therefore not so bent on undermining the royal power as the Foxites were.

Their twenty years "in the wilderness" had purified the Whigs' ideals. The evils of political bribery, which their predecessors had exercised for fifty years, came home to them since the King had turned the tables on them by taking it into his own hands. They came into office determined to do something to make such methods impossible for the future. As soon as they got into office they carried through an *Economical Reform Bill* (1783), devised by Burke and sponsored by Fox. Much of the King's hold over the Commons had been due to his practice of giving Government contracts to his "Friends," and to the fact that a tenth of the voters of the country were revenue officers who were dependent on him for employment. The Bill made all Government contractors ineligible for Parliament, and deprived revenue officers of their votes.

But George III, though a man of limited capacity in other directions, was an adept at the shady tricks of political life, and was particularly skilful in playing on the weaker side of human nature. He dexterously widened the breach between Fox and Shelburne by favouring the latter at the expense of the former. The climax came when, on the death of Rockingham

(July 1782), he appointed Shelburne as Prime Minister. Fox and Burke resigned—which was exactly what the wily King wanted them to do.

§ 236. SHELburnE AND “THE INFAMOUS COALITION.”—The new Prime Minister was a man of enlightened ideas and marked ability ; but he had a sly, underhand manner that made people distrust him. As we have mentioned before, he had been a follower of Chatham, and he appointed the second son of the great minister as his Chancellor of the Exchequer. The young *William Pitt* (1759-1806) was only twenty-three years old ; but he had been brought up by his father to be a statesman, and had already made a mark in Parliament as an able debater, and as a singularly level-headed, self-controlled young man.

The chief achievement of the Shelburne Ministry was the *Peace of Versailles* (1783). The King hoped up to the last that the Americans would be content with something short of complete independence ; but his hopes proved vain. On the other hand, Rodney's defeat of the French fleet at the *Battle of the Saints* (1782), and Elliott's successful defence of *Gibraltar* against the Spaniards, enabled Britain to emerge from the war with little further loss.

But on the Opposition side of the House there were two men who were bitterly jealous of Shelburne. Though Fox had spent the greater part of his public life in vituperating North over the American War, the two men were now united by a determination to overthrow the minister who had been pushed into power by the King's favour. Each had a considerable personal following in the House. Separately they could do nothing against a Ministry that had the support of the “King's Friends,” but united they could outvote it. So they joined forces, compelled Shelburne to resign, and forced the King to instal them in office.

The triumph of this “Infamous Coalition” was short-lived, however. Public opinion was outraged by an alliance between extreme Whig and extreme Tory—it looked like a disgusting

greed for the sweets of office. As for George, he was beside himself with rage, and openly declared that he would never rest until he had contrived to get rid of them.

The opportunity came within a few months, over Fox's India Bill (1783). Recent events in India (N168) had shown that the British Government would have to take control of the provinces hitherto ruled by the East India Company. Fox proposed to take these duties over, lock, stock and barrel, leaving the Company what it had originally been—a mere trading corporation. There was much opposition to the measure, for it would have enabled the Coalition to entrench themselves in power by appointing their supporters to innumerable posts under the Indian Government. The King set himself to foment this opposition by every means in his power, and when the Bill came before the House of Lords he let the peers know that he would regard as his enemy any of them who voted for it. This message had the desired effect—the measure was rejected. Thereupon George demanded the instant resignation of the ministers, ordering them to return their seals of office by messenger, so as to save him the annoyance of a personal interview.

§ 237. ANOTHER WILLIAM PITT EMERGES.—The King would not have ventured upon this step if he had not had an alternative Ministry up his sleeve. When this was announced, it made the political world gasp with amazement: he appointed as Prime Minister young William Pitt!

It was a daring move; but it was his last desperate gamble to get rid of Fox. Shelburne was impossible, owing to personal unpopularity; and nothing would be lost by giving his young supporter a chance. It was an equally bold act for Pitt to accept the position, for if he failed his career would be blighted at its very outset. And at first it seemed as if failure was inevitable. Fox and his friends poured ridicule upon him; with the support of the Northites they could—and did—outvote him whenever they liked. Everybody prophesied that the Ministry would not last more than a few weeks.

But the young man held grimly on. It was unconstitutional for a Minister to cling to office if repeatedly defeated in the House; but he replied that although the Opposition were for the time being in a majority, they did not represent the true feeling of the nation. When he thought the right moment had come, he dissolved Parliament so that a general election might enable the country to decide between him and them. The answer was decisive. Despite the frantic efforts of the Opposition, there was a substantial majority in favour of Pitt in the new Parliament.

There were several reasons for his triumph. Firstly, the nation was disgusted at the shabby trickery by which the Fox-North coalition had gained office. Secondly, everybody admired Pitt's courage in standing up to such formidable opponents in debate. Thirdly, both Fox and North had in different ways played ignoble parts in the recent disasters—North had been responsible for them, and Fox had rejoiced at them; whereas Pitt had opposed the policy which led to the war, but had lamented the humiliations which were its outcome. Lastly, the very name of PITT was a great asset—it reminded people of how his great father had pulled the country out of a slough of despond, thirty years before, in the face of similar corruptions and degradations.

Thus the King could congratulate himself that he had saved something from the wreck of his scheme to "Be King" (§ 224). Pitt would not be a Lord North—a sort of Grand Vizier carrying out the behests of Sultan George; but at any rate, he would not reduce the King to the position of a mere figure-head as the Whigs wanted to. For, as a matter of fact, he would always be more or less dependent on the Tory members who sat for the royal boroughs and the Tory squires who represented the counties. On the other hand, the King was equally dependent on Pitt as his only safeguard against the detested power of Fox.

This partnership between King and Minister was destined to subsist for twenty years, and to steer the country through some of the most critical times in its history.

CHAPTER LIV

PITT IN PEACE

1784-1792

§.238. A WHIG TURNING TORY.—As we should expect of the "Great Commoner's" son, Pitt in these early days of his public life was full of "liberal" ideals. He brought forward measures to reform Parliament, to restrict the Slave Trade, to give fair play to Irish commerce, and so on ; but each of them was bitterly opposed—largely by people financially interested in the evils to be redressed. Like his father, Pitt was convinced that he was the only man who could save the country from disaster, and he was never willing to risk being turned out of office for the sake of an unpopular cause, however much he believed in it. Thus the reforming spirit faded out of him ; and the process was hastened when the French Revolution made all reforms seem dangerous.

In truth, his position in Parliament was never very strong. There were no regular party organisations with official " Whips " as there are to-day. The House was divided into groups, each led by some influential personage. Pitt had the support of the biggest of these " blocs " : the " King's Friends " ; but they had been a good deal weakened by the Economical Reform Act (§ 235) ; and his personal following never numbered more than forty.

In the Cabinet, too, his position was made difficult by his lack of years and experience. He could not give office to able men like Shelburne lest his authority should be weakened, and he had to assume an air of haughty aloofness that rivalled his father's. It seemed as if though young in age he had never been young in spirit. He was always cool, cautious, circumspect. On occasion he could rise to noble heights of dignified oratory, but his most remarkable gift was a ready flow of words with which to express his thoughts—or to conceal them, if he

despatches for the approval of a Board of Control appointed by the Government, which was to have the power to appoint the highest officials, especially the Governor-General.

§ 241. PITT AND THE EMPIRE : (b) AUSTRALIA AND CANADA. —Pitt was also responsible for measures which led to the development of Australia and Canada as homes of the English-speaking race. As regards Australia, it is unlikely that he realised all the consequences of his actions. Captain Cook had rediscovered the continent during his famous voyages, undertaken under the auspices of the Royal Navy in the interests of nautical and geographical knowledge. He claimed these lands in the name of the King, but nothing was to be done to follow this action up until 1786. Now that persons sentenced to transportation could no longer be sent to the American "plantations," some fresh dumping-ground had to be found for them. Lord Sydney, Pitt's Home Secretary, bethought him of these lands in the Antipodes; and in January 1788 Captain Arthur Phillips, with three storeships containing seeds, implements, and cattle, and six transports carrying 750 convicts with a strong guard of soldiers, arrived in the glorious harbour which was named after the Minister. How this very humble beginning led to a new Britain across the seas will be told later in this book.

If Australia was founded "in a fit of absence of mind," the same cannot be said of Canada. The Quebec Act (1774) had given religious freedom to the French *habitants* who had been brought under the British Crown ten years before. Lord North's Government had been violently attacked by the New England colonists for this tolerant policy, and the Canadians took warning from this to remain loyal to the British Government in the War of Independence. But that war altered their position. A large proportion of the American colonists had stood by King George throughout the struggle; and though the British Government obtained promises of fair treatment for them in the Treaty of Versailles, these promises were disregarded. Life was made so unpleasant for them that

thousands fled to take refuge under the British flag. Of these *United Empire Loyalists*, as they proudly called themselves, some 45,000 migrated to Canada. So many settled in the St. John River district that this was cut off from Nova Scotia and formed into *New Brunswick*, with its own government. But even more went to the fertile lands west of Quebec. So far from being "myrmidons of tyranny," as their former persecutors called them, they immediately demanded self-government. But they had very different ideas and traditions from the French Canadians about politics and religion. For the *habitants* were Catholics; they had no experience of parliamentary government; and they were attached to the semi-feudal system of land-tenure to which they had always been accustomed. To have left both populations under the same government would have caused endless quarrels and perhaps another disruption. So Pitt's *Canada Act* (1791) made two distinct provinces (apart from the Atlantic colonies—Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland): Lower Canada, or *Quebec*, and Upper Canada, or *Ontario*. Each had its own elected Assembly, and its own Governor, and administrative Council nominated by the home Government. Thus each was left free to develop in its own way—Ontario being British, progressive, and Protestant, while Quebec was French, conservative, and Catholic.

CHAPTER LV

PITT IN WAR—THE FIRST COALITION

1793-1797

§ 242. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.—We have seen that the distinction between social classes meant much more in the eighteenth century than it does to-day (§ 210). Upper and lower classes seemed to inhabit different worlds, and it was almost impossible for a man born in humble circumstances to

cross the barrier between them.¹ This "caste" system was not confined to Britain—in fact it was less rigid here than in most continental countries. In France, Germany, and Spain the upper classes had not the political power wielded by the British aristocracy, but they clung all the more tenaciously to the privileges which marked their superiority to the "common herd." For instance, it was almost impossible for anyone not "well-born" to hold a military commission in these countries; and all persons of noble birth were exempt from the most onerous of the taxes—which, of course, threw the heaviest burden of taxation on the backs least able to bear it.

To those who enjoyed the benefit of these inequalities they seemed a part of the natural order of things; but sooner or later there was bound to be a reaction against such a monstrously artificial order of society, a return to the feeling that all men are equal in the sight of God and should be so in the eyes of the law. This reaction appeared first in France, not because the Old Régime was most oppressive there, but because it was there that it was most felt. For revolutions are seldom made by the utterly destitute and down-trodden. They are usually brought about by people who enjoy just enough opportunity for happiness and well-being to long for more; and this was the position in France.)

Theories of the "Rights of Man" had long been discussed among enlightened Frenchmen. Moreover, thousands who had been to America to help the colonists in the War of Independence came back with a glowing account of the effects of freedom and equality in making mankind happy and prosperous. Still, the Old Régime might have staggered on indefinitely but for the fact that France's share in that war had brought her to the verge of bankruptcy. We have seen how Pitt dragged Britain back from the precipice; but France was less fortunate. Various expedients were tried for "balancing the budget," but each

¹ For instance, Edmund Burke, though a lawyer by profession, and an intellectual giant, was debarred from high office, even when his party was in power, by the fact that he was not of aristocratic birth.

experiment only made matters worse. At last King Louis XVI, the well-meaning but rather stupid king who now paid the penalty for the misgovernment of his predecessors, was driven to summon the States General, a sort of Parliament which had not met since 1614.

The exciting events which followed cannot be recounted here. It must suffice to recall how the members met at Versailles in May 1789, full of good-will and hope; how distrust arose between those who sought to use this opportunity to give France a constitutional government and the Court Party, who were determined that the royal power should remain as absolute as ever; how these antagonisms resulted in a riot in which the Bastille was stormed; how all feudal privileges were abolished; how the King tried to escape out of the country; and how at last (September 1791) a form of constitutional monarchy was fixed up and the Revolution seemed to have ended happily.

§ 243. WAR WITH THE REVOLUTION.—At first almost everybody on this side of the Channel was sympathetic towards the revolutionaries. They seemed to be paying Britain the sincerest form of flattery in trying to imitate our "constitutional Government," and the fact that the French aristocracy had lost their privileges was regarded as a just retribution for their action in the late war. Moreover, it seemed certain that these internal disturbances would prevent France from again being a dangerous enemy to Britain for a long time to come.

But these complacent views were combated by Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution* (1790). Burke was what would to-day be called a "Conservative"—he believed in "Freedom slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent," and he denied that a sound form of government could be built up in a moment. ✓ The British Constitution had been a thing of organic growth, like a man or a tree; but the French revolutionaries had destroyed their existing Constitution to build afresh on a theory of the "Rights of Man." Burke felt that this was as wicked as it was foolish, and predicted that it

would lead to an orgy of violence and bloodshed ending in a military tyranny.

His words made a profound impression on all thinking men in Britain—especially when they began to come true. For the settlement of 1791 was very short-lived. The King and Queen secretly invited the Emperor and the King of Prussia to invade France and destroy the Revolution before its doctrines spread to their own countries, and war was declared in April 1792. The opening stages went all in favour of the invaders, and Paris was in danger. The result was to give the extremist revolutionaries—now beginning to be known as *Jacobins*—an excuse to work up another panic in which the monarchy was overthrown, thousands of aristocrats were butchered, a Convention was summoned to create another Constitution, and France was declared a Republic. Such energy was infused into the armies that the tide of invasion was turned back. The great victory of Jemappes placed Belgium under the young Republic; and to justify their going on to conquer Holland, the Convention issued the *November Decrees*, declaring (a) that they would not be bound by any king-made treaties, and (b) that they would lend armed support to any people that would imitate their example in “throwing off the chains of tyranny.”

Pitt was desperately anxious to keep out of the war against the Revolution; for peace was absolutely necessary to his plans for national recovery;¹ but public opinion in Britain became more and more antagonistic to these violent proceedings. When, in January 1793, they culminated in the execution of Louis XVI, indignation burst its bounds. Public mourning was declared, theatres were closed, and the King's coach was surrounded by mobs demanding immediate war. At last Pitt was forced to give way, and Britain joined the anti-Revolutionary coalition in February 1793.

¹ In introducing his proposal for a Sinking Fund in 1792, Pitt declared that it would need ten years of peace to become really effective, but that fortunately there had seldom been a time when continued peace could be so confidently anticipated. Within a few months Britain had entered upon a war which lasted, with one brief interval, for twenty-two years.

§ 244. PITT AS WAR MINISTER.—The declaration of war was a sharp dividing-line in Pitt's career. Hitherto he had been absorbed in domestic affairs, but henceforth we shall see him grappling with the problems of war. This later task was far less congenial to him, and he was nothing like so successful at it.

We can trace his lack of success to three main causes. Firstly, he did not expect that bankrupt France would be able to carry on the war more than a year or two, for he could not foresee how devotedly Frenchmen would sacrifice their lives and property in defence of the Revolution. Hence he sought to avoid interfering with the financial schemes he had laid down in peace-time, and tried to pay for the war by loans instead of by taxation—a policy which in the long run led to disastrous confusion.

Secondly, he lacked his father's gift for directing distant campaigns, for choosing able commanders, and inspiring them with confidence. He squandered some of the finest regiments of the army on expeditions to the West Indies, where they were almost wiped out by disease. An army sent to co-operate with our allies in the Low Countries was paralysed by the incapable generalship of the Duke of York, whose only qualification for the command was that he was the King's son. Subsidies poured out to Prussia were spent in partitioning Poland instead of in fighting the French.

Thirdly, he repeated the mistaken naval policy which had cost us so dear in the American War—that is to say, he failed to keep enemy fleets blockaded in their harbours. Hence the French were able to bring corn over from America; and, although Admiral Hood defeated the convoying fleet in the battle of *The Glorious First of June* (1794), the foodships got safely into Cherbourg and saved the situation for the Republic.

§ 245. "ANTI-JACOBINISM."—The Jacobin "Committee of Public Safety," which had seized control of the French Government, put tremendous energy into organising the defence of the Revolution from its enemies without and within; and they

crushed all opposition to their rule by a Reign of Terror, in the course of which thousands of men and women were publicly guillotined. The horror aroused by their violence had most important effects on the political development of Britain. The ruling classes were so alarmed lest Jacobinism should spread to this country and overturn the established order of things, that they resolutely opposed all reforms that would give the lower classes more influence over the Government. Pitt went with the stream.* He abandoned all his early sympathies with liberal reform, and became a whole-hearted Tory. An Act was passed making it high treason to advocate any change in the Constitution, and savage sentences of transportation were passed on harmless individuals merely for being members of societies formed to agitate for such reforms.

This "anti-Jacobin" spirit dominated the British Government for the next forty years. It seemed that because Frenchmen mismanaged the business of reforming their institutions, Englishmen were not to be allowed to do so at all.

The Whig party split over the subject. Some of the more conservative members of it joined the Ministry in 1795, so that the nation might show a united front to the enemy; but Fox and a few of his devoted adherents remained faithful to their ideals of Liberty and Reform. The lifelong friendship between Fox and Burke was broken when the former continued to sympathise with the revolutionaries, even when the country was at war with them.

§ 246. THE BLACK YEAR.—Meanwhile the revolutionary armies were carrying all before them. Prussia and Spain made peace with the Republic in 1795, and in the following year a brilliant young French general named Napoleon Bonaparte pulverised the Austrian armies in northern Italy and compelled the Emperor to agree to the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797). Thus Britain was left to cope unaided with the Republic; and a formidable foe it proved itself. The French felt that they had a mission to spread the gospel of the Revolution all over the

world, and their soldiers were inspired with irresistible energy and self-confidence. "With bread and iron we can get to China," they boasted. Britain was no longer a member of a powerful alliance engaged in chastising a regicide republic; she was herself struggling against a coalition. For the Spanish Government—always anxious to recover the losses of earlier wars with Britain—had now thrown in its lot with France, while Holland was equally under the domination of the Republic. Thus Britain's command of the sea, on which she was dependent for her very existence, was threatened by a combination of the three next strongest fleets in Europe. Nor was this all. Pitt was in desperate straits for revenue, and had to pile on taxation to ruinous heights. (In the following year he put up a new impost—an *Income Tax*.) The war brought foreign trade almost to a standstill. Several successive bad harvests caused fearful distress among the working-classes. Great commercial firms went bankrupt, and many banks closed their doors. Ireland was on the brink of armed rebellion; and British India was threatened with trouble stirred up by French agents.

One ray of sunshine pierced the gloom early in the year, when Admiral Sir John Jervis (with Nelson as second-in-command) prevented the Spanish fleet from joining the French by the *Battle of St. Vincent*. But then came the most ominous disaster of all—two *naval mutinies*. Conditions of service in the fleet were appalling. The food was often unfit for human consumption, and the discipline was so harsh that men sometimes died under the lash. In war-time the fleet was manned by the press-gang, which took men by force to serve in the fleet. In the April of this "Black Year" the crews of the Channel fleet lying at Spithead presented a petition to the Admiralty, asking for redress of some of their grievances, and refused to sail until something had been done about them. After some hesitation the authorities gave way, and the men went quietly back to their duty. Hardly had this been settled when a far more serious outbreak occurred in the North Sea fleet at the Nore. Here the men seemed to have caught the spirit of the Revolution.

They took control of the ships, blockaded the mouth of the river, and threatened London with famine. But this time the Government stood firm. The spirit of resistance began to die out of the men; in one ship after another the officers regained their authority, the movement collapsed, and the ringleaders were hanged. The mutinies had one permanent effect—they drew attention to the hardships suffered by the men on whom the nation depended for its safety; and some of the worst of these grievances were remedied.

Then followed another flicker of sunshine. The ships from the Nore sailed across to join Admiral Duncan, who was blockading the Dutch behind the Texel. The ex-mutineers were so anxious to prove their loyalty that they made short work of the Dutchmen when they came out of port, and at the *Battle of Camperdown* (October 1797) the Dutch fleet disappeared from history.

CHAPTER LVI

PITT IN WAR—THE SECOND COALITION

1798-1802

§ 247. NAPOLEON BONAPARTE APPEARS ON THE SCENE.—The war between Britain and France was like a contest between a whale and an elephant—neither could get at the other. Britain had a powerful navy but no army to speak of, while France had a powerful army but no navy to speak of. Direct attack being impossible, the committee of five "Directors" who were now ruling France hit upon an indirect way of striking at Britain. Their brilliant young general, Bonaparte, suggested a conquest of the Turkish province of Egypt as a half-way house to India. Setting out from Toulon with an army and a fleet in the spring of 1798, he managed to evade the British fleet under Nelson which was watching for him, and landed his troops at Alexandria. But while he was defeating the Egyptian army at the

Battle of the Pyramids, Nelson came and destroyed his fleet as it lay at anchor in Aboukir Bay (*The Battle of the Nile*, 1798). This cut his communications with France and made it impossible for him to go on with his designs on India. Furthermore, it encouraged Austria and Russia to join Britain in a *Second Coalition* against the Republic.

Bonaparte tried to retrieve his situation by attacking the Turkish Empire through Palestine; but this plan was frustrated by his failure to capture Acre, where the defenders were supported by some British warships under Sir Sidney Smith. When he marched his weary troops back to Egypt he learned that the Directory had become very unpopular in France through the incompetence and corruption of its government. He had long harboured designs to seize the helm of state himself, and it seemed as if the critical moment was approaching. So he slipped away from Egypt and returned to France, leaving his army behind. By a bold and adroit *coup d'état* he overturned the existing Constitution, and set up a "Consulate," with himself as all-powerful "First Consul." He promised France peace after victory and a reorganisation of the Republic; and an overwhelming majority of the nation voted in favour of his new system.

It was not long before the Second Coalition went the way of the First. First, the Czar fell out with his allies, and made a separate peace; then Austria was knocked out by another Napoleonic victory in northern Italy—the Battle of Marengo (1800); and the Emperor was forced to agree to another humiliating peace with the young conqueror (the Treaty of Lunéville, 1801).

§ 248. TROUBLE BREWING IN IRELAND.—Of all the domestic difficulties with which Pitt had to grapple during the struggle with France, the most formidable was the unrest in Ireland. This was the outcome of centuries of misgovernment and intolerance. The English Government had always treated the Irish as a subject race who could have no more right to the soil

of their country than the aborigines in Australia. Again and again, under Elizabeth, James I, and Cromwell, large areas had been confiscated and given to English or Scottish settlers. The Battle of the Boyne (1690) had confirmed the ascendancy of this non-Irish ruling class, and it had used its power to try to crush the Catholic faith which was held so ardently by the great majority of the people. By the *Penal Code* no Catholic could be elected to the Irish Parliament, or vote at elections, or enter the learned professions, or hold commissions in the Services, or be appointed to any public office, or own land, or serve on a jury. Furthermore, the English Government oppressed the country (Protestant and Catholic alike) by a *Commercial Code* which prevented Irish produce from competing with English crops and manufactures, in England, or in foreign countries, or even in the colonies.

As the eighteenth century progressed, more enlightened ideas began to prevail, and the penal laws were gradually relaxed. Above all, England's extremity during the American war was Ireland's opportunity. The Government was unable to spare any troops to protect the sister island from the danger of a French invasion, and it was forced to authorise the formation of a body of *Irish Volunteers*. Grattan, an Irish Protestant who made himself the spokesman of the national claims, demanded that the Dublin Parliament should be entirely independent of that at Westminster; and the existence of an armed force of 80,000 men was a stronger argument than even his burning eloquence. The Rockingham Ministry, which came into power on the fall of Lord North (§ 235), repealed "Poyning's Laws" (1494, N68), which made the Irish Parliament subordinate to the English.

§ 249. THE REBELLION OF 1798.—But the Irish were not satisfied by this concession. So long as the Dublin Parliament merely represented the Protestant landlord class, the English Government could continue to control it by giving pensions and places to the members. They therefore demanded a reform

of the parliamentary system that would make it truly representative of the Irish people ; and as a necessary part of this reform, they wanted to make an end of the laws which prevented Catholics (fully four-fifths of the population) from taking part in public life.

The jealousy between the two countries was embittered by Pitt's vain attempt to establish Free Trade between them (§ 239); and the doctrines of the French Revolution gave a fresh impetus to the agitation. In 1791 a young Belfast lawyer named Wolfe Tone formed a *Society of United Irishmen* to agitate for complete democracy. Pitt knew that he would be unable to control a reformed Irish Parliament by his methods of corruption, so he suppressed the Society, and Tone fled to France. The movement was strongest among the Ulster Protestants ; and to counteract this, Pitt forced through the Irish Parliament an Act giving Catholics the vote. But the agitation continued ; for the great majority of the people were convinced that a truly national Parliament and Government, free from English "influence," was essential to their prosperity.

In 1795 Pitt made a tragic blunder : he sent over as Lord-Lieutenant a Whig nobleman who was well known to be in favour of the Catholic claims. Lord Fitzwilliam acted as if he had been authorised to bring the reform about ; the Irish Catholics assumed that they were to be granted full "emancipation," and great was their rejoicing. But it was all a mistake : Pitt had no intention of granting them any further privileges. He recalled Fitzwilliam and repudiated all his pro-Catholic actions. From the pinnacle of hope the Irish were cast down into the depths of despair. They felt that they had no resource but armed rebellion.

It broke out in 1798. Wolfe Tone besought the revolutionary Government in France to carry out their "November Decrees" (N175) and come to the aid of the oppressed Irish ; but each of their attempts to do so failed. A storm drove one expedition back, and the Battle of Camperdown (§ 246) destroyed the Dutch fleet which was to have convoyed another. At last the leaders of

the movement felt that they could delay no longer—they must act independently of the French. But there were spies among them who betrayed all their plans to the British Government. On the eve of the date fixed for the rising all the ringleaders were arrested. The peasantry made an attempt to carry through the rebellion by themselves, but the only place where they made any effective resistance was at *Vinegar Hill* in Wexford. Even here the King's troops and the local Protestant "Yeomanry" had little difficulty in sweeping the half-armed, ignorant, and terrified peasants out of their camp and over the country-side. The savagery with which southern Ireland was "pacified" during the following months left an indelible mark on the minds of the Irish people. When all was over, the French sent over a force of 5000 men, which landed at Lough Swilly; but it was at once surrounded and destroyed by the British troops. Among the prisoners taken was Wolfe Tone, who saved himself from a traitor's death by committing suicide in prison.

§ 250. THE ACT OF UNION.—This deplorable chapter in the history of Anglo-Irish relations had an equally deplorable sequel a year or two later. Pitt had long been considering a scheme for bringing Ireland under the Government and Parliament at Westminster. He hoped that this would provide a solution for two vexatious problems—the freeing of Irish commerce and the granting of Catholic Emancipation. For British manufacturers could not object to Irish competition if Ireland became an integral part of Great Britain; and the fear lest Catholic M.P.'s would dominate Irish affairs would evaporate if they sat in an assembly where they would be outnumbered by the English and Scottish members. It seemed as if the recent rebellion would be both an excuse and an opportunity for carrying through the change.

At first all classes in Ireland opposed the scheme. For one thing, it would end the separate national existence of the country, and would make Dublin a mere provincial city instead of the capital of a kingdom. Moreover, the Protestant upper

classes realised that it would rob them of their social ascendancy and their political power. Pitt sent over a Chief Secretary (Lord Castlereagh) and a Lord-Lieutenant (Lord Cornwallis) with the special task of converting the Irish to the scheme by hinting at the commercial advantages and the religious equality that would result from it. They were not at first very successful, for when the Union Bill came before the Dublin Parliament it was rejected by an overwhelming majority. But it was introduced again a month or two later and was passed. This miracle was worked by means of bribery and intimidation. The Government bought up many seats in the Dublin Parliament; it bribed aristocratic seat-owners by steps in rank; it broadcast Government posts among the members. Above all, it declared that it would bring in a similar Bill every session until it was passed, and that nobody who voted against it need look for any office or honour or favour.

The Union having been passed, the time came to carry out the promises made to the Irish; but an obstacle cropped up which ought to have been foreseen. The King was bitterly anti-Catholic, and he utterly refused to agree to any Act giving further privileges to Catholics: he declared that to do so would be a violation of his Coronation Oath to maintain the privileges of the Anglican Church, and he would rather abdicate and go back to Hanover than do such a thing. Pitt thus found himself in the position of having given pledges he was unable to fulfil; and he took the only course open to him in such circumstances—he resigned office. But this did nothing to allay the bitterness of Irish Catholics at what they naturally regarded as the basest treachery.

§ 251. THE PEACE OF AMIENS.—After the Treaty of Lunéville with Austria, the First Consul could concentrate on the war with Britain. As before (§ 247), his problem was to find some way of striking at a Sea Power. It has always been a sore point with other Powers that Britain should in war-time make use of her supremacy at sea to prevent neutral ships from trading with

her enemies. The Baltic States had formed a hostile alliance against her in the War of Independence, as a protest against this practice (§ 231), and Bonaparte now contrived to revive this *Armed Neutrality*. The principal Powers concerned were Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Russia, and the immediate result was to shut Britain out of the Baltic Sea, whence she obtained much important material for ship-building, such as timber, tar, and hemp. A fleet was sent under Sir Hyde Parker with Nelson as second-in-command, to break down the resistance of the northern Powers. Denmark was compelled to submit by the *Battle of the Baltic* (N184), and a day or two later the murder of the anti-British Czar Paul brought about a change in Russian policy. The *Armed Neutrality* was destroyed.

Napoleon was as determined as ever to get the better of Britain, but he was now convinced that this was going to be a big undertaking, and that he must first have a breathing-space in which to carry out the reorganisation of the institutions of France which had been destroyed by the Revolution. He therefore pushed on the peace negotiations which had been opened soon after the Treaty of Lunéville (§ 247).

Britain was equally ready to come to terms. What was there for her to go on fighting for? Two coalitions, though liberally subsidised by her money, had collapsed ignominiously. She could not carry on the struggle single-handed. As for her navy, the enemy had no more ships for it to destroy or colonies for it to seize. Pitt's successor, Addington (a personal friend of the King's), was unequal to the responsibility of carrying on the war. British commerce was crippled by the disturbed state of Europe, and the load of taxation was mounting year by year. Moreover, everybody hoped that France would now settle down to a peaceful existence under the Constitution which she had approved by such an overwhelming majority.

By the Treaty of Amiens (1802) Britain gave up all her conquests except Trinidad and Ceylon; but the settlement was

very popular, and when the new French ambassador arrived in London his carriage was pulled through the streets by the delighted mob.

CHAPTER LVII

THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

1760-1820

§ 252. **THE MACHINE AGE BEGINS.**—During this period great changes were taking place in our ancestors' way of life : they were becoming a predominantly town-dwelling people instead of country-dwelling, and wage-workers instead of home-workers. When George III came to the throne in 1760, Britain was mainly self-supporting—her only imports were "luxury goods," such as wines and silks. Nine-tenths of the nation's food was provided by her own soil, much of it being produced by small owner-farmers. Its clothes were nearly all spun and woven in cottage-homes, and its ironware was smelted on a small scale by means of charcoal in the wooded areas of south and west. But by the end of the reign (1820) the country had become dependent on foreign trade; big farms were in the hands of tenant-farmers who employed hired labourers; spinning and weaving were being carried on in factories by paid "hands"; iron was being smelted by coal in great foundries in the north and midlands. These changes constitute what we call *The Industrial Revolution*.

They began with the growth of the slave trade. One of the most profitable lines which commerce took in the eighteenth century was the export of cotton cloth to West Africa, where it was exchanged for negro slaves captured by Arab dealers. The slaves were sold in America—many of them to the plantations which provided the raw material for the growing cotton industry of Lancashire. So long as English village life had been self-sufficing there was no inducement for anybody to devise

improved methods ; but this expansion of foreign markets meant that the more people could produce, the more money they could make, and this set men's wits to work to accelerate production.

These developments came first in the cotton industry, for which, as we have seen, there were elastic markets and sources of raw material. Output had long been restricted by the fact that it took five spinners to keep one weaver supplied with yarn. So, about 1764, James Hargreaves invented a *Spinning Jenny*, which enabled one person to attend to a number of mechanically propelled spindles. The next step forward was a method of strengthening the spun thread. Hitherto linen had to be used for the warp of cotton cloth, as cotton could not be spun strong enough for the purpose ; but Richard Arkwright's *Water Frame* got over the difficulty by twisting the yarn as it spun it. Ten years later Samuel Crompton combined these two inventions in *The Mule*, which produced yarn strong enough to be used as warp, yet fine enough to be woven into the finest fabrics, which had hitherto been produced only in India. A little later similar inventions were applied to the manufacture of woollen cloth as well.

§ 253. THE AGE OF POWER BEGINS.—The changes led to others. The ever-growing demand for machinery caused great engineering works to be set up, and greatly increased quantities of iron were required. The supply of wood for smelting soon failed, and methods were devised of using coal for the purpose.

At first most of the power used to drive the machinery was water-power—hence the word “ mill ” for a building in which manufacture is carried on ; and the earliest of these mills were built by the side of streams. But the growth of the industry made some more concentrated form of energy necessary, and stimulated the development of *steam-power*. The greatest pioneer in this matter was James Watt, who made an engine that was far more powerful and less wasteful of fuel than any that had hitherto been devised. At first the engines turned out from the works of Boulton & Watt at Birmingham were used only for pumping the water out of mines ; but by degrees

they were adapted for driving all sorts of machinery, and were imitated by other firms. This harnessing of the forces of nature to replace human labour is one of the most striking features of our modern civilisation.

Coal-mining was further stimulated by the need for fuel to make the steam in the engines ; and an indirect consequence of this was a shifting of population. Hitherto the south had been the most populous part of the country, inasmuch as it was richest in agricultural land and had the great port of London as its centre ; but after the development of the steam-engine the new manufactures developed near the coalfields which provided them with their fuel, and crowded industrial towns grew up in the north and midlands.

Other notable developments of the age were in the matter of locomotion. Practically nothing had been done in the way of road-making since the departure of the Romans. So long as the badness of the roads was merely a source of inconvenience, men had only grumbled at it ; but when it became a hindrance to making money they began to use their brains to improve matters. The first step—about the beginning of George III's reign—was to create "turnpike trusts," which were authorised by Act of Parliament to levy tolls from the users of the roads they maintained. A generation later came the pioneers of scientific road-making, Telford and Macadam ; and by the turn of the century fast mail-coaches on hard roads had halved the time required for journeys. Equally important was the development of canals. In 1759 James Brindley designed a canal between Manchester and the Duke of Bridgewater's collieries at Worsley ; and this was later continued to connect with the Mersey. The cost of transporting cotton between Liverpool and Manchester was reduced from forty shillings to five shillings a ton. No wonder that all the chief industrial centres of the country were soon connected by similar waterways.¹

¹ There were called "Inland Navigation Canals," and so many men were employed digging them that the word "navvy" has remained in use for this type of labourer.

§ 254. THE ENCLOSURES.—As long as English people were mainly country-dwellers, and "every rood of land maintained its man," there was little inducement to improve agricultural methods, inasmuch as there would have been nobody to buy any surplus produce. But when ever-increasing numbers lived in towns, where they were employed in tending machines instead of producing food, a demand for increased crops began to be felt. We have seen how, during the first half of the century, Jethro Tull devised machines for drill-sowing and horse-hoeing, Lord Townshend experimented with rotations of crops and developed roots for the winter-feed of cattle, and Robert Bakewell increased the supply of meat by scientific breeding (N171). But these men were pioneers who gained little from their enterprise—the profits fell to a later generation, after the "Industrial Revolution" had created a market for the increased products.

And with the accession of George III the new interest in scientific farming had another, more far-reaching, effect. A great part of the country was still cultivated under the medieval "open-field" system, by which each villager owned strips in each of three or four great unenclosed fields. These strips were divided from each other by mere grass "balks," and the whole of each field was under the same crop at the same time. This system made up-to-date methods impossible, and local squires who wanted to profit by the mounting price of corn sought to end it. They got Parliament to pass "Enclosure Acts" authorising them to fence in the village lands, including the commons and waste land, and re-divide it into compact blocks. This hit the village "small-holder" in three ways. Firstly, he generally got the worst of the deal when the lands were re-divided; secondly, he could rarely find the money for his share of the cost of passing the Act and fencing the fields; thirdly, he had lost the use of the "common" on which he had hitherto turned out his cow and pigs and geese. Moreover, the large-scale scientific farmer was able to undersell the humble yeoman. The consequence was that the latter generally had to sell his share of the

village lands and either work for wages on them as a hired labourer, or emigrate to one of the colonies, or drift into the nearest town to work in one of the new factories.

§ 255. THE NEW OUTLOOK.—But the most vital of the changes wrought by the "Industrial Revolution" was in the relationship between man and man. The new processes of manufacture required machinery which was enormously costly to buy, to house, and to feed with raw material. All this was quite beyond the resources of the cottage-worker. Furthermore, mass-production turned out huge quantities of goods at a price with which the hand-worker could not compete. These humble folk were starved into abandoning their home-industry and working for wages. Thus the nation came to be divided into two hostile classes—those who live by owning and those who live by earning—wage-payers and wage-earners—*capitalists* and *labourers*.

The fact that Britain was the first country in which this Industrial Revolution took place gave her an enormous advantage in the accumulation of wealth. It was this which enabled Britain to hold out in the long struggle with France; and it has been well said that the rocks upon which the Napoleonic Empire foundered were the factory chimneys of Yorkshire and Lancashire.

Unfortunately a price had to be paid for this, and that price was the health and happiness of several generations of our ancestors. Life in the country may be dull, but at any rate it is spent healthily in the open air; whereas in the mushroom towns which sprang up in the new industrial areas the workers lived from morning to night in the foul atmosphere of a crowded mill, and from night to morning in the equally foul atmosphere of a crowded home. Even in agricultural districts the labourer had now no rights, no freedom; and his wages fell so low, owing to economical methods of farming, that he could scarcely keep body and soul together. Moreover, many of the tasks in the factories could be performed by children, and those who

survived the long hours of monotonous toil grew up a stunted and discontented race.

Parliament did nothing to improve these conditions, chiefly because it was convinced by such writers as Adam Smith (§ 239) that wages and conditions of labour were as completely outside human control as the law of gravitation. They argued that, by the "Law of Supply and Demand," wages fall if there are more workers than jobs for them, and *vice versa*. This doctrine of letting such matters alone—"Laissez-faire"—dominated the minds of the ruling classes for half a century and more. It was a comfortable doctrine for them, for it seemed to free them from all responsibility. Moreover, low wages enabled employers to accumulate capital to expand their businesses, and it appeared to be a patriotic duty to do everything possible to encourage this.

The only step that they could take in self-defence was to come to agreements among themselves not to work for lower wages or longer hours than seemed reasonable. Here we see the origin of Trade Unionism; but in this, its earliest form, it was doomed to a very short life. In 1799 Pitt passed a *Combination Act*, which forbade any workman to combine with other workmen to impose conditions on employers, under a penalty of three months' hard labour.

CHAPTER LVIII

PITT IN WAR—THE THIRD COALITION

1803-1805

§ 256. **THE GREAT INVASION SCARE.**—Within a few months of the signing of the Peace of Amiens (§ 251) it became evident that war would break out again very soon. Bonaparte showed that he intended to make France the dominant Power in the world, and that he realised that Britain was the most serious obstacle

to his so doing (1812). The British Government determined not to allow him to complete his preparations at his leisure, and declared war (May 1803). Yet the "Napoleonic War"—which followed was more truly a defensive war than any other in which this country ever engaged. The nation felt that the threat of a military dictatorship must be checked before it swallowed up Britain as it had already swallowed up the Netherlands, the Rhine Provinces, and northern Italy.

Bonaparte now made elaborate plans for an invasion of England. He collected near Boulogne what he called "The Grand Army of England." It was one of the most formidable fighting forces the world has ever seen, consisting of 150,000 soldiers—most of them still young in age but veterans of ten years of almost continuous warfare—commanded by keenly ambitious junior officers, with Soult, Lannes, Ney, and Davoust as Generals of Division, with Murat ("Le beau sabreur") in charge of the cavalry and Berthier as Chief of Staff; and, over all, the greatest military genius of modern times. For two years this army lived in huts on the Picardy coast, rehearsing their attack on the white cliffs which they could plainly see on clear days, while their Emperor (as he became in 1804) was planning the means to ferry them across the thirty miles of Channel that intervened.

In England these preparations caused much alarm. The militia was called up, a volunteer corps was raised, and the Martello Towers and Beacon Hills along the south coast still bear witness to those days and nights of anxiety. But the most essential step which the nation took to meet the danger was to call Pitt back to office. Everybody realised that the Addington Government was quite incompetent to meet the crisis. When George III sent for Pitt, he extorted from him a promise that he would not again bring up the question of Catholic Emancipation; and Pitt, feeling that national safety must be his first consideration, agreed. He was anxious to form a really national Ministry by including the principal Whigs; but the King would not admit Fox to office, and none of the others would join without their leader.

The only counter-move which Pitt could make against the threat of invasion was to construct another of "those creaking coalition machines," as Napoleon contemptuously called them. Prussia refused to join, being paralysed by fear of Napoleon, but Pitt was more successful with Russia and Austria. England was once more to pay the Austrian army to fight; and the first stage of the campaign was to be the invasion of France through Bavaria (her ally) by an Austro-Russian army. What the second stage was to be did not in the event matter much—as we shall see.

§ 257. SEA POWER AGAIN.—Of course, Napoleon knew all about these "secret" negotiations; but it would be a death-blow to the projected Coalition if he could knock England out, and for a time he persisted with his invasion scheme. His great difficulty was how to convey his men, horses, guns, and ammunition across the Channel. He had thousands of flat-bottomed boats built, and at first he hoped that they would be able to slip across on some dark night. But experience showed that several tides would be necessary to get the boats loaded; and what would the British navy be doing meanwhile?

By the beginning of 1805, therefore, he decided that he must contrive to gain a preponderance of naval strength in the Channel, if only for a few days. His first step was to add the naval resources of Spain to those of France, by inducing the feeble Spanish Government, which he always had under his thumb, to declare war upon Great Britain. True to his basic principle of strategy, he aimed at concentrating the whole Franco-Spanish fleet at the vital spot so suddenly as to give the British no time to collect their scattered squadrons. The chief obstacle to this was that the British navy was blockading the French and Spanish harbours, in accordance with its maxim that "the first line of defence is the enemy's ports." Napoleon instructed Villeneuve (the commander of the Toulon fleet) to give the slip to the blockading squadron (commanded by Nelson), brush aside the blockade of Cadiz, and with the Spanish ships

thus released to sail to the West Indies. A similar plan was to be carried out by Gantheaume at Brest and Rochefort, and the combined fleets were then to return swiftly to Europe, where it was hoped they would be at least a week ahead of the enemy.

At first the plan prospered. Villeneuve got out while Nelson was refitting and revictualling in a roadstead near Sardinia. He released the Cadiz fleet and sailed for Martinique with twenty ships of the line. It took Nelson nearly a month to get any reliable information as to Villeneuve's destination, and to his great disappointment he failed to bring him to battle in the West Indies. Villeneuve had set off back to Europe, but Nelson sent on a fast frigate to warn the Admiralty. Sir Robert Calder was sent with fifteen ships to intercept the enemy at the mouth of the Channel. After an indecisive action, Villeneuve got into harbour just as Nelson was approaching Europe. Nelson had fretted himself sick during his fruitless chase. Leaving the task of blockading Villeneuve at Cadiz to Lord Collingwood, he came home on leave—and was surprised that nobody reproached him with his failure.

That was the end of Napoleon's invasion scheme. He suddenly decided to abandon a plan which depended on such incalculable factors as ships and sailors, and fell back on the game he knew he could play—the destruction of the Austrian army now slowly concentrating in Bavaria for the invasion of France.

Once more had Britain been saved by her fleet. "The storm-tossed ships on which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world."

§ 258: ULM, TRAFALGAR, AUSTERLITZ.—There followed one of the most striking examples of military efficiency in history. Within six weeks of breaking camp at Boulogne the French army had marched into Bavaria, had surrounded the Austrian army at *Ulm* (October 1805) and had compelled it to surrender. The Allies' plan of campaign was shattered before it was well begun.

A day or two later came news of a very different colour—the destruction of the Franco-Spanish fleet. Nelson wanted nothing

so much as an opportunity to come to grips with the enemy. On 25th September he arrived off Cadiz and took over the command. Ten days later the Franco-Spanish fleet came forth to its destruction off *Cape Trafalgar* (21st October 1805). The battle began just before midday, and by three of the afternoon ten of the allied ships had been destroyed, eighteen more had been captured, and Nelson was lying dead in the cockpit of the *Victory*. Trafalgar compelled Napoleon to abandon all hope of a direct attack upon Britain, and push forward with an alternative method of overcoming her—a method which ultimately led to his own downfall.

In his speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in the November of this year Pitt made his famous remark: "England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, I trust, save Europe by her example." But Europe was a long way from being saved as yet. Napoleon followed up his success at Ulm by defeating the main Russo-Austrian army at *Austerlitz* (December 1805). The Austrian Emperor was compelled to make a humiliating peace with Napoleon for the third time, while the Czar withdrew his shattered forces into Poland. The Third Coalition had ended like the First and Second, with Britain left to face the enemy alone.

The news of Austerlitz killed Pitt. His health had long been breaking down, and the overthrow of his Coalition was too much for his weakened physique. People afterwards spoke of "the Austerlitz look," which never left his face until his death some six weeks later.

CHAPTER LIX

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

1806-1813

§ 259. HUMANITARIANISM.—There were so few men of outstanding ability in English politics at this time that, on the death

of Pitt, King George was forced to admit Fox to office. It seemed as if at last a truly National Ministry had been formed ; but this "Ministry of All the Talents" was as short-lived as the earlier Whig-Tory coalition. Like that of 1783, it managed to pass just one sound measure through Parliament.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Methodist revival began to have the effects that the Wesleys had always hoped it would have—a deepening of religious faith in the Church of England (§ 211). "Evangelical Churchmen," as they were called, were great Bible-readers ; they condemned frivolous amusements, especially on the Sabbath ; above all, they believed in "good works"—in promoting the well-being of mankind. The first fruits of this "humanitarianism" were reaped in the work of John Howard and Elizabeth Fry, who devoted their lives to improving conditions in prisons, where men, women, and children—the vilest criminals and innocent persons awaiting trial—were all herded together in foul dens. Another notable manifestation of the spirit was the founding of missionary societies—the Church Missionary Society in 1799 and the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1804.

Most notable of all was the Anti-Slavery Society, in which the leading figure was *William Wilberforce* (1759–1833). He tried to get his friend Pitt to do something in the matter ; but Pitt quailed before the fierce opposition of the influential men who were profiting by the system (§ 238). As a matter of fact, the Industrial Revolution in England, together with the invention in America of the "cotton gin" for separating the fibre from the seeds, caused such an expansion of the plantations that the rate of slave importation (mostly carried on in British ships) quadrupled during the last twenty years of the century.

Wilberforce's campaign had always been warmly supported in Parliament by Fox, though the latter drew his humanitarian impulse rather from the doctrines of the "Rights of Man" than from those of Christianity ; and the great Whig statesman now forced through Parliament the Abolition of the Slave Trade (1806–7). This was only half-way towards Wilberforce's

goal, for it did not set free the slaves who were already working on the plantations ; but it was a move in the right direction.

Fox died in September 1806, and early in the following year the Coalition Ministry resigned because the King refused to allow them to proceed with a measure throwing all ranks in army and navy open to Catholics. A Tory Ministry was now formed under the Duke of Portland, and the Whigs were not in office again for another twenty-three years.

§ 260. THE RIVAL BLOCKADES.—Napoleon's new plan of campaign against Britain was *The Continental System*. "The Industrial Revolution had already gone so far that the country was no longer self-supporting. If an enemy could prevent Britain from importing foodstuffs and raw materials, and from exporting manufactured goods to pay for them, she would soon be starved into surrender. She had herself set an example of blockading an enemy coast ; she should now be blockaded herself. Not, of course, by the same method. His navy having been destroyed at Trafalgar, Napoleon could not stop merchant ships at sea ; but he could prevent their delivering their cargoes at European ports—provided that he controlled the countries to which those ports belonged. This was a big undertaking, but Bonaparte was now beginning to suffer from that overweening self-confidence which ultimately caused his downfall. He already dominated Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy, and he felt that he would soon find a way to impose his will upon the rest. The most serious breach in the "system" at the moment was the North Sea coast of Prussia ; but that did not present much difficulty to the Emperor. He lost no time in picking a quarrel with the King of Prussia, annihilated his army at Jena (1806), and entered Berlin as a conqueror.

It was from the Prussian capital that he launched his economic campaign against Britain. By the *Berlin Decrees* (1806) he proclaimed the British Isles in a state of blockade. No vessel that had touched at a British port was to be allowed to enter any

harbour under his control. To this the British Government replied by the *Orders in Council*, (1807). Since the French Emperor forbade Europe to trade with Britain, Britain would forbid Europe to trade with anyone else. The British navy would take as prizes any vessel sailing to any port under French control unless it had first called at a British port and paid a duty on its cargo.

§ 261. THE EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADES.—Henceforward his "Continental System" was seldom out of Bonaparte's thoughts. Having mastered Prussia, his next care was to bring Russia into the System. This he did by first defeating the Czar at the Battle of Friedland, and then coming to terms with him by the *Treaty of Tilsit* (1807).

There is no doubt that the blockade war hit Britain very hard. There were several bad harvests, and the difficulty of getting supplies from the Continent raised prices to famine heights. Wages nowhere rose in proportion to the cost of living, and in some cases they actually fell. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of workpeople were thrown out of employment altogether. The effect of the new machines was at its worst: they saved a great deal of labour, while the increased output which might have made up for this was checked by the loss of continental markets. It is not surprising that *Luddite Riots* occurred, in which starving mobs raided mills and smashed the machinery which seemed to be the cause of their misery. The wonder is that those dark days did not see a great social upheaval. The nation as a whole tightened its belt and set its teeth and looked forward to better times as soon as "Boney" was beaten.


Meanwhile the British counter-blockade was hurting France and her subject states even more. Nothing makes us realise the spell which Bonaparte cast over the minds, not only of France but of Europe generally, than the fact that at his behest they submitted to a system from which they derived no sort of advantage, but which deprived them of coffee, sugar, and tobacco, quadrupled the cost of their clothing, laid up the

shipping in their ports, and made grass grow in their market-places.

An even more important effect of the Continental System was that Napoleon's efforts to make it effective led him into a number of enterprises which dissipated his strength and led indirectly to his downfall. The first of these enterprises was an attack on Portugal. The prosperity of that country was dependent on trade with Britain, and its Government refused to commit economic suicide even to please the great Napoleon. He therefore sent Marshal Junot with an army to compel it to do so by force. In order to reach Portugal this French army marched through Spain with scant regard for the self-respect of the Spaniards. So indignant were they at the weakness of their King in not resisting this high-handed action that there was a movement to depose him in favour of his son Ferdinand. Napoleon had long felt that these Bourbon Kings of Spain were too weak to enforce the Berlin Decrees efficiently, and these family jars gave him an excuse to intervene. He summoned King and Prince to Bayonne, insisted upon their both resigning their rights to the throne, and announced that he had appointed his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, to reign in their stead. But this was leaving out of account the feelings of the Spaniards. Pride of race was among their strongest characteristics, and they utterly refused to accept their new "King." There were risings in half a dozen provinces at once, and several of the self-appointed Provincial Governments asked support from Britain—with whom Spain was still nominally at war.

§ 262. THE PENINSULAR WAR.—This was the origin of one of the most famous wars in which the British army was ever concerned. It began on a very small scale, with a force of 10,000 sent out under Sir Arthur Wellesley, recently returned from India (N181). He defeated Junot at *Vimeiro* (1808); but the next day he was superseded by the arrival of senior officers, who made the *Convention of Cintra*, allowing the French to evacuate Portugal in British ships. All the generals were recalled to

THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-1814



England for an inquiry into this unsatisfactory armistice ; and the command was now taken over by Sir John Moore. When Napoleon came with an army to compel Spain to submit to his brother, Moore made a dash at the French communications in order to draw him off from southern Spain. As anticipated, Napoleon turned to smash the hated British, whereupon Moore retreated to *Corunna*, where his transports lay. There he fought a rearguard action, in the course of which he was killed.

Wellesley, who had been exonerated from blame over the Cintra affair, sent in a memorandum to the War Office pointing out the advantages of the Iberian Peninsula as a theatre of war for the British army (N186). Ever since the collapse of the Third Coalition the Government had made up its mind not to throw away any more money putting in the field foreign armies which fell to pieces the moment Napoleon appeared on the scene ; but in the Peninsula our soldiers would be able to fight their own battles, supported by a Spanish national rising, and within reach of the navy. So they decided to let Wellesley see what he could do, and sent him back to Portugal with a fresh army.

Into the details of the six great campaigns which followed we cannot enter here. Wellesley was in constant difficulties, owing to the half-heartedness of the home Government. Most of the members of the Cabinet did not really believe that he would be successful, and he always knew that if he suffered any serious loss they would insist upon his abandoning the enterprise altogether. Moreover, they stinted him of guns, ammunition, food, clothing, and even pay for his troops. Another handicap was the fact that though in irregular "guerrilla" tactics the Spaniards inflicted great losses on the enemy, their regular troops were very unreliable.

Over all these difficulties Wellington's soldierly qualities enabled him in the end to triumph. By 1813 he had driven the French out of Spain, and in the following year he was able to advance through the Pyrenees into France itself.

CHAPTER LX

THE DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON

1812-1815

§ 263. THE MOSCOW CAMPAIGN.—The Peninsular War was but the first of a number of difficulties in which Napoleon was involved by his Continental System. The peoples of Europe were forced for a time to submit to the hardships it imposed on them, but they grew more and more restive. Napoleon annexed Holland, deposing his brother Louis, whom he had placed on its throne, for failing to carry out the System efficiently; he quarrelled with the Pope for the same reason, thereby arousing the opposition of every earnest Catholic in Europe; in Germany everybody was looking for, yearning for, working for the day of deliverance from the tyrant's yoke.

But it was Russia that struck the first blow. The Czar had very soon begun to repent of the bargain he had made at Tilsit (§ 261), for it had crippled Russian commerce and had cut his revenue down by a half. He began to issue special licences for trading with Britain, despite Bonaparte's angry protests. Napoleon realised that if this sort of thing continued, other rulers would follow suit, and his precious System would collapse. He therefore decided to overawe Europe by a demonstration of irresistible power, and invaded Russia with 450,000 men. But the Czar's troops retreated before him, and thus drew him farther and farther into the country. It was not until he was within a hundred miles of Moscow that they made a stand, and even after this battle (Borodino) they were able to continue their retirement in good order. When the French entered the city, they found it deserted; and as they could not spend the winter there, and the Czar still declined even to discuss terms of peace, there was nothing for it but to return. On the way back they suffered such losses from cold, hunger, fatigue, and pursuing Cossacks, that of the proud host which had marched into Russia

a few months before, only a few thousand survivors staggered back across the frontier.

Germany was roused to a fever of excitement. The King of Prussia, and a little later the Emperor of Austria, plucked up courage to make alliance with the Czar and declare war. By superhuman efforts Napoleon raised another army to replace that which he had lost in Russia; but the troops were not of the same quality, and the disaster had shaken not only men's belief in him, but his belief in himself. In a tremendous "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig (1813) he was completely defeated, and had to withdraw across the Rhine. The allies followed him up, and France was invaded by four armies at once—Russians, Prussians, and Austrians from the east, and British (the Peninsular War having just reached its triumphant close) from the south. In the "Campaign of France" (1814) Napoleon performed some of his most marvellous feats of generalship; but the odds against him were too great. He was forced to abdicate, and was exiled to the island of Elba, while the victorious sovereigns and their ministers met in the Congress of Vienna to remake the map of Europe.

§ 264. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR OF 1812.—One of the most deplorable results of the blockade war, from the British point of view, was that it involved her in a war with the United States. We have seen again and again how Britain's insistence on the "Right of Search" led to disputes with neutral Powers (§ 251); and this time the dispute went so far as to lead to actual warfare.

In the early stages of the war with France the British navy had interfered as little as possible with American ships; but France took advantage of this laxity to have large quantities of West Indian produce shipped to France under the Stars and Stripes. When the British navy put a stop to this the American President retaliated by a "Non-importation Act," excluding British goods from America, coupled with an embargo preventing the export of raw cotton to Britain.

And this was not America's only grievance against the British navy. Most British warships were undermanned, for it was difficult to get sailors to face the hard conditions of life in them ; and they took every opportunity to desert and take service in American merchantmen, in which they got better pay and food and less risk. This gave naval officers an excuse to stop American merchantmen on the high seas, and carry off any likely looking members of their crews, without any very careful inquiry into their legal citizenship.

When the Continental System was at its height, the British Government redoubled its efforts to prevent neutrals from supplying France, and the Power to suffer most by these efforts was the United States. There was a long and bitter controversy between the two Governments. The British blockade hit America hard, but the American embargo hit Britain even harder ; and at last the British Government withdrew the Orders in Council. But it was just too late. The American President, driven on by an anti-British party in Congress, had declared war a few days before, and matters having gone so far, national pride prevented either side from withdrawing.

Fortunately the fighting was on such a small scale that it had no appreciable effect on the course of the European war. Of two little navies improvised on Lake Erie, the American was much the stronger, and was completely victorious. The Americans also had the best of a series of isolated frigate actions on the Atlantic. An American invasion of Canada failed as completely as an English attempt to capture New Orleans. The Americans made a raid on Toronto and the British retaliated at the expense of Washington, destroying its public buildings.

When Napoleon was defeated in 1814 the absurdity of carrying on this war became apparent to both sides. Blockades had long ended and sailors were being discharged instead of being pressed. Moreover, the close of the European war would have enabled Britain to concentrate her vast naval and military resources on what had hitherto been a mere " side-show " to

her, and the consequences would have been unfortunate for all concerned. The *Peace of Ghent* (1814) restored the *status quo ante bellum*—it did not even mention the Right of Search or the impressment of American sailors. The only advantage that either side drew from the war was that they agreed not to fortify the Canadian frontier or to keep warships on the lakes.

§ 265. THE HUNDRED DAYS.—While the allied rulers and statesmen were discussing the resettlement of Europe at Vienna, the startling news reached them that Napoleon had escaped from Elba, had returned to France, and had been acclaimed once more as Emperor. He announced that he intended henceforth to rule as a constitutional sovereign and to live at peace with all men; but the Allies were not so easily deceived. The four principal Powers agreed that each should put 150,000 men in the field against him until he had been finally overcome. During the next few weeks he excelled all his previous feats in the way of military organisation, and by the middle of May he had collected a well-equipped army of 200,000 men.

By this time an Anglo-Hanoverian army under Wellington and a Prussian army under Blücher had concentrated in the Netherlands. Napoleon decided to strike in between them and destroy them in turn, before his other foes were ready to attack him. After a fiercely contested battle at Ligny he drove the Prussians off, but they retired in good order in a northerly direction, and Blücher was able to keep in touch with Wellington. When Napoleon turned on Wellington, the most famous battle in British history was fought at *Waterloo* (18th June 1815). The French army dashed itself to pieces on Wellington's lines, and the Prussians coming up in the evening turned the French defeat into a rout.

The Emperor made a second abdication, and then went to Rochefort, where he surrendered to a British man-of-war. The Allies now entrusted his safe-keeping to the British Government, which exiled him to St. Helena, a rocky island in the South Atlantic. There he died, some six years later.

§ 266. THE GREAT RECOVERY.—Let us now contrast the position of Britain at the end of our Period with her position at the beginning of it (§ 234). Some of the happenings of these thirty-two years threatened big trouble for the future. For instance, the Combination Acts (1799-1800) marked the opening of a prolonged and bitter struggle between Capital and Labour. The Act of Union, again, passed at about the same time without the promised measure of Catholic Emancipation, was one of the most deplorable of the many "untoward events" in the history of the relationship between England and Ireland. Moreover, the war had intensified the fear of revolution which had brought Britain into it, and this anti-Jacobin spirit long held Parliament back from passing reforms necessary for the well-being of the people.

Yet there was much to be thankful for. In 1783 the disasters of the American war had humbled the country's pride and had brought her into dire financial straits. Foreign statesmen thought that her day was done, and that she would henceforth drop out of the front rank as a Power, in the same way as Poland, Sweden, and Holland had already done. But by 1815 her position was higher and stronger than ever. Her navy dominated the seas with irresistible power. Her army had played an honourable part in overcoming the Napoleonic Empire both in the Peninsula and in the Waterloo campaign. Wellington was the most distinguished of the generals concerned in the overthrow of Napoleon, and the British Government took a leading part in the resettlement of Europe at the Congress of Vienna. A second overseas Empire was already growing up to compensate her for the loss of the American Colonies: Australia and South Africa were brought under the Union Jack in the course of the Period, and striking developments had taken place in Canada and India. Lastly, the Industrial Revolution had begun in Britain long before any such phenomenon appeared on the Continent; and the immense cheapening of the new methods of producing were already giving her an immense advantage in the markets of the world, and a financial strength which was the envy of other States.

NOTES ON PERIOD VIII (1783-1815)

KING OF ENGLAND

GEORGE III (1760-1820)

MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN RULERS

- FRANCE : Louis XVI (1774-1792).
The First Republic (1792-1799).
Napoleon Bonaparte ("First Consul," 1799-1804;
"Emperor," 1804-1815).
Louis XVIII (1814-1824).
EMPEROR : Francis II (1792-1835).
RUSSIA : Catherine II ("the Great"), (1762-1796).
Paul (1796-1801).
Alexander I (1801-1825).

No. 173.—RESULTS OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

(A) DIRECT RESULTS.—By the Treaty of Versailles (1783) the Thirteen Colonies gained their independence.

The other principal terms of the Treaty were the exchange of captures in the West Indies by Britain and France, and the cession of Minorca to Spain.

The National Debt was doubled.

British prestige was so lowered that other Powers thought Britain was finished as a Great Power.

(B) INDIRECT RESULTS.—The population of Canada was doubled by the immigration of "United Empire Loyalists" (§ 241).

This created a problem—the relationship between British and French settlers, which Pitt solved by his Canada Act (1791), (§ 241).

Possession was taken of Australia, as a dumping-ground for convicts sentenced to "transportation."

They had hitherto been sent to the "plantations" in the American colonies.

No. 174.—PITT'S WORK BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE FRENCH WAR (1783-1793).

(A) IN FINANCE.—He saved the country from the bankruptcy which seemed imminent in 1783 (§ 239).

CHIEF FINANCIAL MEASURES.—(a) He drew up a new "Book of Rates," greatly reducing Import Duties, so that smuggling became unprofitable, and in the long run greater revenue was collected; (b) he abolished many sinecures, despite the opposition of the King; (c) he devised a more efficient system of auditing the national accounts; (d) he had Government Loans raised by the Treasury itself, instead of being farmed out to private persons who made a profit out of them; (e) he established a new Sinking Fund, to reduce the National Debt; (f) he tried to increase the volume of foreign trade by a Commercial Treaty with France.

(b) **IN LIBERAL REFORM.**—He had enlightened ideals about the Reform of Parliament, Free Trade with Ireland, and the Abolition of the Slave Trade; but would not risk his position by insisting on them in the face of the opposition of "vested interests," which controlled many votes in Parliament (§ 238).

(c) **IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.**—1786.—The Commercial Treaty with France (§ 239).

1787.—The Triple Alliance with Holland and Prussia. —

To prevent France from getting control of the Dutch Government. This Alliance did much to revive the importance of Britain in European affairs, after the humiliation of the American War.

1790.—Success over Nootka Sound.

Spain claimed what is now British Columbia, and ill-treated British settlers there. Pitt compelled Spain to withdraw. (Spain would not have given way if she could have counted on French support under the Family Compact; but France was now in the throes of the Revolution.)

1791.—Failure over Ocsakow.

Pitt was anxious to check the aggression of Russia against Turkey, especially prevent her acquiring Constantinople. He demanded that Catherine II should restore Ocsakow, on the Black Sea, to the Sultan; but she contemptuously ignored his ultimatum, and Pitt had to swallow the rebuff, as his Cabinet would not support a war about such a distant region.

(N.B.—This was the first stage of the anti-Russian, pro-Turkish, line of policy which led in the following century to the Crimean War, etc.)

No. 175.—WHY BRITAIN WENT TO WAR WITH THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Public opinion in Britain was at first favourable to the Revolution (§ 243); but this was changed by the following events:—

(a) The "November Decrees" (1792) which (i) cancelled all treaties made by the defunct monarchy; and (ii) offered support to all peoples who would start similar revolutions.

(i) Especially the treaty which closed the River Scheldt to shipping in order to prevent Antwerp from becoming a rival port to London and Amsterdam.

(ii) No Government will tolerate a neighbouring Government inciting its subjects to rebellion.

- (b) The conquest of the Netherlands by the armies of the Republic.

For centuries it has been Britain's policy to prevent any strong Power from gaining possession of the mouths of the Rhine, lest this should enable it to threaten Britain in commerce and war. (See p. 341.)

(Note the similarity between the causes of Britain entering this war and those that brought her into the Great War of 1914-18: the upholding of treaties and the independence of the Netherlands.)

- (c) The warnings of men like Burke (Nr78) and Gibbon.

Gibbon, the famous historian of the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, wrote: "Do not suffer yourselves to be deluded into a false security; remember the proud fabric of the French Monarchy. Not four years ago it stood founded, as it might seem, on the rock of time, force, and opinion. It is crumbled into dust; it is vanished from the earth. If this tremendous warning has no effect on the men of property in England, if it does not open every eye and raise every arm, you will deserve your fate."

- (d) The execution of the King.

The indignation felt at this seemed somewhat irrational on the part of a nation which had set the example of decapitating kings; but, of course, the people of England had not consented to the execution of Charles I any more than the people of France consented to that of Louis XVI.

No. 176.—EFFECTS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND.

It aroused much enthusiasm among the small minority of Britons who held advanced political views, and wanted to make Britain a democracy instead of an oligarchy by a reform of Parliament.

But the most permanent result was the spirit of *anti-Jacobinism* which dominated the minds of the ruling classes for the next forty years—a dread lest any concession to "the lower orders"—especially in the direction of giving them more influence over the Government—should lead to a similar outbreak, overthrowing law and order and the established social and political system.

This ANTI-JACOBIN spirit was seen in (a) the postponement of parliamentary reform until 1832, and a relentless persecution of all who advocated such reform; (b) the Combination Acts (1799-1800), to keep work-people in subjection to their employers.

No. 177.—PITT'S FAILINGS AS A WAR MINISTER.

(1) He had no broad grasp of the operations of war, and did not use British resources to the best advantage.

E.g.—Thousands of troops were wasted on expeditions to the West Indies, and he had none to spare to support the rebellion at Toulon against the Jacobins.

(But let us not forget that he took the bold step of sending the fleet into the Mediterranean, where the flag had not been seen for fifty years—and where it won the Battle of the Nile.)

- (2) He lacked his father's gift for finding great commanders.

E.g.—The King's incompetent son, the Duke of York, was placed in command of operations in the Netherlands.

(But let us not forget that he was much more dependent on George III than his father had been on George II; and he did discover Nelson.)

- (3) He wasted precious money in financing coalitions of sovereigns which all collapsed.

E.g.—The King of Prussia spent his subsidies in overrunning Poland. What beat Napoleon in the end was not so much a coalition of sovereigns as national risings in Spain, Germany, and Russia.

(But let us not forget that national feeling had not yet arisen in those countries.)

And, in general, let us bear in mind that he was "The Pilot that weathered the Storm." Despite mistakes in detail, he stuck doggedly to his task during years of gloom, disappointment, and disaster.

No. 178.—EDMUND BURKE (1729-1797).

THE GREATEST OF ENGLISH POLITICAL WRITERS, AND THE FOUNDER OF THE THEORY OF ENGLISH "CONSERVATISM."

Irishman; lawyer; patronised by Rockingham, who made him his private secretary and found him a seat in Parliament. Provided brains for the reformed aristocratic Whig party.

1770.—*Thoughts on the Present Discontents*, to justify party allegiances as the only safeguard against the King's "Non-Party" system (N163).

1775-82.—Parliamentary opposition to the King's American War.

• His line of argument was: Never mind about the abstract right of taxation—will it be any use, in the long run, to use compulsion?

1782.—A subordinate member of the Second Rockingham Ministry (§ 235).

Responsible for the "Economic Reform Act."

1788-95.—Led the impeachment of Warren Hastings (N180).

An example of his passionate hatred of oppression.

1789-98.—Bitterly opposed to the French Revolution, and urged from the first that Britain should join in the war against it.

1790.—*Reflections on the French Revolution*, to uphold time-honoured rights and customs against violent reforms by theoretical "constitution-makers." Argued that constitutions are organic—they cannot be destroyed and created afresh. Foretold the future course of the Revolution with remarkable accuracy. An immensely influential book, both then and since—a sort of "Old Testament" of the Conservative political outlook.

1792.—Quarrelled with his lifelong friend and political ally, Fox, when the latter continued to uphold the Revolution. *Terribly in earnest!*

No. 179.—CHARLES JAMES FOX (1748-1806).

THE MOST FAMOUS LEADER OF PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION IN HISTORY.

A dissolute but lovable spendthrift; a brilliant orator and debater. Joined the Whig Opposition over the American war, and rejoiced at American victories. *His generous and passionate love of liberty covers a multitude of sins.*

George III hated him with a particularly bitter hatred, not only as a Whig who wanted to restrict the power of the Crown, but as a friend of the Prince of Wales. The King ascribed the dissolute morals and undutiful conduct of his son to Fox's influence.

1782.—Secretary of State in the Second Rockingham Ministry (§ 235). Resigned when on Rockingham's death the King appointed Shelburne Prime Minister.

1783.—Turned out Shelburne by the "Infamous Coalition" with his old enemy North (§ 236).

By this action he "sold his birthright for a hasty spoonful of porridge," for he forfeited public confidence, and was not in office again until a few months before his death, twenty-three years later.

1788-95.—Took leading part in impeachment of Warren Hastings (Nr80).

1789.—Gloried in the Revolution, and quarrelled with Burke over it.

Speaking of the fall of the Bastille, he said, "How much the greatest event it is that ever happened in the world! And how much the best!"

1794.—When most of the leading Whigs joined Pitt to form a National Government he and his friends continued to oppose it, especially its anti-Jacobin persecution of reformers (Nr76).

When Pitt formed his Second Ministry (1804) he wanted Fox in it; but the King would not allow this.

1806.—Pitt's death forced the King to admit Fox to office—Secretary of State in the "Ministry of all the Talents." Put through the abolition of the Slave Trade. Tried to come to terms with Napoleon. Died (September 1806).

No. 180.—IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS. (1786-1793).


On his return from successfully carrying British India through the crisis of the American War, Hastings was attacked by the Whig Opposition for ill-treating the Indians.

The chief charges against him were:—

(1) That he had connived at the hanging of a Hindu banker, Nuncmar, who had opposed him. But he was not really responsible for the execution.

(2) That he had hired out the Company's troops to help the Nawab of Oudh to crush the Rohillas. But this was justified in order to preserve order in the Punjab.

INDIA at the recall of WELLESLEY, 1805



(3) That he had the Begums of Oudh tortured to extract money. But the Begums were holding the money unjustly; there is no evidence that they were actually ill-treated; and Hastings urgently needed the money for the desperate struggle on which he was engaged.

The truth of the matter seems to be that he was not over-particular what he did under pressure; but it was not for his personal gain; and if he had been more squeamish the British would have been driven out of India.

Burke and Fox conducted the impeachment, moved by passionate sympathy for oppressed people everywhere; but everybody got confused over the complicated details of the charges.

After seven years (off and on) Hastings was acquitted on all counts, but was ruined by the cost of the trial.

The impeachment, though unfair to Hastings, did good in the long run, for it acted as a warning to future empire-builders that no triumphs would condone unjust treatment of native races.

No. 181.—BRITISH INDIA: IV. WELLESLEY (1797-1805).

The French Republic made an indirect attack on Britain in India, stirring up anti-British feeling in certain princes. (Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition had been a part of this policy. Egypt being a half-way house to India.)

Pitt decided to reverse the non-intervention policy laid down in passing his India Bill (1784, § 240). Appointed his friend Wellesley as Governor-General, with authority to take whatever steps the situation required.

Richard Wellesley, Lord Mornington, afterwards Marquess Wellesley, was a far-seeing, strong-willed man—one of the four great builders of British India. *He was the first to have a vision of Britain as the paramount power in India.*

He caused the Nizam of HYDERABAD to expel French officers, and joined him in defeating Tipu, Sultan of MYSORE (*Seringapatam*, 1799), in return for a cession of territory and a Subsidiary Alliance. He obtained a similar cession and alliance from the Nawab of OUDH. He induced the Nawab of the CARNATIC to hand over his territories to the Company in return for a pension.

(N.B.—These "Subsidiary Alliances" were an essential part of his policy. They provided that (a) the princes were to support a sepoy force which would both protect them and keep them in subjection; and (b) they undertook to have no relations with other Powers save through the Company.)

British power having thus been made supreme in the south-east and in the Ganges valley, Wellesley turned his attention to the MAHRATTA STATES, which lay between. The Mahrattas had dominated central India for a century, and he saw that the Company must master them. One of their princes (the Peishwa) made a Subsidiary Treaty; two others were defeated (Battles of *Assaye* and *Argaum*, 1803, in which his brother Arthur commanded the Company forces); an expedition against the fourth (Holkar) was less successful.

Almeida captured (May 1811). *Ciudad Rodrigo* taken by assault—(January 1812), (Earl of Wellington).

- *Badajoz* taken by assault (April 1812). Great victory over Marmont at *Salamanca* (July 1812) results in capture of chief French store depôt. Siege of Burgos fails. Wellington retires to Portuguese border for winter (Marquess of Wellington).

STAGE IV.—Victorious advance into Spain (1813).

"King" Joseph compelled to abandon southern Spain, caught in a bottle-neck with all his forces and spoils at *Vitoria* (June 1813). French driven headlong out of Spain (Field-Marshal).

STAGE V.—Advance through the Pyrenees into France (1814).

Capture of *San Sebastian*. Battle of *Orthez* and capture of *Toulouse* (April 1814)* Russian, Prussian, and Austrian armies have by this time invaded France also—"Campaign of France"—first abdication of Napoleon (§ 263), (Duke of Wellington).

No. 186.—CHARACTER OF WELLINGTON AS A COMMANDER.

"He never attempted to inspire enthusiasm, for he had a profound contempt for 'sentiment.'¹ We cannot imagine him telling his men what England expected of them, like Nelson at Trafalgar; or that forty centuries looked down upon their deeds, like Napoleon at the Pyramids. He was slow to praise and quick to blame his officers.² He certainly took great care of the health of his men, and never squandered their lives uselessly; but they felt that this was due mainly to his concern for military advantage. He despised 'humbug'—he once said that the secret of success in war was merely knowing what to do and how to do it. Nothing ever disturbed his calm facing of the facts of the situation. He had a sure eye for topography,³ a business-like grasp of such drab but vital matters as transport and commissariat, and a first-rate capacity for bringing infantry into action to the best advantage.⁴ And in time his men began to feel that he was 'the long-nosed beggar as beats the French'—they had supreme confidence in his generalship, if little affection for his personality."—(*England in Modern Times*.)

¹ He once spoke of his troops as "the scum of the earth—enlisted for drink."

² As in his remarks in Army Orders after the retreat from Burgos.

³ Exemplified in his selection of defensive positions at Torres Vedras.

⁴ Exemplified at Salamanca, a victory mainly due to this factor.

No. 187.—WHY FRANCE LOST THE PENINSULAR WAR.

(1) *Geography*: difficult lines of communications across barren mountain ranges running east and west.

(2) *Opposition of a "nation in arms."* The Spanish proved very gifted in guerrilla warfare (the very word is Spanish), and their country well adapted for it.

(3) *Britain had command of the sea*—could easily keep her army reinforced and supplied.

(4) *Wellington*. His patience, tenacity, and care of commissariat made him an ideal commander in the prevailing circumstances.

(5) *Napoleon never came himself* (after 1808). He tried to run the war from a distance; and his marshals were too jealous of each other to co-operate cordially.

NO. 188.—BRITAIN'S SHARE IN THE OVERTHROW OF NAPOLEON.

(1) *The Economic Blockade*.—Britain blockaded the French coasts long before Bonaparte started his Continental System.

He made this an excuse for his Berlin Decrees.

(2) *Destruction of his Navy* (1805).—This compelled him to adopt the Continental System, which led to his downfall by bringing him into conflict with the peoples of Spain, Russia, and Germany.

The Peninsular War, the Moscow Campaign (1812), and the German "War of Liberation" (1813).

(3) *Walcheren Expedition* (1809).—The largest naval and military expedition that had ever left British shores was landed on the island of Walcheren to attack Napoleon's new docks at Antwerp, and to support Austria's effort to shake off his yoke.

A dismal failure—terrible losses from disease—troops brought home without having accomplished anything.

(4) *Peninsular Campaign* (1809-14).—Locked up 200,000 French troops for six years. But for this drain on his resources he might have pulled through the crisis of 1812-13.

Napoleon called this war a "running sore," which sapped his strength.

(5) *Waterloo Campaign* (1815).—About half Wellington's troops were British. Their steady fire-discipline enabled the line to defeat the column-tactics by which Napoleon's victories had been won.

And, of course, another very important British contribution to this campaign was Wellington himself. His inspired great confidence in the Allies.

PERIOD IX

BRITAIN BECOMES A GREAT INDUSTRIAL POWER (1815-1867)

During this Period the landed classes, who had hitherto controlled Parliament, were compelled to share their power with the classes that had prospered by the Industrial Revolution. The first great era of reform culminated in the repeal of the Corn Laws, which marked the definite triumph of the industrial over the landed interest. Then began an epoch of great material prosperity, in the course of which Britain gained a long lead in the world's industry, commerce, and shipping, and the foundations of the "British Commonwealth of Nations" were laid. The Period closes with the passing of a Second Reform Bill, which made an important step towards democracy by giving votes to the artisan-class in the towns.

CHAPTER LXI

HARD TIMES

1815-1822

§ 267. PEACE WITHOUT PLENTY.—The great war with France had lasted, with two short intermissions, from 1793 till 1815. During that long period the nation had suffered great hardships from the interference with foreign trade, the high cost of living, low wages, and unemployment. They had looked forward to the end of the war to bring back better times; but they were disappointed. We, in our day, have learned by experience that the evils that wars do live after them. They leave a heavy

legacy of debt, for the huge cost of waging them has to be paid sooner or later, and the dislocation of international trade takes years to repair.

Thus after the Peace of 1815 the nation suffered great distress. The war had greatly stimulated the Industrial Revolution (§§ 252-3), owing to Government demands for foodstuffs, clothing, and munitions of war; but the Government now ceased to require these commodities—in fact, it began to sell its surplus stock. Foreign trade declined instead of reviving; for continental countries were too impoverished by the war to be able to import British goods. Moreover, British exporters lost that monopoly of world-markets which command of the sea had given them in war-time. Lastly, the discharge of thousands of sailors and soldiers flooded the labour market, keeping wages at a low level, and causing widespread unemployment (N189).

§ 268. PARLIAMENT MAKES BAD WORSE.—These troubles were unavoidable—they are part of the price man has to pay for the folly of war; but Parliament aggravated the hardships of the working-class by unwise legislation. During the war, when the importation of corn had been almost impossible, farmers had been encouraged to bring more of their land under the plough. Many of those who had borrowed capital for this purpose saw themselves faced with ruin when the return of peace compelled them to meet once more the competition of imported corn. Parliament was still largely under the influence of aristocratic landlords whose incomes depended on the rents paid by these farmers. It therefore hastened to pass the *Corn Law* (1815), which imposed an import-duty on corn, so as to keep the price up to a high level. Bread was (and is) the staple food of the poor, and its dearthness brought them to the verge of starvation.

And this was not all. When Pitt put on the Income Tax in 1798 (§ 246) he had promised that it should be only “for the duration of the war.” Like all “direct” taxes it fell mainly on the well-to-do; and as that class dominated Parliament, they were able to insist that Pitt’s promise should be at once

redeemed. The consequence was that the Government had to meet its expenditure (still enormously high, owing to the interest on war-loans) by increasing indirect taxation, especially "duties" on imported goods. This policy raised the cost of living for all classes of the community; but, of course, it was the poorest who felt them most.

§ 269. THE RADICALS.—Some people blamed the Government for the distress, and felt that it would be compelled to find a remedy if only the working-class had more influence on Parliament. So long as the bulk of the nation had no votes, Parliament would take little notice of their needs and rights. These "Radical" agitators therefore demanded a reform that would make Parliament really represent the nation as a whole, and not merely the upper classes. The most famous of them were "*Orator*," *Hunt*, who went about making inflammatory speeches to great mass-meetings, and *William Cobbett*, who attacked the Government week after week in his *Political Register*.

The governing classes were extremely alarmed by all this, being still haunted by the fear of "Jacobinism." They felt that any concession to such demands would lead to the complete overturn of the established order of things. They strove to silence the Radicals—*Hunt* was imprisoned and *Cobbett* driven into exile for a time; but this was like trying to cure a disease by suppressing the symptoms. This repression culminated in the famous *Peterloo Massacre*. "*Orator*" *Hunt* was announced to address a great meeting in favour of parliamentary reform in St. Peter's Fields, Manchester. Thousands flocked in from the districts round, but they were quite unarmed, and there were many women among them. Perturbed at the sight of such a great multitude, the magistrates sent a detachment of yeomanry to arrest *Hunt*. The horsemen found it difficult to force their way through the crowd, and there was some jostling and confusion. Thereupon the magistrates ordered a detachment of regular cavalry to charge the mob. The soldiers slashed their way through the terrified mob, killing several and wound-

ing more. The most deplorable part of the episode was that the Government hastened to thank the magistrates and congratulate them on their prompt action in quelling the "riot." And Parliament made the incident an excuse for passing *The Six Acts*, which practically deprived the nation of some of its most cherished rights (N190).

§ 270. CASTLEREAGH AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—The Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, had no claims to statesmanship beyond a useful ability to hold a Cabinet together. For the first ten years of his long Ministry—which lasted altogether from 1812 to 1827—the dominant personality in the Ministry was *Lord Castlereagh* (1769-1822). He had represented Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna which made the peace settlement in 1814-15, and he continued to act as Foreign Secretary until his death in 1822. When peace was made, the leading sovereigns of Europe had agreed to form a permanent "Holy Alliance," and to meet from time to time to discuss matters of common interest in European affairs. The great Austrian Minister, Metternich, contrived that these periodical "Congresses" should be used to arrange joint action against "revolutionary movements" in various parts of Europe. Castlereagh, like most of his colleagues in the Cabinet, was a strong Tory and a determined "Anti-Jacobin"; but he knew that Parliament would never support a Ministry that tried to use the British army and navy to put down attempts by foreign peoples to win constitutional government. He therefore announced at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) that Britain would take no part in any such action; and when, at the Congress of Troppau (1820), the Powers did decide to help the King of Naples to crush a revolt, the British representative protested and withdrew. This undermined the effectiveness of the Holy Alliance, and it began to decay.

§ 271. THE TIDE OF REACTION TURNS.—The bad times, the Corn Law, the heavy taxation, and the Six Acts combined to

make the Government extremely unpopular. By 1820 they were about the best-hated set of men that ever ruled Britain. All the credit they had won in guiding the country to victory in the war had long since evaporated. The "Battle of Waterloo" made a great impression on the minds of people who had hitherto supported the Government; men felt that if the Tories could not keep order without the sabring of women and children, it was time they gave way to ministers who could. •

Their prestige sank still lower when they tried to please George IV (who had succeeded to the throne on the death of his poor blind, mad old father in 1820) over what was known as *The Queen's Affair*. The new King liked to consider himself "the first gentleman of Europe," but he was really a selfish and sensual old fop, for whom nobody could feel any affection or respect. He had long since separated from his wife, whom he had cruelly wronged; and he now demanded that a Bill of Pains and Penalties should be passed to prevent her from taking any part in public life as Queen. The great bulk of the nation sided with her in the unseemly wrangle that ensued—so strong was the feeling on the subject that Lord Liverpool had to withdraw the measure. The painful situation was brought to an end a few weeks later by the death of the unfortunate lady.

The only actual sign of danger to the Government was the *Cato Street Conspiracy* (1820)—a wild plot to murder all the ministers when gathered at a dinner-party, to seize the Tower and the Bank and the Government Offices, and set up a republic. The conspirators' plans were known to the police, they were arrested while making their final preparations, and four of them were hanged. Nevertheless, it was evident that the nation was sick and tired of reactionary Toryism, and had lost respect even for the monarchy. It seemed that the Ministry must collapse—perhaps that the dreaded revolution was at hand. But there were in the Tory party a number of men who had some understanding of the evils of the day and of how they might be remedied; and circumstances now gave this group the ascendancy in Lord Liverpool's Cabinet.

CHAPTER LXII

THE TORY REFORMERS

1822-1827

§ 272. THE ENLIGHTENED TORIES.—When Castlereagh committed suicide in a fit of depression in 1822, Lord Liverpool had great difficulty in finding a suitable man to take over the responsible duties of Foreign Secretary. The most obvious candidate for the post was *George Canning* (1770-1827), who had made a mark as Foreign Secretary fifteen years before. But Canning had resigned over the Cabinet's persecution of the Queen (§ 271), and had thereby brought himself into extreme disfavour with George IV. It seemed as if his career as an active statesman was closed. He had just accepted the post of Governor-General of India—which meant that he would disappear altogether from public life at home—when the death of Castlereagh opened the path of ambition to him again. At first the King would not hear of appointing him, but he gave way when Lord Liverpool forced his hand by threatening to resign himself; for this might have led to the Whigs gaining office, and George IV had now become as bitter a Tory as his father.

Canning was a very different type of man from his predecessor. Castlereagh was a haughty aristocrat, who made no attempt to win popularity for himself or his measures. Canning, on the other hand, had made his way in the political world by a forceful personality and brilliant speech-making (N191). His colleagues in the Cabinet had always rather looked down on him as a man of doubtful social position—very clever, no doubt, but not to be regarded as one of themselves.

But other changes now took place in the Liverpool Ministry which made Canning more at home in it. Several of the old "die-hard" Tories like Sidmouth and Eldon resigned at about this time, and their places were taken by Tories of a new type—

men whose fortunes were due to the growth of commerce and manufactures under the Industrial Revolution rather than to the ownership of land. Such men were *Robert Peel* (1788-1850), who now became Home Secretary, *F. J. Robinson*, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, and *William Huskisson* (1770-1830), who took charge of the Board of Trade. The main concern of the "Old Gang" had been to repress discontents by such methods as The Six Acts; but the younger men had a greater understanding of the problems which underlay the discontents of the time, and more practical ability in tackling them. No social prejudices prevented their appreciation of Canning's greatness as a statesman, and he acquired much the same sort of dominant position in the counsels of the Government that had formerly been enjoyed by Castlereagh.

§ 273. CANNING AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—Canning continued his predecessor's policy of refusing to join with the other Great Powers in helping foreign Governments to repress "liberal" movements among their subjects (§ 270); and in several cases he went a long step further—he intervened on behalf of the insurgents. For instance, he sent an army to Lisbon to prevent the overthrow of the Constitution which the Portuguese "liberals" had established. Even more noteworthy was his action over the Spanish colonies in South America. These had refused to recognise the authority of "King" Joseph Bonaparte (§ 261); and they found it so advantageous to be free from the restrictions which their home Government had always imposed on their commerce that when their "legitimate" King, Ferdinand, was restored to the throne in 1814, they declared that they were going to maintain their independence. Ferdinand tried in vain to compel them to submit; and when the other Powers proposed to come to his aid in the matter, Canning recognised the independence of the new republics, which was a broad hint that the British navy would prevent the transport of French or Russian troops to suppress them (N191). In this action he was supported by the United States, whose

President laid down what has ever since been known as "The Monroe Doctrine"—to the effect that the United States would not suffer any interference by European Powers in the affairs of the American continents.

Another important example of Canning's activity on behalf of foreign "liberal" movements was his intervention in the Greek War of Independence. The Greeks had revolted against the barbarous tyranny of their Turkish rulers. Many Englishmen of the educated class had flocked to support the rebels, the most famous of these volunteers being Lord Byron. Canning did not intervene for some time, for he feared lest the weakening of Turkey should make Russia all-powerful in the Eastern Mediterranean. But when the Sultan's Egyptian troops seemed bent on wiping the Greek nation out of existence altogether, he joined with Russia and France in sending a combined fleet to put a check on such atrocities. As the allied ships lay alongside the Turkish navy in *Navarino Bay* (1827), a Turkish ship fired on a British row-boat, whereupon a general engagement ensued in which the Turkish navy was completely destroyed. The British Government apologised to the Sultan for this "untoward incident," for war had not been declared against him; but no apology could cancel the effect of the action, which made it impossible for the Sultan to overcome his Greek subjects. In the end he was compelled to recognise their independence by the Treaty of Adrianople (1829):

§ 274. PEEL HUMANISES THE CRIMINAL LAW.—For centuries past Parliament's only notion of repressing crime had been to impose the death penalty for more and more offences. The consequence was that the criminal law had become a mass of absurdities and inconsistencies. No less than two hundred offences were punishable with death—burglary by night (but not burglary by day!), personating a Chelsea pensioner, stealing from a bleaching-ground, and cutting down young fruit trees, and so on. Various attempts had been made to remove these anomalies, especially by Sir Samuel Romilly (N193), but in

vain. The severity of the law resulted in crimes often going unpunished altogether, for juries constantly acquitted prisoners in contradiction of the plainest evidence, rather than see a fellow-creature sent to the gallows for some trifling offence. Peel set about the revision of the criminal code with a grasp of the fact that it is the certainty of punishment rather than its severity that acts as a deterrent. He repealed the death penalty for over a hundred offences, substituting imprisonment or transportation.

A few years later he crowned his work in this direction by forming the police system. In place of the incompetent old night-watchmen he instituted a regular constabulary. Unlike the police of other countries, there was nothing military about these "Bobbies" (as they were nicknamed after their founder). They wore tail-coats and tall hats, and were armed only with wooden truncheons. It was only the Metropolitan Police Force that he organised, for his authority in this matter was confined to the London district; but his innovation worked such a remarkable improvement that within a few years it was copied by other local authorities, and a police system grew up all over the country, of which as a nation we may be justly proud.

§ 275. THE MORNING STAR OF FREE TRADE.—Huskisson was the first Minister to realise that Britain's future lay in commerce rather than in agriculture, and to make a systematic attempt to foster foreign trade by the principles laid down in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (§ 239). Pitt had simplified and reduced the Customs Duties, but since then the "Book of Rates" had got into a fearful tangle again. Huskisson abolished many of the duties and reduced others, taking particular care that raw materials coming into the country for manufacture should not be burdened with taxation. He also modified the Navigation Laws, which had been passed in the seventeenth century to encourage British shipping by forbidding foreign goods being brought to Britain save in British ships or in ships of the country whence the goods came (§ 162). These laws had served their

turn in their day, but they were now out of date ; for several foreign countries were retaliating by adopting similar methods against British shipping. The Navigation Laws were not finally abolished until 1849 ; but Huskisson obtained for the Board of Trade the power to make bargains with other countries by which each party suspended such restrictions against the other.

Furthermore, Huskisson was almost the only man of his generation to realise the importance of fostering the new Empire that was growing up. He did so by granting preferential duties to the colonies—that is to say, by allowing colonial goods to come in at lower rates of duty than those imposed on foreign goods, and so giving the Empire produce an advantage in selling to British buyers. This applied particularly to Canadian timber.

§ 276. THE REPEAL OF THE COMBINATION ACTS.—All the reforms we have been describing were carried through by Ministers ; but another of not less importance was put through by a little group of independent Radicals. The Combination Acts, by which Pitt made it illegal for workmen to combine to gain higher wages, had not destroyed the Trade Unions (§ 255)—it had merely compelled them to become secret, and therefore more dangerous than ever. A Radical master-tailor named *Francis Place* set himself to get the Act repealed—not because he believed in Trade Unions, but because he was convinced that if men were free to join Unions they would no longer want to do so.

He inspired Joseph Hume, one of the very few Radical Members of Parliament, to bring in a Bill repealing the Combination Acts. This Bill was smuggled through Parliament without the members really understanding its importance (1824). But Place's expectation that this would weaken Trade Unionism was speedily falsified. On the contrary, the Unions took such advantage of the new law that strikes occurred all over the country. Deputations of shipbuilders and cotton-masters convinced the

Ministers that they had made a mistake in letting the Bill go through. But Place was a bad man to beat. When the Government set up a Committee to inquire what had best be done, he contrived that respectable working-men should be brought up to town to waylay members and respectfully ask for fairplay; and Hume cross-examined the witnesses who came before the Committee with such skill that in the end the Act of the previous year was merely modified. Henceforward it was definitely declared to be lawful for men to consult together about wages, and to take concerted action in withholding their labour; but they were strictly forbidden to "molest" or "obstruct" either employers or fellow-workmen who refused to come out on strike.

CHAPTER LXIII

THE END OF TORY RULE

1827-1830

§ 277. TWO BURNING QUESTIONS.—Parliament was almost unanimous in passing most of the reforms mentioned in the last chapter; but there were two matters upon which Tories were sharply divided. Should Catholics be given equal rights as citizens with Protestants—should they be eligible as Members of Parliament, for instance? And should the House of Commons be reorganised so as to make it more representative of the nation? The Whigs supported both reforms; but among the Tories some, like Wellington and Peel, were opposed to both, while others, like Canning and Huskisson, were in favour of Emancipation but not Parliamentary Reform. As long as Lord Liverpool was Prime Minister he contrived to keep these disagreements in the background. But early in 1827 his health failed and he had to resign. Canning had dominated the Cabinet for so long that the King had no choice but to make him Prime Minister. The cracks in the party which Liverpool had

"papered over" so skilfully now burst open into a definite split. The Wellingtonian wing had been willing to act as colleagues of Canning in the Liverpool Ministry, but they would not serve under him. Their resignations made it very difficult for him to form an efficient Ministry, and may have hastened his death a few months later (1827).

His old friend Lord Goderich (formerly Robinson) tried to carry on the Government, but nobody had much faith in the Canningites now that Canning himself was gone, and they were soon forced to resign. George IV then placed Wellington in office, with Peel as leader of the House of Commons. He was delighted at the turn things had taken, for he felt that the country would now be safe from the "danger" of Catholic Emancipation.

§ 278. RELIGIOUS EQUALITY.—But Fate had a strange trick in store for him: his high Tory friends found themselves compelled not merely to consent to Emancipation, but to force it on a reluctant Parliament and nation, although in so doing they shattered the Tory party, which had been in office for sixty years!

The first matter in which they had to give way to the reforming spirit was the *Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts* (1828). These Acts had been passed in the reign of Charles II to enhance the privileged position of the Church of England by making Dissenters ineligible for public offices in the Government or municipalities (N118). It was long since anyone had been prosecuted for breaking the law in the matter; but with the growth of more tolerant views about religion, broad-minded men had long felt that it was unjust to place millions of worthy fellow-citizens in a humiliating position of inferiority. The Whigs (who had always counted Dissenters among their most loyal supporters in elections) now brought forward a motion that the Acts should be repealed. The Government found public opinion so strong on the subject that they had to give way before it.

In resisting Catholic Emancipation, on the other hand, they had four-fifths of English and Scottish people at their backs;

for "anti-Papist" prejudice was still very strong. Of course, the part of the British Isles most affected by the question was Ireland, where Catholics formed the great bulk of the population. The Irish felt that the English Government had never given them fair play in this or any other matter, and they particularly resented the shameful betrayal of promises made as the price of their consent to the Act of Union in 1800 (§ 250). A great movement had recently been organised under the leadership of *Daniel O'Connell*—probably the most famous political agitator in all history. He had the support of the Catholic clergy, whose influence over the Irish peasants was all-powerful, and the expenses of the movement were met by a "Catholic Rent" of a penny a week from nearly every household in the land. His method was to hold great mass-meetings, which he inflamed to wrathful indignation against the wrongs of Ireland; but he always urged his followers to refrain from violence, lest the English Government should make this an excuse to put down the movement by military force.

Wellington sent over a personal friend of his, Lord Anglesey, as Lord-Lieutenant, with the special object of keeping the agitation in check; but Anglesey reported that what he had seen convinced him that if Emancipation were not speedily granted, a terrible rising would occur—perhaps a civil war. This opened the Duke's eyes to the gravity of the situation—he had seen enough of war to make him determined not to let its horrors loose in the King's dominions if he could help it. Then O'Connell clinched matters by getting himself elected Member of Parliament for County Clare. Of course, he was not strictly eligible, being a Catholic; but the fact that the electors gave him a triumphant majority over his opponent, who was one of the few popular Protestant landlords, was a convincing demonstration of the determined spirit of the Irish people. So Wellington and Peel felt that it would be the lesser of two evils to give way. By the *Catholic Relief Act* (1829) all public offices were open to Catholics save that of Sovereign, Regent, Lord Lieutenant and Lord Chancellor.

— § 279. "OUR MATCHLESS CONSTITUTION."—It was a great shock to the rank-and-file of the Tories that their leaders should have given way over the Catholic claims. The one force that held them together was the feeling that the Whigs must be kept out of office at all costs lest they should "destroy the Constitution" by putting through a reform of Parliament.

What, then, was the system which Wellington and his friends so staunchly upheld? Ever since the fifteenth century each county had elected two members; but there was no system about the representation of towns. The Industrial Revolution had caused a great shifting of population; many places still sent members to Parliament on the strength of a bygone importance, when they had shrunk to a dozen voters or less; while great industrial towns had grown up, such as Birmingham, which had no representation at all. The right to vote ("the franchise") was distributed in an equally haphazard way. In many boroughs it was confined to members of the corporation; in others it was enjoyed by all who paid rates; in others to the holders of particular dwellings; and so on. And there were scores of "rotten boroughs"—constituencies in which there were so few voters that the chief landlord of the place could procure the election of anybody he liked by means of intimidation and bribery. Thus the landlord-class really dominated Parliament. A great nobleman like the Earl of Lonsdale returned ten members of the House of Commons, while all Yorkshire returned only two, and Manchester none at all!

Men of "liberal" views had often discussed the reform of these injustices and absurdities, and Pitt had brought in a Bill to end some of the worst of them; but the borough-owners fought tooth and nail to preserve the system to which they owed so much of their wealth and importance, and they had hitherto been successful. During the 'twenties, however, the demand for reform had been growing louder and more insistent. The Whigs, who had long been rather half-hearted about it, now took it up with renewed enthusiasm as a popular move against the Tory Government. Radicals like Cobbett, too, were

stirring up the working-classes to insist on parliamentary representation as a cure for all their sufferings (§ 269). Moreover, manufacturers, merchants, professional men, and all who were thriving on the Industrial Revolution, felt more and more how unjust it was that the landowners should monopolise political power.

In 1830 the tidal wave which had long been gathering weight came to a head. The death of George IV in that year removed from the scene an implacable opponent of reform, and his brother, who succeeded him as *William IV*, was inclined to pose as a "reformer." Moreover, when the Duke made a statement of his policy to the first Parliament of the reign, he expressed himself so strongly against the smallest alteration in "our matchless Constitution" that some of the younger members of his Ministry resigned and went over to the Opposition. Such men as Lord Palmerston and Lord Melbourne were not very enthusiastic about "reform" for its own sake, but they felt that it was folly to try to withstand public opinion on the subject.

The Wellington Government, already weakened by its surrender over Catholic Emancipation, could not stand this second shock. The Duke resigned, and old King William sent for Lord Grey, the leader of the Whigs, to form a Government.

The sixty years of Tory rule had come to an end at last!

§ 280. THE GREAT REFORM BILL.—Of course, the first use the Whigs made of their power was to bring in a Reform Bill (April 1831). After a long and animated debate, the House of Commons rejected it by a majority of eight. Thereupon Lord Grey dissolved Parliament, and there followed the most exciting General Election in all our history.¹ Naturally, the borough-owners made the most desperate efforts to defeat the Whigs, but they were overwhelmed by the passionate determination of the nation in favour of "The Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill!" Every constituency in which the voting was at

¹ This is graphically depicted in Stanley Weyman's *Chippinge*.

all free returned members pledged to support it; and when the Bill was brought before the new House of Commons it was passed by a substantial majority. Then it was the Lords' turn to try to hold the fort for the Old Régime. When the Bill came before them they passed such drastic amendments that it became worthless. It was impossible for Grey to "appeal to the country" again so soon after the last General Election; so he asked the King to force the Bill through by creating a hundred new Whig peers to vote down the Opposition. But William refused, for the Bill was a much bolder measure than he had expected, and he hesitated about making such a sweeping change in the Constitution. So Lord Grey and the Whigs resigned, and Wellington became Prime Minister again.

But only for a few weeks. The nation showed in the most vigorous way its indignation at the shelving of the measure on which it had set its heart. Great meetings of working-men were held in the north and midlands. The City of London threatened to embarrass the Government by withdrawing the gold from the Bank of England. Riots broke out in which public buildings were destroyed. There were no regular police, and the army was too small to cope with such widespread disorders—even if the soldiers could be relied on to act in such a cause, which Wellington had reason to doubt. So he had to give up the attempt, and the King was compelled to recall Grey and agree to his request. Of course the House of Lords did not hold out any longer—that would have meant cheapening the dignity of the peerage, and would not have saved them from the Bill in any case. It became law in 1832.

The Great Reform Bill deprived fifty-six very small constituencies—the *very* rotten boroughs—of both their members; thirty others, rather larger, were allowed to retain one. The seats thus set free were distributed among the large towns which had hitherto been unrepresented. The right to vote in boroughs was given to all householders who paid £10 or more a year in rent. Thus the Bill did less than nothing for the working-class, who had been so enthusiastic about it. Many of them had

had votes in the old boroughs, but very few paid as much as £10 a year in rent. The real effect of the Bill, then, was to make the landlords share their political power with the upper middle class.

CHAPTER LXIV

THE FIRST GREAT ERA OF REFORM

1830-1841

§ 281. THE REFORMED PARLIAMENT.—As might have been expected, the first General Election after the passing of the Reform Bill confirmed the Whigs in power by a big majority; and there followed a decade of tremendous activity in Parliament. The rapid development of manufactures during the past fifty years had brought about great changes in social conditions, such as the growth of crowded industrial towns. The Tories, who had monopolised power since 1770, had been very reluctant to make any drastic alterations in the law to deal with these new conditions—partly because they believed in the doctrine of *laissez faire*, that the less the Government interferes with the lives of individuals the better, and partly because they feared lest reform should lead on to revolution, as in France. But a new spirit had now come over Parliament. Recent elections showed that the nation wanted the overdue reforms to be passed without delay, and the Government set about its task with a will. Royal Commissions were set up to inquire into existing evils and to recommend remedies for them; and more Acts of Parliament were passed in the ensuing decade than during the previous half-century.

The career of the Government was checked for a few months at the end of 1834, however. Old King William had been alarmed by the rushing tide of legislation, so he took advantage of a chance defeat of the Ministry to call for its resignation, and commissioned Peel to form a Cabinet. Peel issued the *Tam-*

worth *Manifesto*, in which he set forth the programme of the "Conservative" party which he had been forming out of the ruins of the old Toryism. He announced that they accepted the new parliamentary system, and were prepared to go forward with any sensible reforms that might be necessary, but that they would not proceed with such reckless haste as the Whigs. When he dissolved Parliament, however, the voters returned the Whigs with almost the same majority as before. So Peel had to resign after his "Hundred Days" of power; and the Whigs returned to office under the premiership of Lord Melbourne.

§ 282. THE FACTORY ACT.—One of the most obvious cases of fresh laws being needed to deal with changed conditions was the employment of children in factories. It may or may not have been wise to leave workmen to make their own bargains with employers, according to the "law of supply and demand"—but not when the "workmen" were six or seven years old. Much of the work of machine-minding could be done by children; and times were so bad that parents were forced to send them to work for the sake of the shilling or two a week that their wages added to the family budget. As soon as they could walk they were sent to a mill or a mine, to work for ten, twelve, or fourteen hours a day in a stifling atmosphere, with no schooling and no play and no pleasure in their lives at all. Whenever proposals were made for diminishing the evils, the millowners declared that they would be ruined if they could not keep their mills working for long hours.

But the cause of the children was now taken up by Lord Ashley, afterwards *Earl of Shaftesbury* (1801-1885). He was an aristocratic Tory landowner; and like that other great Tory philanthropist, Wilberforce, a pious evangelical Churchman. He induced the Government to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the conditions in the factories; and the report which this Commission produced shocked Parliament into doing something to improve matters. The Factory Act of 1833 forbade the employment of children under nine altogether; the

daily hours of those under thirteen were limited to 8; while "young persons" under eighteen were not to work more than 13½. A particularly important and novel feature about the Act was that it provided for inspectors to be appointed by the Home Office to see that these restrictions were duly carried out. This was the beginning of "bureaucracy"—the administration of the law by paid officials instead of by local magistrates. The Act once passed, the masters found that it did not ruin them after all, for it imposed the same restrictions on all alike.

§ 283. THE NEW POOR LAW.—Another of the most urgent problems of the day was the relief of the poor. By the Poor Law which had been in force ever since the days of Elizabeth (§ 115), a rate was levied on the landholders in each district for this purpose, and the funds were administered by locally-elected "Guardians." But improvements in agriculture and machine-production, together with the rapid increase in the population, had brought wages so low that the old system had long since proved inadequate. When, towards the end of the eighteenth century, agricultural wages fell to about six shillings a week, with bread at famine prices, tens of thousands of working-class families were brought to the verge of starvation—or beyond it. The governing class were frightened lest this state of things should lead to an outbreak of "Jacobinism." A meeting of Berkshire magistrates at Speenhamland, near Newbury, decided to adopt a sliding scale of relief which would make the labourer's wages up to a subsistence level—the actual amount varying with the size of his family and the price of corn. Other districts followed this example, and the *Speenhamland System* soon spread all over the country. It relieved the situation for the moment, but it led to three deplorable consequences. (1) Employers had no longer any motive for paying a living wage—they could get their labour below cost price at the expense of the ratepayers. (2) Working-men lost all self-respect, for their wages fell so low that they could not be independent of "parish relief" however industrious and thrifty they were. They came

to regard it as part of their regular income. (3) The Poor Rate soared to such heights that in some districts it amounted to more than the rent. Thousands of farmers were ruined by it, and many of them were forced to give up the struggle—to become labourers themselves, and so draw money from the rates instead of having to pay them.

Obviously something would have to be done before the growing evil strangled the prosperity of the country altogether. A Commission on the subject was appointed under the chairmanship of Edwin Chadwick, a clear-headed, practical-minded Radical. The report of this Commission resulted in *The Poor Law Amendment Act* (1834). "Outdoor Relief" was stopped for all able-bodied persons. Any who needed assistance from the rates were sent to "workhouses," where they were separated from their families, and where conditions were deliberately made more unpleasant than the most unpleasant kind of life outside. The whole system was to be under the control of three Poor Law Commissioners, of whom Chadwick himself was one.

Thus employers were henceforth compelled to pay a living wage or be deprived of labour altogether; while labourers had to provide for their own subsistence on pain of imprisonment in the "Bastilles," as the new workhouses were indignantly called. But it took a good many years for people to adjust themselves to the new conditions, and during this time the sufferings of the working-class were made more acute than ever by the Act.

§ 284. THE DECLINE OF THE WHIG MINISTRY.—When the Whigs passed their Reform Bill in 1832 it seemed as if they were destined to a lease of power as long as the Tories had formerly enjoyed. But they were beset with all sorts of difficulties, and soon began to lose the confidence of the nation. One grave problem was finance. Year after year the Government spent more than its income. Trade was bad, which diminished the return from taxation; and if they tried to make up the deficiency by increased duties, the only result was to cripple trade still further without increasing the revenue.

Another embarrassing problem was the state of Ireland. As a result of Catholic Emancipation, O'Connell was now in Parliament, at the head of a compact little group of Irish members nicknamed "O'Connell's Tail." They engaged in a new agitation—for the repeal of the Act of Union (§ 250) which had deprived Ireland of its independent government, and for the abolition of tithes. The latter were a form of rate, levied for the support of the Protestant Church, the payment of which not only bore heavily on the impoverished Irish peasantry, but was forbidden by their religion. Refusal to pay it led to scenes of violence which seemed likely to end in something like a revolution. O'Connell and his "Tail" enforced their demands by obstructing parliamentary business in every possible way; and the worst of it was that the Ministers were not agreed as to the right policy to adopt in the matter. In 1835 O'Connell made a secret bargain with the Ministry,¹ by which he undertook to drop the agitation for repeal in return for an Act abolishing tithes. But the rank and file of the Whig party were entirely opposed to this concession, and voted against the measure when it came before Parliament. So O'Connell started his twofold agitation again with redoubled bitterness, and the Government had profited nothing by an action which had robbed them of the confidence of their own supporters.

Then, again, the Radicals felt that the Whigs had cheated them over the Reform Bill, and began the "Chartist" agitation for a further reform of Parliament. Furthermore, some of the Government's well-meant reforms, such as the New Poor Law, were causing great distress among the poor.

The Whigs were saved for a time by the death of William IV in 1837. For he was succeeded by his niece *Victoria*, an inexperienced girl of eighteen, who was dependent for guidance on the Prime Minister; and Lord Melbourne proved just the man for the task. A courtly, kindly, experienced man of the world, he assisted the young Queen over her difficulties with such tact and fatherly geniality that she became devoted to him, and was

¹ Sometimes called "The Lichfield House Compact."

anxious to postpone as long as possible the day when she would have to take as her principal adviser the austere and dignified Peel.

How that day came at last we shall see in our next chapter.

CHAPTER LXV

THE UNFETTERING OF TRADE

1841-1846

§ 285. PEEL'S FIRST "FREE TRADE" BUDGET.—By 1838 the Whig Government, which had set out so confidently on its reforming career eight years before, had forfeited all its popularity. This was partly due to their concessions to O'Connell, partly to their refusal to consider the demands of the Chartists, partly to the harshness of their new Poor Law, but chiefly to their incapacity to make ends meet in the national finances. The end came when in 1841 they proposed to modify the Corn Law (§ 268). There was much to be said for the proposal, but it so alarmed the land-owning element among their own supporters that the measure was defeated. Parliament was dissolved, and the ensuing election produced a substantial Conservative majority. So the Whig Ministry resigned, much relieved to be rid of a position which had been growing more difficult and irksome every year.

Peel's hour had come. He had been nursing the Tory party back to health and strength ever since its collapse over Catholic Relief and Parliamentary Reform (§ 279). Under its new title of "Conservative," its strength lay mainly in the landed aristocracy. Its creed had been set forth in Peel's "Tamworth Manifesto" (§ 281)—to maintain the Constitution with such moderate and well-considered reforms as might be found necessary from time to time. The circumstances of Peel's accession to power gave him a twofold mandate—to set the national finances in order, and to preserve the Corn Laws.

Unlike most men in public life—whether Whig or Conservative—Peel understood business ; and he adopted a daring remedy for solving the problem with which he was faced : he proposed to increase revenue by decreasing taxation. The Whigs had got the import duties into a terrible tangle after Huskisson's attempt to clear the way for Free Trade (§ 275). There were import duties on no less than five hundred different classes of goods, and these duties were regulated by eighty different Acts of Parliament. A whole army of revenue officers was required to assess and collect it. Many of the taxes were unproductive, because they raised the price of the article so high that people could not afford to buy it. Thus our foreign trade was choked up ; for foreign countries can only pay for our goods by sending their own in exchange.

Peel reckoned that decreasing the duties would do so much to revive trade, to augment the spending-power of the nation and the consumption of goods, that the other duties would provide a greatly increased revenue. Of course, some little time would be needed to allow this process to take effect ; so he reimposed the Income Tax for a few years, at the rate of 6d. in the £.

The first year of the new system gave such promising results that it was carried a little further in 1843, and again in the two following years. The cost of living went down, trade revived, and the budget was balanced year by year. All-round prosperity of this sort is a plant of slow growth, however ; and in this case its development was retarded by the fact that Peel did not venture to tamper with the most obstructive and burdensome of all these duties—those on corn.

§ 286. THE ANTI-CORN-LAW LEAGUE.—But a number of men—mostly well-to-do manufacturers and merchants—felt that the duties which kept foreign corn out of the country for the benefit of the “ landed classes ” (§ 268) were cramping trade as well as keeping up the price of the staple food of the poor. They therefore formed a great organisation to educate public

opinion on the subject, and so to bring pressure to bear upon Parliament to repeal the obnoxious laws. Meetings were held all over the country; lectures were given; leaflets and pamphlets were distributed. Two circumstances greatly favoured the agitation: (1) the institution of the *Penny Post* (1840), which enabled them to reach the breakfast-tables of the public in a way that would have been impossible a few years earlier; and (2) the new *railways*, which made it easy for their lecturers to get about the country.

The two most famous apostles of the movement were *Richard Cobden* and *John Bright*. Both were well-to-do manufacturers, who gave up business to advance a cause which they believed would bring prosperity to the country. Cobden's style of speech-making was a frank, straightforward appeal to common sense, while Bright was an impassioned orator who stirred his audiences to indignation against the system which allowed aristocratic landowners to enrich themselves at the expense of the poor.

Cobden was elected to Parliament in 1841, and contrived to keep the subject to the fore with persistent persuasiveness year after year. Peel became convinced that the Corn Laws would have to go, sooner or later; but he had come into office pledged to maintain them, and his followers regarded them as something almost sacred. He was a shy, reticent man, always rather cold and distant to his colleagues, so that they knew little or nothing of his gradual change of views on the subject. Meanwhile, he turned the matter over in his mind, quietly waiting for a suitable opportunity—such as the General Election, which would be due in a year or two—to declare his new conviction, and to ask the approval of his party and the country for putting it into action.

§ 287. THE REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS.—Then his hand was forced by an unexpected catastrophe. In 1845 the potato crop failed in Ireland. The peasantry were entirely dependent on potatoes for food, and by the autumn of that year they were literally starving. In most years it might have been possible to

relieve the situation with corn from England ; but heavy rains during the summer had ruined this crop too. As Cobden afterwards said, these untimely rains washed away the Corn Laws. Peel was deeply distressed by the accounts that reached him of the desperate plight of the Irish people, and he determined that something must be done without delay to relieve it. The most obvious method was to throw open the ports to foreign corn, and he announced to the Cabinet that he proposed to repeal the Corn Laws forthwith. Some of the old-fashioned Tory Ministers objected, even in this emergency, to such a course ; whereupon Peel resigned, and the Queen sent for Lord John Russell, who had now become the head of the Whig party. Lord John had recently declared in his famous *Edinburgh Letter* to his constituents that "total and immediate repeal" was part of the official policy of the Whig party ; but he now found that he would have as much difficulty as Peel in obtaining the unanimous support of his followers in carrying it out ; for many of the most influential Whigs were landed aristocrats, like the leading Tories. So Lord John had to give up the attempt to form a Ministry, and "handed the poisoned chalice back to Peel."

Sir Robert re-entered upon office full of confidence. He knew that many of his back-bench supporters objected to the policy, but he did not fear that their opposition would be dangerous, for most of them were country gentlemen who knew more about fox-hunting than about speech-making, and none of them seemed capable of giving the others a lead.

But here he was making a miscalculation. Among those rank-and-file Tories was a clever young Jew named *Benjamin Disraeli* (1804-81). He had been disappointed of a place in the Ministry when Peel took office in 1841, and he now led a revolt against the Prime Minister who had overlooked his claims. In a series of brilliant speeches he attacked Peel for betraying his followers in repealing the laws which he had been placed in office to defend. Thus the Tory party was split into "Peelites" and "Protectionists." Peel put through his measure with the aid of Whig votes ; but shortly afterwards the Protectionists

joined the Whig Opposition to defeat him over another proposal, and he was driven from office.

The breach in the Conservative party was never healed. Lord Derby became leader of the "Protectionists" with Disraeli as his "chief-of-staff." They were numerically stronger than the "Peelites"; but the latter included most of the abler members of the party, and they would never forgive Disraeli for his attacks on their honoured chief. The result was that the Whig-Liberals were in power with brief intervals for nearly thirty years (1846-1874). As for Peel, he was never in office again, but sat, a universally respected personality, on the Opposition benches until his death in 1850.

CHAPTER LXVI

BETTER 'TIMES'

1835-1852

§ 288. SELF-HELP FOR THE WORKING-CLASSES.—Peel's revolution in the fiscal system of Britain was the turning-point of the century, for it marked the beginning of a period of great industrial and commercial prosperity. The effects of this were felt even among the working-classes, and ended the worst of the bad times through which they had passed since Waterloo. But this result only came after the middle of the century, and we still speak of "the hungry 'forties"—though, as a matter of fact, the 'thirties were still hungrier. Let us now briefly examine some of the attempts by which the working-classes sought to improve their lot during those hard times.

First came an attempt to use Trade Unionism for the purpose. In 1834, Robert Owen (N196) founded the *Grand National Consolidated Trade Union*, to which all existing Unions were to be affiliated. A general strike was to bring a quick end to the existing capitalist system, whereafter all competition was to cease, and manufactures were to be carried on by national

companies. It was an alluring dream for the poverty-stricken workers, and they flocked to join the Unions by tens of thousands. The Government became seriously alarmed, and made frantic efforts to crush the movement.¹ But the Grand National was too unwieldy to be effective, especially before railways and the penny post quickened communications. It was impossible for the central organisation to prevent local Unions from acting independently, or from being crushed by "the document"—a pledge which employers compelled their workmen to take, abjuring Trade Unions. The movement simply faded out, and the position of the Unions was worse than before.

Then came a movement to gain for the working-classes more control over Parliament. The Radicals (§ 269) were disappointed that the Reform Act of 1832, from which they had expected so much, merely enfranchised the middle classes (§ 280). They embodied their demands under six heads, which became known as *The People's Charter* (N198). Mass meetings were held, with torchlight processions. Representatives were chosen from various districts to a National Convention, and a petition to Parliament was drawn up. But the movement was weakened by internal dissensions. One party, led by William Lovett, was opposed to anything more than a constitutional agitation; but a "Physical Force Party," under Feargus O'Connor, was for resorting to violence if the petition was ignored—as it was.

The Government took firm steps against the danger by imprisoning the leaders, and nothing came of the threats of revolution. Nevertheless *Chartism* was for years a sort of religion to thousands of well-meaning men. After some years of quiescence it revived in 1848, when O'Connor announced a great meeting on Kennington Common, to form a procession and present a "monster petition" to Parliament. But when the

¹ A well-known example of their methods was the case of the "Dorchester Labourers." The Government prosecuted some harmless labourers at Tolpuddle in Dorsetshire for administering an oath to members of their Union, although its rules expressly forbade strikes. They were sentenced to seven years transportation under a forgotten Act of Parliament forbidding such oaths. But the outcry against this savage sentence was so great they were pardoned and brought back some years later.

Government prohibited the meeting, O'Connor (whose bark was always worse than his bite) gave way and abandoned it. Furthermore, many of the signatures to the petition were obviously forged. This ludicrous failure crippled the movement; but the underlying reason why it died away was that some of the prosperity which was now beginning to come over the nation's industries began to percolate down to the working-classes.

A movement which had far more lasting effects was *Co-operation*. A group of Rochdale weavers ("The Rochdale Pioneers") clubbed together to open a little shop for the supply of foodstuffs for themselves and their neighbours. Similar schemes had been tried before, but all had broken down. The great point about the "Toad Lane Store" was that the profits were to be shared by all customers in proportion to the amount of their purchases, and thus they all had an interest in promoting its sales. The idea spread, the system was applied to all sorts of commodities, and to-day one-third of the households of Britain are co-operators. The movement has played a great part in the political development of the nation, for it has given the working-class a motive for thrift, a bracing sense of having "a stake in the country," and valuable experience of working together for a common cause.

§ 289. THE GREAT "BOOM" BEGINS.—The repeal of the Corn Laws was a notable sign of the change which had long been coming over the nation—the change from an agricultural to an industrial people—from a Government dominated by land-owners to a Government dominated by capitalists. The Reform Act of 1832 had compelled the landlord class to share their political power with "business men," and the latter had now forced through a change in fiscal policy which mainly furthered their own interests. For by reducing the cost of food it reduced the cost of labour, and it encouraged the foreign trade on which their prosperity depended.

And the freeing of trade was only one of many measures by which Parliament advanced the interests of "big business"

during this period. In 1837 was passed the first *Limited Liability Act*. Hitherto, each of the shareholders in a business might be held responsible for all its liabilities, but henceforward the amount which each shareholder might lose by the failure of a properly registered company was limited to the amount of the capital he had put into it. This encouraged people to invest their savings in productive enterprises instead of hoarding them, and so provided the capital for the rapid expansion of industry. Peel's *Bank Act* (1844) tended in the same direction. The Bank of England is the foundation of all British industry and commerce, for it acts as a bank to all the smaller banks which provide capital for industrial development. This Act placed it in a sounder position than before, by limiting its issue of "paper money" to a fixed proportion of the gold in its vaults, which increased public confidence in it.

The great railway boom of the 'thirties and 'forties was at once a consequence and a cause of industrial prosperity. The transport of goods was one of the main objects of the new railways, and the manufacture of rails and rolling-stock stimulated iron foundries and engineering works—especially when foreign countries began to establish railway systems and had to obtain the materials from Britain. British shipbuilding, too, took a new lease of life with the adoption of steam instead of sails as means of propulsion, and of iron instead of wood as material.

We may see an outward and visible reminder of the spirit of the age when we look at the Crystal Palace; for this was originally the building which housed the first *Great Exhibition* held in Hyde Park in 1851 to display with pride the wonders of the new methods of production, and to encourage international trade.

§ 290. LORD PALMERSTON.—The nation was becoming full of self-confidence—proud of its inventive genius, of its commercial enterprise, of its material wealth, and of the national character and political institutions which underlay all this "progress." This spirit was personified by *Lord Palmerston* (1784-1865),

who became the dominant personality in British public life for the twenty years following on the retirement of Peel in 1846.

He had begun his political life as a Tory, and had been Secretary at War during the long Ministry of Lord Liverpool; but when Wellington succeeded to the leadership of the party and declared that he was opposed to Parliamentary Reform (§ 279), Palmerston went over to the Whigs, and became Foreign Secretary in the Whig Government which held office from 1830 till 1841. This office gave unlimited scope to his immense vitality and delight in the details of administration. It has been said of him that he was "a Liberal abroad and a Conservative at home." He had supported Catholic Emancipation and Parliamentary Reform because he felt that these measures were imperatively demanded by public opinion—that it would be political suicide to withstand them; but he took little interest in the multifarious domestic reforms which were passed into law during the following years. In his own department, on the other hand, he carried on the general lines of policy laid down by Canning, especially the friendly interest in the struggles of oppressed peoples towards national independence and parliamentary government (§ 273). Nothing pleased him better than an opportunity to make the power of Britain felt abroad; and he scored several notable diplomatic successes at the expense of foreign Powers (N215). This sort of thing made him immensely popular with his fellow-countrymen, who gave him the affectionate nickname of "Pam." His Whig colleagues did not altogether approve of his methods; but his popularity was a valuable asset to them; and when they returned to office in 1846 (on the fall of Peel (§ 287)) he resumed control of the Foreign Office as a matter of course.

§ 291. "PAM" IN HOT WATER.—Circumstances had somewhat changed since his first spell of office, however. Firstly, Lord John Russell was much more disposed to insist on the Prime Minister's right to be consulted about foreign affairs than easy-going old Lord Melbourne had been. Secondly, Victoria

had in 1840 married Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg, a well-informed and earnest-minded young German, who became a sort of unofficial private secretary to her. The Prince Consort devoted himself to the affairs of his adopted country. He had no wish that the Queen should exceed her rights as a constitutional sovereign, but he felt that it was within those rights that she should take an active part in dealing with foreign sovereigns. When, therefore, Lord Palmerston went on his jaunty way, dealing with important despatches "off his own bat," the Queen and the Prince complained to Lord John; and Lord John (who had similar grievances of his own) remonstrated with Palmerston. But the Foreign Secretary regarded the young couple at Windsor with genial contempt, and had no great respect even for the Prime Minister. He made jocular excuses, apologised—and went on doing the same thing. He knew that his popularity made him indispensable to the Government, whereas the Queen's foreign husband was disliked and distrusted.

But at last he went a step too far. The constitutional monarchy set up in France by the revolution of 1830 (N194) was ended by another revolution in 1848. Louis Philippe, the constitutional King, fled to England, and a republican government was established. The position of President in this Second Republic was obtained by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the nephew of the great Emperor. In 1851 he followed his uncle's example by suddenly having all his political opponents arrested, and using the army to quell opposition in the streets of Paris; and he shortly afterwards had himself proclaimed Emperor of the French. This *coup d'état* came so suddenly that the British Government decided to withhold recognition of the new régime for the moment. But Palmerston ignored this decision, and instructed the ambassador at Paris to congratulate the new Napoleon on his success. When this became known the indignation of the Queen and the Premier boiled over, and the Foreign Minister was compelled to resign. Nevertheless, he still had a good many personal supporters in Parliament, and a few weeks later he had his "tit for tat with Johnny Russell," as

he himself put it. He led his followers to vote against the Government and turned it out.

§ 292. GLADSTONE COMPLETES PEEL'S WORK.—This let in the Protectionist Tories under Derby and Disraeli; but they found themselves in a very difficult position. For the question at once arose: Were they going to impose the Corn Laws again? The landed interest, who formed the backbone of their party, naturally expected them to do so, else why had they quarrelled with Peel? But the repeal of these laws was already producing such beneficial results that there would have been a fearful outcry at any attempt to reimpose them. Disraeli tried a sort of half-and-half policy in his budget which satisfied nobody, and the Conservatives were driven out of office within three months.

Then it was the Whigs' turn to find themselves in a quandary; for neither of their leading men (Russell and Palmerston) would serve under the other, yet neither could form a Ministry without the other. At last it was arranged that they should form a coalition with the Peelite Conservatives. One of the latter group, *Lord Aberdeen*, was to be Prime Minister, and another, *W. E. Gladstone* (1809-98), became Chancellor of the Exchequer; while Russell and Palmerston took charge of Foreign and Home departments respectively.

Gladstone had served an apprenticeship to Free Trade finance when acting as President of the Board of Trade under Peel; and he now had an opportunity to complete his master's work. His passion for economy and efficiency, his clear-headed mastery of facts and figures, and his tremendous powers of concentrated mental effort made him an ideal Chancellor of the Exchequer. The freeing of foreign trade, begun by Peel ten years before, was making Britain the workshop of the world, and Gladstone carried the process a long step further by abolishing the duties on over a hundred articles and reducing them on over a hundred more. To compensate for the temporary loss of revenue, he had to continue Peel's expedient of renewing the Income Tax; but

he outlined a scheme by which it was to be gradually reduced until 1860, when it would be possible to dispense with it altogether.

CHAPTER LXVII

THE CRIMEA AND THE MUTINY

1853-1858

§ 293. THE EASTERN QUESTION.—When Gladstone prophesied that it would be possible to remit the Income Tax in 1860 (§ 292), he should have “touched wood,” for in the interim Britain became involved in two wars which upset all his calculations.

Even when he was making that Budget Speech of 1853, a cloud no bigger than a man's hand was gathering in the East to burst over Europe before the year was out. The root of the trouble lay in what was called “The Eastern Question.” The Ottoman Turks, a semi-civilised Moslem people, had conquered south-eastern Europe some centuries before, and had established themselves as rulers over the Christian races of the Balkan Peninsula. The Greeks had already succeeded in casting off their misrule (§ 273), and the Bulgars, Serbs, and Rumanians were permanently on the verge of rebellion. We might have expected that the Western Powers would sympathise with the efforts of fellow-Christians to throw off the degrading tyranny of semi-barbarous “unbelievers”; but this feeling was counteracted by another. The Balkan peoples were Slav by race and Orthodox by religion, and naturally looked for support to the great Slav and Orthodox Power, Russia. The other Powers felt that the Turkish Empire played a useful part in holding in check the ambitions of the Czars, who were spreading their dominions all over northern Asia and threatened to dominate Europe. And if Serbs and Bulgars threw off the yoke of the Sultan, would they not come under the influence of Russia, the “big brother” of the smaller Slav-Orthodox peoples?

These ambitions and jealousies now led to the first big war since Waterloo. A treaty signed in the eighteenth century gave the Czar vaguely expressed rights to interfere on behalf of their co-religionists in the Turkish dominions; and in 1853 Czar Nicholas I demanded that these rights should be definitely admitted by the Sultan. Backed up by the British ambassador at Constantinople, the Sultan refused; whereupon the Czar sent an army to occupy two Turkish provinces that flanked the mouth of the Danube (June 1853). War was now declared between Russia and Turkey.


France, England, Prussia, and Austria presented "The Vienna Note" to Czar and Sultan, suggesting a settlement of the points in dispute (August 1853). The Czar accepted, but the Sultan declined them. Nevertheless, France and Britain felt bound to go to the support of the Sultan, for it was upon their advice that he had adopted the defiance of Russia which had led to the war. They therefore sent their fleets to protect Constantinople, and demanded that the Russian troops should be withdrawn from the Danubian Provinces. After some hesitation the Czar complied; but in the meantime his fleet had destroyed a Turkish squadron in the Bay of Sinope. The British public was so inflamed with fear and hatred of Russia that this perfectly legitimate act led to an outburst of war fever which forced on a declaration of war on Russia in conjunction with France, whose Emperor had grievances of his own against the Czar (March 1854), (N203).

§ 294. SOMEONE HAD BLUNDERED.—After an unsuccessful naval expedition to the Baltic, an Anglo-French army was sent to attack Sebastopol, the chief Russian naval port on the Black Sea. It was hoped that by making the Crimea the main theatre of war the allies would enjoy the same advantages that the British had enjoyed in the last war fought in a peninsula (N187)—they would be in touch with the sea, while the steppes of southern Russia would present as big an obstacle to the communications of the Czar's troops as the mountains of Spain had

presented to Napoleon. But the allied forces suffered from divided counsels, and from the fact that their war-organisation had rusted during the forty years of peace.

The Franco-British force landed some miles to the north of Sebastopol, under the command of Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud, and on the way to the port the Russians resisted its

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL



crossing of the *River Alma*. When the enemy were driven off, St. Arnaud decided that his troops needed rest before following them up. The delay gave the Russian Commander, Todleben, time to complete the fortifications; and so ably did he do it that by the time the Allies arrived they could only invest the place with inadequate forces and send home for their siege artillery. No provision had been made for a winter campaign, and the sufferings of the troops during the next few months

were terrible. Ridiculous mistakes were made by the authorities in sending things to the wrong places, and the transport system broke down so completely that stores urgently needed by the troops in the trenches were left rotting on the beach at Balaclava for lack of means to carry them twenty miles. Worse still, the hospital arrangements proved utterly inadequate—sick and wounded men died by the hundred for want of the simplest necessities. This was the first war to be fought since the invention of the electric telegraph, and the public at home were kept informed of these horrors by William Russell, the war correspondent of *The Times*.

Naturally, the Aberdeen Government was blamed, though it was no more responsible than its predecessors for the system which had broken down so deplorably. A Radical M.P. named Roebuck brought forward a motion calling for an inquiry into the conduct of the war. The Government refused to allow this while the war was still on; but its prestige was sadly shaken when Lord John Russell, one of its leading members, resigned because he thought it ought to have accepted the proposed inquiry. When the Roebuck motion was put to the vote, the House passed it, whereupon the Government resigned. Thus the coalition, which had seemed so unassailably strong had collapsed ignominiously within two years of its formation.

§ 295. PALMERSTON TO THE RESCUE.—The Protectionist Tories were so weak that Lord Derby declined even to attempt to form a Ministry; Lord John Russell had made himself unpopular by his desertion of Aberdeen; and the Queen was therefore compelled to ask Lord Palmerston to become Prime Minister—as he himself expressed it, he was "L'Inévitable." He quickly proved himself the right man for the situation. He had been a whole-hearted supporter of the anti-Russian policy which had led to the war, and his breezy, energetic self-confidence was just the spirit needed to profit by the experience so dearly bought in the first months of the war.

The notable feature of the last half of the war was the reform of the army hospital system by *Florence Nightingale*. She was a lady of wealth and social position who had devoted her life to the study of sick-nursing; and the Aberdeen Ministry had gladly accepted her offer to go out and put matters right. When she and her band of voluntary lady-helpers reached the base hospital at Scutari, they found the most appalling conditions—no water, no sanitary arrangements, no laundry system, no drugs, no bandages—not even a scrubbing-brush or a cake of soap. She displayed marvellous organising power and vigorous determination in overcoming the slackness of army officials responsible; and she got her way in the end. By the close of the war the death-rate was only a twentieth of what it had been on her arrival. Her health was permanently broken down by the strain, but she devoted the rest of her long life to the reform of the Army Medical Service, and did much to raise the status of nursing as a career for women.


Then came the death of the Czar Nicholas (March 1855). The new Czar, Alexander II, had been in no way responsible for the events which had led to the war. When peace negotiations were opened he at once agreed to all the terms demanded by the Allies save one—an undertaking not to keep warships on the Black Sea. France was ready to give way over this point, but Palmerston insisted on it. The fact is, he was unwilling to make peace until the British had won some striking military success. But the French Emperor was bent on making peace. He had no quarrel with the new Czar; his troops had gained all the "glory" they were likely to gain in the war; the cost of it was making him unpopular. So he invited the Powers to send representatives to a great Peace Congress at Paris, where he acted as host and was the central figure in a round of festivities and discussions. Palmerston was forced to give way; but it was a particularly futile end to a particularly futile war. The Czar surrendered his claim to protect the Balkan Christians on the strength of the Sultan's promise to give his Christian subjects equal rights with Mohammedans—an undertaking which

he never made the least attempt to carry out. The Black Sea was "neutralised," but this stipulation was cancelled by the Czar in 1871 (N229). And within twenty years "the Eastern Question" was again troubling the peace of Europe.

§ 296. THE GREAT MUTINY BREAKS OUT.—The second unlooked-for event which threw out Gladstone's financial prophecies was the *Indian Mutiny* (1857-8). Trouble had long been brewing among the sepoys, chiefly because they suspected that the British were planning to undermine their religious faith. The climax came when, in 1854, the Enfield rifle was introduced; for its cartridges had to be bitten off before use, and rumours were deliberately started that these cartridges were smeared with the fat of cows and pigs and were thus not fit to be handled by either Hindus or Mohammedans. At Meerut, in April 1857, a regiment refused to carry out its musketry exercises; and when the ringleaders were imprisoned their comrades broke into revolt, released them, murdered their officers, and rushed off to Delhi, some forty-five miles distant. Joined by the regiments at Delhi, they proclaimed Bahadur Shah II, the last of the Mughals who was living in the Fort under British protection, as Emperor and, until the fall of Delhi, he was the figurehead of the rebellion.

Apart from Delhi, the chief storm-centres of the Mutiny were Cawnpore and Lucknow. At *Cawnpore* 300 soldiers and a party of civilians engaged in railway construction were besieged with their wives and children in some hastily constructed entrenchments by thousands of mutineers. The commandant, Sir Hugh Wheeler, appealed for help to the Nana Sahib, an Indian prince, who had always professed warm friendship for the British, but was nursing a grievance because the Government refused to continue to pay him a huge pension (at the expense of the Indian taxpayer) which had been awarded to his adoptive father. He came—but to take command of the mutineers. After some weeks of desperate resistance, within crumbling walls and with a failing water-supply, the survivors surrendered

THE MUTINY



on a promise of safety from Nana. But hardly had they embarked on the river when all the men were shot down, and the women and children were brought back into the town. Some days later they too were murdered, and their bodies were thrown down a great well in the courtyard. At Lucknow, the capital of Oudh, the little garrison, which included a number of sepoys, contrived to hold out until relief came.

§ 297. **THE GREAT MUTINY SUPPRESSED.**—The Governor-General, Lord Canning, had not hitherto had a particularly distinguished career ; but he rose to the occasion finely. Serious as the situation was, he never fell into a panic. He summoned troops engaged in a less critical campaign in Persia, and sent for others from the Cape. By the beginning of July he was able to despatch Sir Henry Havelock to the scene of the disturbance with 1500 men. Cawnpore was recaptured ; but the little force (though reinforced by 2500 more men under Sir James Outram) was itself shut up in Lucknow by the mutineers. In September the troops outside Delhi took the city by assault, after the Kashmir gate had been blown in by a famous act of heroism.

Meanwhile 20,000 fresh troops had been sent out from home under Sir Colin Campbell, one of the few senior officers who had come out of the Crimean War without losing his military reputation. He carried out his task most efficiently. Havelock's force was released from Lucknow, and the rebels in Central India were dispersed by Sir Hugh Rose. By August 1858 the last embers of the rebellion had been stamped out.

The repression was stained by no undue severity. The people at home who clamoured for bloodthirsty reprisals, nicknamed the Governor-General " Clemency Canning " in ridicule of his mildness ; but his policy was supported by the Queen and the Ministry ; and there is no doubt that it was justified by the result (N210).

CHAPTER LXVIII

THE NEW COLONIAL EMPIRE

1833-1867

§ 298. THE RADICAL IMPERIALISTS.—During the period with which we are now dealing a new overseas empire was growing up. It owed very little to the conscious planning of statesmen—some people have gone so far as to say that it was “acquired in a fit of absence of mind.” But Britons seem to have inherited an impulse to seek their fortunes in new lands, as well as qualities of character that make them successful in so doing.

British Governments were guided by two principles in their dealings with these settlements. Firstly, the humanitarian impulse which was so strong at this time (N193) impelled them to safeguard the native races from being wronged; we have seen this spirit at work in the abolition of slavery, and we shall see further examples of it in the early history of both South Africa and of New Zealand. Secondly, pride in our democratic Constitution made them very ready to grant the colonies the right of self-government; and they were encouraged in this policy by a disbelief in the practical value of colonies to the mother-country. What had happened to the American colonies would, they felt sure, happen again—“when the fruit was ripe it would drop off the tree.”

The first “imperialists” in the modern sense of the term were a little group of Radicals, led by *Edward Gibbon Wakefield* (1796-1862). An ambitious, able, and energetic man, he ruined his chances of a successful career in Parliament by abducting an heiress and inducing her to marry him. While in prison expiating this crime, he read every book about the colonies that he could get hold of, with a view to making a fresh start in life. He formed very definite views on the subject, and when he was released he founded a Colonisation Society to put these views into action. Britain, he pointed out, was over-populated, while

the colonies were empty. Vast supplies of raw material were required for our industrial machinery, and vast supplies of food for our industrial workers. Furthermore, these industries needed ever-expanding markets for their products. If our overseas possessions were developed they could absorb surplus population, and send home foodstuffs and raw materials in return for British manufactured goods. The hindrances to this complementary system were two. (1) So long as people could get land free in the colonies, they would take it up without any real intention of developing it, nor was the necessary labour available on the spot. (2) The poorest class, members of which would benefit most by being transplanted into a new country, were just those who could not afford the cost of emigration. If the Government *sold* the land instead of making free grants, it would acquire a fund with which to assist emigration, and everybody would be better off.

§ 299. ADVANCE AUSTRALIA !—The first colony to be developed on these lines was Australia. We have seen in an earlier chapter (§ 241) how that subcontinent came to be used as a dumping-place for convicts. Not all of those sent out were criminals in the usual sense of the word ; for the laws in those days were so severe that a person might be sentenced to transportation for quite a trivial offence—even for such actions as that of the “Dorchester Labourers” (§ 288). Most of them remained as free settlers when their sentences expired ; and when Captain MacArthur, an officer of the garrison, discovered splendid pasturage beyond the Blue Mountains at the back of Sydney, the colony of New South Wales began to thrive. He imported fine merino sheep from the Cape, and interested the wool manufacturers of Yorkshire in this new source of supply for their raw material.

But many who might have emigrated were deterred by the idea of settling among ex-convicts, and in 1835 Wakefield planned a new settlement that should be free from the “taint.” He intended that “South Australia” should be self-governing

from the start ; but the Home Government intervened, and the new colony was with difficulty saved from financial collapse by Sir George Grey, who became Governor in 1841. Nevertheless, within a few years 16,000 settlers were successfully "planted" under Wakefield's scheme.

The British Government now abolished transportation for crime, replacing it by a system of penal servitude in convict prisons. As soon as this check had been removed, Australia began to develop at an amazing pace. In 1833, for instance, the population of New South Wales was only 60,000, of whom nearly half were convicts, but in 1850 it was 265,000, of whom less than 1 per cent. were convicts. The way was now open for responsible self-government, and in 1850 Lord John Russell carried a Bill empowering the three colonies to frame their own Constitutions, including their own trade regulations. There were to be no "tea-parties" in Sydney harbour ! Meanwhile Victoria had been settled by people from New South Wales, and the discovery of gold there in 1851 caused the population to be trebled within a few years.

§ 300. EARLY DAYS IN NEW ZEALAND.—An even fairer field for Wakefield's activities was offered by New Zealand, where the climate and soil more closely resembled those of Great Britain. Here the problems of settlement were complicated by the existence of a vigorous, intelligent, and adaptable native race. Christian missionaries already at work among them were most anxious to preserve their converts from debasing contact with other white men ; and in this they were strongly supported by Lord Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, an evangelical Churchman, who felt that Britain ought to act as trustee for civilisation towards these "backward races." Despite the Government's refusal to help in any way, Wakefield contrived to organise a "New Zealand Company," and in 1839 sent out a pioneer party under his brother, Charles Wakefield. Unfortunately the settlers got into conflict both with the missionaries and with the natives over the Maori system by which land is owned not by

individuals, but by the tribe as a whole. It was no longer possible for the Government to hold aloof, and in 1840 an officer was sent to annex the islands. He called a gathering of the Maori chiefs and concluded with them the *Treaty of Waitangi* (1840), by which they recognised Queen Victoria as their sovereign, but were themselves recognised as sole owners of the soil. Nevertheless, there was constant friction for some years; the settlers were greedy for land, the missionaries opposed them, and the Maoris love quarrelling for its own sake. Fortunately Sir George Grey—fresh from his success in setting South Australia on its feet—was appointed Governor in 1845. He won the hearts of the Maoris by learning their language and studying their folklore, but he insisted on their living at peace with their white neighbours, and he settled the trouble over land-tenure by buying up large areas from the native tribes and selling it to settlers on terms they could understand. The missionaries were gradually reconciled to the new state of affairs. The Scottish Churches organised a party of settlers to the southern part of the colony, where they found conditions very similar to those of their native land; while the Church Missionary Society sent out a similar party to what is now Canterbury. Thus by 1852 New Zealand had some 30,000 white inhabitants, and was in a position to undertake its own government. A Constitution was drafted under the supervision of Grey by which each district had its own elected "Provincial Council," and also sent representatives to a General Assembly at Wellington (named after the old Duke, who had just died), to which a measure of independence was granted as complete as that of the Australian colonies.

§ 301. DUTCH AND BRITISH IN SOUTH AFRICA.—In South Africa there was also a "native problem," and here it was complicated by the presence of another European race. The conflicts which arose long retarded the progress of the colony, and have left a legacy of bitterness to this day. Cape Colony had been captured from the Dutch allies of Napoleon, and, when

peace was made in 1815, Holland finally sold it to Britain for £6,000,000. Britain wanted it mainly as a calling-place for ships on the long voyage to India, and for many years almost the only white inhabitants were the Dutch farmers, who cultivated the soil in primitive style with slave-labour. These "Boers" were much aggrieved when slavery was abolished in all British possessions (1833), the more so as the sum offered them was quite inadequate. At about the same time they were faced with another difficulty—the attacks of warlike Kaffirs from the north. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, the Governor of Cape Colony, drove the Kaffirs back, and annexed a strip of territory to be a sort of "No Man's Land" between them and Cape Colony. But when Lord Glenelg, the Home Secretary, heard of this he felt that the Kaffirs had been wronged. The annexation was cancelled and D'Urban recalled. The Boers were disgusted. They felt that the British Government had not only robbed them of the labour necessary to till their farms, but had shown itself unwilling even to defend them against their savage enemies. So some of them decided to seek new homes for themselves in the wilderness, where they would be able to make their own arrangements both as to labour and to protection. This exodus was known as *The Great Trek*. A number of families put all their movable property in their great ox-wagons and set out northwards, driving their herds before them. Some settled down beyond the Orange River, but others pushed on until they had crossed the Vaal.

But their farmsteads were so scattered that they were quite unable to organise any effective defence against the Kaffir raids; and this left Cape Colony itself exposed to similar attacks. So Sir Harry Smith, the new Governor, decided to annex the new Boer territories (1847). For a few years South Africa enjoyed peace and quiet; but then there was another change of policy in the British Government. As we have seen, our statesmen were very ready to rid themselves of the responsibility for governing overseas possessions, which they felt were more trouble than they were worth. In 1852, therefore, they recog-

granted the complete independence of the Transvaal Republic by the *Sand River Convention*; and two years later the *Bloemfontein Convention* did the same for the Orange Free State.

But this was far from being the end of the story, as we shall see.

§ 302. CANADA—LORD DURHAM'S REPORT.—One reason why the British Government had been so ready to grant rights of self-government to Australia and New Zealand was that recent events in Canada had given it a new conception of the relationship between the colonies and the mother-country. Trouble had arisen there through much the same causes as those which had led to the War of Independence. Under Pitt's Canada Act (§ 241) each of the provinces had a Governor and a Council nominated by the Home Government, and a Legislative Assembly elected by the colonists. Councils and Assemblies had got at loggerheads owing to the Canadians' resentment at the power thus given to members of the British ruling class, who had no personal interest in the country. And this feeling was accentuated by the fact that the Government made huge grants of the best land to these "outsiders," and to the Church—a Church to which few of the colonists belonged, inasmuch as the people of Quebec were almost all French Catholics, while the Ontarians were mostly Scottish Presbyterians. In 1837 these discontents broke out into half-hearted rebellions in both provinces. The risings were easily put down by the officials on the spot; but the Government were too wise to let matters stop there. They sent out a Special Commissioner to clear up the effects of the trouble, to inquire into their underlying causes, and to suggest permanent remedies. Furthermore, they took the bold step of appointing as Commissioner *Lord Durham* (1792-1840), one of the most prominent members of the Radical Imperialist group.

Durham was a man of that high-minded, energetic, determined type which has done so much to build up the Empire. He began by issuing a series of Ordinances, banishing the

leading rebels on pain of death without trial, and pardoning the others. He then set about inquiring into the political situation and the state of public opinion, and drew up a Report to the Government. But before he had completed his task the Ministry intervened. Shocked at his high-handed proceedings, they disowned his actions and cancelled his Ordinances. He resigned his post and came home ; and his death in the following year was said to be hastened by his mortification at this treatment.

It was said after his death that he had " made an empire but marred a career." The suggestions contained in his famous Report (1839) were the starting-point of a line of policy which has led to the establishment of the British Commonwealth of Nations as it exists to-day. He recommended that the provinces should be joined under a Government which would be dependent on the support of an elected Parliament ; and he declared that the only way to keep the colonies permanently loyal is to let them govern themselves with a minimum of interference from the Home Government (N211).

Unfortunately the union of the provinces revived the jealousy felt by the French *habitants* for the British immigrants who now began to swarm into Ontario, since the numerical superiority of the latter gave them complete control over the Government. Moreover, for some years it seemed as if the geographical and economic situation would sooner or later make the provinces join the United States. That this tendency was overcome was largely due to the statesmanship of Sir John Macdonald. He saw that the only way to make the provinces strong enough to resist the attraction of their great neighbour was to join them in a federal union, and make this union an independent nation in free partnership with the mother-country. This ideal was embodied in the *British North America Act* of 1867. The Dominion Government which it set up has control over all Canadian affairs except purely local matters, which are administered by Provincial Councils. The British Government is represented merely by a Governor-General, who plays much the part that is played in the British Constitution by the King.

CHAPTER LXIX

THE SECOND REFORM ACT

1858-1867

§ 303. ANOTHER DERBY-DISRAELI INTERLUDE.—Lord Palmerston, having brought the country successfully through the Crimean War, kept the Premiership for the rest of his life, except for one short period in 1858-9. His temporary fall from favour was due to a curious lapse from his general line of policy. Early in 1858 an attempt was made on the life of the Emperor Napoleon III in Paris, and it was found that the plot had been hatched and the bomb manufactured in London. The Emperor's personal supporters, especially among the army officers, expressed great indignation that the British Government seemed unable to take effective steps to prevent such nefarious activities. One might have expected that "Pam"—usually so ready to put foreigners "in their place"—would have told them that Britain could manage her affairs without their advice; but he had always been a great admirer of the Bonaparte adventurer (§ 291), and he now tried to gratify him by bringing forward a *Conspiracy to Murder Bill*, stiffening up the law against such offences. But Parliament was indignant at this "truckling to the foreigner," and threw the Bill out, whereupon Palmerston was forced to resign.

Lord Derby and his henchman Disraeli were once more placed in office through a disagreement among their opponents (§ 292); but their tenure lasted little longer than on the first occasion. They passed a Bill making Jews eligible for Parliament, and they reorganised the government of India after the Mutiny; but when they dissolved Parliament the General Election went against them, and they had to resign after less than a year of office.

Lord Palmerston now formed his second Ministry, with Lord John Russell as Foreign Secretary and Gladstone as Chan-

cellor of the Exchequer. Thus Gladstone, who had begun his political life as a Tory, had thrown in his lot with the Whig-Liberals. He had to choose one party or the other if he intended to remain in public life, and it was impossible for him to return to the main body of the Tories so long as its most prominent personality was Disraeli. For the Peelites considered that he had "stabbed Peel in the back" over the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, and could never forgive him for it (§ 287). Moreover, Gladstone's outlook became more and more liberal as he grew older; and the House of Commons was for the next twenty years an arena for a sort of gladiatorial contest between him and Disraeli.

§ 304. THE TRIUMVIRATE.—Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone were such outstanding figures in this second Palmerston Government (1859-65) that it is sometimes called the "Triumvirate Ministry." But they were really rather an ill-assorted trio. The only matter on which there was cordial agreement between them was sympathy for the "Risorgimento"—the great patriotic movement by which the Italians, led by Garibaldi and Cavour, became a united nation under King Victor Emanuel of Sardinia. But apart from this, Lord John never quite got over his jealousy of Palmerston, while Gladstone disliked his aggressive attitude towards foreign Powers.

The Prime Minister had taken to heart his rebuff over the Conspiracy Bill, and he never risked his popularity in the same way again. Indeed, his attitude towards France went from one extreme to the other. The British public had got the idea into its head that Napoleon III meant to attack Britain sooner or later. Everything that he did or did not do was regarded as evidence of some dark design on his part. The country was seized by a "war scare." Volunteer corps were raised—the original form of our present-day "Territorial Army"; and there was a loud demand that the fortifications of our naval ports should be strengthened. Gladstone, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was most anxious to avoid the expense involved by

these warlike preparations. Rigid economy and the husbanding of the national resources had become a leading passion with him (N201). His Budget of 1860 was called "The Crown and Summit" of the Free Trade Policy which he had inherited from his master, Peel. The Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny had made it impossible for him to wipe out the Income Tax, as he had hopefully predicted in 1853 (§ 292); but trade was so prosperous that the revenue was increasing (as he said in his speech on this occasion) "by leaps and bounds," and he was therefore able to reduce taxation still further. Two of his most important steps in this direction were the abolition of the Paper Duties and a *Commercial Treaty with France* (1860). He called the Paper Duties a "tax on knowledge," because they made books and newspapers dear. The Lords rejected his measure abolishing the duties, but he circumvented them by tacking it on to his next Budget, which they could not constitutionally touch. The Commercial Treaty was negotiated in the course of some informal discussions between the French Emperor and Richard Cobden, the great apostle of Free Trade. Arrangements were made for each country to lower its duties on the staple products of the other, the general effect being that British hardware was exchanged for French wines and silks. From the point of view of Gladstone and Cobden, it killed two birds with one stone—it promoted the cause of Free Trade and it counteracted the "war scare" by bringing the two countries into closer commercial relationship.

§ 305. THE MOVEMENT FOR "REFORM."—The subject on which there was the sharpest division in the Cabinet was Parliamentary Reform. We have seen that the Act of 1832 had enfranchised the middle classes, but had left the working-man as voteless as before. The Chartists had agitated for a further reform (§ 288), but the Whigs had been as determined as the Tories in resisting it, and the movement had died down. Nobody had been more opposed to it than Lord John Russell—in fact, the Radicals had nicknamed him "Finality Jack," because he

had stated so emphatically that the measure of 1832 was as far as he was prepared to go in the matter. But as time went on he had come to see that further reform was both just and necessary. He made several vain attempts to put such measures through. Gladstone was now such a whole-hearted Liberal that he also took up the cause; and another ardent supporter of it (outside the Cabinet) was John Bright, the famous Radical orator.

There was one formidable obstacle to it, however. Lord Palmerston was, as we have seen, as "conservative" in home affairs as he was "liberal" in support of foreign movements for constitutional government (§ 290). Being head of a Liberal Government, he could not very well oppose reform openly; but he was so half-hearted about it that there was little chance of such a drastic change in the Constitution being carried as long as he was head of the Government.

But in 1865 he died, after a parliamentary life extending over sixty years, of which nearly fifty had been spent in office. Russell succeeded to the Premiership, and naturally the first thing he and Gladstone did was to bring in a Reform Bill. It was quite a moderate measure, and would only have enfranchised about half a million new voters. But the Tory Opposition fought it tooth and nail, and so did a considerable number of the Liberals themselves. Bright likened these latter to the discontented Israelites who had flocked to support King David in the Cave of Adullam;¹ and ever since then a section of a party which breaks away from the main body over some particular question has been called a "cave." When the measure came before the House, the combination of Tories under Disraeli and "Adullamites" under Robert Lowe was sufficient to outvote the Government, and Russell resigned.

§ 306. "A LEAP IN THE DARK."—Thus the Tories found themselves once more in office owing to a split among their opponents. This third "Derby-Disraeli Interregnum" carried

¹ 1 Samuel, chapter 22.

through just one notable measure—but that one was sensational indeed. Having obtained office by defeating the very moderate Reform Bill of the Liberals, it passed a far more sweeping one itself !

The explanation of this strange episode is really quite simple. Disraeli had never liked the middle-class rule which had been imposed upon the country by the Act of 1832. In his younger days he had started a movement which he called "Young England," to make the old aristocracy the leaders of the nation, ruling in the interests of the working-class and supported by them. He was therefore not opposed in principle to parliamentary reform which would swamp the power of the middle class by giving votes to the "lower orders." He had hitherto opposed it mainly because it had been advocated by the Whig-Liberals ; but he now saw an opportunity of putting it through himself, and so (as he hoped) gaining the support of the new voters for his schemes of "Tory Democracy." Until the last year or so the working-classes had shown little interest in the subject ; but it seemed as if the rejection of Russell's Bill in 1866 had stirred up an urgent demand for it. Great mass meetings, especially in the north and midlands, were stirred to enthusiasm by the oratory of Bright and Gladstone, and a tidal wave of enthusiasm was forming like that which had carried through the Bill of 1832. Disraeli did not see why his opponents should have a monopoly of reform, and determined to gain the credit of passing it for his own party.

His chief difficulty was with his colleagues. Lord Derby and his friends were not so nimble-minded as Disraeli. They had always opposed reform, and could not quite follow his sudden change in tactics. He therefore had to content himself with a very modest proposal, which would not have enfranchised more than 300,000 new voters. But the Liberals now saw a new means of getting their way. Led by Gladstone, they brought forward a series of resolutions which quite altered the character of the Bill—ending with one which gave the vote to practically all householders in boroughs and enfranchised twice as many

people as their own Bill of the year before. The House passed these amendments, and Disraeli had to choose between accepting them or dropping the Bill altogether. He was so anxious to get it through that he adopted the former alternative, despite the doubts of his colleagues. Of course, the rank and file of the Conservative party could not very well vote against a measure brought forward by their own Government, and the support of the Gladstonian Liberals made its success certain.

In effect, the Reform Act of 1867 merely gave the vote to the more "respectable" type of working-class people in the towns (N219). Nevertheless, many public men were seriously alarmed. Lord Derby, the Prime Minister, called the measure "a leap in the dark"—no one could see what would be the outcome. Thomas Carlyle spoke of it as "shooting Niagara"—taking a mad plunge into the whirlpool of democracy. Lord Cranborne (one of the leaders among the younger Conservatives, afterwards Lord Salisbury) said that for a Conservative Government to pass such a measure was "a piece of political dishonesty unexampled in our history." And Coventry Patmore described 1867 as :

"The year of the great crime
When the false English nobles and their Jew,
By God demented, slew
The trust they stood twice pledged to keep from wrong."

NOTES ON PERIOD IX (1815-1867)

SOVEREIGNS OF BRITAIN

GEORGE III (1760-1820).

(But he had been blind and insane since 1811.)

GEORGE IV (1820-1830).

WILLIAM IV (1830-1837).

VICTORIA (1837-1901).

CHIEF FOREIGN RULERS

FRANCE : LOUIS XVIII (1814-1824).

The pre-Revolution line of Bourbon is restored.

CHARLES X (1824-1830).

Overthrown by the Revolution of 1830.

LOUIS PHILIPPE (1830-1848).

Constitutional monarchy, overthrown by Revolution of 1848.

SECOND REPUBLIC (1848-1852).

With Louis Napoleon Bonaparte as President. Overthrown by the *coup d'état*.

NAPOLÉON III (Emperor).

The Second Empire (1852-1870).

No. 189.—CAUSES OF SOCIAL UNREST (1815-20).

(1) THE WASTE OF WAR.

War expends wealth unproductively. For a time it gives a false appearance of prosperity—high wages and profits. But *it all has to be paid for*, sooner or later. Hence there are always "bad times" after a war.

(2) REACTION AFTER WAR STIMULUS.

War stimulates production; but much of the capital thus sunk becomes a dead loss when peace returns. The fact that the Industrial Revolution was at its height during these years accentuated this factor.

(3) LABOUR MARKET FLOODED with discharged soldiers and sailors.

There were no pensions or war-gratuities in those days.

4) SHORT-SIGHTED ECONOMIC POLICY of Parliament.

The imposition of the Corn Law (1815) and the removal of the

Income Tax (1816) raised the cost of living (§ 268), especially for the working-class.

(N.B.—*An impoverished working-class means lack of consuming-power and therefore a lack of demand for commodities.*)

NO. 190.—THE GOVERNMENT'S METHODS OF DEALING WITH SOCIAL UNREST.

The Government was liable to panic because (i) there was no regular police system; and (ii) it was still haunted by the dread of "Jacobinism."

- (a) Spies and *agents provocateurs* employed to hunt out conspiracies. Such persons always tend to return alarmist reports.
- (b) Habeas Corpus Act was suspended. One of the Briton's great safeguards against governmental oppression.
- (c) Radical agitators were silenced—as far as possible. "Orator" Hunt imprisoned; Cobbett driven (for a time) to America.
- (d) The Six Acts (1819-20).
 - (a) Act to prevent unauthorised military training. (Still in force.)
 - (b) Act authorising magistrates to seize arms. (In force till 1822.)
 - (c) Act to prevent delay in dealing with crimes of violence.
 - (d) Act to prevent "seditious meetings." (In force for five years.)
 - (e) Act prescribing heavier penalties for "seditious libels."
 - (f) Act to compel certain publications to bear a Government stamp, which raised the price. (Aimed particularly at Cobbett's *Register*.)

(N.B.—Some of these Acts were inroads on the Briton's traditional rights to freedom of speech; but even after they were passed the nation enjoyed far greater freedom than any other in Europe.)

Also, let us remember that it was the Government's first duty to keep order in critical times, and that it did so at the cost of very little bloodshed.

NO. 191.—CASTLEREAGH (1769-1822) AND CANNING (1770-1827)—A COMPARISON.

Same age; both served political apprenticeship under Pitt.

But Castlereagh belonged to the "inner circle" of aristocratic politicians, whereas Canning had to make his way with few social advantages.

DURING THE WAR.—Canning made a mark as Foreign Secretary, especially by the seizure of the Danish fleet after the Treaty of Tilsit (1807). Castlereagh as Secretary at War was largely responsible for the country undertaking the Peninsular War (also for the disastrous Walcheren Expedition), (1809).

PERSONAL RIVALRY.—(They fought a duel over the Walcheren Expedition.) Canning was a brilliant speaker; Castlereagh a halting, ineffective one. Canning was inclined to bold, enterprising measures—rather "flashy"; Castlereagh was steadier, more cautious—rather "wooden."

LATER POLITICAL CAREERS.—*Castlereagh* dominated Lord Liverpool's Cabinet as Foreign Secretary and Leader of the Commons (1812-22).

Helped to organise the overthrow of Napoleon; represented Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna, and carried on foreign policy during the first years of the peace. Was held responsible for measures of repression with which he really had little to do (N190).

Canning dominated Lord Liverpool's Cabinet as Foreign Secretary and Leader of the Commons (1822-27). (Prime Minister from February 1827 till his death in August of that year.)

Freed Britain from "European entanglements," but favoured the liberty of Portugal and Spanish America. Was held responsible for measures of domestic reform with which he really had little to do (§ 272).

FOREIGN POLICY.—*Castlereagh* laid down the policy of refusing to assist other Powers in putting down "revolutionary" movements for constitutional government.

He really pricked a slow puncture in the Holy Alliance at its first Congress (Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818).

The fact that *Canning* went further and in several cases actually supported the rebels was mainly due to the fact that in these later cases British commercial interests were at stake.

E.g. if Portugal and the South American Republics had fallen under the sway of France and Spain, British trade with them would have suffered.

(In this matter there was not so much difference between them as is generally supposed.)

No. 192.—REFORMS OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE IV.

First Period (1820-22). *Castlereagh* still the dominant influence in the Liverpool Ministry: no reforms.

Second Period (1822-27).—(a) *Canning* the dominant influence in the Liverpool Ministry ("The Enlightened Tories"): *Canning* pursues a "liberal" Foreign Policy; (b) *Peel* humanises the Criminal Law; (c) *Huskisson* and *Robinson* reorganise the Customs tariff; (d) the Combination Acts are repealed.

Third Period (1828-30).—The "Old Tories" in office again under *Wellington*: (e) the Metropolitan Police established; (f) the Teat and Corporation Acts repealed; (g) the Catholic Relief Act passed.

Note that (d) was mainly due to a private member; (f) was forced through by public opinion; (g) was forced upon the Government by fear of civil war in Ireland.

No. 193.—HUMANITARIANISM.

From about 1790 there was a great increase in philanthropic interest in the welfare of the unfortunate. It was the outcome of two dis-

The *Alabama* was built at Birkenhead to prey on Federal shipping. Much bad feeling caused, and Britain had eventually to pay compensation for all the damage she had done (§ 310).

The Trent Incident.—Envoys to Europe from the Confederate Government in a British ship, the *Trent*, were captured by a Federal warship on the high seas.

Much indignation at this "insult to the flag." Eventually, largely through the good offices of the Prince Consort and the American ambassador, the matter was smoothed over. President Lincoln released the captured envoys.

The Cotton Famine.—The Federal Government blockaded the southern ports, thus preventing the export of cotton, on which the prosperity of Lancashire depended. The people there suffered terrible privations, only partly relieved by public subscription.

Great credit was gained by the work-people, who refrained from any disorder, and would not encourage any movement to stop the war lest this should lead to the perpetuation of slavery.

No. 214.—JOHN BRIGHT (1811–1889).

Quaker-Radical orator. Successful calico-printer. Represented "the Nonconformist Conscience." Took leading part in three famous agitations.

(1) For Repeal of the Corn Laws. (In conjunction with Cobden.)

(2) Against the anti-Russian war fever at the time of the Crimean War. (In conjunction with Cobden.)

In this agitation he sacrificed all the popularity he had gained over the anti-Corn Law agitation.

(3) In favour of Parliamentary Reform (1860–67).

He was a member of Gladstone's Ministries (1868–74 and 1880–85); but opposed Gladstone over Home Rule (§ 318).

No. 215.—HENRY TEMPLE, VISCOUNT PALMERSTON (1784–1865).

TYPICAL OF EARLY VICTORIAN NATIONAL COMPLACENCY AND "COCKSURENESS."

Lived eighty-one years—in Parliament, sixty; in office, fifty; Prime Minister, ten.

Secretary at War under Liverpool (1812–27). Left Tories over "Reform" (§ 279).

Foreign Secretary under Grey, Melbourne, Russell (1830–41).

He revelled in making foreign potentates feel the power of Britain. The following are some typical examples of his foreign policy.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELGIUM (1830–1).—When Belgium became independent of Holland he induced Louis Philippe to withdraw his son's candidature for the throne, procured the election of Leopold of Coburg

(relative of English royal family) and prevented the other Powers from interfering with Belgian independence.

THE TWO CHINESE WARS.—In 1840 he crushed the resistance of the Chinese Government, which wanted to prevent the importation of opium from India. In the end, China was compelled to cede Hong Kong and to open five other "Treaty Ports" to British shipping. In 1856 the Chinese Government seized the *Arrow* on a charge of piracy. She was owned and manned by Chinese, but had been registered as a British ship, so this was "an insult to the flag." China offered compensation, but would not apologise. Another cheap war, resulting in an indemnity of £4,000,000 being extracted from China.

THE DON PACIFICO AFFAIR (1850).—Don Pacifico, a Maltese Jew, lost some property in a riot at Athens, and made a preposterously exaggerated claim against the Greek Government. Palmerston backed this claim with a threat of war.

THE DANISH DUCHIES (1863).—He hinted to Denmark that she would have British support in resisting Prussian claim to Schleswig-Holstein, but had to leave them to their fate, for Cabinet and public were averse to war, and the Queen was pro-German.

Got into disfavour with Queen and Prime Minister (Russell) by not consulting them over policy.

Compelled to resign over his unauthorised approval of the *coup d'état* (§ 291).

Home Secretary in Aberdeen Coalition (§ 292).

Furious anti-Russian over the Eastern Question (§ 293).

Succeeded Aberdeen as Prime Minister (1855), (§ 295).

Finished off Crimean War successfully (§ 295).

Defeated over "Conspiracy to Murder Bill" (§ 303).

Prime Minister of the "Triumvirate Ministry" (1859-65), (§ 304).

NO. 216.—RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS.

There were three remarkable developments of the Church of England during this period :

(1) **THE EVANGELICAL MOVEMENT.**—Due to the influence of the mission of Wesley (§ 211). After his death his work began to have the effect he always hoped for it—the quickening of the religious life of the Church of England, of which he was a priest.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.—Insistence on a personal sense of sin and atonement ; reliance on the Bible ; simplification of worship ; puritanism ; humanitarianism.

MOST OUTSTANDING PERSONALITIES.—Wilberforce (N193) ; Shaftesbury (§ 282) ; Gt. Gt. Gt. (§ 301).

THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN "LOW CHURCH" PARTY.

(2) **THE TRACTARIAN MOVEMENT.**—In the 'thirties a series of tracts by various Oxford clergymen appeared, supporting the view that the Anglican Church was a branch of the Catholic Church, and that its clergy had mystic powers handed down through the ages by the Apostolic Succession from the time of the Apostles. "Tract No. 90."

sought to prove that there was nothing contradictory between the Thirty-nine Articles and the doctrines of the Roman Church. This aroused a great outcry, and the Tract had to be withdrawn; but many prominent men went over to the Roman Catholic Church.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.—Insistence on the sanctity of Holy Orders, and on the importance of the Sacraments of the Church.

LEADING PERSONALITIES.—John Keble (author of *The Christian Year*); Edward Pusey; J. H. Newman (writer of "Tract No. 90"); and Archdeacon Manning. All these were Anglican clergymen, but the two latter went over to the Roman Catholic Church and later became Cardinals.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN "HIGH CHURCH" PARTY.

(3) **THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.**—Emphasised the application of the Christian faith to everyday life, especially the betterment of the life of the poor—education, housing, sanitation, etc.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.—As above. ("*Muscular Christianity*.")

LEADING PERSONALITIES.—Rev. F. D. Maurice (specially connected with women's education); Rev. Charles Kingsley (author of *Alton Locke*, *Westward Ho!* etc.); Thomas Hughes (author of *Tom Brown's School-days*).

THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN "BROAD CHURCH" PARTY.

No. 217.—THE GREAT AGE OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS.

This period saw greater advance in men's knowledge of the universe, and in their control over its forces, than any similar period in the history of mankind. It was a practical age, much taken up with the creation of wealth; and a great deal of the new knowledge was at once harnessed to this purpose.

GEOLOGY.—Lyell's *Principles of Geology* (1830-3) proved the vast age of the earth, displacing the accepted theory that it was only a few thousand years old.

BIOLOGY.—Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) showed how existing forms of life developed from earlier, simpler forms.

LIGHT.—*Photography* was developed.

HEAT.—Joule demonstrated the Law of the *Conservation of Energy*, which is one of the foundations of modern mechanical engineering.

ELECTRICITY.—Faraday's studies paved the way for *Telegraphy* (1837), first used on the new railways, and the first Atlantic cable was laid in 1866.

METALLURGY.—The *Bessemer process* for making steel (1855) gave Britain a long start in the manufacture of cheap steel of good quality.

MEDICINE.—Pasteur (1855) proved the part played in disease by bacteria, which led to the development of *antiseptic surgery* by Lister. Sir James Simpson developed *anesthetics* about the middle of the century.

No. 218.—RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT.

The 'thirties and 'forties were the great period of railway development.

- 1830.—Liverpool and Manchester Railway opened.
 1838.—London and Birmingham (afterwards L.N.W.R.).
 1838.—Great Western.
 1840.—London and Southampton (afterwards L.S.W.R.).
 1841.—South Eastern.

These undertakings were the result of private enterprise, owing to the principle of *laissez faire*; hence much waste of capital, in buying out competing lines, etc. But the Government eventually had to step in and regulate them.

1840.—Regulation of Railways Act empowered Board of Trade to inspect railways and their rolling-stock, and to require returns of traffic and of accidents.

1844.—Act empowered Board of Trade to revise rates, and to limit profits, and required every railway to run at least one train a day to every station at the rate of 1d. per mile, not less than 12 miles an hour—"parliamentary trains."

No. 219.—PROGRESS OF PARLIAMENTARY REFORM (1815-1867).

Catholic Emancipation (1829).—Made Catholics eligible for Parliament.

First Great Reform Act (1832).—(a) Took away 143 seats from "pocket" and "rotten" boroughs, giving them to large towns hitherto unrepresented, and to the counties; (b) abolished the variegated qualifications for the vote, and established a uniform franchise—in the towns to householders who paid £10 or more in rent, in the counties to possessors of a 40s. freehold and to those who paid £50 or more per annum in rent.

Net result—to enfranchise the upper middle class, and to make an inroad on the monopoly of power hitherto enjoyed by the landed class. Added 500,000 voters, making a total of 1,000,000.

Jews made eligible for Parliament (1858).

Property Qualification abolished (1858).—Hitherto nobody had been eligible to be an M.P. unless he held land to a certain value.

Second Great Reform Act (1867).—Enfranchised in boroughs all householders who paid poor rates, and lodgers who paid £10 or more in rent; in counties all who paid rates on more than £10 assessment.

Net result—to enfranchise artisans, shopkeepers, small farmers. Added 1,000,000, making a total of 2,300,000.

PERIOD X
DEMOCRACY AND EMPIRE
(1867-1914)

From the passing of the Second Reform Bill (1867) to the opening of the World War (1914) we shall find three threads running through our national history: the development of democracy—of government for the people and by the people; increasing consciousness of the Empire and pride in it; and vain efforts to solve the problems which had accumulated through the centuries about the government of Ireland.

CHAPTER LXX
THE SECOND GREAT ERA OF REFORM
1868-1874

§ 307. GLADSTONE TACKLES THE IRISH PROBLEM.—Just after the passing of the Second Reform Bill (1867) the problem of Ireland was brought forcibly to the attention of the public by the "Fenian outrages." In the years following the potato famine (§ 287) thousands of Irish families had emigrated to America. The younger generation had fought in the American Civil War; and now that that war was over they worked up a conspiracy against British rule in Ireland. As usual, there were spies among them, and the Government was able to frustrate their plans for an armed insurrection; but their violent attempts to rescue prisoners at Manchester and Clerkenwell made the English nation feel that it was high time to put an end to grievances which led to such demonstrations of hostility.

Gladstone now took up the study of Irish problems with characteristic intensity, and they remained his chief preoccupation for the rest of his long life. He became convinced that the root of the trouble lay partly in religion and partly in land-holding. (1) The Church of Ireland was a Protestant Episcopal Church, like the Church of England. It enjoyed all sorts of privileges and owned vast wealth, yet it did not minister to the spiritual needs of more than a tenth of the population; for four-fifths of the Irish were Roman Catholics, and half the remaining fifth were Presbyterians. It stood as a symbol for the domination of the English ruling class which the Irish hated so much. (2) The poorer classes in Ireland could not exist without land, for there were no town industries to which they could turn as an alternative occupation. The demand being greater than the supply, landlords could extort almost what terms they chose. The peasants outbid each other by offering impossible rents; and they were liable to be turned out at short notice without a penny of compensation for any improvements they had made in the land.

Though Gladstone was a staunch member of the Church of England, he felt that the privileges of its sister Church in Ireland were unjust. He therefore brought forward resolutions in the House of Commons in favour of the disestablishment of the Irish Church—that is to say, placing it on an equality with all other religious denominations. Despite the opposition of the Conservative Government, the House of Commons passed these resolutions, whereupon Disraeli dissolved Parliament. He doubtless hoped that the working-class, whom he had enfranchised so recently (§ 306), would show their gratitude by returning him to power; but these new electors felt that the Reform Bill really owed more to Gladstone than to its author; and there was a strong feeling in the country in favour of redressing the grievances of Ireland. So the ensuing General Election gave the Liberals such a substantial majority that Disraeli resigned without waiting to be defeated in the new House.

Gladstone's immediate task was, as he said, "to pacify Ireland." He drew up a Bill for the *Disestablishment of the Irish Church* (1869), followed by another for its disendowment. The latter measure authorised the use of its surplus funds (after provision had been made for reasonable stipends for its clergy) for the relief of distress in Ireland. Then he put through a *Land Act* (1870), which enacted that no tenant could be evicted as long as he paid his agreed rent, and that he should be entitled on ceasing his tenancy to compensation for any improvements he had made in the land.

§ 308. "EDUCATING OUR MASTERS."—But Irish discontent was only one of many problems that were urgently demanding attention at this time; for as long as Palmerston was alive his "Conservatism at home" (§ 290) had hindered all attempts at reform. Gladstone gave a much freer hand to his colleagues; and so many important measures were passed during the next few years that we are reminded of the tremendous legislative activity of the 'thirties (N197). We sometimes speak of this as "The Second Great Era of Reform."

Perhaps the most critical of these questions was national education. Governmental grants in aid of the two "Voluntary Societies" (N193) had gradually increased since 1833; but there were still many districts without schools. Now that the Second Reform Bill had given the working-class the vote, it was positively dangerous that those who would in future control the country's destinies should be unable even to read and write. It was time, as one prominent public man put it, "to educate our masters."

It fell to *W. E. Forster*, the Lord President of the Council in the Gladstone Ministry, to provide a remedy. The first question he had to settle was whether the Government would give increased grants to the existing "Voluntary" schools, and merely fill in the gaps; or withdraw the grants from those schools and make an entirely fresh start. Of course, the former alternative would be the cheaper; but it was open to one

objection. Of the existing voluntary schools, far more had been organised by the Church of England than by the Nonconformist bodies, and the latter strongly objected to large sums of public money being used to propagate doctrines in which they did not believe. These Nonconformists were among the chief supporters of the Liberal party, and the Government could not afford to offend them. So bitter was the opposition that at one time it seemed as if the measure would have to be dropped altogether ; but Forster contrived at last to frame a Bill which satisfied a majority of the members. By the *Education Act* (1870) the Voluntary Societies were given another year in which to build schools of their own. After that the Government would build schools wherever none existed, placing these under the control of locally elected "Boards." All these "Public Elementary Schools" were to receive Government grants, and the Board Schools were to draw the rest of their income from local "Education Rates."

There remained the tasks of drawing up courses of instruction, providing for the training of teachers, arranging for the building of hundreds of new schools, and appointing inspectors to see that they were conducted efficiently. Into all this Forster threw himself with such zeal that within a few years the Government was able to make elementary education compulsory for all children up to the age of fourteen.

§ 309. . CARDWELL'S REFORM OF THE ARMY.—Meanwhile a whole series of drastic reforms were being carried through in the organisation of the Army. The Crimean War (§ 294) and the Indian Mutiny had disclosed the fact that our military system was badly out of date ; and the lesson had been driven home by the startling success of the Prussian army in the wars against Austria (1866) and France (1870). One notable difference between the Prussian and British armies was in length of service. In the Prussian army, soldiers were trained for two or three years and then sent back to civil life (where they increased the national wealth instead of being a drain upon it), to be called

up for periodical training to keep them fit for war service ; whereas, in the British army, men enlisted for twenty years, with the result that a large proportion were too old to stand the strain of active service, and there was no reservoir of reserves to call upon in war-time. What was wanted was an army that would be "a manufactory for making soldiers, rather than a costly receptacle for veterans."

This task was undertaken by *Edward Cardwell*, an old Peelite colleague of Gladstone's, who had now become his Secretary for War. We may sum up his measures under four headings : (1) He established a short service system. In future, men were to enlist for twelve years, the first few years to be spent "with the colours" and the remainder "in the reserve." (2) The infantry regiments, hitherto known only by numbers, were to be grouped in pairs, each pair being allotted to a particular recruiting area, of which it took the name and in which it had a *dépôt*.¹ It is a peculiarity of the British army that a considerable proportion of it is always serving overseas (especially in India); and the new system enabled one battalion to be on foreign service while the other was at the *dépôt*, bringing its numbers and efficiency up to the required standard. (3) The absurd old system by which officers bought and sold their commissions was abolished. (4) Hitherto the army had been controlled by three or four independent authorities — one for personnel, another for clothing and stores, and so on. Henceforward the Secretary for War, assisted by an Army Council of experienced officers, was to be supreme over the whole military system.

The net result of all this was that army officers began to take a more serious interest in their profession, while service in the ranks became a possible occupation for self-respecting young men, instead of being left to "the scum of the earth, enlisted for drink," as the old Duke once said.

¹ Thus, for instance, the 64th Foot and the 98th Foot were grouped together as "The North Staffordshire Regiment," with a *dépôt* at Lichfield.

§ 310. THE SWING OF THE PENDULUM.—Everything that a Ministry does or does not do is bound to offend some section of the community. (Doubtless each of its actions gratifies some section, too; but this is nothing like such a lively feeling.) Consequently, every Ministry tends to lose favour with the public almost from the moment it takes office; and after it has been in power a few years a general feeling arises in favour of "giving the other side an innings." Consequently Liberals and Conservatives have been in office, turn and turn about, with a good deal of regularity, ever since the Reform Act of 1867 made Governments dependent on popular favour.

Generally speaking, the more a Ministry does the more voters it alienates, and the Gladstone Ministry of 1868-74 had been particularly active. Disraeli said of them, "They have harassed every profession and worried every interest." The Disestablishment of the Irish Church made English Churchmen fear that their turn would come next; landlords regarded the Irish Land Act as an inroad on the rights of every property-owner to "do what he likes with his own"; army officers were convinced that Cardwell's reforms would send the Service "to the dogs"; Dissenters were scandalised because Forster's Education Act gave support to Church schools out of public money. Then the Government's Licensing Bill (1872), which limited the number of public-houses and their hours of opening, vexed all connected with the Drink Trade because it went too far, and all Temperance Reformers because it did not go far enough. Some people declared that the Ballot Act (1872), which made voting secret, would "sap the manly independence of the voter." And so on.

The Government's foreign policy also laid it open to criticism. The great European event of these years was the Franco-German War, which led to the overthrow of the French Empire under Napoleon III and the creation of a German Empire under William I. Britain had no concern with the quarrel, and took no part in the war beyond extracting a guarantee from both parties that they would keep out of Belgium.

But the Czar took this opportunity to repudiate the clause in the Treaty of Paris (§ 295) which forbade him to keep warships on the Black Sea. Britain had to acquiesce, for it would have been impossible to go to war with Russia without the support of France, and France was now *hors de combat*.

Then there was the *Alabama* affair. This was a warship built in a Birkenhead shipyard for the Southern Government during the American Civil War. She had destroyed thousands of tons of Federal shipping before being herself sunk by a Federal warship. The American Government considered that Britain had broken international law in allowing her to be built, and was financially liable for all the damage she had done. The dispute was causing much bitterness between the two nations. Gladstone induced his Cabinet and the American Government to agree to the matter being placed before an International Arbitration Court. The Court, which consisted of representatives of Switzerland, Brazil, the United States, and Great Britain, met at Geneva, and finally decided that Britain must pay an indemnity of £3,000,000. It was a considerable sum, but only a small fraction of what a war would have cost; nor would the financial loss have been the most deplorable aspect of such a war.

In each of these cases, taken separately, it is difficult to see how Gladstone could have taken any other line; but there was a feeling that they all pointed one way—to a loss of that respect in the eyes of the rest of the world, which Britain had enjoyed in the days when “good old Pam” kept the flag flying so gallantly.

Thus, the Ministry had laid itself open to attack along many lines, and the Conservative Opposition, under the astute leadership of Disraeli, made the most of its opportunities. It was not surprising, therefore, that when the next General Election was held, at the beginning of 1874, the Liberals were decisively defeated. Gladstone was vexed because many of his party had voted with the Opposition over several recent measures, and resigned his position as its leader.

CHAPTER LXXI

THE DISRAELI MINISTRY

1874-1880

§ 311. "TORY DEMOCRACY."—Disraeli had led the Conservative party in the Commons for twenty-eight years, but for twenty-five of them he had been in opposition. Even during his three short spells of office (with Lord Derby as Prime Minister) it was only dissension among the Liberals that let them in, and they were turned out again at the next election. Disraeli had made a great mark as Leader of the Opposition. He had shown steadfast courage and persistence amid all sorts of discouraging circumstances; he had become a most adroit parliamentary tactician and a brilliant debater; and he had overcome the prejudice which the "gentlemen of England," who formed the backbone of the party, felt for a Jew whose appearance and outlook were so different from their own. Above all, he had given the party a definite policy. Conservatism, he said, stood for the maintenance of our institutions, the preservation of our Empire, and the improvement of the condition of our people. The mention of the Empire was specially noteworthy, for hitherto British Governments, of whichever party, had taken little interest in colonial matters. And we shall notice that Disraeli was more disposed to play a striking part in foreign affairs than Gladstone. He carried on the Palmerstonian tradition that foreign potentates ought to be made to feel that Britain must be treated with respect.

§ 312. THE EASTERN QUESTION AGAIN.—Disraeli's pledge of "social reform" was fulfilled by half a dozen important Acts bearing on the health and protection of the working-classes (N223). These were mostly the work of the Home Secretary, Richard Cross. The Prime Minister gave them cordial support, but he had none of Gladstone's delight in the details of legisla-

tion. His chief contribution to the business of government lay in the imagination and insight with which he directed its foreign and imperial policy. Above all, he was concerned for our hold over India. To gain control over the route thither he bought up the shares in the Suez Canal which had hitherto been held by the Khedive of Egypt (1875). He arranged for the Prince of Wales to pay an official visit to India—the first time that any of the overseas possessions had been visited by a royal personage; and, realising that Indians could understand a personal overlordship far better than the authority of Parliament, he procured the passing of an Act giving the Queen the title of “Empress of India.”

It was concern for India, moreover, which led him into the most striking achievement of his Ministry—his checking of Russian ambitions in the Balkans. Like Palmerston, he felt that the Czars had designs on India, and that Britain must uphold the fading strength of Turkey in order to prevent Russia from increasing her influence in the Near East (§ 293).

The Sultan had made little pretence of carrying out his promise (in the Treaty of Paris that ended the Crimean War, § 295) of better treatment for his Christian subjects. In 1876 the Balkan peoples were goaded into a revolt which was repressed with barbarous cruelty by the Sultan's irregular troops. The tale of these horrors aroused general indignation throughout Europe, and Czar Alexander II proposed that Russia, Austria, Germany, and England should make a joint protest. But as Disraeli refused to take part in this lest it should weaken the Sultan's authority, the project fell to the ground. Thereupon the Czar determined to intervene single-handed, to which Disraeli replied by collecting an army at Malta, and sending a fleet to protect Constantinople.

Gladstone came out of his retirement to support the old cause of “the oppressed nationalities” of Europe, and to uphold the Czar in driving the Turks “bag and baggage out of the provinces they had desolated and profaned.” His pamphlet on “The Bulgarian Atrocities” and his eloquent

orations had much effect in the north and midlands, but public feeling among the ruling classes and in London was as furiously Russophobe as it had been before the Crimean War (§ 293). For some months it seemed as if the Government might be carried away by this wave of feeling into taking up arms in support of "our old ally." The Queen was foremost in urging extreme measures on her Prime Minister, who had lately become *Earl of Beaconsfield*.

§ 313. "PEACE WITH HONOUR."—But Beaconsfield (as we must now call him) had no serious intention of going as far as that. The war fever in Britain was a great asset to him in dealing with the situation, inasmuch as it intimidated the Czar. As in 1854, the Turks were encouraged to resist by their hopes of British support (N205). They were repeatedly defeated, however; and the Russian army was already in sight of the minarets of Constantinople when the Czar's anxiety at the hostility of Britain made him come to terms with his adversary without pressing home his advantage. By the Treaty of San Stephano (1878) the greater part of the Sultan's Balkan possessions were to become the independent states of Bulgaria and Serbia.

This, of course, was exactly what Beaconsfield intended to prevent, and he now intervened with decisive effect. He pointed out that the boundaries of the Turkish Empire had been fixed by the Treaty of Paris (1856), and that this settlement could only be modified with the consent of all the Powers that had been party to it. The rulers of Europe were impressed by the fact that Britain seemed to know what she wanted and to be determined to have her way. They agreed to send representatives to the *Congress of Berlin* (1878), which was presided over by Bismarck. Beaconsfield insisted upon a large part of the new state of Bulgaria being thrust back under the Sultan; he refused the suggestion that Britain should annex Egypt, and accepted Cyprus instead; he demanded that if Bosnia was to be taken from Turkey it should be placed under

the control of Austria, so that Austrian influence might be a counterpoise to that of Russia.

When Beaconsfield returned home, bringing, as he said, "peace with honour," he was greeted with rapturous enthusiasm, and was rewarded by the delighted Queen with the Order of the Garter.¹

§ 314. THE PENDULUM SWINGS AGAIN.—But pride goes before a fall: from this moment nothing seemed to go right for the Conservative Ministry. British farmers now began to feel the competition of the foreign wheatfields which had grown up to supply the British market since the repeal of the Corn Laws; and this agricultural "depression" helped to cause one of those "slumps" in commerce which occur periodically in industrial countries. People generally blame the Government of the day for these "bad times," whether it has any share of responsibility for them or not.

Moreover, several of Beaconsfield's "imperialist" schemes turned out unfortunately. His fears of Russian designs on India impelled him to send out as Viceroy his personal friend Lord Lytton, with instructions to prevent the Czar from gaining control of Afghanistan. Lytton compelled the Amir to receive a British envoy who was to control his foreign policy; but a few months later the envoy and all his staff were murdered in Kabul by a mutinous Afghan army. Sir Frederick Roberts retrieved British prestige by a campaign in the course of which he made a daring march through the wilderness from Kabul to Kandahar; but it was evident that the policy of intervention would require a permanent British garrison in Afghanistan, which would have entailed a ruinous expense on the Indian Government. So a return had to be made to the system of

¹ The arrangements made by the Berlin Congress were not so successful as appeared at the time. The "Big Bulgaria" came into existence a few years later; the possession of Egypt could have saved Britain many difficulties later on; and the encouragement of Austrian influence in the Balkans was the immediate cause of the Great War.

treating the country as a friendly buffer-state between British India and Asiatic Russia.

Nor was this the only place where history was repeating itself unpleasantly. The Boers, who had been given their independence in 1852-4 (§ 301), were quite unable to defend themselves against the Zulus, who were now becoming very active under their famous chief, Cetewayo. If the Zulus overran the Dutch republics it would be very difficult to defend the British colonies from their attacks. Disraeli had long advocated "drawing closer the bonds of Empire"; and a High Commissioner was sent out to organise a federation of the whole of South Africa. The first step was the annexation of the Dutch republics; and this was proclaimed in 1877, coupled with a promise that the Boers should be given local self-government in the near future. But the British forces sent out to deal with the Zulus met with disaster at Isandlwana (1879); and although Cetewayo was soon afterwards defeated and captured at Ulundi, the prestige of the British army had suffered a good deal in the eyes of the Boers.

By this time Gladstone had changed his mind about retiring from politics. A General Election was now in sight, and he threw down a challenge to the Government by becoming candidate for Midlothian, which had been a safe Conservative seat ever since 1832. In the autumn of 1879 he went there and carried on the most famous "campaign" in the history of British politics, denouncing the Government's policy towards the Turks, the Afghans, and the Boers in words of passionate indignation. His speeches, reported in the newspapers, made a profound impression on public opinion, and at the General Election of 1880 the Liberals were returned to power with a majority of 140.

CHAPTER LXXII

DECLINE AND FALL OF LIBERALISM

1880-1886

§ 315. THE MINISTRY OF ALL THE TROUBLES.—Gladstone's Second Ministry (1880-5) had behind it as big a majority in Parliament as his First (1868-74), and it included as many able men, but it seemed to be "born to trouble as the sparks fly upward." Its only successful piece of legislation was the *County Franchise Bill* (1884), which gave the vote to dwellers in rural districts on the same terms as the Act of 1867 had given it to town-dwellers (N236). One underlying cause of weakness was that the Cabinet was divided against itself, for it included old-fashioned "Whigs" like Lord Hartington and advanced Radicals like Joseph Chamberlain (N232). The only force which held it together was the personality of Gladstone, and the "*Grand Old Man*," as his admirers called him, had always lacked Beaconsfield's gift for understanding men and dealing with them. He was now over seventy years of age, and his vast political experience and awe-inspiring loftiness of character seemed to remove him so far above his colleagues that he could not enter into their varied points of view or co-ordinate their varied talents.

But apart from its own shortcomings, the Ministry suffered from a great deal of sheer bad luck. Some of its difficulties were the after-effects of the imperialist policy of the late Government. In South Africa, for instance, the Transvaal Republic had been annexed, as the first step towards a scheme of federation (§ 314). Though Gladstone had denounced this piece of "*Beaconsfieldism*" in his Midlothian campaign, he was at first inclined to let the annexation stand, being informed by Government representatives on the spot that the Boers were reconciled to it. But the Boers soon showed that this was a mistaken notion, by collecting an armed force on the Natal

frontier. General Colley, the Governor of Natal, raised a defence force, but agreed to an armistice while negotiations were carried on with President Kruger of the Republic. When the armistice expired, Colley advanced and seized *Majuba Hill*, which commanded the Boer position. The next day the Boers drove the British force off the hill, Colley himself being among the slain. And all the while an answer from Kruger, accepting the terms, was on its way to him.

What was the Government to do about it? To annex the Transvaal against the will of its inhabitants was repugnant to every Liberal principle; but to cancel the annexation after a military defeat seemed humiliating. Some members of the Cabinet were for a middle course—to defeat the Boers and then give them back their freedom; but it did not seem very dignified to sacrifice hundreds of lives in order to demonstrate that the British Empire was more powerful than a handful of Dutch farmers! Gladstone decided that the policy most worthy of a Christian nation would also be the wisest. A treaty was made by which the Boers recovered their independence on condition that they did not enter into relations with any other European Power, and that they admitted all white settlers to equal political rights with themselves.

It is difficult to see what wiser or worthier course Gladstone could have taken, but his opponents were confirmed in their view that he was not to be trusted to uphold the prestige of Britain in the eyes of foreigners (§ 310).

§ 316. TROUBLE IN IRELAND.—Another grave problem was the state of Ireland. The Land Act of 1870 (§ 307) had been the best that Gladstone could do in the face of a House of Lords very jealous for the rights of property, but it fell far short of being a real solution of the trouble. Its failure had been accentuated by another terrible potato famine in 1879-80; for thousands of families had been unable to pay their rent, and had been turned out of their homes to die of exposure and starvation. Their sufferings led to murder and outrage, and

there was a policeman or a soldier for every thirty people, vainly trying to keep order. An ex-Fenian named Michael Davitt formed a *Land League*, by which the peasantry bound themselves not to force up rents by bidding against each other for land, and not to pay any rent at all to harsh landlords. Any person who fell under the displeasure of the League was "boycotted"—that is to say, nobody was to have any dealings with him.

The wrongs of Ireland were kept forcibly before the attention of Parliament by the Irish members, who had recently formed themselves into a distinct "*Nationalist Party*," under the leadership of *Charles Stuart Parnell*. There were only about sixty of them, but they were so well disciplined that they were able to make themselves extremely unpleasant. Parnell's method was to compel the Government to attend to Ireland's grievances by obstructing all other public business. This obstruction consisted of incessant speech-making by organised relays of Nationalist members.

The Chief Secretary for Ireland in the Ministry was W. E. Forster, the hero of the Education Act of 1870. Though an advanced Radical, he felt that the disorders must be suppressed before anything else could be done for the country, and he therefore brought in a drastic "*Coercion Bill*" (1881), empowering magistrates to imprison people without trial. The Irish members resisted it with such pertinacity that they prolonged the debate from four o'clock on a Monday until nine o'clock on the following Wednesday; but it was forced through at last, and Gladstone was compelled to alter the procedure of the House by a regulation which empowered the Speaker to apply "the closure" whenever a debate was carried to an unreasonable length.

Meanwhile the Prime Minister had been busy preparing a *Second Land Act* (1881) to repair the deficiencies of the First. It was the longest and most elaborate piece of legislation ever brought before Parliament. The principles embodied in it were spoken of as "*The Three F's*": Fair Rents, to be fixed by independent tribunals; Fixity of Tenure, so that a tenant

could not be turned out as long as he paid his rent ; and Free Sale, which enabled him to sell his interest in his holding. But Parnell was not satisfied, and under his orders the peasantry refused to have anything to do with the Land Courts set up by the Act. This so annoyed Gladstone that he allowed Forster to have the Irish leader arrested under the Coercion Act. But it soon became clear that Parnell's influence had been against violence, for the disturbances now became worse than ever. Gladstone was always opposed to repressive measures, and he soon began to feel that his Government had made a mistake in taking this line towards Ireland. He therefore authorised a bargain with Parnell (sometimes called *The Kilmainham Treaty*, after the name of the gaol in which Parnell was imprisoned), by which the Government undertook to bring in a Bill relieving farmers who were unable to pay their arrears of rent, while Parnell undertook to stop the campaign of lawlessness. Forster was so indignant at this abandonment of his policy of repression that he resigned, his place as Chief Secretary being taken by Lord Frederick Cavendish, a high-minded man whom everybody liked and respected. For a few weeks it seemed as if this "new departure" of goodwill was going to bring about a permanent change for the better in the relations between the two countries ; but a perverse fate once more intervened. Lord Frederick and a Government official were murdered in Phoenix Park, Dublin, in broad daylight, by a gang of ruffians who called themselves "The Invincibles." Parnell abhorred their deed as much as anyone ; but suspicion naturally fell upon him and his friends. All good feeling was at an end, and the Government had to bring in another Coercion Bill more severe even than that of 1881.

§ 317. TROUBLE IN EGYPT.—The Government was also beset by a harassing series of complications in Egypt. Ten years before, a spendthrift Khedive had got heavily into debt to foreign bankers—chiefly English and French ; even the sale of his Suez Canal shares had only relieved his difficulties for a

time. He taxed his unfortunate subjects to the limit of endurance, but his finances were in such disorder that it seemed likely that his creditors would lose their money. They therefore put pressure on their respective Governments to intervene, and an International Commission was set up in Cairo to see that the payment of interest on the loans was a first charge upon the revenue. When he tried to shake this off he was deposed and replaced by a more compliant Khedive, under a Franco-British "*Dual Control*."

Gladstone had denounced these arrangements before the election; but he found it as difficult to reverse his predecessor's policy here as in the Transvaal. Indeed, he was soon obliged to go further. A mutiny in the Egyptian army, headed by an officer named Arabi Pasha, developed into an attack on the foreigners who were sucking up the national revenue for the interest on their loans; and some Europeans were murdered



in a riot at Alexandria. If Egypt fell a prey to anarchy the Suez Canal might be blocked, and France or Russia might intervene. Could Britain allow any other Power to get possession of that bottle-neck of her trade-routes? Gladstone felt that Britain must support the Khedive's Government until it was strong enough to stand alone. France declined to take any part in this action, so it was a purely British fleet and army that was sent to restore order. The forts at Alexandria were destroyed by a naval squadron, and an army under Sir Garnet Wolseley crushed Arabi and his mutineers at *Tel-el-Kebir* (1882). The work of reorganising the finances and government of the country was now undertaken by Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer), who became semi-official "adviser" to the Khedive.

Meanwhile a fresh complication was arising in the Sudan, an outlying province of Egypt. It had been shockingly misgoverned, and had only been kept in subjection by means of garrisons commanded for the most part by British officers in the Khedive's service. A great rebellion now broke out there under a Mohammedan religious fanatic who called himself the Mahdi. The Khedive was quite unable to suppress it with his own resources, but it was not to be thought of that British lives and money should be expended to recover the Sudan for him to misrule. The Gladstone Ministry decided that the province must be evacuated until the Khedive was strong enough to reconquer it for himself. It therefore sent out *General Charles Gordon* to report on the possibility of withdrawing the Egyptian garrisons before they were overcome by the Mahdi's forces. This was an unfortunate appointment. Gordon had formerly been Governor of the Sudan under the Khedive, and had made fervent efforts to civilise the Sudanese and to convert them to Christianity. He hated the thought of handing them over to "a lot of stinking dervishes," as he said. He was an able and experienced soldier, and an earnest Christian, but was too independent-minded to carry through a task of which he did not approve. When he got to Khartoum he made

no attempt to carry out his instructions, but waited in the expectation that the Government would sooner or later be compelled to send out an army to relieve him—and to overcome the Mahdi.

Gladstone knew that some members of his Cabinet were opposed to the policy of abandoning the Sudan, and he felt that they had engineered the appointment of Gordon because they foresaw what would happen. Vexed at the attempt to force his hand, he refused to send a relief force for a long time; and when at last he consented to do so, it was too late. The place had been stormed by the Mahdi a few days before, and Gordon had been killed. The nation was overwhelmed with grief and indignation, and the Queen stopped little short of calling Gladstone a murderer. The Government's majority crumbled away, and when Parnell decided to support the Opposition (in the belief that a Conservative Government would henceforward be able to do more for Ireland than the Liberals), the Second Gladstone Ministry was defeated.

§ 318. HOME RULE.—Gladstone now came forward with a bold scheme for dealing with the grievances of Ireland. Ever since the time of O'Connell, the Irish members had been demanding the Repeal of the Act of Union (§ 250). Hitherto this had seemed like crying for the moon; but the state of Ireland had become so deplorable, and the Nationalists were making themselves so objectionable in the House of Commons, that some members of both the great parties began to consider whether something of the sort might not be the best method of dealing with the situation.

When Gladstone resigned in 1885 it was impossible to hold a General Election at once, for new lists of voters had to be prepared after the passing of the County Franchise Act (§ 315). The Conservatives accepted office under Lord Salisbury for the time being, but the election confirmed the Liberal majority, and Gladstone found himself Prime Minister for the third time. Just before taking office he announced that he felt that

the right way of dealing with Ireland was to leave her affairs in the hands of her own people, just as we had with the affairs of Canada and Australia. He quickly discovered that such a measure would cost him the support of a large section of his party. Hartington refused to take office with him; Chamberlain resigned a few weeks later; even John Bright, one of his oldest friends and staunchest supporters, opposed a scheme that would put Ulster Presbyterians under a Parliament of Catholic Nationalists such as those who had relied on lawless methods both at Westminster and in Ireland. But the old statesman had put his hand to the plough, and he did not turn back. His *Home Rule Bill* (1886) kept the army, the navy, the customs and foreign affairs under the Imperial Parliament at Westminster; but for all other matters concerning Ireland a separate assembly was to sit at Dublin. When the Bill was put to the vote, eighty Liberals voted with the Opposition, and it was defeated. Gladstone dissolved Parliament, and "appealed to the country." But the bulk of the nation felt that Home Rule would strike a blow at the unity of the Empire. In the new Parliament the Conservatives had a majority of nearly two hundred, Gladstone resigned, and the Conservatives were placed in office for a second time within a twelvemonth.

CHAPTER LXXIII

NEW POLITICAL GOSPELS

1886-1895

§ 319. "RESOLUTE GOVERNMENT."—Lord Salisbury was now Prime Minister again—this time with a substantial majority behind him. He took charge of foreign affairs himself; but the most vital question of the day was, what policy the Government was going to adopt towards Ireland, in place of the Home Rule which had been so decidedly rejected by the electors.

Salisbury declared that what Ireland needed was "twenty years of resolute government"—the stern repression of disorder, coupled with measures to alleviate the distress of the peasantry. He appointed his nephew, *A. J. Balfour*, as Chief Secretary for Ireland, to carry this policy out. Balfour had hitherto been regarded as too mild and refined for the rough-and-tumble of political life; but he soon showed that he was made of sterner stuff than most people imagined. He put through a most drastic *Crimes Act* (1888), suspending for an indefinite period the right to trial by jury, and placing all offences against order under the jurisdiction of resident magistrates appointed by the Government. Balfour was subjected to bitter attacks both from Liberals and from Nationalists; but he pursued his way unflinchingly, and it could not be denied that his methods were effective in keeping Ireland quiet. The other aspect of the Government's Irish policy was seen a year or two later in the *Land Purchase Act* (1890), whereby the Treasury undertook to lend tenants the money to purchase their holdings, provided that their landlord was willing to sell.

The only important piece of domestic legislation carried out by the Ministry was the establishment of *County Councils* (1888). A system under which millions of citizens had no control over the spending of the rates which they paid was an anachronism in a modern democracy. Henceforth these functions were to be performed by County Councils elected by the ratepayers (N224).

§ 320. THE NEW GOSPEL OF "IMPERIALISM."—One of the main reasons for the unpopularity of Gladstone's Home Rule policy was that the nation was just beginning to take a pride in the Empire. "Imperialism" had hitherto been mainly a hobby of a few enthusiasts like Gibbon Wakefield and Lord Durham (§§ 298, 302). Disraeli had talked about the preservation of the Empire (§ 311); but his only practical step in that direction—the scheme for the federation of South Africa

—had not led to very encouraging results. Of the other leading statesmen of the first half of Victoria's reign, Palmerston was mainly interested in European politics, John Russell in parliamentary reform, and Gladstone in finance and Ireland. As for the continental Powers, the fact that France, England, and Spain had all lost overseas empires within half a century (1760-1810) had convinced them that colonies were not worth while. In any case they felt no need for them, having no surplus populations and no industries requiring large supplies of raw material.

But towards the end of the 'seventies the situation began to change. The Industrial Revolution was by this time making rapid headway in Belgium, France, and Germany; and a vast new field for development had been brought to light through the exploration of Africa, especially by Livingstone and Stanley (N230). The first man in Europe to realise the possibilities of the new continent was Leopold II, King of the Belgians. He sent out Stanley to the Congo district to establish stations for trading with the natives; and the rubber, timber, palm-oil, and ivory which were forthcoming was a revelation to the rest of Europe. A "scramble for Africa" began, each country trying to "stake out claims" to profitable territory. Rivalries arose which threatened to lead to international complications—perhaps to open war. So Bismarck, the great statesman who had founded the German Empire in 1871, organised a Conference at Berlin (1884), at which each Power was assigned its own "spheres of influence."

In accordance with this agreement, almost the whole continent was partitioned amongst European Powers in the course of the next ten years. Spain acquired a strip along the north-east coast; Italy seized a tract near the Red Sea; France claimed the Sahara and Algiers; Germany and Portugal obtained territories on both seaboard; and Belgium founded the "Congo Free State." But the lion's share fell to Britain. Not only did she consolidate valuable possessions on the Gold Coast, in Nigeria and in what is now called Kenya, she also

made good a claim to the only remaining portion of Africa suited to be a permanent dwelling-place for white men. With this last development we shall deal more fully in a later chapter (§ 324).

We sometimes call these acquisitions Britain's "Third Empire." They differed from the great Dominions in the fact that they were the result of deliberate policy on the part of the Government. In 1884 an Imperial Federation League was founded; and people began to talk about "Britain's Imperial destiny," to take a pride in "the Empire on which the sun never sets," and to point out that "trade follows the flag." In 1887 there were great festivities in London to celebrate the fiftieth year of Victoria's reign; and one of the features of this "Jubilee" was a gathering of representatives from all the Queen's overseas possessions. This brought home to people how vast and varied those possessions were.

The most notable convert to the new gospel was Joseph Chamberlain. He had become the leader of the group of "~~Liberal Unionists~~"—the Liberals who had left the main body of the party over Home Rule (§ 318). They did not as yet ally themselves officially with the Conservatives, but they usually supported Lord Salisbury's Government in Parliament; and under Chamberlain's influence that Government became more and more closely identified with the policy of "Imperial Expansion."

§ 321. THE NEW GOSPEL OF "SOCIALISM."—Another new movement was beginning to make headway in Great Britain at this time. The effects of the trade depression of the years 1878-80 (§ 314) was felt for some years after, and caused much suffering among the working-class. This aroused great interest in social questions, and among the remedies suggested was "Socialism." Its doctrines had been propounded in a book called *Das Kapital*, by Karl Marx, a German Jew, who, expelled from his native land for his political views, had lived in London, and had produced this epoch-making work in 1869. He sought

to prove by historical arguments that the "capitalist" system of production is bound sooner or later to be replaced by a system under which the workers will collectively own the instruments of production—and that it behoves all men of good will to be prepared for a class war which will hasten the coming of this state of things. These ideas had not aroused much interest in this country until they were taken up in the early 'eighties by some of the younger Trade Union leaders. Most of the existing Unions were limited to highly skilled workers, who could afford a weekly subscription of a shilling or more, in return for which their Unions insured them against sickness and unemployment. But this system was quite out of the reach of the unskilled "casual" worker.

A great strike of the London dock-workers brought the matter to a head. The strike was a remarkable piece of improvised organisation carried through by some of the new type of "Socialist" Trade Union leaders, notably John Burns and Tom Mann. The dockers had a very strong case, and public opinion was on their side. In the end they gained practically all that they were fighting for—sixpence an hour, and spells of not less than four hours' employment. Their success gave a great impetus to the "new Trade Unionism." Unskilled workers began to form Unions with a weekly subscription of a few pence, designed simply to support their interests against employers, with the ultimate object of bringing "the capitalist system" to an end and substituting "common ownership of the means of production." From this time the Trade Union movement became more and more associated with Socialism.

§ 322. GLADSTONE TRIES AGAIN.—Gladstone, now over eighty years of age, remained "chained to the oar" (to use his own expression) by his determination to make one more attempt to carry through Home Rule. There were signs that public opinion was beginning to veer round, for the prisons were crowded with political prisoners, including a number of Mem-

bers of Parliament, and such methods of government have always been repugnant to the British people. Moreover, *The Times*, in the course of a series of attacks on the Nationalist party, printed a letter supposed to be written by Parnell, implying approval of the Phoenix Park murders (§ 316). This letter was afterwards proved to be a forgery, and the episode naturally produced a reaction in his favour. The Liberal party and their Irish allies began to hope that there would be a majority in favour of Home Rule at the next General Election. Then Parnell fell into disgrace by being involved in a divorce suit; and a bitter feud arose, both in the Liberal party and among the Irish themselves, as to whether he ought to be allowed to continue as leader of the Nationalist party.

These dissensions checked the "swing of the pendulum," and the election of 1892 sent to Parliament Liberals and Conservatives in almost equal numbers. The effect was to give control to the Nationalists, who held the balance between the English parties. Their support enabled Gladstone to turn out the Conservatives, and to form his Fourth Ministry. The most notable member of it, after the old Premier himself, was Sir William Harcourt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. His Budget of 1894 made a mark in the history of British fiscal policy by its extension of the *Death Duties*—that is to say, the duties payable on legacies. There was a great outcry against this "robbery of the dead" but it still forms one of the most important sources of revenue.

Gladstone now brought in a *Second Home Rule Bill* (1893). This time he proposed that Ireland should be represented at Westminster as well as in her own Parliament, so that she might take her share in the direction of imperial affairs. It scraped through the House of Commons, but was foredoomed to rejection by the House of Lords, where it was thrown out by a majority of something like ten to one. Under the shadow of this defeat the "Grand Old Man" retired from political life, and died some four years later. His place as Prime Minister was taken by Lord Rosebery; but the Government was torn

by personal squabbles now that its great leader was gone, and a year or so later it was turned out of office.

CHAPTER LXXIV

BRITON VERSUS BOER

1895-1902

§ 323. LORD SALISBURY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—When Lord Salisbury formed his Third Ministry, after the fall of the Liberals in 1895, the "Liberal Unionist" group took office under him. Indeed, the new ingredient worked so strongly in the Conservative party that its very name was changed to "Unionist," and Chamberlain became the most prominent member of the Cabinet. He could have chosen any of the great offices of state; and the fact that he decided to become Colonial Secretary indicated that imperialism had become the centre of his political interests. The post had hitherto been regarded as of minor importance; but his vigorous personality soon made it the predominant department.

Lord Salisbury returned to his old post at the Foreign Office. He was almost immediately called upon to deal with a difficulty over the boundary between British Guiana and the republic of *Venezuela*. President Cleveland of the United States announced that he would appoint a commission to settle the dispute, and that he would treat any attempt by Britain to enforce her claims as a breach of the "Monroe Doctrine" (§ 273). This was very like a threat of war; but Salisbury made "the soft answer which turneth away wrath." He agreed to submit the question to an Arbitration Commission, which ultimately decided in favour of Britain, and all ended well.

A few years later the danger of war loomed up again—this time with France. During the last fifteen years the govern-

ment and army of Egypt had been so successfully reorganised by Lord Cromer and Colonel Kitchener (§ 317) that the country was able to undertake the long-delayed reconquest of the Sudan. Kitchener set to work in a very methodical way, building a railway as he advanced, so as to bring the Sudan into permanent communication with Egypt. It took him nearly three years to reach Khartoum, where he brought the forces of the Mahdi to bay, and utterly destroyed them at the Battle of *Omdurman* (1898).

The French had long regretted their action in leaving Britain in sole control of Egyptian affairs, and they were very jealous of the success of the Nile campaign, particularly as it threatened to upset a scheme of their own for extending their dominions from the Sahara to the Red Sea. They therefore sent Major Marchand to set up the tricolor at *Fashoda*, on the upper Nile. Kitchener requested Marchand to withdraw, pointing out that the Egyptian Government could not allow a foreign Power to control the upper waters of the river on which its very existence depended. For some weeks it seemed as if war might ensue, but wiser counsels prevailed, and the French Government abandoned its claims.

A joint Anglo-Egyptian administration was set up to rule the Sudan, which prospered exceedingly under the care of Sir Francis Wingate, who became High Commissioner a year or two later.

§ 324. RHODESIA.—Meanwhile a critical situation was developing in another part of Africa. The greatest personality in the imperialist movement of the 'eighties and 'nineties was *Cecil Rhodes* (1853–1902). The son of a country clergyman, he had gone out to South Africa for the benefit of his health, and there he made a fortune in the diamond-fields. The expansion of the British Empire was a religion to him. In particular he dreamed of a United States of South Africa wherein Britons would unite with Boers to form a new nation, much as they had united with Frenchmen to form the Canadian nation.

He had no love for Colonial Office administration—his aim was a self-governing dominion, to be joined eventually with Australia, New Zealand, and Canada in a British Commonwealth of Nations to preserve the peace of the world and the progress of civilisation.

He began by urging the Cape Parliament (of which he had been a member since 1880) to annex Bechuanaland, lest it should be absorbed in German West Africa, and so prevent the northward expansion of British power. But the Cape Government refused to embark upon such an adventurous policy; so Rhodes had to be content with seeing the country taken under the protection of the Colonial Office. This incident showed him that he must be able to act independently of politicians, and therefore must have the power which money alone can give. He therefore devoted himself to "cornering" the diamond market, with the result that within three years his personal income was something like a million a year. He was now in a position to set on foot a great scheme to develop the splendid high-lying country between the Limpopo and the Great Lakes. He formed a private Company, and obtained from the Government a charter authorising it to extend the railway and telegraph through this territory, to organise trade and colonisation within it, and to develop its mineral wealth. In 1890 the first band of pioneers, British and Dutch, were sent up to take possession. At first there was trouble with the Matabele; but after this warlike race had been subdued the development of the new country proceeded apace. In 1895 it received by royal proclamation the name of *Rhodesia*. This was the zenith of Rhodes's career. Prime Minister of the Cape Government, chairman of the Chartered Company, controller of the world's diamond output, he wielded such power as has rarely fallen into the hands of a private citizen. But Nemesis was at hand.

§ 325. THE JAMESON RAID.—One great obstacle to Rhodes's plans was the existence of the Dutch republics: they refused

even to join the British colonies in a common railway and postal system. In 1889 the position was complicated by the discovery of gold near Johannesburg, in the south-west corner of the Transvaal. Within a few months gold-seekers from all parts of the world—many of them people of very undesirable character—far outnumbered the entire Boer population of the republic. Under the existing Constitution these "Uitlanders" (foreigners) would gain control of the government. To prevent this, the Boers passed a law making it almost impossible for foreign-born persons to gain the right to vote. The Uitlanders felt that it was unjust that they should pay nineteen-twentieths of the taxes (the revenue had risen from £150,000 to £3,000,000 since the discovery of gold) and yet have no voice in the spending of the money. But President Kruger turned a deaf ear to their complaints. Finding themselves unable to gain redress by constitutional methods, they plotted an armed insurrection to overthrow the Boer Government.


Rhodes, tempted by the hope of clearing away the Boer opposition to his schemes, entered into the conspiracy. He supplied the Uitlanders with arms and ammunition, and undertook to support their rising with 1,500 men in the service of the Chartered Company. This force was to make a raid from the Bechuanaland border, under the command of Dr. Starr Jameson, who was his close personal friend and the controller of Rhodesia. Of course, this was quite an unjustifiable proceeding, especially on the part of the Prime Minister of the Cape Government (as he now was); but he was impatient to see his schemes carried through, for the doctors had warned him that he had not long to live. Mature reflection made him see his mistake, and he had sent a message cancelling the arrangements, when appalling news was brought to him. Jameson, becoming impatient of delay, had "ridden in" without even concerting action with the Uitlanders; and the Boers had captured all the raiders with humiliating ease. It was a terrible blow to all that Rhodes held most dear. He was forced to resign all his public positions; a wedge had been driven be-

tween the two races which he most wished to unite ; and his imperialist ideals had been covered with disgrace and ridicule.

§ 326. THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR.—The Jameson Raid made good relations between the two races impossible. The Transvaal Government felt that the British had designs upon their country, and began to spend the revenue they extorted from the Uitlanders in providing themselves with up-to-date equipment for war and instructors from the French and German armies ; while the Uitlanders complained more and more bitterly of the unfair treatment to which they were subjected. In 1897 they petitioned the British Government to intervene with President Kruger on their behalf, and Chamberlain took up their cause with eager zest. The treaty of 1881 (§ 315) had granted the Boers something short of complete independence, and disputes arose as to exactly how far Britain had a right to interfere in their affairs. At length the British Government demanded that Kruger should definitely acknowledge that Britain was the paramount Power throughout South Africa, and upon his refusal troops were moved up towards the frontiers of the republic. When Kruger demanded that these threatening actions should cease, war was declared (October 1899). The Orange Free State, though it had taken no part in the quarrel (for, having no goldfields, it had no Uitlanders), threw in its lot with its sister republic and declared war also.

At first sight it seemed an amazing piece of audacity for these two tiny states, with a combined population of less than 100,000, thus to challenge the British Empire ; and it was generally expected that the affair would be over in a few months. But the Boers had much in their favour. A wide expanse of sparsely populated country is very difficult to master, as the British had found in the War of American Independence (§ 230). Such a country is suited for guerrilla warfare, and at this the Boers proved themselves highly expert. Their civil occupations made them horsemen and marksmen ; they knew the country ; they were fighting among their own people ;

SOUTH AFRICA: circa 1900



they had the most modern weapons and had been trained to use them by first-rate instructors; and, unhampered by elaborate baggage-trains, they could move about with a mobility highly disconcerting to a professional army, accustomed only to old-fashioned mass-tactics.

The details of the fighting are summarised elsewhere in this book (N233). The British forces met with disaster during the first few months, but their overwhelming superiority in numbers and resources gradually wore the Boers down, though the war lasted ten times as long as had been predicted at the outset. At the *Peace of Vereeniging* (May 1902) the Boers had to surrender all claim to independence, but were promised full rights of self-government under the Union Jack in the near future. Parliament made a grant of £10,000,000 towards repairing the damage done in the war, restocking the farms and reopening the diamond mines.

The promise of self-government was fulfilled in 1906, and a few years later the four South African Colonies (two Boer and two British) were united to form a new Dominion. Rhodes's vision had come true, though he did not live to see it (he died in 1902). Unfortunately the seeds of hostility sown by the raid and the war continued to produce an undergrowth of ill-feeling, and racial cleavage is still a handicap to the progress of the Union.



CHAPTER LXXV

THE REVIVAL OF LIBERALISM

1903-1914

§ 327. THE FALL OF THE UNIONIST GOVERNMENT.—In January 1901 the longest reign in English history came to an end with the death of Victoria and the accession of her son as *Edward VII.* This was followed a year later by the retirement of Lord Salis-

bury, who was succeeded as Premier by Balfour. The Unionist Government had gained a renewed lease of power by a General Election in 1900. The South African War had checked the normal "swing of the pendulum," for although the disasters of the first stage of the war had reflected a good deal of discredit on the Government, people remembered the old warning against "changing horses while crossing a brook." Moreover, the war had divided the ranks of the Liberals, for some of them supported the Government in its policy towards the Boers, while others were entirely opposed to it. Among those who became extremely unpopular owing to their "pro-Boer" and anti-war sentiments were the official leader of the party, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and one of the most notable of its younger members, Lloyd George.

But as soon as the war was over the tide began to turn strongly against the Unionists, partly owing to their conduct of it, and partly owing to the rising demand for a number of social reforms which they showed no sign of carrying through. Then Chamberlain's fervent imperialism impelled him to take up a new line of policy which hastened their decline in favour. In order to draw the Dominions and the Mother Country more closely together, he brought forward a scheme of Imperial Preference—that is to say, he proposed that lower duties should be charged on goods coming from other parts of the Empire than on foreign produce. This involved putting fresh duties on the foreign goods, and thus reversing the Free Trade policy under which Britain's commercial and shipping supremacy had been built up since the time of Peel. At first Chamberlain limited his demands to a small duty on corn; but the opposition was so fierce that his fighting spirit was roused, and he went on to advocate a thoroughgoing *Tariff Reform*—all-round "Protection" to prevent foreign countries from competing with British-made goods in the home market. Whatever the merits of his proposals, they completed the ruin of the Unionist party. For some of the most important members of the party were unconvinced by his arguments; and, on the other hand, the

Liberals forgot their squabbles over the war and rallied as one man to the defence of Free Trade.

Balfour clung to office for a time in order to enable his Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, to carry through the "Entente Cordiale" (N228), but this damming up of the tide of Liberal reaction made it all the more irresistible when at length Parliament was dissolved. At the election of January 1906 the Unionist majority of 150 was turned into a Liberal majority of 360, the largest in the whole history of our party politics.

§ 328. SOCIAL REFORM.—Campbell-Bannerman got together a very capable Ministry. Sir Edward Grey took charge of Foreign Affairs, R. B. Haldane became Secretary for War, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer was H. H. Asquith, an able young lawyer, who had been Home Secretary in Gladstone's last Cabinet. But perhaps the most noteworthy appointment was that of John Burns as President of the Board of Trade, for this signalled the birth of a new parliamentary party. In 1893 the various Socialist organisations had joined to form an Independent Labour Party, to put forward candidates at elections. We have seen that the Trade Unions were now adopting Socialism as their creed (§ 321); and in 1899 their central organisation, the Trades Union Congress, decided to associate itself with the work of this I.L.P. They had only three or four members in the Parliament of 1900, but at the election of 1906 twenty-nine of their candidates were elected. Most of these "Labour Members" were Trade Union officials, and supported out of Trade Union funds. They mostly called themselves "Socialists," but this is a vague term, and their aim was social reform rather than the overthrow of capitalism foretold by Karl Marx (§ 321). Of course, the gigantic Liberal majority made the Government quite independent of the support of this handful of members; but Campbell-Bannerman gave a Cabinet post to Burns as an indication that Liberals welcomed the Labour party as allies.

There is no doubt that the Labour leaven had a stronger

influence on the Government than its numbers would warrant, in much the same way as the Liberal Unionists had influenced the Conservatives in the later 'nineties (§ 323). For instance, one of the first cares of the new Government was to strengthen the position of the Trade Unions by a *Trade Disputes Act* (1906) (N237). And it went on to pass so many measures designed to improve the lot of the working-class that these years, 1906-1914, may be regarded as a *Third Great Reform Era*, comparable with those of the 'forties and of the 'seventies (N238). To mention only a few of the most outstanding of these measures, *Old Age Pensions* were provided to keep the aged poor out of the workhouse; *Labour Exchanges* were organised to enable employers to get into touch with unemployed workpeople; and a *National Insurance* scheme was adopted whereby the working-class were insured against sickness and unemployment, the premiums being paid partly by the Government, partly by the employer, and partly by the workman himself.

§ 329. LORDS v. COMMONS.—Early in 1908 Campbell-Bannerman was compelled to retire owing to ill-health, and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Asquith. The Chancellorship of the Exchequer now fell to Lloyd George. He had always been an advanced Radical, and in 1909 he brought in what he called *The People's Budget*—no ordinary peace Budget, as he explained, but “a war Budget, to raise funds for an attack on poverty and squalor.” In order to raise funds for costly social reforms such as Old Age Pensions, the Income Tax was raised to 1s. 2d. in the £ for incomes over £3000, while incomes over £5000 were to pay a “super-tax” of 6d. in the £. There was such a tremendous outcry on the part of the well-to-do against this “confiscatory taxation” that, despite the Government's huge majority, the Budget—which is usually dealt with by the end of June—did not pass the Commons until November.

Then a fresh excitement began. According to the established principles of the Constitution, the House of Lords cannot touch a “Money Bill”; but the Opposition declared that this was an

exceptional case--the Budget was an attack on the rights of property. For the first time in history a Budget was rejected by the Upper Chamber. Asquith dissolved Parliament to enable the country to decide the all-important question. At the General Election of January 1910 the Government's majority was reduced to about 120; but this was sufficient for the purpose, and when the Budget came before the Lords again (in April 1910, by which time another Budget was due!) they allowed it to pass.

But the Government would not let matters rest there. The incident had brought to a head a long-standing quarrel between the Liberal party and the House of Lords. For there was a permanent and overwhelming Conservative majority in that House, and Liberals complained that important measures, passed by large majorities in a newly elected House of Commons after weighty discussion, had been summarily rejected by a sparsely attended House of Lords with practically no discussion at all. The Asquith Government therefore determined to follow up its victory of the Budget by permanently limiting the power of the Lords to a "suspensive veto." The battle over this drastic amendment to the Constitution was just about to begin when the death of King Edward (May 1910) caused a suspension of hostilities. A conference between the leaders of both sides was carried on for some time; but in November it broke up without having come to an agreement. Thereupon Asquith announced another General Election (the second in 1910) on the sole question as to whether the absolute veto of the House of Lords should be abolished. The result was that the Liberal majority remained practically unchanged. The Lords tried to defy this verdict by passing amendments to the "Parliament Bill," which quite altered its provisions. The Commons rejected these amendments and sent the Bill up to the Lords again in its original form; and Asquith now announced that King George V, taking into consideration the result of the last election, had agreed to enforce the will of the people (as expressed at the recent election) by creating enough new Liberal Peers to redress

the balance of parties in the Lords. Thus, if the Upper Chamber insisted on its amendments its dignity would be cheapened by the creation of hundreds of new Peers, and the obnoxious Bill would be passed after all. So they gave way, and the Parliament Act became law (N236).

§ 330. STRIFE.—The Budget Crisis and the Abolition of the Lords' Veto were but two of many struggles which excited the public during these years. Another was the movement for *Votes for Women*. Hitherto it had been carried on in a sober constitutional way, and nobody had taken much notice of it; but in 1905 Mrs. Pankhurst and her two daughters founded "The Women's Social and Political Union," which went in for more vigorous methods. They determined that neither Government nor nation should know a moment's peace until it had granted their demands. They smashed shop-windows, they threw inflammable material into post-boxes, they burned down public buildings, they invaded the House of Commons, they attacked Ministers with dog-whips and red pepper. When they were arrested for these exploits they refused to pay fines; and when they were imprisoned they went on hunger-strike. The Government was a good deal embarrassed by the movement, but it refused to give way, and women only gained the vote in 1918, when the justice of their claim had been brought home to the nation by their devotion to the national cause during the War.

Then the Trade Union movement took a revolutionary turn. The Unions were disappointed that the Labour party had not done more for the working-classes, and some of the younger and wilder spirits among the leaders began to preach a return to the gospel of social revolution as taught by Karl Marx. There was a great railway strike in 1911, because the companies would not recognise the right of the Unions to speak for the men in arranging wages and conditions of employment. Then followed a gigantic miners' strike, to enforce a minimum wage all over the country of 5s. a day. Over a million men were idle,

many other industries were affected, and a blow was struck at the coal-export trade from which it never recovered. The strike was only ended when the Government stepped in, propounded a compromise, and enforced it by an Act of Parliament. To many people all this was a disquieting revelation of the strength and solidarity of the Unions; and this alarm was increased when in the spring of 1913 three of the greatest of them—the railwaymen, the miners, and the transport workers—formed a *Triple Industrial Alliance*, to pool their power of putting pressure on the employers.

Lastly, the question of Home Rule came up again, and provoked a crisis which brought Ireland within measurable distance of civil war. So long as the Liberal Government had the majority of 1906 it could afford to ignore the Irish Party; but when the elections of 1910 reduced its majority to 120, it was forced to do something to placate them. Accordingly, a *Third Home Rule Bill* was brought in (1912). The great majority of the Irish people were insistent in their claim for autonomy; but the Protestants of Ulster were equally determined that in no circumstances would they submit to a Catholic Government at Dublin. Encouraged by the Unionist party in England, they imported arms and began to drill, so as to be able to resist by force any attempt to coerce them; and the Nationalists of southern Ireland made counter-preparations. The Lords rejected the Bill, but under the new Parliament Act it would come into force without their consent within three years. It seemed as if this would be the signal for open war. As the fatal day approached, King George summoned representatives of both sides to a conference (June 1914), but the feeling in Ireland was so white-hot that if any of them had made a concession he would have been repudiated by his followers. Then, just when the excitement was at its height, this crisis was swallowed up by a greater.

§ 331. THE ROAD TO ARMYAGEDDON.—To explain the causes of the World War would need the whole of a book much bigger

than this; for these causes involved three distinct currents of ill-feeling--the rivalry between Austria and Russia for influence in the Balkans, the rivalry between Britain and Germany for commercial and naval supremacy, and the far older and more complicated race-hatred between France and Germany. Here we can but mention a few of the main points as seen from a British angle.

The Franco-German War had left great bitterness between those two Powers, and each sought to strengthen itself with allies, Germany forming the Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy, while France made a Dual Alliance with Russia. Britain prided herself on "a policy of *Splendid Isolation*" from these continental animosities; though on the whole we were drawn rather towards our German "cousins" than towards France, with whom we had several bones of contention, especially over Egypt (§ 323). But when things went badly with our forces in the early days of the Boer War, there was a universal shout of delight from European Powers which were jealous of our Empire, and in this chorus it was Germany that took the lead. Indeed, the German Emperor hinted that nothing but the overwhelming superiority of the British navy prevented him from coming to the aid of the Boers. And as he now began to build up his own navy as if to challenge that superiority, our statesmen felt that it would be suicidal to remain on bad terms with France as well. So soon after the death of Salisbury (who stood by the old pro-German policy) his successor as Foreign Secretary (Lord Lansdowne) and in the Premiership (Balfour) negotiated an *Entente Cordiale* with France. This was not a formal treaty. It merely cleared up several outstanding causes of ill-feeling between the two countries, and made a "gentlemen's agreement" that each would support the other in case of attack by a third party. This was supplemented a few years later by a similar understanding between Britain and France's ally, Russia (N228, 229).

The Liberal Government under Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith continued this policy. Admiral Fisher designed a

super-battleship, the *Dreadnought*, which could outrange and outsteam anything afloat; and a race began between Britain and Germany in building ships of this type. Haldane at the War Office reorganised the army to fit it for a new purpose—to take its place alongside the French army in a continental war. And all this time the Government was careful to avoid any word or deed that might precipitate the crisis, and many Liberals were opposed to the growing expenditure on armaments. Several times it seemed as if war were about to break out on the Continent, but on each occasion the crisis was successfully tided over. When at last the tension reached breaking-point, it was through a comparatively minor incident. A recent war between the Balkan states had resulted in greatly strengthening Serbia, of which Austria was very jealous. In June 1914 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, was murdered at Sarajevo, presumably by Serbians. Austria demanded humiliating penance from the Serbian Government. Serbia agreed to nine-tenths of the Austrian demands, but the fact that she demurred at the other tenth was made an excuse for an immediate declaration of war. Thereupon Russia came to the support of Serbia, Germany supported Austria against Russia, and France supported Russia against Germany, all within the space of a few days.

The great question now was: What would England do? There was a general feeling in favour of France, though the Entente did not bind us to come to her aid in the existing circumstances, yet what had we to do with the Balkan rivalries which had been the root cause of the quarrel?

The situation was still in the balance when news came that the Germans were attacking France through Belgium. The maintenance of treaties and the safety of the Netherlands were the reason for our entering upon the World War, just as they had been the reason for our entering upon the Revolutionary Wars 120 years earlier (§ 243). The Government had the whole nation at its back when it sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding the immediate evacuation of Belgium. The German

February : Kimberley relieved ; Boers' main forces (under Cronje) destroyed at PAARDEBURG ; Ladysmith relieved.

March : Bloemfontein captured. (Orange Free State knocked out of war.)

May : Mafeking relieved.

June : Pretoria captured. End of Transvaal Republican Government.

November : Roberts returns, leaving the rest to Kitchener.

III. November 1900 - May 1902 : "CLEARING UP." (Commander : Lord Kitchener.)

It proved very difficult, owing to the nature of the country, to round up isolated "commandos." (One Boer leader, De Wet, became a hero with the British public owing to his elusiveness.) As the Boers in the field were helped by their people on the farms, the civil population was placed in "concentration camps" and the farms destroyed. (This caused Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal leader, to accuse the army of employing "methods of barbarism.")

But at last further resistance became impossible, owing to effects of attrition.

Treaty of Vereeniging (May 1902).

Boers surrendered their independence, but were promised self-government within the Empire.

No. 234.—RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN THE DOMINIONS.

NOTE : "Responsible Government" implies a system of government by Ministers answerable to elected Parliament, the Home Government being represented merely by a Governor-General, whose powers are much the same as those of the Sovereign in the Imperial Government. The chief difference between the Dominions and sovereign states is that the former have not an independent foreign policy. (But Canada keeps a Minister at Washington.)

CANADA.—The Provinces formed a Federal Government under the *British North America Act* (1867), with a capital at Ottawa.

For later developments see § 302.

NEW ZEALAND.—In 1852 each of the six settlements became Provinces with its own elective Council and a central government at Wellington, consisting of a Governor and a Parliament. In 1857 this central government became "responsible." In 1875 the Provincial Governments were abolished.

1890-1903.—Great development of "State Socialism" by Seddon (Premier) and Reeves (Minister of Labour) ; Government Arbitration Courts settle labour disputes, its awards being binding on both parties. Large estates broken up by steeply graduated Land Tax. High Protection. Immigration discouraged—90 per cent. of population are New Zealand born.

AUSTRALIA.—New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria, and Tasmania each granted responsible government in 1856 ; Queensland in 1859 ; Western Australia in 1893.

There could have been separated by such vast distances that federation was not thought of till 1881. But it became imperative, for a common policy to exclude cheap coloured labour, for defence against threatened Japanese control of the Pacific, etc. (The great obstacle to federation was that N.A.W. wanted to keep Free Trade for the benefit of Sydney shipping, while all the rest wanted Protection.)

"Commonwealth of Australia" created in 1900, with a very democratic Constitution—the Senate has no veto.

The Labour Party, consisting of fed-rated Trades Unions, became a powerful party; aimed at making Australia a "working-man's paradise" by maintaining high wages and keeping out cheap labour.

Boer War. Cape Colony received "responsible government" in 1871; Natal in 1893. The former Boer republics were granted self-government (in accordance with the Peace of Vereeniging, 1833) in 1900-7. This cleared the way for Rhodes's dream of a Union of South Africa (1911). Delegates from the four colonies met at Durban to draw up a Constitution (1909).

The Constitution was more like that of New Zealand than that of Australia. The four colonies were renamed "Provinces," their local governments being entirely subordinate to the Dominion Parliament at Cape Town. The first Prime Minister was Louis Botha, an ex-Boer general.

No. 235.—DEVELOPMENT OF IMPERIAL POLICY (1840-1914).

Lord Durham's Report (1839, § 302) laid down the future lines of British imperial policy: self-government.

The first result of the Report may be seen in the readiness with which the British Parliament granted self-government to the Australian Colonies (1835); Cape Colony (1853); New Zealand (1857); The new policy was fully developed in the formation of the Dominion of Canada (1867, § 302)—"the Eldest of the Daughter Nations."

Disraeli attempted a federation of South Africa (1876-80).

Any failure, owing to resistance of the Boers, who rebelled against annexation, and recovered their independence under Gladstone (§ 315).

An Imperial Federation League (including Forster, Chamberlain, Rosebery) was formed (1884) to draw the colonies into closer relationship with Britain.

First Colonial Conference (1887), consisting of the Premiers of the colonies who were in London for the first jubilee of Queen Victoria.

NOTE THAT "RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT" PLACES PRIME MINISTERS IN A POSITION TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THEIR PEOPLE.

Second Colonial Conference (1897) presided over by the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain (N232). The Premiers had come for the Diamond Jubilee.

They showed no enthusiasm for close federation, as they cherished their independence.

THE RALLY OF THE COLONIES TO SUPPORT THE MOTHER COUNTRY IN THE DARK DAYS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR REVEALED HOW REAL WERE THE BONDS OF SENTIMENT WHICH HELD THE EMPIRE TOGETHER.

Third Colonial Conference (1902), presided over by Chamberlain, on the occasion of the coronation of Edward VII.

Chamberlain sounded the Premiers on the subject of Imperial Preference (he launched his Tariff Reform scheme the following year, § 327); but they were too enamoured of their *Protective Tariffs* to be willing to lower them, even to each other or to the mother-country.

(Note that Edward VII was styled "King of all the Britains.")

First Imperial Conference (1907), presided over by Asquith. Note (a) the change of title; (b) the fact that it was *specially* summoned; (c) that it was presided over by the Prime Minister himself.

It was summoned to discuss Foreign Policy—the *Entente Cordiale* and the growing tension with Germany. The Dominions would be involved by Britain's policy, so must be consulted.

Second Imperial Conference (1911), presided over by Asquith.

Agenda: common action for Imperial Defence—a permanent committee set up for the purpose. The Great War foreshadowed.

THE WAR FAULT IN GERMANY UNDERESTIMATED THE COHESION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

No. 236.—PROGRESS OF PARLIAMENTARY REFORM (1867-1914).

1872. BALLOT ACT (passed in Gladstone's First Ministry).

Made voting secret, which discouraged bribery and intimidation.

1883. CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (passed in Gladstone's Second Ministry).

Purified elections by imposing penalties on indirect bribery, forbade hiring of carriages, limited the amount that candidates might spend.

1884. COUNTY FRANCHISE ACT (passed by Gladstone's Second Ministry).

Gave the vote to all householders, whether in borough or in rural districts, who paid £10 or more in rent. Net effect: enfranchisement of agricultural workers on the same terms as the Act of 1867 had enfranchised the town worker. (It also enfranchised many working-men who lived in towns not large enough to be separate "Parliamentary Boroughs.") Added two million voters, making a total of five millions. (Note that it enfranchised more than the two earlier Reform Bills put together.)

1885. REDISTRIBUTION ACT (which accompanied the County Franchise Act).

Disfranchised all boroughs of less than 15,000, merging them in county constituencies; and limited towns of less than 50,000 to one member each. The extra members were distributed among the biggest towns—London got 37 more.

1911. PARLIAMENT ACT (passed by Asquith's Ministry).

- Bills passed in three consecutive sessions by the Commons to become law without requiring the assent of the Lords; the duration of Parliament reduced from seven to five years. (Only passed after a fierce struggle with the Lords, § 329).

1911. PAYMENT OF MEMBERS (passed by Asquith's Ministry).

Made it possible for working-men to become Members of Parliament.

No. 237.—DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNION MOVEMENT (1867-1914).

After the fiasco over Robert Owen's "Grand National" (§ 288) the movement was limited to Unions of skilled artisans who could afford substantial subscriptions, in return for which they received "Friendly Society" benefits.

Growing unrest because judges punished as "intimidation" the mere threat of a strike, and declared that Unions could not prosecute dishonest officials.

1871. CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT (passed by the First Gladstone Ministry).

Protected Unions against dishonest officials, and defined "intimidation" more closely; but left them liable to prosecution for "conspiracy."

1875. EMPLOYERS AND WORKMEN ACT (passed by Disraeli's Ministry).

Declared that Unions could not be prosecuted for anything that would not be illegal if done by an individual.

DURING THE 'EIGHTIES "SOCIALISM" BEGAN TO TAKE HOLD OF THE MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE GREAT DOCK STRIKE OF 1889 (§ 321). "FIGHTING" UNIONS OF UNSKILLED WORKERS WERE NOW FORMED.

The *Taff Vale Judgment* (1901) decided that Unions were liable for all losses suffered by employers during a strike. The urgent need to get the law altered in this matter was the main cause for the birth of the LABOUR PARTY, of which the Trade Unions were the backbone. The undertaking by the Liberals to bring in the necessary legislation did much to gain them their overwhelming victory of 1906 (§ 327).

1906. THE TRADE DISPUTES ACT (passed by Campbell-Bannerman's Ministry).

Made Unions immune from prosecution for losses caused by strikes. The *Osborne Judgment* (1909) declared that it was illegal for Unions to use their funds for political purposes (i.e. to support Members of Parliament, etc.). This decision deprived the Labour party of its financial mainstay. So they put pressure on the Government to get the law altered.

1913. THE TRADE UNION ACT (passed by Asquith's Ministry).

Made it legal for Unions to carry on political activities, provided (a) that a majority of their members were in favour of this, and (b) that any member could be exempted from payment towards such expenditure.

Syndicalism, a movement for the control of an industry by the workers employed in it, now gained adherents, especially with the South Wales miners.

Many great strikes took place, 1910-14; and a *Triple Industrial Alliance* was formed by three of the greatest Unions, in order to bring more effective pressure on employers (§ 330).

No. 238.—THE THIRD GREAT ERA OF REFORM (1906-1913).

1906.—**WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT** extended to all trades the protection which had been applied to some by an Act of 1897.

TRADE DISPUTES ACT protecting the funds of Trade Unions (N237).

PROVISION OF MEALS ACT empowered Education Authorities to feed children who came to school hungry.

1907.—**MEDICAL INSPECTION ACT** brought all Elementary School children under medical supervision.

SMALL HOLDINGS ACT imposed upon County Councils the duty of providing Small Holdings, giving them powers of compulsory purchase.

1908.—**OLD AGE PENSIONS** established.

"**CHILDREN'S CHARTER**" protected children from evil influences, and set up special courts for juvenile crime.

1909.—**SWRATED INDUSTRIES ACT** set up Trade Boards to regulate wages and conditions of work in industries where Trade Union action was difficult.

HOUSING AND TOWN-PLANNING ACT endowed Local Authorities with powers for demolition of insanitary slums, and imposed on them the duty of seeing to orderly and systematic development.

LABOUR EXCHANGES established.

1911.—**SHOP HOURS ACT** regulated hours and conditions of shop assistants.

1911.—**NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT** (§ 328) established a system of compulsory insurance for the working-class.

PARLIAMENT ACT (§ 329) abolished the veto of the House of Lords.

PAYMENT OF MEMBERS enabled working-men to become Members of Parliament.

1912.—**THIRD HOME RULE BILL** passed the Commons (§ 330).

1913.—**TRADE UNION ACT** (N237) empowered Unions to use their funds for political purposes.

No. 239. — BRITISH INDIA: VI. THE MORLEY-MINTO REFORMS.

During the 'nineties a Nationalist Movement arose, demanding self-government as had been granted to the Dominions.

Great difficulties in the way of European democracy: (a) dozens of distinct races; (b) hundreds of distinct languages; (c) religious jealousy between Hindus and Mohammedans; (d) caste system; (e) the vast majority illiterate.

Great indignation in Bengal over Lord Curzon's Partition of Bengal for purposes of administration (1905). Outrage and assassination. The partition of Bengal was abolished in 1911 when King George V

visited India and held an Imperial Durbar at Delhi. At the same time the capital of India was transferred from Calcutta to Delhi.

^a The Liberal Government (1906-14) tried to meet the discontent by the largest practicable grant of self-government. In 1909 Lord Morley (Secretary of State for India) and Lord Minto (Viceroy) introduced important changes in the governmental system to ensure that Indian opinion should always be directly represented.

A certain number of elected representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council; an elected Indian majority brought into Provincial Legislative Councils (but it cannot control the Executive as in "Responsible Government"); Indians added to the Viceroy's Executive Council and to the Secretary's Council in London.

But these reforms were far from satisfying Indian demands.

No. 240.—PROGRESS OF SCIENCE: THE AGE OF ELECTRICITY.

The great feature of the scientific progress of the age was the application of electricity to the use of man.

COMMUNICATION:

- 1837.—Telegraphy.
- 1878.—Telephony.
- 1898.—Wireless Telegraphy.

ILLUMINATION:

- 1880.—Arc lamps (in G.P.O. and Liverpool Street Station).
- 1881.—Arc lamps (for street lighting, in London and Liverpool).
- 1882.—Vacuum bulb made electricity available for domestic illumination.

TRACTION:

- 1834.—Underground—Conduit tramway-system adopted by Blackpool.
- 1886.—Overhead—Trolley tramway system adopted by Leeds.
- 1900.—First underground electric railway opened—The Central, London.

As applied to INTERNAL COMBUSTION:

- 1891.—The first motor-vehicle.
- 1901.—The first dirigible balloon.
- 1903.—The first motor-bus.
- 1909.—The first practical aeroplane (Blériot flew the Channel).

Apart from electricity, note that *refrigeration* (developed in the 'eighties) greatly cheapened meat; and that the investigation of *Radio-activity*, which began in 1896, is leading to developments of which we even yet have not realised the full significance.

PERIOD XI

THE FIRST GREAT WAR AND THE TWENTY YEARS' TRUCE

(1914-1939)

Some events stand out in history like watersheds in a continent : they mark the boundary between different aspects and climates and conditions of life. Such an historical watershed was the irruption of the barbarians into the Roman Empire (§ 6) ; another was the Renaissance (§ 83) ; and another was the World War of 1914-1918. We are living far too close to it to comprehend the changes which have been brought about in the destiny of mankind by that stupendous cataclysm. But the treaty that ended it was so faulty, and so faultily carried out, that the next twenty years were merely an uneasy truce, ending in another general war more perilous to civilisation than the first. And now the future of Man depends on his capacity to learn from his mistakes.

CHAPTER LXXVI

THE WAR

1914-1918

§ 332. 1914: MONS—YPRES—THE FALKLANDS.—The war party in Germany had hoped that Britain would be too handicapped by domestic discords to be able to fight, but they soon found their mistake. The Irish problem was adjourned by the passing of the Home Rule Bill, with the proviso that it should not come into force until after the war, when some means was to be found of meeting the objections of Ulster. A truce was called in all Trade Union disputes and in the campaign for Women's Suffrage. The Dominions and India⁹ hastened to raise forces to fight for the Empire.

If the war was inevitable, it could not have come at a more fortunate moment for Britain. Firstly, the fleet had just been engaged in manœuvres, and was therefore already on a war-footing. Secondly, the day after the Declaration of War was a Bank Holiday, and by keeping the banks closed for the next two days the Government was able to avert the danger of a financial panic. By the Thursday the Treasury had printed Notes, and Parliament had passed a law making these Notes legal currency instead of gold. Thirdly, Lord Kitchener happened to be at home on leave, and by promptly making him Secretary for War the Government gained the support of his great reputation for strength and efficiency. People had rather a shock when he prophesied that the war would last at least three years ; but the response to his call for volunteers to form a new army was overwhelming.

Meanwhile the British Expeditionary Force had been swiftly and silently transported across the Channel to take up a position on the left of the French line. Unfortunately it had not been realised how wide the German sweep through Belgium would be, or what vast numbers would be employed in it. The whole left wing of the Allied forces had to retire precipitately lest it should be enveloped. An alleged German Army Order referring to "the contemptible little British army" coined an expression which became a title of honour, for the *Retreat from Mons*, carried out in perfect order amid great difficulties, was a finer military exploit than many a glorious victory.

The Allies turned at bay at the Marne, and drove the enemy back to the Aisne. There they dug themselves in, and soon there was a continuous line of trenches from the Swiss frontier to the English Channel. During the rest of 1914 the Germans made determined efforts to gain the Channel ports, which the British used as their bases. In the long-drawn-out defence of Ypres the old British army was almost destroyed ; but by this time reserves were ready to step into the breach.

Meanwhile the Russians had tried to relieve the pressure on France by attacking East Prussia ; but they were swept back by

Hindenburg at the Battle of Tannenburg, and never again set foot on German soil. Trench warfare now began on the Eastern Front as well as on the Western.

The naval policy of the German Government was to keep their main fleet in port until mines and submarines had reduced the British strength to something like their own. The British fleet was unable to blockade them closely owing to minefields, and it therefore took up a position at Scapa watching for its enemy to appear. Several German warships were at distant stations when war broke out, and of these two managed to reach Constantinople, where their presence encouraged Turkey to enter the war on behalf of the Central Powers (November 1914). Four others which were in the Pacific destroyed a weaker British squadron off *Coronel* (Chili); but a month later they were themselves taken at a disadvantage near the *Falkland Islands* and completely destroyed. Thus by the end of the year the German flag had disappeared from the sea, and the Allies had a monopoly of sea-borne commerce for the rest of the War.

§ 333. 1915: TRENCH WARFARE—GALLIPOLI—COALITION GOVERNMENT.—During this year the trench defences on the Western Front was so developed by barbed-wire entanglements and machine-guns that none of the attacks made by either side made gains proportionate to the casualties they cost. Hand grenades and trench mortars and poison gas were also brought into use; and the industrial resources of all the belligerent countries were gradually concentrated on the production of war material.

There was much debate as to whether it would be better for the Allies to concentrate their strength for frontal attacks in the west, or to strike at points where the enemy was weaker—on the Turkish or Balkan fronts. On the whole, the generals favoured the former policy and the statesmen the latter. The result of this division of opinion was seen in the *Gallipoli* adventure of this year. An attempt was made to knock Turkey out of the war, so as to relieve the pressure on Russia; but the

War Office was so reluctant to spare men and munitions for the expedition that it was crippled; and after deeds of valour unsurpassed in the history of warfare (especially by the Australasian troops), the Gallipoli Peninsula was evacuated. An attack on the Turkish province of Mesopotamia also failed, the Anglo-Indian force engaged being forced to surrender at *Kut-al-Amaru*. These two mishaps to the allied cause influenced Bulgaria to throw in her lot with Germany, and Greece (which had been on the point of joining the Allies) to remain neutral.

A Russian attack on Austria was met by a German counter-attack, which only ended when the Central Powers had established their trench lines well inside Russian territory. They might have pushed their advantage even further but for the fact that Italy declared war on Austria, in the hope of gaining certain Austrian provinces inhabited mainly by Italians. But this accession of strength was counteracted when the enemy overran Serbia in order to free their communications with the Turkish Empire along the Berlin-Bagdad railway.

The end of the year saw two notable changes in the British control of the war. Firstly, a number of Conservatives now joined the Asquith Government, and, for the rest of the war, Britain was ruled by a Coalition in which each of the three political parties was represented. Secondly, Sir John French was superseded in the chief command by Sir Douglas Haig.

§ 334. 1916: THE SOMME—JUTLAND—LLOYD GEORGE.—Military service was now made compulsory for all men of suitable age, and by the end of the year almost the whole nation was involved in war work, directly or indirectly. In order to release men to fight, thousands of women undertook work that had hitherto been done by men, as munition workers, tram conductors, postmen, lorry drivers, bank clerks, and so on.

The chief naval action of the war took place on 31st May. The German fleet came into conflict with the British battle cruiser squadron off *Jutland*. Two British ships were quickly

sunk ; but the German commander declined to be drawn into a conflict with the main British battle fleet, which was rushing to the scene of action at full speed, and sought the protection of his minefields under cover of mist and darkness. Admiral Jellicoe dared not risk the destruction of his capital ships by mines and submarines, and turned back to his base at Scapa. The Germans had inflicted more damage than they received ; but their High Seas Fleet did not venture out of port again for the rest of the war.

At home in England, air raids by Zeppelins did a good deal of damage without any appreciable approach to their main object of terrorising the civilian population ; and the destruction of several of these airships in the course of September did much to discourage this form of attack. A more serious difficulty was the rebellion which broke out in Ireland. The republican party there, now known as *Sinn Féin* (" ourselves alone "), took advantage of the Government's preoccupation with the war, and they had to be kept in check by a garrison which drew off troops urgently required in France.

The chief political event of the year was the replacement of Asquith by Lloyd George as head of the Coalition Ministry—the result of a feeling that the Government had not carried on the war with sufficient concentration of energy.

§ 335. 1917 : SUBMARINES—AMERICA—JERUSALEM.—At the beginning of 1917 the German Government began an intensive effort to starve Britain by means of submarine blockade. They announced that they would sink all vessels, of whatever nationality, proceeding to or from a British port. It was almost certain that this would bring the United States in against them, but they calculated that they would have won the war long before American forces would be ready to fight. For a time it seemed as if they might win this race against time, for they sank so many ships that the British nation had to be put upon rations. But great efforts were made to increase the production of foodstuffs and shipping, and various ingenious plans were

adopted for destroying the U-boats. By the autumn the country was out of danger.

The United States, as had been expected, declared war on the Central Powers ; but this important addition to the allied strength was for a time counterbalanced by the defection of Russia. The appalling suffering inflicted upon the poorer classes in that country by the war gave an opportunity to revolutionary forces that had long been working underground against the despotism of the Czar's government. The Czar was forced to abdicate, and a group of Communists known as *Bolsheviks* gained control. Their first act was to make an armistice as a preliminary to a reorganisation of Russia in accordance with their own political and social faith.

Several more futile " offensives " were made on the Western Front. At the time it was hoped that these attacks were wearing out the enemy's strength ; but we know now that our losses were always greater than theirs. Almost the only bright spot amid the general gloom with which the year ended was Allenby's capture of Palestine from the Turks. But it seemed a long way from Jerusalem to Berlin !

§ 336. 1918 : DISASTER—TRIUMPH—ARMISTICE.—The economic blockade with which the Allies (and especially the British navy) had ringed the Central Powers around caused great privations among their civil population as well as among their troops, and they were now running short of commodities essential to carrying on the war. They entered upon the campaign of 1918 determined to force matters to an immediate issue before the American army appeared on the Western Front. The collapse of Russia enabled them to concentrate almost their whole strength on that front ; and Ludendorff, who was now Commander-in-Chief, had devised new methods of attack which promised to be more successful than anything attempted in the past.

The Allies knew something of what was in store for them, and set up a joint Council of War in Paris to unify their de-

fences ; yet when the attack came it was so terrific that one British army was completely wiped out, the line was pushed back for miles, enormous quantities of war material and tens of thousands of prisoners were lost. By desperate efforts the breach in the line was closed up, and the losses in men and material were repaired ; but by June the Germans were back on the Marne and Paris was once more in danger. But the threatened disaster had driven the Allies to take two steps which now turned the tide—they appointed Marshal Foch to take command of the whole of their forces ; and they accelerated the arrival of the American troops. The realisation that a fresh enemy, with inexhaustible resources in wealth and manpower, had appeared in the field against them, was a crushing disappointment to the war-worn Germans. In August the British won a notable success, following a surprise attack by hundreds of tanks. French, American, and British armies side by side drove the enemy steadily back all through September. By this time Bulgaria and Turkey were in a state of collapse. Serbia was recovered by an attack from Salonica, and Austria—thus exposed to attacks from the south—was unable to offer any further resistance.

Revolutions now broke out in Germany, as a result of the terrible privations which the nation had so long suffered. The navy mutinied when ordered out to certain destruction. The Kaiser fled to Holland, and his abdication was followed by that of all the other ruling princes of Germany. A provisional republic was set up, and an armistice brought the fighting to an end at eleven o'clock on the morning of 11th November.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THE HARVEST OF WAR

1919-1922

§ 337. THE PEACE TREATIES.—During the first half of 1919 the most remarkable Peace Conference in world history was held in Paris. The Germans had agreed to the armistice on the understanding that the general basis of the settlement was to be the famous "Fourteen Points" in which President Wilson had set forth the war aims of the Allies (N242). These "Points" were open to very varied interpretations—it was only with great difficulty that the Allies themselves could be brought to an agreement as to what they really implied; but so complete had been the defeat and demoralisation of the Central Powers that they could not in any case renew the conflict, and were therefore compelled to accept the terms laid down by the victors. They were not even allowed to discuss them—the Allied Powers merely summoned their representatives to hear the decisions to be imposed upon them.

Thirty-seven Governments were represented at the Conference; but the real issues were settled at private meetings by the "Big Four"—President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando. There were acute differences of opinion over some of the problems before them—as to the conflicting claims of Italy and Serbia to the eastern coast of the Adriatic, for instance. And throughout the discussions the great hindrance to a wise settlement was the fact that the statesmen were dependent for power on democracies whose patriotism had been fanned to fever heat by war passions.

President Wilson had immense prestige in Europe owing partly to his lofty utterances on democracy, and partly to the fact that he controlled the vast resources of the United States, which were much less impaired by the war than those of the Allies. He was therefore able to get his way when he insisted

that his project for a *League of Nations*—an international organisation to prevent future wars—should take precedence over all other matters before the Conference. The Covenant of the League formed the first part of the actual Treaties signed with each of the enemy Powers (N243).

But the dominant personality at the Conference was Clemenceau, the veteran French statesman, who was rigidly determined that the utmost advantage should be taken of the victory to ensure that Germany should never again be in a position to invade French soil. The Germans had hoped that by establishing a republic they would gain better terms from the victors; but these could not well have been more severe in any case. They had to give Alsace-Lorraine back to France, and a large slice of Prussia to the new republic of Poland (N244); they were forced to admit their sole responsibility for the war, and were condemned to pay an indemnity so vast that the amount could not be fixed—it was to be settled later by a special commission; they were to surrender all their war fleet and most of their merchant vessels; their future army and navy were to be limited to the minimum necessary for defence, and they were forbidden to have submarines or air force. Their colonies were "mandated" to Britain and the British Dominions, to be governed and developed under the supervision of the League (N243).

In treaties passed during the next year or so the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dismembered; part of it formed the republics of Hungary and Czechoslovakia; part was added to Serbia to form the kingdom of Yugoslavia. Similarly with the Turkish Empire: its outlying provinces were mandated to Britain and France, and two of them (Arabia and Irak) soon became independent kingdoms.

§ 338. THE RETURN TO PEACE IN BRITAIN.—Several domestic reforms of permanent importance had been made by Parliament in the course of the war. H. A. L. Fisher, President of the Board of Education, put through a Bill to raise the school-leaving

age to 15 and to provide compulsory part-time education for young persons up to the age of 18. The Local Government Board was reconstructed as a "Ministry of Health," and new Ministries were set up for Labour and for Transport. The splendid service rendered by women to the national cause, in the uniformed services, in hospitals, factories, and offices, on railways, trains, and buses, and in a thousand other jobs commonly done by men, demonstrated more effectively than the suffragette agitation their right to full citizenship; and the *Representation of the People Act* (1918) went a long step in that direction by giving the vote to women over 30. Finally, the *Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act* (1919) threw nearly all professions and public offices open to them—they could become doctors, barristers, town councillors or members of Parliament.

A General Election—the first since 1911—was held immediately after the Armistice. Lloyd George claimed that the Coalition Ministry which had won the war should be entrusted with making the peace and organising the nation's return to civil life. To strengthen its claims to support, he perpetuated the split among Liberals by representing that Asquith and his followers had hampered the national war effort. He promised that the Coalition would (a) "Hang the Kaiser," and call other ex-enemies to account for unlawful methods of warfare; (b) "Make Germany Pay" the whole cost of the war; and (c) turn Britain into "A Land Fit for Heroes to live in." The nation, dazzled by these glittering prospects, gave the Coalition an enormous majority, consisting mainly of Conservatives. The Labour Party and the Asquithian Liberals could muster only 63 and 27 members respectively. The Labour Party, after an existence of only twenty years, now became the official Opposition, and Liberalism, only fourteen years after its greatest triumph, sank into a mere minority group.

The Coalition Government was not very successful in carrying out its pledges. Holland refused to hand over the ex-Kaiser, and the Allies made no serious attempt to compel

her to do so. The efforts to extract the cost of the war ended in almost complete failure, as we shall shortly see (§ 344). Nor was there any marked improvement in the conditions of life in Britain. On the contrary, much confusion and ill-feeling arose over "demobilisation"—the return of the millions of temporary soldiers and sailors to civilian life. There was an acute shortage of houses, and the Government's attempts to make it up fell ludicrously short of what was required. The most vital parts of the new Education Act could not be put into effect for lack of funds. The cost of living had doubled during the war, and continued to rise even after the return of peace. After a year or so of hectic "boom," while people who had done well out of the war were spending money on the things they had had to do without, a disastrous "slump" set in. Tens of thousands were thrown out of work. The scales of benefit under the Unemployment Insurance Act had been increased to tally with the increased cost of living; but the system was supposed to be self-supporting—the Act did not entitle people to maintenance for more than a certain number of weeks after paying a certain number of weekly contributions. But the estimated maximum of 8 per cent. unemployed was now doubled; tens of thousands were now permanently out of work, and more young people entered the labour market every week without having had a chance to earn the right to benefit. So the Insurance Fund had to be constantly replenished from the Treasury—i.e., at the expense of the taxpayer. These extra "uncovenanted" payments became known as "the dole"—an ugly word which cast an unfair aspersion on these victims of a new Industrial Revolution.

Thus there was a widespread feeling of disappointment and discontent which found expression in embittered labour disputes. The Trade Unions had gained greatly in strength during the war, when the demand for labour enabled them to extort higher wages than ever before. They were determined to maintain these improved standards of living, but the employers were equally determined to return to peace conditions

as soon as possible. The battle was first joined over the coal-mines. The miners demanded higher wages, shorter hours, and the "nationalisation" of the mines. After much negotiation, they gave notice that they would enforce these demands by a strike, and the other members of the Triple Alliance (§ 330) threatened to support them. At the last moment the Government induced them to postpone action while the matter was threshed out by a Royal Commission on which all parties would be represented under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Sankey. After sitting for several weeks, a majority of the Commission reported in favour of a modified advance in wages and the purchase of the collieries by the State. These terms satisfied the miners, and the strike was averted. Then it was the turn of the railwaymen. Their wages had been doubled by a war bonus, and the Government (which had taken control over the railway system during the war) now proposed to make some reduction. In this case the strike actually occurred, and the transport system of the country came to a standstill for over a week. In the end the men gained most of their demands.

§ 339. THE "SUPPRESSED NATIONALITIES" OF THE EMPIRE. —The national feeling which had been one of the main causes of the war was intensified rather than allayed in consequence of it. This was made manifest not only by the birth of new national-states in Europe and Asia, but also in the British Commonwealth. The emancipation of the "Daughter Nations" was recognised by the fact that each of them sent its own delegates to the Peace Conference, and became separate members of the League of Nations. Britain has gladly acquiesced in this growing independence; but in other parts of the Empire nationalist aspirations led to bitter struggles in the years immediately after the war.

In *Ireland* the old Nationalist Party was everywhere defeated by "Sinn Fein" (§ 334) at the election of 1918; and the members set up an independent government at Dublin

instead of joining the Parliament at Westminster. When this act of defiance was followed by the murder of officials, policemen, and soldiers, the British Government declared Sinn Féin abolished, and arrested its leading members. After two years of atrocious murders and savage reprisals, the Coalition passed an Act which gave Ireland much completer Home Rule than Gladstone ever contemplated (§ 318). The great difficulty was, as always, that the people of the north-eastern counties round Belfast, being mainly Protestant, were determined never to come under the rule of their hereditary enemies the Catholic majority. The new Act tried to cut the Gordian knot by *partition*—giving N.E. Ireland a parliament and government of its own, as well as a share in those at Westminster. This aroused furious indignation in the more violent elements of Sinn Féin; nothing would now satisfy them but an independent republic of all Ireland. The bloodshed and destruction continued until in the autumn of 1921 the Sinn Féin leaders agreed to a treaty by which Ireland (apart from the six north-eastern counties) became a "Free State" with the same degree of independence as the Dominion of Canada.¹ A minority of out-and-out Republicans resisted the settlement, but it was henceforth the duty of the Free State Government at Dublin to suppress them. Several more years of assassinations and executions followed before the country settled down.

In 1917 *India* had been promised "Dominion status" as soon as her people (only a tenth of whom could read and write) were ready for democratic government. E. S. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, had gone out to confer with Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, and the result was an Act of Parliament passed in 1918. This set up a "Dyarchy" by which certain subjects (such as Education and Public Health) were "transferred" to Indian ministers responsible (§ 234) to elected parliaments in the various provinces of British India, while others (including Finance and the Police) were "reserved" to

¹ The "Unionist" Party which had taken the chief part in making this Treaty now reverted to its old name "Conservative."

ministers (usually Indians) appointed by the Governor. This system was to be in force for ten years, at the end of which the British Government was to consider whether the time was ripe for a further step towards independence. But this did not satisfy the Nationalists. They were organised in an "Indian National Congress" under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who wanted India to win political independence as part of a revolt against European industrialism and a return to the simple life. He exhorted his followers to make British rule impossible by merely refusing to co-operate with it; and when they disobeyed him and resorted to violence, he underwent severe fasts to atone for their misdeeds. But in spite of opposition the Montagu-Chelmsford system provided India with a government in which Indians took a greater part than ever before.

During the war the British Government had to make *Egypt* a Protectorate, strongly defended against possible enemy aggression; but with the return of peace the desire to throw off the British yoke was so strong among the Egyptians that the Government gave way. In 1922 a Declaration was published making Egypt a sovereign state under a constitutional monarchy, the only limitations to its complete independence being the right of Britain to control the Suez Canal, the protection of foreigners and the government of the Sudan. A party of extremists continued to agitate for complete independence, and to enforce their claims by murdering British officials. When this party gained a majority at general elections, constitutional government had to be suspended for a time; and the disturbances continued until in 1936 Egypt became a kingdom independent except for a kind of permanent alliance with Great Britain.

§ 340. POLITICAL INNOVATIONS.—We have noted some of the immediate effects of the war upon the political and social life of Britain; but these were unimportant compared with the revolutions which took place in other European countries.

At the time of the Russian Revolution (1917, § 335) the Allies had tried to bolster up the moderate party under Kerensky against the Communists under Lenin, who insisted on an immediate peace with Germany in order to establish the earthly paradise foretold by Karl Marx (§ 321)—the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The civil war between these parties went on long after the Great War had ended, and for a time the Allied Powers continued to support the “Whites” against the “Reds.” Nevertheless, in the end the latter were completely successful, and they were able to set up a *Union of Socialist Soviet Republics* which united the provinces (Asiatic as well as European) in a federation of locally elected councils (*Soviets*). Leadership is exercised by the Communist Party; farms and factories are owned by the community—nobody lives in idleness on rents or dividends. The creation by this minority of fanatics of an entirely new political, social, and economic system was a tremendous undertaking. For a time the other civilised Powers felt the same dread of “Bolshevism” that had been felt 120 years earlier of “Jacobinism” (§ 245), but the Bolsheviks, like their prototypes, soon had to abandon their hopes of converting the whole world to their creed, and hostility towards them gradually died down.

For a time their doctrines undoubtedly had a good deal of influence outside Russia. In Germany, Austria, and Hungary there were armed conflicts before parliamentary republics could be established; and in several countries the normal working of parliamentary institutions was replaced by dictatorship. The most significant examples of this were Italy and Turkey.

The whole economic life of Italy had been thrown out of gear by the war. Unemployment and semi-starvation were rife; prices were doubled; business was crippled by lack of capital and high taxation; there were constant labour disputes, often accompanied by violence. Armed factions were on the point of civil war, and the constitutional Government seemed helpless to avert it. At last, in October 1922, an anti-Communist party known as *Fascisti* foregathered at Naples, and,

marching on Rome, seized power by main force. Their leader, Mussolini, became Premier, and organised a vigorous government in which he himself had all real power, the parliamentary monarchy being reduced to a mere shadow. The majority of the Italian people seemed to find compensation for the loss of their "liberty" in the orderly and efficient government which the new régime provides.

An equally striking development took place in Turkey. By the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) the Allies deprived Turkey not only of its outlying Arab provinces, but of most of Asia Minor. But the landing of a Greek force at Smyrna, which had been allotted to Greece by the treaty, revived patriotic fervour among the Turks. Rallying round a revolutionary leader named *Mustapha Kemal*, they threw the Greeks out, set up a republic, and compelled the Allies to reopen the question of peace terms. The result was the *Treaty of Lausanne* (1923), by which the republic of Turkey under Kemal retained the whole of Asia Minor, with Ankara as its capital. Kemal then went on to create a new, powerful, and progressive Turkish nation.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THE AFTERMATH

1922-1929

§ 341. THE FIRST LABOUR GOVERNMENT.—Lloyd George was very active in grappling with post-war problems—German reparations, European frontiers, Irish troubles, Labour discontents. But the difficulties were insuperable; everybody was disappointed with the Government for one reason or another, and when the Prime Minister proposed to go to war in support of the Greeks in Asia Minor, the Conservatives felt that the time had come to discard him and use the great parliamentary majority they had won in 1918 to set up an independent party

Government. A General Election confirmed them in power under Bonar Law (1922). The Opposition was now made up of three distinct groups—the Labour Party under Ramsay MacDonald, the “National Liberal” followers of Lloyd George, and the “Independent Liberals” under Asquith.

The most notable achievement of the Bonar Law ministry was an arrangement for paying off the war debt to the United States. Britain was owed far more by France and Italy than she owed to America, and was quite willing to pay over all that she received. But the continental ex-Allies showed no sign of liquidating their debts, and America would not agree to any such conditional arrangement. So Stanley Baldwin, Bonar Law's Chancellor of the Exchequer, went over to Washington and made an agreement by which Britain was to pay annual instalments of about £35 millions for 70 years.

In May 1923 Bonar Law resigned owing to illness from which he died a few months later. He was succeeded by Baldwin, and the King's action in sending for this comparatively unknown statesman instead of the far more experienced and celebrated Lord Curzon (who had been Viceroy of India and a member of the War Cabinet) marked the fact that it is essential nowadays for a Prime Minister to be in the House of Commons.

Many Conservatives still wanted “Tariff Reform”—the protection of British industries by import duties (§ 327); and at the end of the year Baldwin dissolved Parliament and appealed to the country for authority to make a change in this direction as the only cure for unemployment. The threat to “Free Trade” was almost as fatal to the Conservatives as it had been twenty years before. They lost 90 seats, of which Labour gained 50. All the Opposition parties were united over this question, and their combined votes turned the Government out. The King now summoned Ramsay MacDonald, as head of the largest Opposition group, to form a Ministry. Thus the Labour party became responsible for the government of the country in little more than twenty years after its very humble beginnings (§ 328).

But though it was in office it was not really in power, for it was dependent on the support of the Liberal groups. It was therefore unable to pass any socialistic legislation. Many people were surprised that the Ministers, none of whom had any experience of office, were able to carry on the Government efficiently—especially in foreign affairs, which were in the hands of the Prime Minister himself. Their lease of office did not last very long, however. Before the year was out they fell under suspicion of being in league with the Russian Bolsheviks (§ 340). MacDonald had to dissolve Parliament owing to this, and after the ensuing election (the fourth in three years!) the Conservatives had a substantial majority over Liberals and Labour combined.

§ 342. **BRITAIN GOES BACK TO GOLD.**—The Chancellor of the Exchequer in this second Baldwin Ministry, Winston Churchill (who had been President of the Board of Trade and First Lord of the Admiralty in the last Liberal Government, but now reverted to his original party), made a bold stroke of financial policy by putting Britain back on the Gold Standard. What this really meant is not easy to understand, but we must make the attempt, for it had most important consequences for the nation.

If the money of different countries is exchangeable for gold (which has a fairly steady intrinsic value), there is a permanent rate of exchange between them—a certain number of dollars, for instance, will always have the same value as a pound sterling. That was one of the objects of Peel's Bank Act (§ 289), which compelled the Bank of England to sell gold for foreign currencies up to any amount at this fixed rate. This Act encouraged foreign governments to keep deposits in London: "safe as the Bank of England" was a saying all over the globe; and London became the centre of world finance. But in 1914 the British Government had to suspend the gold clause of the Act—it needed all the gold in the bank to finance its immense war expenditure. Most other countries (but not the United States) had followed suit. The £, no longer pinned to gold, fluctuated

in value according to supply and demand, just like any other commodity. During the war Britain needed to buy \$ with £s (to pay for American goods) so much more than Americans needed £s (to pay for British goods), that the exchange value of the £ fell from the pre-war \$4.86 to \$3.70. This encouraged Americans to buy British goods, since they could get £s to pay for them so cheaply. But it hurt British pride that the sovereign should lose its character as an international standard of value, and that "Wall Street" should replace "The City" as the hub of the financial world. Moreover, it was very harmful to international trade that the money of different countries should fluctuate—exporters and importers never knew where they were when they asked or accepted prices for goods; and a Conference of the European Powers at Genoa in 1922 recommended that they should all restore a fixed value in gold to their money as soon as possible. The British Government felt that it ought to set an example to the smaller fry by giving the £ its pre-war value. By raising the bank rate (the official rate of interest for business loans) and thus restricting the outflow of credit, the value of the £ was screwed up until in the spring of 1925 Parliament took the final step of re-enacting the gold clause of the Bank Act. Now again, as before 1914, it took \$4.86 to buy a £ worth of British goods. "The Pound could look the Dollar in the face" once more, but the increased cost of British goods to foreign consumers caused a serious falling off in export trade. To combat it by lower prices employers had to reduce their costs of production—80 per cent. of which consist of wages. Unemployment and social discontent became worse than ever, and the ill-will between employers and workers that had been smouldering for years burst into flame.

The miners still nursed a grievance that the Government had never carried out the recommendations of the Sankey Commission (§ 338); but the root of the trouble went deeper than that. The demand for British coal had fallen off after the war, owing to the facts that other countries were developing their own supplies, and that oil was displacing

coal as fuel. The working-classes in general, and the miners in particular, had hoped that the war would result in better conditions for them, and that they would gain some measure of control over the industries on which they depended for their living. But the coal-owners declared that the mines could not pay higher wages in existing conditions. The miners replied that they could if they were nationalised; and these disputes led in 1920-21 to two strikes which only made the situation worse by driving foreign customers to seek supplies elsewhere.

The next few years were disastrous for the whole Trade Union movement. Trade declined, wages were further reduced, unemployment increased, membership of the Unions fell off. The leaders, finding that the strike-weapon availed them little, turned once more to political action; and by a great effort placed the Labour party in office in 1924. But, as we have seen (§ 341), the MacDonald Ministry could do little to fulfil the hopes of its supporters, and was soon forced to resign. In June 1925 another crisis arose. The Baldwin Ministry suddenly gave up the control of the mines which the Government had exercised ever since 1917. This threatened the miners with a further loss of earning-power, and they demanded a subsidy to tide them over until some new arrangement could be made. The Government at first refused; but when the other leading Unions organised "sympathetic strikes" it gave way.

The idea of putting pressure on Government and employers by means of a general stoppage of work had long been discussed by continental Socialists. We have seen what disaster followed Robert Owen's attempt to carry it out in the early days of the movement (§ 288). British Trade Unionists as a whole had no taste for such "revolutionary" expedients; but their success in extorting the coal subsidy turned their heads. When the subsidy expired (1st May 1926) they threatened to support the miners by a General Strike unless it were renewed. Rather to their surprise the Government accepted the challenge, and the strike was declared. It lasted a little more than a week, and ended in a complete defeat for the Unions. There were

four main reasons for this result. Firstly, the Government had foreseen the strike, and had prepared for it by organising an emergency system for supplying all parts of the country with the necessaries of life. Secondly, the people who were hardest hit by it were the strikers and their families, who formed the bulk of the community. Thirdly, road-transport carried on by amateur lorry-drivers minimised the effects of the stoppage of railway traffic. Fourthly, the Trade Union leaders were not really "revolutionists" at heart, and were alarmed to learn that the strike was illegal.

The Government followed up its success by passing a new *Trade Union Act* (1927)¹ which made it illegal to put pressure on the community by "sympathetic strikes," and put difficulties in the way of Trade Unions supporting Members of Parliament. But this did little to obliterate the deplorable effects of the episode on industry and trade, which in turn aggravated the unemployment which was already blighting the nation's welfare.

§ 344. WAR DEBTS AND PEACE PACTS.—The Great War, which had been the outcome of national passions, made them intenser than ever; but it also made the nations anxious to find some way of living together in peace. For it seemed doubtful if European civilisation would be able to survive another such cataclysm, especially in view of the continual development of apparatus for destroying life and property. The League of Nations did useful work from time to time (N245); but two of the greatest states in the world, the United States and Soviet Russia, were not members; and if any Power refused to obey its behests it had no means of enforcing them. * *

One great obstacle to good feeling and prosperity we have already mentioned—the question of reparations and war debts. The payment of international debts is always very difficult. In this case what had been borrowed was not money, but goods with which to wage the war; and no country was willing to

¹ This was repealed by the Labour Government in 1946.

receive repayment in the form of goods which would compete with its own industries. The problem was most acute over the matter of German reparations. The most fantastic ideas were entertained at first about Germany's capacity to pay the whole cost of the war. Britain woke up from this rosy dream a long time before France did, and the two Governments drifted apart over the question of extorting payment. In 1923 France put pressure on the German Republic by sending her troops to occupy the Ruhr coalfields; but this failed of its immediate purpose and had unfortunate effects on the economic welfare not only of Germany but of Europe in general. The German Government could not buy francs to pay France without causing a fall in the value of the mark; and after the occupation of the Ruhr they gave up trying to do so—they printed more and more paper money until a truck-load of it was needed to buy a loaf of bread.

As the ex-Allies declared that the payment of their war-debts to America depended on Germany's payment of reparations, the United States sent their Colonel Dawes to preside over a committee of experts to consider the whole problem (1924). It restored German currency, arranged for an ascending scale of annual payments, and set up a Transfer Committee through which the German Government could pay without reducing the value of their new Reichsmarks. But even now the total amount was not specified, and Germans were discouraged by the feeling that the harder they worked and the more they stinted their own consumption, the more they would be expected to pay over to their former enemies.

This Dawes Scheme gave Europe a respite of five years in which to devise some guarantee of peace more effective than the League. The three countries chiefly concerned had able statesmen in control of their foreign affairs: Briand, Austen Chamberlain (the elder son of the Victorian statesman) and Stresemann. Between them they threshed out the Treaty of *Locarno* (1925) whereby France and Germany agreed to refer any future disputes to arbitration, and Britain guaranteed the

Franco-German frontier. Germany was now admitted to the League of Nations, and became (if only for a few years) a decent member of the family of nations.

Locarno was supplemented a few years later by the *Kellogg Pact*, by which the Powers undertook never to try to gain their ends by war. This may seem like a mere repetition of the League Covenant, but it had the advantage that it was accepted by Russia and the United States, the two World Powers outside the League.

§ 345. THE END OF THE OLD POOR LAW.—Meanwhile, in home affairs the second Baldwin Government proceeded on its placid way. It completed universal suffrage by the *Equal Franchise Act* (1928) which gave the vote to all men and women over 21 on level terms. And it passed a *Local Government Act* (1929) which was notable evidence of a general feeling that a democratic government ought to see that everybody has a fair chance of health and happiness. As far back as 1909 a Royal Commission on the Poor Law had declared that the Act of 1834 (§ 283) which deliberately made the life of paupers wretched was hopelessly out of date. It showed that most pauperism was due to sickness; and this fact was recognised when in 1919 the old Local Government Board (which supervised the administration of the Poor Law) became the Ministry of Health. The new Ministry encouraged Town and County Councils to provide general, mental, and isolation hospitals, centres for maternity and child welfare, and so on. But there were many unfortunate people, during those bad years when unemployment hovered round the two million mark, whose needs were not met by any of these institutions, nor by the extension of insurance and Old Age Pensions. Their only resource was Poor Relief, and the funds at the disposal of Guardians' Committees became bankrupt. So the Minister of Health in the Baldwin Government (Neville Chamberlain, half-brother of Austen) carried through a new Act which abolished the old system altogether. The main duties of the Guardians were

handed over to "Public Assistance Committees" of County and County Borough Councils, their duties relating to hospitals being delegated to "Committees for Public Health."

CHAPTER LXXIX

THE GREAT SLUMP

1929-1935

§ 346. THE SECOND LABOUR GOVERNMENT.—In 1929 the five-years term of the Parliament elected in 1924 came to an end, and another General Election fell due. Baldwin and his colleagues took "Safety First" as their battlecry: they had provided sound, sane, and steady government, and would continue to do so if confirmed in office. But the political pendulum was swinging as usual; the Trade Unions were resentful about the General Strike and the Trade Union Act (§ 343); there was a general feeling that the Tories were "tired," and that Labour ought to be given a chance to tackle the persistent problem of unemployment. The Liberals, reunited under Lloyd George after the death of Asquith in 1928, were also burning for a chance to recover their position as a great national party with an ambitious scheme to cure unemployment by public works on roads, bridges, housing, and electricity.

The result of the election was to increase the strength of the Labour party from 160 to 290, and to reduce that of the Conservatives from 390 to 260, but the number of Liberal members only rose from 46 to 60. It looked as if Liberalism was doomed to a lingering death, for electors will not go on indefinitely supporting a party which has no chance of ever coming back into power.

So Labour had its second spell of office, with Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister, Arthur Henderson at the Foreign

Office, and Philip Snowden as Chancellor of the Exchequer. It had a bigger majority than in 1923-24, but was still hampered by the fact that a united vote of the two Opposition parties could turn it out at any moment. And it had an ill-starred existence. It began by raising the scale of benefits to the unemployed. This was only fulfilling a promise made at the election, but it increased the strain on the financial position of the country, and before long the Insurance Fund was "borrowing" £1,000,000 a week from the Treasury. J. H. Thomas, who had been made Lord Privy Seal with the special task of grappling with unemployment, achieved less than nothing. By the end of his first year of office the number of insured persons out of work had risen 30 per cent., and a year later it was nearly three million.

§ 347. TRADE CYCLES.—There was worse to follow, for the Government had the misfortune to be in office during the greatest trade depression in history. "Booms" and "slumps" had alternated ever since the Industrial Revolution started mass production for world markets (§ 314). Whenever the management of a manufacturing firm found a new opening for selling its products it hastened to take advantage of the fact. It laid down more plant, obtained more raw material, engaged more labour. Suppliers of the plant, the material and the labour all shared in the increased demand, and were able to consume more of the goods of other producers. Thus the effects spread far and wide, like the ripples from a stone thrown into a pond. But competitors rushed in to try to get a share of the new market—there was no central planning authority to regulate supply by demand. After a time the market was over-supplied, stocks accumulate, or had to be sold at a loss. But now there were few to buy, even at the reduced price, for factories were closing, hands were being discharged, every one was cutting down his expenditure—the whole process was reversed; and countries were now so inter-dependent that ups and downs became world-wide.

The war had upset the rhythm of the "business cycle," but from 1925 onwards there was a steady revival of trade over most of the world, and the United States, where vast profits had been made out of the war, seemed to have a permanent high level of prosperity. Mankind had doubled his productive power since the beginning of the century, and there appeared to be no reason why all should not sooner or later be able to share in the advantages. Large sums went to America in payment of war debts, and as interest on loans to Germany and Austria, and this gold encouraged American banks to advance large credits for the expansion of industry. There was a feverish rush to buy shares in business enterprises, and Americans borrowed money recklessly, often at rates of interest as high as 15 per cent., from their own banks and from those of Europe, to take part in the scramble. Soon speculation took the place of investment—people bought shares not to draw revenue from them but to sell them at a profit. But there came a time, in the autumn of 1929, when it became plain to sensible folk that production lagged far behind the fantastic prices to which shares had risen; more wanted to sell than wanted to buy. A panic set in on the New York Stock Exchange. Prices came down faster than they had gone up; tens of thousands of people were impoverished, millions became unemployed.

The effects of "the Wall Street Crash" were almost as shattering in Europe as in America. Germany had borrowed much American money to reconstruct her heavy industries and to pay her reparations under the Dawes Plan. But in the boom of 1928 Americans had more profitable uses for their money at home, and in the slump of 1929 they had no more money to lend. To prevent Germany becoming bankrupt the Dawes Plan was replaced by a Young Plan (so called after the name of the American chairman of the committee that arranged it), which reduced the scale of reparations and made them partly dependent on circumstances. The German Government tried to keep up the payments by raising the bank rate, by dismissing state employees and by heavy taxation, but this threw millions

out of work and caused dangerous discontents. Then in the middle of 1931 the failure of the Vienna Credit Anstalt, which was closely connected with the great German banks, made American, British, and French investors rush to recall their loans from Germany. To meet these demands vast quantities of marks had to be turned into foreign currency, and their value fell rapidly. The German Finance Minister appealed to London for a loan. But London could not help—and this fact revealed to a dumbfounded world that Britain's own financial position was almost equally shaky.

§ 348. THE "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" FORMED.—Britain had shared little of the American boom. The debt settlement (§ 341) was a handicap, for American tariffs prevented payment in goods, and the drain of bullion limited the capacity of the Bank of England to encourage British industries. And the return to the Gold Standard (§ 342) hindered the sale of our goods abroad. Hence the growth of unemployment, which (apart from the cost of the "Dole") was a ruinous waste of the country's manpower. Already in the spring of 1931 Snowden had declared that from the way things were going he did not see how he was going to be able to balance his next budget. The Government had therefore appointed a committee with Sir Thomas May as chairman to look into the situation. This committee recommended severe cuts in the pay of all Government employees (including the Services) and drastic increases in taxation. The publication of the May Report, just at the moment when the Government and the bank had to refuse a loan to save the German banks, made foreign governments scramble to withdraw the balances which they kept at the Bank of England; for if the bank "went off gold" again these deposits would lose much of their value.

To maintain gold payments and restore confidence the Government borrowed from Paris and New York, but the French and American bankers said they would not be able to do this again unless Britain proved her own solvency by

balancing her budget. So MacDonald reassembled the Cabinet from its summer vacation, and laid before it a scheme to reduce Service pay and the "Dole" by about 20 per cent. Three of the ministers agreed to this course, but the others (led by Henderson) were of opinion that the difficulty could be tided over by increased taxation of the rich. So MacDonald turned for support to the other parties. He resigned as Prime Minister of the Labour Government and received the King's commission to form a "National Government." This consisted of four Conservatives, four Labour ministers, and two Liberals. Snowden, who continued at the Exchequer, brought in a second budget for the year, embodying the cuts in pay and benefit, and imposing increased taxes. In a broadcast MacDonald justified all this by the necessity of preserving the Gold Standard: it would be dishonourable, he said, to go back on our pledge to repay in gold on demand the sums entrusted by foreign Governments to our bank; moreover, there would be grave danger that our paper money would lose its purchasing power here at home, and that we should find ourselves in the same position of the Germans in 1923 (§ 344). For a week or two he seemed to have succeeded. But then came news of a disturbance at the naval base of Invergordon: the crew of a battleship had refused duty as a protest against reductions of pay which had never been explained to them and which bore unfairly on the lower deck. (The cut in an admiral's pay of 10s. in £5 per day was nothing like so severe as the able seaman's loss of 1s. in 5s.) There were rumours that the fleet was bombarding Brighton and Dover, and excited foreigners remembered that both the German and the Russian revolutions had started with naval mutinies. The run on the bank started again; by closing time on Saturday, 19th September, the vaults were practically empty; and on the Monday a Bill to suspend the obligation to sell gold was rushed through both Houses and received the Royal Assent.

MacDonald and Baldwin had declared that their coalition was merely a temporary device to save the £. The £ had not

been saved, but nobody seemed any the worse, and they decided to continue their partnership. Early in October they dissolved Parliament, and asked the country for "a Doctor's Mandate" to diagnose the disease which had led to the recent crisis, and to prescribe a remedy without tying their hands as to what that remedy would be. They declared that the Socialist alternative would reduce the country to bankruptcy, which would mean the loss of everybody's savings. This had the desired effect. The Labour party was reduced from 290 to 52, and there was once more a decisive Conservative majority in the House of Commons. And the National Government, originally designed to last for a few weeks, lasted fourteen years.

§ 349. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AT WORK.—The Government soon ceased to be "National" in more than name. Most of the little group of Liberals in it resigned a year or so later, when it used its "Doctor's Mandate" to introduce "Protection"; and of the half-dozen Labour members who supported MacDonald against the rest of their party, Snowden soon went over to the Opposition on this same Free Trade issue. Baldwin, as leader of the Party which supplied nine-tenths of the Government's support in Parliament, was always the chief power in it, and in 1935 he became Prime Minister in name as well as in effect.

On the whole the Government fulfilled its purpose—apart from "the Death of the Pound." Its "Import Duties Act" did not raise prices as Free Traders had prophesied. Trade recovered and unemployment decreased, though very slowly. Payment of war debt to America was reduced to a mere "token" in 1931, and dropped altogether in the following year. The drain on the Insurance Fund was stanchd (*a*) by a "Means Test," which reduced the benefit drawn by several members of the same household and by those who had savings to live on; and (*b*) by sending people who had outrun their right to benefit to an "Unemployment Assistance Board" working under the Ministry of Labour.

The Conservatives now had a chance to carry out the policy advocated by Joseph Chamberlain at the beginning of the century—to draw the Empire together in a “Customs Union,” members of which would put lower duties on each other’s goods than on goods from outside. With this in view an *Imperial Economic Conference* was held at Ottawa in 1932. But the Dominions were no longer willing, as in early days, to take British manufactures freely in return for their agricultural products; and Britain could not discourage her own farmers by allowing unrestricted importation of corn and meat, even from other parts of the Empire. So it was impossible to do more than arrange agreements between individual members of the Commonwealth, and most of these were cancelled before many years were past.

Another great project of Empire that proved disappointing was the *Government of India Act* (1935). In 1928 a Royal Commission had been sent out with Sir John Simon as chairman, to make suggestions for the next stage in the “Dominion Status” promised in 1918 (§ 339). A Round Table Conference, on which all Indian parties were represented, met in London in 1931-32 to consider how its report was to be carried into effect. How was such a vast sub-continent, with varied races and religions, two-thirds of it included in British India and the rest ruled by semi-independent princes, to be given a united parliamentary government? The Conference decided that the only way was to draw it together in a federation, with Provincial parliaments in which each of the different “Communities” would have a fair proportion of members. A Bill on these lines was passed, despite the protests of a group of “die-hard” Conservatives led by Churchill. Each of the eleven Provinces was to have an elected Parliament, to which its ministers were to be responsible (except for certain “reserved” departments, such as finance and defence, in which the Governor could intervene in an emergency); and there was to be a central federal Government in which the Princes would be represented.

The Indian National Congress, being the only organised

political party, won the first elections in eight of the Provinces, and conducted their affairs with some success. But the federal part of the scheme never came into effect, for the Princes drew back when they realised that by joining it they would lose more of their independence. Thus when war came in 1939 there was still no representative central government through which India could volunteer to take her stand with Britain and the Dominions on the side of liberty and democracy.

CHAPTER LXXX

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE LEAGUE

1931-1936

§ 350. THE END OF DISARMAMENT.—One of the hardest problems before the Governments of Europe was to come to some agreement about reducing their fighting forces. Britain had cut her own Army, Navy and Air force to the bone, and this placed her in a dangerous position unless others followed her example. So long as a large part of a country's revenue goes in maintaining armed strength it will always be tempted to use that strength to further its interests. And unless the Powers reduced their armaments, it would be difficult for them to prevent Germany from rearming too ; for in the Versailles Treaty they had declared that in compelling Germany to disarm they were only preparing the way for doing so themselves.

On the naval side something had been achieved. At the Washington Conference (1922) the three chief Sea Powers (Britain, the United States and Japan) agreed to limit the number and size of their battleships ; but later attempts to do the same for smaller vessels failed. And discussions about reducing armies did little more than reveal the difficulties which complicate the problem. For instance, if the limitation was to be by numbers, highly trained professional troops are worth more man for man than half-trained conscripts ; while if limitation was to be by cost,

professional armies cost more, man for man, than conscripts. Moreover, governments were very reluctant to pledge themselves to go to war in defence of a victim of aggression, for it is often impossible to decide which of two quarrelling countries is really the aggressor. And there was endless argument as to which types of armament could be considered "defensive" and therefore allowable. Did submarines, tanks or bombers come within that category?

At last, after much preparation and postponement, a general Disarmament Conference met in a hall specially built for it at Geneva (February, 1932). But very little progress was made for the obvious though unspoken reason that the nations could not trust each other. And as a matter of fact a deadly blow had been struck at the Conference before it ever met by the actions of Japan. Owing mainly to the effects of the world slump, which brought millions of Japanese to starvation, a military and nationalist clique had overthrown the Liberals who had co-operated with the western Powers ever since the war. In 1931 a Japanese army had invaded the Chinese provinces of Manchuria, and it had been turned into a puppet kingdom (Manchukuo) under Japanese control. Obviously the other Powers could not leave themselves defenceless with Japan in this defiant and aggressive mood.

And in 1933, while the Conference was still sitting, Germany's injured national pride, coupled with famine prices and unemployment, led to a revolution in that unhappy country. A National Socialist party, led by Adolf Hitler, had been joined by millions of people embittered by these discontents. It now made an alliance with high army officers and rich business men to overthrow the "Weimar Republic" established in 1919. It set itself to restore Germany's national and military pride, and declared that Germany would accept any degree of disarmament which the other Powers would impose on themselves, but no more. When the other Powers refused thus to treat Germany as an equal, the new Government withdrew not only from the Conference, but from the League of Nations itself.

Much the same thing happened with Japan. The League sent a special Commission, led by Lord Lytton, to enquire on the spot into her "dispute" with China, and when this Commission reported that there were faults on both sides, she regarded this as an affront to her honour and dignity, and resigned her membership. None of the Powers was prepared to make war on the other side of the globe to maintain the League's authority, and thus a fatal example was set to others who might be tempted to defy it.

As for the Disarmament Conference, it quietly faded away.

§ 351. HITLER SHOWS HIS HAND.—The system which the National Socialists set up in Germany was *totalitarian*—a despotism in which individuals exist (like ants in an ant-hill) merely for the good of the state. To this end the Government, controlled by a single party, directed the whole of the citizens' lives, their actions, their very thoughts. Schools and universities, books and newspapers, cinema and radio, were all doctored to make people believe what the Party wanted them to believe. Everything was done to make the country self-supporting. National pride was inflamed by declaring that the German army had not been defeated in the war, but had been "stabbed in the back" by defeatists at home. Jews and Communists were made scapegoats for all the nation's ills. Parliamentary government by prating politicians was condemned as unworthy of a proud people. A master race—the master race—could only be ruled on the principle of *leadership*—taking its orders from an inspired being whom it had acclaimed as its *Führer*. By flaming oratory Hitler succeeded in convincing a large proportion of the German people that he alone could lead the nation out of its poverty and degradation to fresh heights of prosperity, power and glory; and he maintained himself by ruthlessly crushing all whom he could not convince.

He timed his acts of policy with masterly astuteness. It was an open secret that the army chiefs had succeeded in evading the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty; and the

helplessness of the League over Manchuria now encouraged Hitler to defy it openly. In March 1935 he announced that he was going to create a full-sized conscript army; and a year later German regiments took up quarters in the Rhine Provinces. (These had been "demilitarised" by the Treaty—*i.e.*, Germany was forbidden to keep troops or fortifications in them). If France and Britain had taken firm action they could have prevented these measures, for the German forces were as yet far too weak to fight. But they had not the spirit for more than verbal protests, which had no effect whatever. The general feeling in Britain was that Germany had a right to do what she liked with her own people and her own territory.

With Japan and Germany withdrawing from the League of Nations, the other Powers began to realise that the "Collective Security" which they had hoped for was only a dream. They saw that they would have to rely on old-fashioned pacts and alliances, and they began once more to fall into two antagonistic groups like those which had fought each other in 1914-18. Germany herself began the process, by a pact with Poland. This was an obvious threat to Russia, and at the same time deprived France of her hope of Polish support in keeping a check on Germany. So Russia and France naturally came together with a pact for mutual support (1935), and the U.S.S.R. became a member of the League.

(Under Stalin the Soviet Government had given up the idea of converting the world to Communism, and had undertaken "Five-Year Plans" to turn backward Russia into a highly developed industrial state in the short space of ten years, and thus set an example of what Socialist state could accomplish. Of course, Stalin was too wide-awake to trust the defence of the U.S.S.R. to "collective security." For that purpose he now began to build up its armed strength. But membership of the League was a sign to all the world that Soviet Russia was no longer an outcast among the nations.)

§ 352. MUSSOLINI ALSO SHOWS HIS HAND.—It was now

Mussolini's turn to take advantage of the weakness of the League for his own purposes. The Italians seemed to be getting tired of Fascism, and he believed that the best way to restore their enthusiasm would be to conquer a colonial empire. Italians had always felt that they had been badly treated by the Treaty of Versailles in the share-out of ex-enemy possessions; so the Duce (as Mussolini called himself) decided to conquer the only available territory within striking distance—Abyssinia. In the autumn of 1935 he launched a vast expeditionary force against this weak and backward state, despite the fact that it was a fellow-member of the League.

This time the League felt that its very existence would be in danger if it did not do something to maintain its Covenant. To the surprise and rage of the Italians it applied the economic "sanctions" (=penalties) set forth in Article XVI (N243) by which the other nations were to refuse to supply any aggressor with any goods that can be used for war. In this action a strong lead was given by Great Britain, through its Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare.

Just at this juncture another General Election was due in Britain, and Baldwin was very anxious to keep the National Government together. It was quite evident that the nation was determined to support the League; but unfortunately it was very reluctant to spend money on building up the armed forces required for taking an active part in international police work. So to win the election Baldwin promised that the National Government would both give full support to "sanctions" and undertake no general rearmament. From the electoral point of view this appeal was highly successful. The Labour party naturally won back some of the seats it had lost in the panic of 1931, but the National Government (now almost wholly Conservative) still had a large majority over all other parties and groups combined.

Scarcely had the Government won the election when it was faced with the difficulty of fulfilling its contradictory pledges. For it was already evident that the Abyssinians would not be

able without outside help to withstand the Italian onslaught, while "sanctions" were useless so long as America refused to join in applying them. Moreover, Mussolini threatened war against any state that interfered with his oil-tankers, and it was feared that our Mediterranean fleet would be at the mercy of his bombing aeroplanes. So Hoare tried to get the Government out of its dilemma by bringing the war to an immediate end. He crossed over to Paris and made a secret agreement with Laval, the French Foreign Minister, to press the Duce to be content with about two-thirds of Abyssinia, letting the rest remain under its Emperor Haile Selassie. But when the agreement leaked out, the British people were indignant at what seemed like condoning a robbery and letting the robber go off with the best part of his booty. So Baldwin had to declare that the Government did not really mean it; the scheme was dropped, and Hoare resigned.

It was now obvious that neither Britain nor France (the only naval Powers in the League) felt able to take active steps against Italy. Mussolini pressed on unmolested with his conquest, which was completed by the use of mustard gas. Haile Selassie's personal appeal to the League was received in painful silence, and in June 1936 the King of Italy was proclaimed Emperor of Abyssinia.

This was not the worst result of the episode. "The attempt and not the deed" of sanctions roused the Italians to furious indignation against Britain and France; and the support of Hitler throughout the crisis led Mussolini to make a permanent alliance with Germany—the "Berlin-Rome Axis." Furthermore, Italy followed the example of Japan and Germany in quitting the League, and a little later these three Powers joined in an "Anti-Comintern Pact" for a common front against the spread of Communism.

§ 353. A DYNASTIC CRISIS.—The close of 1936 saw one of the most remarkable incidents in the thousand years' history of the British monarchy.

At the jubilee of George V in the summer of 1935 the nation had shown the warmth of its regard for a king who personified, "the ordinary fellow" (to use his own expression), and there was general grief throughout the English-speaking world when, in the following January, he died. The new king, Edward VIII, had enjoyed a wider experience of men and affairs than can usually be gained by kings, and there were high hopes of new and valuable developments in constitutional monarchy.

But it was not to be. During the autumn there were rumours about his friendship with an American lady named Simpson, who had divorced two husbands. Baldwin privately warned him that marriage with her would lead to "serious consequences." The King asked if it would be possible for the lady to be his wife without being queen. To this Baldwin replied (after consulting with his colleagues and the leaders of the Opposition) that a special Act of Parliament would be required—and that neither the Government nor the Opposition were in favour of such a course.

When the facts became known, some people argued that in these democratic days a king ought to be able to marry whom he likes; but it soon became clear that the marriage would lead to a crisis not only in Britain but in the Empire, for none of the Dominion governments was prepared to accept Mrs Simpson as Queen. Thus Edward VIII was called upon to renounce his private happiness at the call of duty, and he found himself unable to respond. On 10th December he signed an abdication, and in a broadcast declared that he could not undertake the burden of kingship without the support of the woman he loved. His brother, the Duke of York, now became King George VI.

CHAPTER LXXXI

THE BREAKDOWN OF PEACE

1937-1939

§ 354. TROUBLE BREWING.—After the Coronation (May, 1937) Baldwin retired to the House of Lords with an earldom, and was succeeded by Neville Chamberlain, half-brother of Austen. The new Prime Minister made it his first aim to appease the dictators who were threatening the peace and security of Europe. He shut his ears to the warning voice of Winston Churchill, who declared that Germany was arming for another attack on the liberties of Europe, and that the only way to ward off the danger was for Britain herself to be strong. To take this line, Chamberlain feared, would start another Great War, and he hoped to avert that disaster by timely concessions. For two years he struggled on with this policy in the face of very discouraging circumstances.

His task was made more difficult by civil war in Spain. In the summer of 1937 a rebellion broke out against the Spanish Republic which had been formed six years earlier on the abdication of King Alfonso XIII. This rebellion was contrived by a group of army officers led by General Franco. It was arranged in advance in collaboration with Mussolini, who wanted to see Spain become another Fascist state, in alliance with Italy; and after the attack was started German as well as Italian armies were unofficially sent to counteract the support which Soviet Russia had sent to the Republic. British traders were, of course, entitled to sell supplies to the Government of Spain, but their ships were attacked by Italian aeroplanes and submarines, and the British Government would not allow the Navy to protect these ships lest this should lead to a general war. Germany, Italy and the U.S.S.R. were induced to agree to "non-intervention," but Germany and Italy did not carry out their undertakings, and early in 1938 Anthony Eden

(who had succeeded Sir Samuel Hoare as Foreign Secretary) resigned because he did not believe in accepting any more Italian promises without some guarantee that they would be kept.

Later in the same year Japan, having completed the conquest of Manchukuo, opened an attack on China itself. Towns were wiped out by bombardment from the air, in defiance of the laws of civilised warfare; vast amounts of British property were destroyed, especially at Shanghai; humiliating insults were heaped upon British men and women by Japanese soldiers; but in the circumstances the Chamberlain Government could not do more than make verbal protests which the Japanese Government treated with contempt.

There was harassing trouble in Palestine, too. Britain had accepted a League mandate to administer that country, but the task had been made almost impossible by the fact that during the War Colonel Lawrence (apparently on behalf of the Government) had encouraged the Arabs to rebel against Turkey by promising that Palestine should become part of a great Arab Confederation, while Balfour had undertaken that it should be restored to the Jews as a national state. Various solutions of the problem were suggested, including partition, but representatives of the parties could not be brought to agree upon any of them. Violence and disorder continued to cause anxiety for the Suez bottleneck of British trade routes.

The Government made concessions to Ireland which cost Britain dear in the World War that came two years later. A dispute had arisen in 1933 when de Valera, on becoming head of the Free State Government, refused to continue paying the interest on loans made forty years before by English people, to help Irish farmers to buy their farms. To make up for this loss the Baldwin Government had imposed special duties on imports from the Free State, which retaliated with similar duties on British goods. In 1937 the Free State Parliament adopted a new constitution by which the country, henceforward to be named "Eire," became practically independent of Great

Britain ; and the British Government strengthened the new régime by giving it favourable terms over the matters in dispute. The " annuities " were wiped out for the payment of a moderate lump sum, and the military stations on the coast which had remained in British occupation as part of the Treaty of 1922 (§ 339) were handed over with a mere stipulation that they should not be used by Britain's enemies in any future war. But de Valera still nursed a grievance about the " partition," and in 1940-41 the lack of these ports as advanced bases against the U-boats brought Britain near to ruin and the world to subjection by the Nazis.

§ 355. THE SEPTEMBER CRISIS.—German rearmament had now gone so far that Hitler was able to use the threat of war as a regular instrument of policy.

To be sure, there was one demand that his army could not fulfil for him—the recovery of the African colonies that had been mandated to Britain at Versailles. Many people in this country thought there was some justice in his claim, but the Nazis' treatment of Jews did not suggest that millions more " non-Aryans " could safely be entrusted to them. And a re-conquest by force was impossible so long as the British Navy held command of the sea.

In central Europe, however, Hitler seemed to be able to do pretty much as he liked. Declaring that the Austrian Republic was ill-treating people who wanted Austria to join the Reich, he suddenly sent in German troops and annexed the country. (March, 1938.) His greatest asset was the fear of what a great war would mean, with all the modern methods of attack let loose on civilians. In China and Spain thousands of non-combatants had been killed, and tens of thousands maimed ; yet what was happening in those countries was a mere trifle compared with the fearful havoc which it was believed would be wrought in the first few days of a general European conflict. Britain realised how backward she was both in defence and in the means of counter-attack. Rearmament was accelerated—

but not fast enough to save another European democracy from destruction in that same year.

The Sudeten-German people of Czechoslovakia complained to Germany that the Czechs would not give them a fair share of offices in the Government of the Republic. Hitler demanded better treatment for them, then home rule for them, then the cession of the Sudeten lands to the Reich, all within a few weeks. The situation was dangerous to Britain because France was bound by treaty to support Czechoslovakia against an aggressor, and if France became involved in a war with Germany, Britain could scarcely stand aside. At the last moment, just when catastrophe seemed inevitable, Chamberlain succeeded in persuading Hitler to receive him and Daladier, the French Premier, at Munich. There they agreed to put pressure on the Czech Government to cede the Sudeten districts to Germany within a few days. If the Czechs refused, they would have to face the whole armed might of Germany without hope of outside help. They gave way.

On his return Chamberlain was acclaimed as the saviour of peace. Enthusiasm cooled when people began to realise that what had been achieved might be no more than a postponement of the evil day. Still, that was something; and the Government set to work in greater earnest to build up the armed forces. Dislike of Nazi methods was intensified when, a month or two after Munich, a fresh persecution of the Jews began in Germany. The problem of what to do with refugees—not only Jews but many other men and women who were in the Nazis' black books—was the more difficult because these unfortunate people were not allowed to take out of the country even the little property that remained to them.

§ 356. **APPEASEMENT DEFEATED.**—Early in 1939 Chamberlain and Lord Halifax (his Foreign Secretary) paid a visit to Rome, hoping to restore the friendly relations which had existed between Italy and Britain ever since the *risorgimento* (§ 304). and to entice Mussolini out of his alliance with Hitler. The

prospects seemed the more favourable because the Spanish civil war was now drawing to an end, with the capture by the insurgents of Barcelona, the last stronghold of the Republic. But the "Axis" was too tough to be broken by amiable words.

And Hitler soon administered another shock which made an end of appeasement altogether. At Munich he had declared that he wanted no Czechs in the Reich—his aim was to include all Germans but no people of other races. But six months later, in March 1939, he invaded what was left of the Czechoslovak Republic, and took it under German "protection." The Czechs were now disarmed; their mines, factories and workshops, and all their apparatus of war, were taken over by "the Master Race."

A cry of indignation went up all over the civilised world. The British Government was at last forced to realise that nothing but a display of superior force would induce Germany to let her neighbours possess their souls in peace. The nation showed that it was as ready as at any time in its history to face stern issues; all that was needed was a clear call from the Government. No one any longer thought of isolation. Everybody realised that it was a duty not only to our neighbours but to ourselves to take a stand for the liberties of Europe. A close alliance was made with Poland, negotiations were opened for some such connection with Russia and Turkey, Rumania and Greece were promised support if they were attacked. Recruiting for the forces went on faster than ever before in peacetime; but it was felt that nothing less than compulsory military training for all would suffice; and the nation gladly agreed even to this sacrifice of its traditions.

The pledge to the Poles pointed straight to trouble, for Hitler was already picking a quarrel with them about the "Corridor" to the Baltic which the Treaty of Versailles had carved out of Germany (N244), and about the old German city of Danzig which that Treaty had made into a Free State. We may ask why Britain should have been so ready to stand by the Poles when she had actually compelled the Czechs to submit.

But there was now a general agreement, shared even by Chamberlain and his friends, that Hitler must not be allowed to carry his methods any further. Whatever excuse there might have been for his treatment of Czechoslovakia there was none whatever for his threats to Poland. After every piece of lawless violence he asserted that his last demands were now satisfied, but each aggression whetted his appetite for another—and gave him more power to carry it out. If he conquered Poland, his next victims would be Holland and Belgium and Denmark. And then——?

The facts of geography made it impossible for Britain and France to do anything for Poland without the support of Soviet Russia, and most people assumed that our Government would now make a close military pact with Stalin. But when in July a mission was at last sent to Moscow, it was too late ; and in August the world was thunderstruck to learn that a Russo-German treaty had been signed by which each party agreed not to help the other's enemies.

The last restraining hand was thus removed from Hitler and his gang. The British Government repeatedly warned them that it would declare war if they attacked Poland ; but they could not believe that Chamberlain had really given up " appeasement." In the early morning of 1st September German armoured columns crossed the Polish frontier, and two days later the British and French Governments declared war—a war, in the words of the Prime Minister's broadcast, on " evil things—brute force, bad faith, injustice, oppression and persecution."

NOTES ON PERIOD XI (1914-1939)
THE FIRST GREAT WAR AND THE TWENTY
YEARS' TRUCE

No. 241.—BRITAIN'S PART IN THE WAR.

IN EUROPE :

(a) Formed the left wing of the Western Front, particularly for the defence of the Channel ports. Took over more and more of the line from the French as the new armies were trained.

(b) Established a force in conjunction with the French at Salonica.

(c) Made a landing in conjunction with the French on the Gallipoli Peninsula with a view to an advance on Constantinople. (Failed.)

(d) Sent a contingent in conjunction with the French to stiffen Italians after their defeat at Caporetto.

IN ASIA :

(a) An advance on Bagdad up the Tigris (checked at Kut-al-Amara).

(b) Palestine overrun.

IN AFRICA :

The German colonies overrun by forces mostly drawn from South Africa.

ON THE SEA :

(a) The only German squadron at sea at the outbreak of war was destroyed near the Falkland Isles (§ 332). All other individual commerce raiders were also destroyed.

(b) The naval blockade resulted in slow starvation for the German population, and was the main cause of their collapse.

The German High Seas Fleet did not venture out of port after the Battle of Jutland (May 1916), though that engagement was claimed as a German victory.

(c) The American army was convoyed across the Atlantic in safety, despite enemy submarines.

No. 242.—PRESIDENT WILSON'S "FOURTEEN POINTS."

Wilson's statement of war aims (made in January 1918) was accepted by both sides as the basis for peace when the armistice was signed in November 1918. The following is a brief summary :

I. No more secret diplomacy.

But the actual discussion of the peace terms went on behind closed doors.

II. Freedom of the seas.

This was intended to check the British practice of seizing neutral cargoes that might be useful to an enemy—a very old cause of offence (§§ 251, 264). It was dropped out of the treaties; but the United States took care to prevent interference for the future by building a navy as strong as the British.

III. The removal of economic barriers.

Those barriers became more numerous and higher than ever.

IV. All armaments to be reduced to a minimum.

They became greater than ever, except those of Great Britain.

V. An impartial adjustment of colonial claims, the interests of the populations having equal weight with the claims of the Governments whose title is to be determined.

Practically all the German colonies came under British rule.

VI. Unhampered opportunity of development for Russia, under institutions of her own choosing, with cordial assistance from other nations.

The Allies made war on Soviet Russia, and afterwards hampered it by economic boycott.

VII. Belgium to be evacuated and restored.**VIII. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France, and all French territory evacuated and restored.**

The restoration was afterwards held to include the making good of all the damage done in the war—that is to say, the whole cost of it, including pensions to wounded and widows.

IX. Italian frontiers to be readjusted.

The rival claims of Italy and Yugoslavia to the eastern coast of the Adriatic led to much bitterness.

X. Subject peoples of Austro-Hungary to gain an independent existence.

This resulted in the creation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

XI. Balkan frontiers to be readjusted on "historical lines."**XII. The non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire to be afforded opportunities of autonomous development.****XIII. "An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, and should be afforded secure access to the sea. . . ."**

See No. 244.

XIV. "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence. . . ."

No. 243.—THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

This forms the first part of the Treaty of Versailles, and of the treaties with each of the other enemy Powers. It begins as follows:

The High Contracting Parties in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war and by the prescription of open, just, and honourable relations between nations

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

Then follow regulations concerning admission, withdrawal, and the constitution of the League. It was to have a Council and Assembly and a Secretariat. France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States were always to have seats on the Council. Four more members of the League were to be elected to the Council by the Assembly from time to time. Except where otherwise provided, decisions in either Council or Assembly must be unanimous. The seat of the League was to be at Geneva. The Council was to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments, to be revised every ten years.

Then follow the all-important clauses about disputes likely to lead to war.

X. The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.


XII. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators on the report of the Council.

XVI. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of the Covenant, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other Members of the League, which hereby undertake to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations. . . . It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be raised to protect the covenants of the League.

The obligation to interfere in the affairs of Europe proved highly offensive to the American people, which has always had a dread of "entangling alliances"; and still more offensive to them was the possibility that under these clauses European Powers might interfere in the affairs of the American republics in spite of the Monroe Doctrine (§ 273). By rejecting the Covenant, Congress rejected the whole Treaty, and had to make a separate peace with Germany some years later.

Article XXII provided for "Mandates" by which the victorious Powers were given charge of backward Africans and Asiatic peoples formerly under the rule of Germany or Turkey. They were to give account of their stewardship periodically to the Mandates Commission of the League.

THE NEW EUROPE AND THE OLD



Article XXIII was the great humanitarian and economic clause. Members of the League were to secure fair conditions of labour, and to assist in the international control of disease. The League was to supervise the trade in arms and in noxious drugs.

No. 244.—PRINCIPAL TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE TREATIES.

I.e. the Treaty of *Versailles* with Germany (June 1919), the Treaty of *St. Germain* with Austria (September 1919), the Treaty of *Neuilly* (November 1919) with Bulgaria, the Treaty of *Trianon* with Hungary (June 1920), and the Treaty of *Lausanne* with Turkey (July 1923), which replaced the Treaty of *Sèvres* (August 1920).

(1) ALSACE-LORRAINE was ceded by Germany to France.

These lands have been a bone of contention between the two countries for centuries.

(2) THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND was created out of Russian, Prussian, and Austrian territories, with a "corridor" to the Baltic through German territory.

Poland had once been a great state, but had been partitioned by neighbouring Powers in the eighteenth century.

(3) THE REPUBLIC OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA was created out of Austro-Hungarian territories.

Bohemia had also been an independent kingdom, until absorbed by the Hapsburgs in the seventeenth century.

(4) THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES, generally known as JUGOSLAVIA, consisted of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Austro-Hungarian provinces inhabited mainly by Southern Slavs.

(5) HUNGARY became an independent republic.

(6) RUMANIA was enlarged by the cession from Hungary of Transylvania, which is inhabited mainly by Rumanians.

(7) THE BALTIC REPUBLICS (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland) became independent.

(8) TURKEY was restricted to Asia Minor and a small foothold in Europe (including Constantinople—now called Stamboul). The Straits were demilitarised.

(9) ARABIA became an independent kingdom.

(10) IRAK, PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDANIA were mandated to Great Britain, but Irak soon became an independent kingdom under a slight degree of British supervision.

(11) SYRIA became a French mandate.

No. 245.—THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

(1) It intervened successfully in disputes between minor states; *e.g.*, between Yugoslavia and Greece (1925).

(2) Two of its offshoots did excellent work :

(a) The *International Labour Organisation* (with its own offices at Geneva) brought working conditions up to recognised standards, and

thus prevented sweated labour in backward countries from undercutting countries where the standard of living was higher.

(b) The *International Court of Justice* at The Hague (consisting of, fourteen whole-time professional judges, nominated by fourteen different Governments) pronounced on questions of international law; and its decisions, which were almost always accepted, prevented disputes from degenerating into wars.

(3) Its "MINORITIES COMMISSION" received reports from the new Governments of Europe on their treatment of alien races within the boundaries created by the Treaty of Versailles.

(It had no power to impose "sanctions," but the mere dread of publicity prevented Governments from ill-treating their minorities.)

(4) Its "MANDATES COMMISSION" did the same for the inhabitants of the former German and Turkish possessions.

(5) It supervised the repatriation of millions of starving and disease-stricken refugees left stranded after 1918. (Its High Commissioner for this purpose was Dr Nansen, the famous Arctic explorer.)

(6) Its Economic Council saved Austria and Hungary from financial collapse (which would have had disastrous repercussions all over Europe) in 1921-24.

(7) ABOVE ALL, IT CREATED A HABIT OF CONSULTATION AND DISCUSSION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS.

No. 246.—ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN MACHINERY FOR PREVENTING WAR.

That provided by the League Covenant was too indefinite to give security.

I. *Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee* (1923)—all signatories to refrain from aggressive war and to come to the aid of any of their number which might be the victim of aggression.

But what is "aggression"? All belligerents always claim that they are the victims of aggression; Germany claimed that she invaded Belgium in 1914 "in self-defence." Britain refused to commit herself to make war on such vague conditions. The Treaty was rejected by the Labour Government of 1924, and therefore fell through.

II. *Geneva Protocol* (1924)—an attempt to provide a universal and uniform system of arbitration which all members of the League will accept.

It came to nothing, because Great Britain once more refused to bind herself in advance. This time it was a Conservative Government which rejected the scheme (1925).

III. *Treaties of Locarno* (1925)—whereby Germany and her neighbours pledged themselves to refer any difference about frontiers to arbitration.

Britain and Italy guaranteed the Western frontier—i.e. they undertook to take military action against either France or Germany to enforce the Treaty. This was a grave responsibility, especially while France was armed and Germany unarmed; but it seemed the best means of

improving Franco-German relations; and it led to Germany becoming a member of the League of Nations.

IV. *The Kellogg Pact* (1929)—a mutual declaration brought forward by the United States by which all leading states (including Russia and U.S.A.) undertook never to use war as a means of gaining their ends, but to settle all differences by arbitration.

But it soon became clear that nations only signed with large "reservations"—they would not arbitrate upon matters affecting "national honour," for instance; and the United States would not let the Pact affect the "Monroe Doctrine." (As a matter of fact, at the very time when the Pact was being signed, American forces were being employed against Nicaragua, a member of the League; and this was about the time that the United States began a great scheme of naval expansion which did not suggest that they really trusted to their Pact.)

NO. 247.—THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AFTER THE FIRST GREAT WAR.

"DOMINION STATUS" HAS COME TO IMPLY THEORETICAL INDEPENDENCE; BUT THERE IS A TENDENCY TOWARDS FULLER ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, AND A GROWING SENSE OF COMMON INTEREST.

1919.—The Dominions became independent members of the League of Nations, and in 1927 Canada was elected to a seat on the Council.

1921.—*Imperial Conference* (under Lloyd George) decided (a) that there should be no sort of federal constitution—Conferences to be held, as before, from time to time; and (b) discussed the question of naval power in the Pacific (which mainly concerned Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States).

As an outcome of this the Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty of 1902 was not renewed in 1922; and the Washington Naval Conference (1922) agreed that Britain, America and Japan should have "capital ships" in the proportion of 5 : 5 : 3.

1922.—*Chanay Incident*.—Lloyd George invited support from Dominions in preventing the Turks from driving the Greeks out of Asia Minor (§ 340), but South Africa and Canada demurred.

They thereby indicated that they were not going to be "jockeyed" into war without previous consultation.

1923.—*Halibut Fisheries Treaty* settled disputes between United States and Canada, all negotiations being carried on by Canadian and American Governments, and Canada refused to allow the British ambassador at Washington even to countersign the Treaty.

When the Locarno Treaty was signed (1925, N245) a special clause made it clear that the Dominions were not involved in Britain's guarantee.

Since 1924 some of the Dominions have kept representatives at foreign capitals: e.g. Eire has its own minister at Washington and Paris, while Canada has a minister at Washington, Paris and Tokio.

BRITAIN AND WORLD AFFAIRS

1789-1946

By

W. T. G. AIREY, M.A. (N.Z.), B.A. (OXON)

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
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GREAT BRITAIN AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1789-1946)

To-day we face a crisis in civilisation. We have a chance to go forward to a world in which "all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want" (A.43); but we may fail and slip back. In one generation not only have we had two world wars in which millions of lives were destroyed, but we have had a world slump in which food and cotton that had been grown were actually destroyed while millions went hungry and cold. Not only is there the continual fear and fact of war between countries, but there is social conflict within countries as to how economic life should be organised and controlled. These are the outward signs of the fact that we have not succeeded in organising ourselves to make proper use of the powers at our disposal.

The roots of the crisis can be traced back to the end of the eighteenth century. There began then in Great Britain a great change, which in the nineteenth century also affected other Western countries, and through them the rest of the world. The change was in the methods by which we produce from the resources round us the things we use—in our tools, or means of production, or technical equipment. There began the age of large-scale machinery driven by power—steam, motors, electricity, and, perhaps soon, atomic power. This big change in our power to produce took place at a much greater speed than at any previous time in the history of man, and in little more than a century revolutionised man's relationship to the material world about him. Instead of the struggle of the past he now had the possibility of plenty.

It is the speed of this change that causes the crisis. For men change their tools more easily than they change their minds, their habits and ways of life—especially when some

have found the old ways very profitable. Men have not changed their relationships among themselves—i.e. their social and political organisation—fast enough to make the full and best use of the tools that are to hand. The tools then become weapons and men's knowledge and power are used in mutual destruction. Atomic power has been first used in war.

Can we solve the problem that our own invention has thrust upon us? Liberalism, which first showed its strength in the French Revolution of 1789, was full of optimism in 1919, when semi-autocratic governments had been overthrown, states organised on a basis of national sentiment, and the League of Nations set up. Broadly, Liberalism aimed at government through a representative parliament with capitalism, or the private ownership of the means of production, in the economic field. (The term "freedom of enterprise" is also sometimes used; but we should be clear that "enterprise"—starting some business with a view to profit—was "free" only to those who could manage to accumulate capital.) To the Liberal, political democracy and international organisation seemed adequate. But already the working-class doctrine of Socialism, or public ownership of the means of production, challenged this middle-class doctrine. Political democracy was not enough. The challenge took solid form in the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 and became more solid with the continued development of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. It challenged capitalist society as the French Revolution challenged the monarchical, aristocratic society of its day.

Then, largely out of the slump, rose Fascism, opposed to both Liberalism and Socialism and appealing to the more reactionary and ignorant elements in many countries. It sought to bring unity not by appealing to men's reason to grapple honestly with their problems, but by domination and by feeding irrational emotions—by deadening men with opium or the bludgeon. It aimed not at a co-operative society of men but at a slave state.

Fascism has, for the time, been scotched in its crudest

forms; but it will reappear in some form if we do not rise to the challenge presented by our power over our material environment. If we do not organise our social, economic, and political life to make the fullest use of our equipment in a way that brings out the best in men, then atomic power will still be used to destroy rather than to enrich human life.

CHAPTER A.I

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, NAPOLEON,
AND EUROPE

§ A.I. THE EUROPEAN IMPORTANCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION—THE RISE OF A NEW ORDER.—On 8th January 1790 Arthur Young, an English enthusiast for improved methods of agriculture, who was travelling in France, noted in his diary: "Certainly the eyes of all sovereigns and of all the great nobility of Europe are on the French Revolution; they look with amazement, even terror, upon a situation which may possibly be hereafter their own case." Brissot, one of the revolutionary leaders, put the matter even more bluntly. Addressing the Legislative Assembly, to which the revolution had given practically all the supreme power which the King had formerly had, he said: "There can be no sincere treaty between tyranny and liberty. Your constitution is an anathema to despotic thrones. All kings must hate it, for it tries and sentences them."

Such statements make it pretty clear that there was likely to be conflict between revolutionary France and the despotically governed states of Europe, such as Prussia and Austria. They also help us to understand that the conflict, when it did come, was not the kind of struggle between different countries that we often have to deal with. It was not a struggle for territory such as the War of Austrian Succession, or for commercial advantages, such as the struggles between France and

Great Britain during the eighteenth century. The struggle was not merely between French on one side and Prussians and Austrians on the other. It was more truly a struggle between those who believed in one form of society and political system and those who believed in another. This is made clear by the fact that a number of Frenchmen—nobles who were wedded to the old order—fought among the invaders of France. We saw the same thing happen—only the other way round—when non-Spanish volunteers went in 1936 to fight in Spain on the side of the constitutional government against those who were trying to resist some of the changes that government was likely to make.

It is important to remember, then, that international affairs, involving questions of peace and war, can sometimes be understood only by studying social questions—the relations of men and groups—inside states. We too often forget that the people of the world are not only divided up into countries under distinct governments—which is the meaning of the term “states”—but that they are also divided into classes enjoying different privileges (§ 255). These class divisions sometimes run on similar lines through different states, if their economic development is about the same.

When there arises a movement which seems to threaten the whole position of a privileged class in one state, it tends to cause alarm among similar classes in other states. Even if the revolutionaries make no special effort to spread their gospel abroad, there is a fear that their example may be followed by people in other countries who have the same kind of grievances against the established order of things. The privileged classes as a whole may then think it wise to drop their mutual squabbles and stand together to defend the order that gives them a comfortable position. They use the power of their states, which they usually control, against the revolution.

This can be seen in the case of Great Britain in the early years of the French Revolution. At first, those whose opinion and power shaped government policy welcomed the Revolu-

tion as likely to keep France weak and divided for some time (§ 243). When, however, attempts were made to put into practice ideas which would have been uncomfortable for the governing classes of Great Britain, there grew a feeling that the Revolution was a dangerous pestilence and that something more like the old order should be restored in France. (This, of course, was not the only, nor even the strongest, reason for Great Britain going to war with France.)

If such fears of the Revolution were present in England, where the governing classes themselves owed their position to the revolutions of the seventeenth century, how much stronger the fear must have been in other parts of Europe. There the position was much more like that of France. The ruling houses, such as the Habsburgs of Austria and the Hohenzollerns of Prussia, did not want to see their absolute power curtailed. The nobility, though they had lost most of their political power as a class, did not want to lose their feudal rights over the land and its wealth. In many parts serfdom, which had practically disappeared from France, still prevailed.

We can get an idea of the feeling of those who had power and privilege in Europe by comparison with our own day. In the period before the Second World War some people considered Communism such a threat to what they regarded as a right and good civilisation that they thought the rivalries between capitalist countries should be set aside in order to meet the common enemy of capitalism. Some may still have the same feeling. It was thus that the upper classes of the eighteenth century felt about the French Revolution.

§ A.2. WHY BRITAIN ENTERED THE WAR.—The struggle between an old order and a rising middle class was thus the general background of the wars which began in April 1792. But for this, a number of matters causing dispute could probably have been settled peacefully (NA.1). The struggle of rival dynasties which had been a feature of the century did not entirely cease. Catherine the Great of Russia, for instance, said

that she had been "breaking her head" to get Prussia and Austria involved with France, because she wanted a free hand for her own affairs in regard to Poland. When she began to act there, the Prussian Hohenzollerns too thought it discreet to divert a good deal of their attention from the struggle against the revolution in France in order to insist on a share in the plunder of Poland. But the other kind of struggle, of the old order against the revolution, is pretty clear. We see it in the threats which the Duke of Brunswick, commander of the invading Austrian and Prussian armies, issued against the revolutionary people of France, and especially against Paris (NA.2).

Britain stood out of the war from April 1792 to February 1793 (§ 243). There were two main causes of Britain's entry. First, there was the old rivalry with France, which was largely based on the conflict of commercial interests. Secondly, there was the fear of the Revolution. The second cause was clearly very strong before other questions became acute. These were concerned with the balance of power, especially in relation to British commerce and to the command of the seas which backed that commerce.

The French opened the Scheldt, which would have permitted Antwerp to become a great commercial port. They also threatened to overrun the whole of the Netherlands. It had been British policy for centuries to prevent any Great Power, especially France, from holding these regions across the Channel. The opening of the Scheldt was in itself reasonable, and justified by the French on the ground of "natural right"; but it was contrary to treaties going back to 1648. This enabled the British government to take its stand on the moral issue of the sanctity of treaties in a war which was primarily waged in defence of British commercial interests and the position of the governing classes (N.175).

Britain's position, close to Europe, yet with a certain amount of detachment and with a great deal of security from invasion, has, generally speaking, enabled the British government to

combine an eye for British interests with words of disinterested moral principle. Thus in 1914 the question of Belgian neutrality gave an excellent moral appeal for a war which at least a section of the governing classes thought should be fought in any case, simply for British interests (N.175 b) (§ A.23). It is largely this mixing of principle and interest that has sometimes given British policy a reputation for hypocrisy among Continental people.

§ A.3. THE RISE OF NAPOLEON IN FRANCE.—We need not again follow the progress of the war (see Period VIII); but we may note a certain change in the nature of the war, as it went on with little break through over twenty years. Revolutionary France, which surprised the Allied governments by its resistance in the early years, was different from Napoleon's power, which was eventually overthrown in 1814-1815. On the other side, the Allied governments had more popular backing at the end of the war than at the beginning.

How did the French Revolution with its watchwords of the rights of man and the sovereignty of the people come to produce the military despotism of Napoleon, spread over half of Europe? The middle class, who were the real leaders of the Revolution, were after all not so democratic as they professed to be. They did not want to give power to the masses and they were very much concerned over safeguarding property. This was surely made clear when they held that it was against the rights of man that workers should organise in any way in order to better their wages or conditions.

The appeal for equality and for the sovereignty of the people had, however, raised hopes that would not be satisfied with a change from one form of ruling class to another. Some of the leaders, too, were enthusiasts and idealists who really meant to carry out the principles they had talked about. They wanted greater equality and real democracy. Further, the defence of the Revolution against the invading armies and against enemies within had at critical times depended on the

support of the popular masses of Paris. Thus had arisen the Jacobins, and especially Robespierre. This middle-class lawyer, in spite of all the bloodshed that is connected with his name, was a typical idealist, anxious for a democratic republic in which there should be no great property-owners likely to dominate the state. This new trend of the Revolution naturally alarmed those whose main interest in the Revolution was the desire to have greater freedom in the use of their property and political power to protect that freedom.

Robespierre's downfall in 1794 was brought about by less scrupulous and idealistic colleagues, who were afraid of his popularity. They could not prevent a reaction in favour of property against the measures that had been intended to safeguard the masses. There followed a period in which all the more glorious spirit of the Revolution had been lost and the more selfish interests predominated. Under the Directory, which was instituted in 1795, a few men clung to power (NA.3). They had made fortunes out of the Revolution. Because they had been involved in the execution of Louis XVI they feared, on the one hand, a royalist restoration. On the other hand, they feared Jacobinism and the Paris masses, because of the fortunes they had made through the Revolution. In order to cling to power and secure their own safety, they intrigued with all parties. Their financial policy was unsuccessful and they were obliged to rely on the plunder of the armies' conquests. Clearly such a government could have no solid base; it was trusted by no one.

Meanwhile the armies created in defence of the Revolution were achieving great successes. In particular, young Napoleon Bonaparte had shown his brilliance as a military leader, as an organiser and administrator, and as a diplomatist. He had become a popular hero. The failures of the politicians helped him to cover up the real failure of his Egyptian and Syrian expedition. Moreover, the Directory, in its straits, had found it necessary to call in the aid of the army to keep their own power. Those armies were more and more becoming armies of

conquest and plunder, devoted to their leaders rather than to the Revolution. This situation Napoleon used shrewdly but unobtrusively, now playing on his popularity in the army, now appearing as the good citizen interested in science and art.

In 1799, avoiding resort to military power as much as possible, though less than he had hoped, he succeeded in carrying through a revision of the constitution which gave him the real substance of power as First Consul. He soon threw aside the veil over his absolutism and crowned himself as Emperor in 1804. He still retained institutions with a popular basis but left them with practically no power.

Why was this new despotism tolerated? Perhaps those who had the power to attack it did not want to, and, for the time, its power to give order satisfied people who were weary of the unsettlement of the Revolution, and disgusted with the corruption and inefficiency of the Directory. Napoleon also preserved the most popular gains of the Revolution, such as the abolition of privilege, equality before the law, and a more systematic form of government. More important, he protected those who had gained materially by the Revolution, through the greater freedom of business enterprise, through profiteering in army supplies, or by buying the noble and church lands which had been confiscated. These property-owners feared further change whether it were a royalist restoration or a new Jacobin movement. They wanted order and stability. Napoleon also pleased the peasantry by his agreement with the Pope, which enabled him to restore the Roman Catholic Church, a traditional part of the peasant's life, while it also enabled him to keep the Church well under his own control.

§ A.4. THE CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE WAR.—It is doubtful, however, whether Napoleon could have made his system permanent. He was shrewd enough to appeal to the important interests among the French people, which any government had to satisfy if it were to be stable. But at bottom he was concerned with his personal ambition. This tended to

drive him on beyond the limits that suited those interests. His rule became more and more burdensome, both to the French and to his other subjects. Moreover, he had not the traditional "divinity that doth hedge a king" to give a sentimental buttress to his power. He is reported to have said that a Habsburg might be defeated twenty times and still receive a welcome from his subjects; but to an upstart like himself one disaster meant ruin. Thus, in addition to the opposition he met from the princes he had humiliated, from the backward peasantry of Spain and the Tyrol, from the progressive merchants of North Germany, and from philosophic lovers of freedom, the basis of his power in France was increasingly insecure. It is interesting that, when he returned from Elba in 1815, he felt it necessary to promise to rule as a constitutional monarch, with more liberal guarantees against despotism than the restored Bourbons had given.

By the end of the Napoleonic wars, then, the position had changed. There had been at first, in broad terms, a struggle of the French *people* on behalf of the Revolution against Allied *governments*, which had little support from their peoples. It was now rather a war of Allied governments which were asking for, receiving, even being driven on by, popular support against a despotic government which was less French than Napoleonic, and which appealed less and less to the enthusiasm of the French people.

The sorry part was that the European governments, though willing to use popular support to drive back Napoleon, had little idea of conceding political power to the popular movements. The Revolution had threatened them. Napoleon had grown out of the Revolution and more than threatened them. Napoleon was not distinguished from the Revolution. War, conquest, and disturbance to the Europe that they knew—the Europe of the aristocratic eighteenth century—were all linked up with the Revolution. Looking at things thus the governments still stood for the old order, and were prepared to resist any important move for change. They wanted to see the people

loyal, but docile, and content to leave politics to their traditional superiors.

Great Britain's continued opposition to revolutionary France, and then to Napoleon, was largely due to the old British policy of opposing the dominance of any one Power on the Continent, especially in the Netherlands. This object was particularly pursued when the dominating Power was France, the one most likely to threaten British colonial and commercial interests. But there was the same tendency as on the Continent to regard Napoleon's aggressiveness as part and parcel of the Revolution. Resistance to Napoleon was accompanied by a repressive anti-Jacobinism at home, which went on for many years after the war (§ 245).

CHAPTER A.II

THE ATTEMPT AT A EUROPEAN SYSTEM

§ A.5. INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY IN MODERN TIMES.—The attempt after the Napoleonic wars to put the relations of the European states on a better footing was a most important development in modern history, and naturally suggests comparison with the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation, all the result of the bitter experience of great wars. In the Middle Ages the idea, if not the fact, of the unity of Europe had been very strong. It was expressed in the term Christendom. It owed a good deal to the influence of the old Roman Empire, which had for over four centuries given some real unity to much of Europe; this was reinforced by the growth of the one Catholic Church which soon extended its sway and its organisation after the Empire had been broken up.

The idea of unity in the Middle Ages was symbolised and partly realised in the position of the Holy Roman Emperor, as

the most exalted prince, though not the actual ruler, of all Europe, and in the position of the Pope as the head of the one Church. But it must be remembered that, so far as economic life and much of the practical work of government were concerned, medieval Europe was organised rather in small local units, centring round the feudal manor.

The rise of more highly organised independent states under strong kings, who later usually had to give way to some measure of parliamentary control, meant, on the whole, a better and more secure life; but it also broke up Europe. Instead of the ideal of unity, distrust, rivalry, and resort to war became the ordinary features of the relations between states. Each was a law to itself because there was no law to govern their actions towards each other; reasons of state—which is a polite way of saying the interests of those who were most powerful in the state—became the highest form of right. This is what we mean by international anarchy.

The evils of this, especially in the form of ruthless and destructive wars, soon produced some effort to lessen this great defect of the modern states system. Beginning with the work of the Dutch lawyer Grotius in the early part of the seventeenth century, a rather uncertain body of international law developed; but it was very largely concerned with the ways in which war might be conducted, rather than with removing the right to resort to war.

Of more practical importance was the softening of the anarchy between states by the expedient of the balance of power. Sometimes this took the form of the combination of a number of states against the domination threatened by some one powerful state. The clearest examples of this are the Grand Alliance which was developed against Louis XIV of France, and the many Coalitions formed against Napoleon, culminating in the alliance that brought about his downfall. The fear of British naval dominance after the defeat of France in the Seven Years' War brought the other maritime Powers—France, Spain and Holland—to the aid of the rebellious

American colonies, and caused the formation of the Armed Neutrality by the Baltic Powers.

At the end of wars an effort was generally made to arrange boundaries so that there would be a fairly equal distribution of power, unlikely to tempt any one state to seek to upset the settlement. The system of buffer states on the borders of those that are thought most likely to be aggressive has the same idea behind it. Of course such a balance is usually favourable to the victors and at the same time shows their suspicion of one another. Occasionally some particular arrangement was guaranteed by treaty as inviolable, in the hope of making the settlement more secure. In times of peace there was strenuous diplomatic activity on the part of each state to maintain or change the existing balance, according to its own advantage. For any increase of power or territory by a rival some compensation was sought.

At best the balance of power was a rough-and-ready, unorganised way of softening the struggle between independent states. But it was not a very great step, in theory, from this to a more organised system, under which all the states should agree on certain rules to govern their mutual relations, involving both rights and duties. Having agreed as to their rights, all could guarantee to give mutual support in maintaining those rights against any attack on them. This is the basic idea of what we have come to call the collective system. With changing conditions, however, existing rights become out-of-date and a cause of friction. There is therefore the further need of agreement as to how changes in existing rights—such as boundaries—should be made. If no international legislature to make and change laws can be agreed on, there is, at least the possibility of a pledge to consult together, in the hope of agreement, when there is a serious demand for change. For such an international system there have been many paper schemes in modern times. There is a good deal in common in the plans put forward by the French minister Sully, the English Quaker William Penn, the French Abbé de St. Pierre, the

Genevèse Rousseau, and the German Kant. But the first practical attempt to put these ideas into political practice was made at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

§ A.6. THE BASIS OF THE CONGRESS SYSTEM.—The term "Holy Alliance" has been often used to describe this attempt; but it is a little misleading. On 26th September 1815, at a great parade of his troops that were occupying Paris, the Czar, Alexander I of Russia, announced his scheme of a Holy Alliance. By this the rulers of Europe were to promise to treat each other with Christian charity as brothers and to be kind fathers to their people. This so-called Holy Alliance was signed ultimately by all the sovereigns of Europe except the British King, the Pope, and the Turkish Sultan. Actually it contained no definite obligations, and no one except Alexander and Frederick William III of Prussia took it very seriously. Men like Castlereagh and Metternich were inclined to ridicule it. They took notice of it only because they thought it wise to humour the serious-minded but emotional Alexander.

Within two months, on 20th November, a much more important document was signed. This was an Alliance between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, which countries on the same day concluded with France the Second Treaty of Paris. The Alliance was intended as a safeguard against any new French aggression; but in it there was an Article with a wider purpose. This Article VI was first drafted by Alexander to provide for periodical meetings of the representatives of the four Powers to watch over conditions in France, Castlereagh, however, had it altered. It then had no special reference to France, but provided for meetings of the four Powers to consult upon their common interests and consider "the measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe."

This Article was the basis of the series of congresses or conferences which took place during the next seven years and to

which France was admitted after 1818. It was a most important step—a real experiment in international affairs; but we must also notice what it was not. There was no system of collective security by which all would come to the aid of any country that was attacked; there was merely an agreement of the four Powers to consult together.

This is less than we might have expected; for the idea of a more complete system had been seriously talked of between statesmen. It had even been mentioned in a treaty as one of the objectives of the Third Coalition formed in 1805. Alexander, Pitt, and, later, Castlereagh had all worked for it, favouring the idea of a federal system in Europe by which all should come to aid of a state which was attacked. Why Castlereagh grew doubtful about such a scheme we shall see soon.

There is another point to remember. The agreement to consult together was an experiment; but most of the arrangements made in Europe were based on old ideas, not new ones. This again may be surprising; for Alexander had urged, as far back as 1804, that before a better international system could succeed, more attention must be paid to the needs and desires of the peoples of Europe. Boundaries should be drawn according to national sentiment, and the whims of rulers should be limited by constitutions giving power to popular opinion.

This comparatively young ruler—he was twenty-four when he came to the throne in 1801—had as tutors and friends men who were full of the new ideas of liberal government and national independence which were to become so general in the nineteenth century. But he also had in him the tradition of the autocratic Russian court—the all-powerful ruler and his armies. A mixture of egoist and idealist, he believed he had a great mission in Europe; but he was emotional and unstable, haunted by the fact that he had come to the throne through the assassination of his half-mad father, Paul.

Alexander's generous impulses towards the peoples of Europe found little place in the settlement, despite the part

those peoples had played in the downfall of Napoleon. The settlement was based rather on the old conception of the distribution of people as tax-payers or cannon-fodder, to be weighed as such in the balance of power, and on the idea of legitimacy, or established traditional right, rather than justice or popular feeling, as the basis of governments. In France, it is true, there was no reversion to the old order. The Bourbons came back with their rights limited by a constitution and a parliament, a wise step for which Alexander had used his influence. No other settlement would have had a chance of surviving in France, as was shown when Charles X tried to restore the old regime and lost his throne in 1830. But, in general, there was little regard for the growing revolutionary demands, while in Great Britain resistance to change was certainly stiffened during this period. Castlereagh himself was one of the leaders of the repression. It would not be a great exaggeration to say that the object of the system of conferences was to make the world safe for the old order rather than to usher in a new.

§ A.7. THE HISTORY AND COLLAPSE OF THE CONGRESS SYSTEM.—The co-operation of the Great Powers did not last beyond 1822 and there were signs of growing differences even before that. It was British policy which gave the decisive blow to the system. Castlereagh and Metternich, the Austrian statesman, had a great deal in common. Both admitted that change was in the air and that it could not permanently be resisted; but both were cautious and conservative, afraid of the possibility of too rapid change. "It is impossible not to perceive," said Castlereagh, "a great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the principles of freedom are in full operation." But in the same dispatch he added: "I am sure it is better to retard than accelerate the operation of this most hazardous principle which is abroad." The main difference in the policies of the two statesmen lies in this. Metternich was concerned with the autocratic Austrian Empire, which had no

basis of unity but the rule of the Habsburg dynasty, and which would certainly have been greatly disturbed if not completely disrupted by "the hazardous principle that was abroad," while Great Britain, on the other hand, already had a constitution which, undemocratic and unrepresentative as it was, yet was the result of revolutionary change. Britain would be less directly and less violently affected by the movement for change. Thus, while neither Castlereagh nor Metternich viewed liberal movements with any pleasure, Metternich tended to think that safety lay in repression; whereas Castlereagh felt that, when a liberal movement was showing itself to be really strong, peace and stability were more likely to result from bowing to the inevitable.

Alexander was much more inclined to the ideas of liberalism and nationality than Castlereagh or Metternich; but he believed that changes should be made by the benevolence of rulers rather than by the action of subjects. Various incidents in Europe in 1819 and 1820 tended to strengthen his fear of revolution and drive him towards Metternich's point of view. Moreover the great power that Alexander had at his disposal caused misgiving to the other European governments, even when Alexander offered to use it for what he quite sincerely believed was for the good of Europe.

These points help to explain the differences that began to appear in the Alliance. Probably already in 1815 Castlereagh began to have doubts. A complete system of collective security might be used, not only to keep the peace and protect existing states from attack, but also to maintain the existing forms of government in every state "without any consideration of the extent to which it (*i.e.* established power) was abused." Castlereagh did not object to repression, and intervention in particular cases; but he saw the danger of making the suppression of revolt a general rule, to be enforced by the collective power of the European governments. The Alliance would then become a mere Trade Union of Kings against their subjects. Therefore he abandoned his earlier and more far-reaching

plans and became anxious that the common obligations of the Great Powers should be limited to consultation in conferences, as provided for in Article VI of the Alliance of 1815. He opposed an attempt made by Alexander at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 to get collective agreement to maintain both boundaries and all established rights. He resisted later attempts to use the Alliance in such a way.

The rift began to appear over the revolt which took place in the kingdom of Naples in 1820. Castlereagh did not oppose Austrian intervention, because there was a treaty between the King of Naples and the Austrian Emperor which gave some legal justification for it; and it could be argued that the revolt in Naples would disturb the Austrian possessions in Italy. But it was also proposed to give the moral support of the other Powers to Austrian action on the ground that changes extorted from rulers by their subjects should always be suppressed. This the British government (as well as the French) definitely refused to support. Thus, in 1820-1821, the Concert of Great Powers seemed likely to break up into a constitutional group, consisting of France and Great Britain, and an autocratic group, consisting of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. However, Greek risings against Turkish rule broke out. On this question Great Britain and Austria were reunited by a common fear of the possible effects of Russian intervention on behalf of the Greeks.

The actual break came over the Spanish question in 1822. Spain was in a disturbed state following a rising to force the reactionary Ferdinand VII to govern through a parliamentary constitution. The French government of Louis XVIII was meditating intervention. Again, Castlereagh, and later Canning, did not wholly oppose this, so long as it was based on French interests and did not mean permanent French influence in Spain or in the Spanish colonies in America. But when there was talk of French intervention being supported by the collective approval of the other Great Powers and being based on objection to the form of government that had been set up in

Spain, then Castlereagh was determined to refuse British assent. Overwrought by a long period of strain, Castlereagh committed suicide in 1822; but Canning, who soon became Foreign Minister, was inclined to go even faster in the direction in which Castlereagh had been moving. Wellington, as Great Britain's representative, definitely withdrew from the Congress of Verona when the question came up. This virtually ended the attempt to found a more organised system for the mutual relations of European states.

Had he lived, Castlereagh would probably have striven to maintain the idea of conferences for discussion, while continuing to resist any attempt to use them as a "Trade Union of Kings" for the suppression of revolution on principle. Canning almost joyfully broke away from the idea of conference as a regular feature of international relations. He regarded a return to the international anarchy characteristic of the modern age as "getting back to a wholesome state of affairs" (NA.4); and we must remember that his policy was not due, in any great degree, to his opposition to repression, or his sympathy with revolution. He was rather moved by a desire to be unfettered in pursuing what he considered to be British interests.

We must have a high regard for Castlereagh as an international statesman. He saw the danger of any complete collective system for Europe if it were based on an indiscriminate support of all existing governments, whatever their nature; but he also saw the value of conference and consultation to get agreement among the Powers where it was possible. Although the more regular use of this method broke down in 1822, it was actually resorted to on a number of occasions during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in times of peace, to deal with questions which might have led to war (NA.5). On the other hand, Castlereagh failed to find a way of giving constructive help to the movements for change which he admitted were going on in Europe. He saw the increasingly popular, liberal, and national nature of the opposition to Napoleon. He had advised Metternich to "rouse and arm the people" and

"not to lose an hour in appealing forcibly to the nation," because "the people are now the only barrier." Nor had he scrupled to give countenance to liberal movements in Italy as an aid to driving out the French. But, when once Napoleon was accounted for, he fell back on the old idea of drawing boundaries according to a balance of power without regard to popular feelings, he discouraged liberal movements in Italy for the sake of conciliating Austria, and regarded them everywhere as risky. We can appreciate his conservative caution at a critical time in European history. At the same time the great tasks in guiding change can only be performed by the running of generous risks; nor can it be denied that Castlereagh sometimes looked on the people merely as instruments of a state to be used for its protection, rather than as human beings with personalities of their own.

§ A.8. CANNING AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.—Out of the struggle of the Spanish colonies in America to establish their independence at this time came the Monroe Doctrine. This was a statement of policy made by President Monroe of the United States. It became a central feature of American policy and was of great importance in world affairs in the nineteenth century. It has often been said that Canning suggested it; but this is scarcely accurate (§ 273).

Canning feared that either France alone or other European Powers in concert would intervene to restore the authority of King Ferdinand in these colonies. Alexander was anxious for this, and as late as 1825 an attempt was made to hold a congress in Paris for this purpose. Meanwhile, since Spain was unable to enforce its monopolistic trade policy, British trade with the rebellious colonies had grown considerably. Canning professed himself willing to see the colonies brought under Spanish control again, if it were done by Spain alone, and if the preference for Spanish trade was made less drastic. He feared that if Spain received help from other Powers then they would receive privileges to the detriment of British trade.

Canning warned France that any move by France to interfere in the colonies would mean war with Britain. He also sounded the American Ambassador on the possibility of a joint stand to warn the European Powers against interference. This was not unwelcome to the American government and its advisers; but John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, or Foreign Minister, made it the opportunity to "make up an American cause," which was not quite what Canning had expected. Confident that Great Britain was now separated from the other European Powers and would resist their encroachment on the American continent, he persuaded Monroe to make his statement. This warned all European Powers that any attempt to extend their existing colonial possessions, or to interfere with the former Spanish colonies, which had "on great consideration and on just principles" been recognised by the United States as independent countries, would be regarded as "unfriendly"—which is the diplomatic way of saying it would probably mean war.

Canning had got more than he had bargained for. Not only were France and the autocratic Powers warned off, but also Spain and Great Britain; nor was Britain at that time willing to recognise the independence of the rebellious colonies, though this was done a little later. Canning and later British Foreign Ministers accepted the position philosophically. Though it cannot be said that the Doctrine has always been strictly maintained, or that its interpretation has always been the same, that it was maintained at all was largely due to British acquiescence in it. It has become generally accepted, though it has no legal basis like a treaty; and there is special reference to it in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Between the United States and Great Britain there has been serious friction on a number of occasions since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823; but in the long run they have all been settled by arbitration or other peaceful means (NA.6).

CHAPTER A.III

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LIBERAL
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

§ A.9. REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN EUROPE.—The statesmen, like Metternich and Castlereagh, who feared rapid change had tried to arrange Europe on what they thought were safe lines; they were not blindly opposed to all change. Metternich, for instance, actually suggested some changes in the Austrian Empire, but could not move the Emperor Francis to carry them out. Some of the rulers, however, whom these statesmen had been willing to restore to their thrones when Napoleon had been driven back, though they were sometimes kindly enough people in their limited way, had very little sense. Not only did they oppose change, but they wanted to wipe out the changes that had been made in their kingdoms during their enforced absence. The restored Bourbons in France, who, it was said, had "learnt nothing and forgotten nothing," were moderate by comparison.

There was Victor Emmanuel I, King of Sardinia, whose most important territory was Piedmont in north-west Italy, with Turin as his capital. He refused to allow his subjects to use the road over the Mont Cenis pass which Napoleon had had made, even though it linked two parts of his dominions. He had the botanical gardens which the French had made in Turin destroyed. He tried to restore all court officials, ceremonies, and styles of dress as they had been in 1798. The Pope abolished the new-fangled street-lighting which the French had established in Rome. A German ruler tried to collect all the taxes he had missed, although the people had had to pay other taxes in the meantime.

Such attempts to set the clock back would be dangerous at any time, for there is always a certain amount of change going

on. But the years following the Napoleonic wars were not ordinary. Things were moving more quickly than usual. Because of the changed way in which people were living, new ideas were growing up which clashed with the ideas and methods and interests of the existing governments. Thus European history from 1815 to 1850 is a good deal occupied by this struggle between revolution and reaction.

§ A.10. THE CAUSES OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS.—Why did people cease to be content with the existing forms of government? The main cause was the use of better methods of producing goods, resulting in more trade to exchange different kinds of goods. The middle class and the workers who carried on the new industries were no longer content to see so many advantages enjoyed by aristocratic landowners who no longer rendered the services that had once given some justification for their privileges. This kind of change had come first in England, later in France, and was now, in the first half of the nineteenth century, beginning to show itself in other parts of Europe. After 1825, the export of many kinds of machinery from Great Britain, which had been prohibited, was permitted. Industrialism grew in France, Belgium, Germany, and North Italy. Roads and waterways were improved, and railways began to link up important centres. Agriculture was also improved. For instance, Count Cavour, who took such a big part in making the different states of Italy into one constitutional kingdom of Italy, had tried to make his estate a model of agricultural efficiency.

As a larger section of ordinary people became increasingly important in economic life and anxious for political power, it was natural that new ideas should grow about government. The state, it was felt, should be run for the good of the many, and the many should have a big share in carrying on the government. This feeling was likely to be all the stronger when, as in many parts of Italy, the rulers were felt to be not only stupid and oppressive, but foreigners without any ties of

sentiment with their subjects. Thus the movements were not only democratic but also national.

Sometimes these ideas were expressed by thinkers with a deep sense of the effects of oppression on human nature. They felt that with greater freedom and democratic government there might be born communities of men working happily together in real fellowship; and that these communities might co-operate together for peace and plenty for all men. Already in the eighteenth century Jean-Jacques Rousseau had popularised this ideal; at the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant expressed the liberal ideal in German philosophy; and after 1830 the Italian idealist, Joseph Mazzini, wrote fervently for national unity and independence, democracy, and international co-operation. Naturally ideas such as this had a great appeal for people who felt themselves to be hampered by the rule of unprogressive monarchs. Increasing development of a class of wage-workers in the towns gave rise to socialist ideas and movements, especially after 1830. The *Communist Manifesto*, written by Karl Marx in conjunction with Frederick Engels, appeared early in 1848. It opens with the words "A spectre is haunting Europe—the Spectre of Communism"—and ends with the slogan "Working men of all countries unite!"

The conquests of the French also had their effect. Napoleon had for some time ruled a great part of Western Europe. Though he had allowed little political power to his subjects, he had introduced some of the improvements that had their origin in the French Revolution. Law was reformed and made the same for all; public positions were no longer reserved for the nobly born; material improvements were introduced. Some of the restored rulers, as we have seen, tried to reverse such things and to hinder progress. But people could not forget and so were restless for change.

Finally, Napoleon had stimulated revolutionary ideas in an opposite way. While in some ways his rule was better, more progressive, and more efficient than people had been used to,

it was also very burdensome in taxes, levies of troops, and interference with trade through the Continental System. To throw off this burden people rallied to their old governments in the great Wars of Liberation which closed the struggle against Napoleon. The peoples had become a political force, and the more active and intelligent of them were not willing to retire completely into the background, especially when their rulers showed so little real sense of their changing needs.

§ A.II. CHANGES IN EUROPE, 1815-1850.—There were many upheavals during this period, 1820-1821, 1830-1833, and 1848-1850 being times of especial disturbance. Revolution was, in fact, constantly simmering and occasionally reaching boiling-point. On the whole, the forces of change had not produced any great transformation of Europe by 1850; but we may note some results. Greece had become independent of Turkish rule; Belgium, which for centuries had been under the Spanish and, later, under the Austrian Habsburgs, and in 1814 joined to Holland under the House of Orange, became an independent constitutional kingdom; most of the Spanish colonies in South and Central America became independent republics; in France parliamentary government on a middle-class basis was more firmly established by the revolution of 1830. In Spain and Portugal struggles between rival claimants to the thrones had gone in favour of the more liberal ones. But movements in Italy, Germany, and Poland had produced little results.

In 1848 most of Europe was ablaze. Many governments were toppled over or forced to go with the current. Soon, however, the old order retrieved most of its old position. In Germany, the Austrian Empire, and Italy, by 1850 things were almost back to where they had been. In France the king, Louis Philippe, had been deposed and a republic set up; but Louis Napoleon, a nephew of the former Emperor, was already preparing the ground for his new Napoleonic despotism.

§ A.12. THE MAIN LINES OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.—The outstanding British Foreign Ministers during this period were Canning and Palmerston. We have already noticed that Canning did not make any sudden break from the policy of Castlereagh; but he was less European in his outlook and was glad to abandon the idea of regular conferences. He also made more appeal to popular opinion, and sometimes played on the emotions and prejudices of people to strengthen his hand. Palmerston had the same characteristics in a more pronounced form. He was something of a mixture. He was an aristocrat with some of the outlook of the eighteenth century; at the same time he had a sympathy for new trends, was unconventional in some of his ways, and knew how to play on popular feeling. He was a dominating personality, but lacked a deep and wide thoughtfulness. He could carry things off with a high hand without having to think out all this actions might involve in the future (N.215).

During a good deal of the time from 1815 till the question of colonies began to loom large about 1880, Great Britain and France worked together in international affairs. We have seen, for instance, how in 1820, at the Congress of Troppau, they had opposed the other Powers over the idea of joint suppression of revolution. There was, of course, a certain similarity in the parliamentary systems of the two countries. In both countries the form of government was due, at least partly, to revolution; and neither was likely to submit to unlimited despotism.

But the diplomatic "friendship" between France and Britain was not wholly based on common ideas about government. When France and Britain worked together, Britain usually joined France to prevent the autocratic Powers, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, which acted a good deal together, from having too great a control of European affairs. It was consideration for the balance of power, rather than love for France or its system of government, that influenced the British government.

On a number of occasions Britain opposed France. If

French policy seemed likely to interfere with any arrangement which was regarded as important to British interests, the British government had no qualms about siding with an autocratic government against parliamentary France. Thus in 1830 the French expedition to Algeria caused alarm because it might disturb British power in the Mediterranean. Again, in 1840, France undertook a bold policy in the troubles of the Turkish Empire, which encircled the east end of the Mediterranean. This might have led to considerable French influence in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. This was regarded as important to British interests in India. Palmerston worked hard and successfully to bring Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain into line, leaving France isolated.

Again, in 1846, when a marriage between a French prince and a Spanish princess caused fear of French influence in Spain, Palmerston again showed his displeasure. In fact, it might be said that, on the whole, Britain worked with France because it was safer than leaving France to pursue a policy that might be dangerous. France, the friend, was also something of a bogey.

Russia was the other bogey of British policy. Russia was powerful in Asia and repeatedly threatened to gain more influence in the Mediterranean, either by protecting Turkey in return for favours or by helping the Christian subjects of the Sultan to a greater independence. It was feared that they would become too largely dependent on Russia, especially if Russia were permitted to help them alone. Once more it was the great British commercial interests in India that made Russian expansion in the Mediterranean region or in Central Asia appear so objectionable to Great Britain.

Austria was regarded by British statesmen as a counterweight to these two bogies. Although British policy was so often opposed to Austria, especially when Austria was acting with Russia and Prussia, it also was bent on preserving Austria as a strong Power in Europe. In the 1848 revolutions Palmerston was most anxious that Austria should survive as a strong

Power. This mattered more than the desire of the Hungarians for independence. Austria, he said, was "a barrier against encroachment on the one side and against invasion on the other. The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up, in my opinion, with the maintenance and integrity of Austria as a great European Power." Anything which weakened or crippled Austria, he thought, must be "a great calamity to Europe and one which every Englishman ought to deprecate and try to prevent." He said that if Austria did not exist it would have to be invented. Before the revolutions had broken out he had urged on Metternich, who had to fly when the outbreak in Vienna came, the importance of making reforms in the Italian territories under Austrian control or influence, as a means of maintaining Austrian power.

§ A.13. BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS.—In Great Britain many people were sympathetic to the attempts abroad to get freer forms of government. There were contributions of money and of active help to the Greek and Italian movements. Revolutionary leaders such as Garibaldi and Mazzini found refuge and friendship among British people. But this popular sympathy did not mean that the government shared it or acted on it. There were many signs that the classes that really had the greatest influence on the government's actions, especially before the Reform Act of 1832, sympathised little with advanced ideas and feared any but the most gradual change.

The poet, Lord Byron, who died in helping the Greek cause, was a lonely voice in the House of Lords when he attacked oppression at home. Shelley was regarded as a dangerous rebel because of his love of freedom. Harsh measures against real freedom of opinion and against organised action for expressing discontent were kept up long after the Napoleonic wars (§ 268 and N.190). Trade Unions were illegal till 1824 and even then much restricted (§ 276). There was determined opposition to the Reform Act of 1832, even though it

was a very cautious measure, giving little political power to the mass of the people (§ 280). Chartism, bred from disappointment at the caution of the Reform Act, met with further repression (§ 288 and N.198).

British foreign policy, then, was not likely to be moved by enthusiasm for revolutionary movements abroad, especially when they were led by fervent idealists, full of confidence in their power to build a new and better world. British policy did sometimes help these movements and British people were glad of it; but the real basis of the government's action was its idea as to how the balance of power would be affected. The best feature of British policy was its matter-of-factness—the willingness to accept what could not be prevented and to make the best of it. The British government was well pleased if things remained quiet—if people were content with their despotic rulers. If discontent became active, then the government hoped it would not go too far. If discontent would not stop short of some important change, then the British government acted: Let the change be made as quickly and with as little fuss as possible. No other Power must be permitted to profit by the change or enlarge its influence in Europe.

These guiding principles can be seen again and again. When the Greeks revolted, Great Britain was not anxious to see Turkey weakened, especially as Russia was suspected of seeking power in the Balkans. It became clear that the Greeks could not be suppressed. Therefore pressure must be put on Turkey to recognise their independence. Great Britain might do this alone; but no other country must act without Britain, and Greece must be made thoroughly independent, not a mere satellite of Russia. This was the policy pursued by Canning, and later by Palmerston, leading to Greek independence in 1832, helped by joint action of Britain, France, and Russia.

When the Belgian part of the Netherlands broke into revolt in 1830, there was upset an arrangement, the union of the Netherlands, which had been a main point of British policy since 1804. But the government of the Dutch king, William I,

had been stupid, and it was not likely the Belgians would willingly submit. France, which had just had its 1830 revolution, was likely to intervene to support the Belgians and might gain influence. Therefore Palmerston decided that Belgium must be independent and arrangements made which would keep foreign influence out of Belgium. Hence he worked hard to secure the agreement of the Dutch king to separation, the agreement of the Powers to a guarantee of Belgian neutrality, and the withdrawal of the son of Louis Philippe, the new French king, after he had been elected as King of the Belgians (N.215).

In France, after the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, enthusiastic French liberals wanted their new governments to assist similar movements in other parts of Europe—in Belgium, in Italy, in Poland. But the British government took the same attitude as the autocratic Powers and made it clear that it would be dangerous for the French government to act on the principle of supporting liberal movements wherever they occurred. In just the same way, earlier British governments had opposed the universal suppression of liberal movements. It was the balance of power and the avoidance of disturbance that really counted.

CHAPTER A.IV

THE MAKING OF TWO GREAT POWERS

§ A.14. THE MAKING OF A UNITED GERMANY AND A UNITED ITALY.—In the parts of Europe where change in the nineteenth century was to have the greatest effects the revolutionary movements up to 1850 had not produced much result. The Germany and the Italy which were to play such an important part as Great Powers in the later history of Europe appeared during the next twenty years, "Germany" and "Italy" till

then were, as Metternich had said, but geographical expressions. The parts of Europe so named had for centuries been divided into a number of separate states under different rulers, most of whom, in the case of Italy, were scarcely Italians. Napoleon had given something nearer unity to these two regions; but the Congress of Vienna had split them up again. In Germany, it is true, many of the very small states which had existed before were not restored. The thirty-odd states which were left were also loosely bound together in the Germanic Confederation, with Austria at its head; but this gave no real unity and was mainly used by Metternich as a means of getting liberal movements repressed wherever they appeared in Germany. In Italy, too, Austria's power was greatly increased by the Vienna arrangements.

There were many people in both regions who were not satisfied with this. They felt that the peoples of these regions were nations and should be united to form national states. Many of those who felt this were also in favour of democratic forms of government. Such desires were strengthened by the economic development which was going on. Business began to enlarge its area. Branches of firms were formed in other towns. Railways were built to deal with the increasing exchange of goods. Greater freedom of trade was desired than could be given by the many small states. Bigger states would in every way be more convenient and profitable to the kind of business enterprise that was developing.

Up to 1850 the movements in this direction achieved little success. Yet there was something rather glorious about their failure. They are a part of the story of unselfish human endeavour. Many of the men who inspired and led these movements had nothing to gain for themselves and were moved only by the idea of making the lot of their fellows better. Among them were professors, teachers, poets and writers. They were often supported by students and workers. They loved freedom and wanted to get rid of the oppression which was shutting in men's lives. They wanted governments to be

the voice of a free people, working for a free and peaceful world, in which men of different countries made their own special contribution to the common good.

The best example, perhaps, is Joseph Mazzini, the Italian writer and poet, who founded a movement called Young Italy and worked for the formation of similar national movements which should be linked together as Young Europe. "All things in liberty through association" was his ideal. Nationalism was to be the path to internationalism. When the nations were free, with democratic governments to express their will, they would co-operate together in a European Federation. For this ideal Mazzini worked through poverty, exile, and disappointment from his young manhood to his death. The finest episode in his career was the brief story of the Roman Republic in 1849.

As we have seen, little success came to these movements, unless it was the inspiration that they left to others. A successful step towards uniting Italy did not come till 1859 and then it depended on outside help given by France under the Emperor Napoleon III. More purely Italian success came in 1860; but later steps in 1866 and 1870 depended on the wars of Prussia against France and Austria. The German process began a little later and was closely connected with the successful wars of Prussia, in 1864, 1866, and 1870-1871.

§ A.15. BISMARCK AND CAVOUR—INDUSTRIALISTS AND DYNASTIES.—The two outstanding figures in the making of the Great Powers, Germany and Italy, were Bismarck and Cavour. They were men of very different outlook and different methods from the earlier leaders. The difference may be summed up in this way. Mazzini in Italy, the Gagners in Germany, Lamartine in France, had really thought of setting peoples free for true self-government; they had appealed to generous ideals and heroic action. Bismarck and Cavour, however, built Great Powers in which the free voice of the people was not so clear; and in doing this they used the methods of cunning and power.

Both of them aristocrats, yet with an eye to how things were moving, they were most skilful in using the material at hand for their purposes. Bismarck, while making a powerful united Germany, still managed to keep for Prussia, with its strong tradition of monarchy and irresponsible government, a very influential place in the new structure. Yet he also managed to find a place for the other German rulers, such as the kings of Bavaria and Saxony. He had an eye for the big business interests which grew rapidly in the new Germany; and he gave a sop to the liberals by making all adult men voters for a parliament whose real power was limited. Above all, he appealed to national sentiment to help his plans, while diverting it from channels that he thought dangerous. Cavour, too, who spoke French more easily than he spoke Italian, as was usual with the nobility of north-west Italy, worked for united Italy by getting other parts to accept the rule of his own master, the King of Sardinia; on the other hand, he used the romantic republican, Garibaldi. The Italian parliament had more real power than the German; but Cavour kept the vote to the more prosperous classes. Power lay not so much with a free Italian nation as with upper middle classes whose strength lay mainly in the more developed north.

Probably such big results could not have been achieved in so short a time by any other methods or with less suffering, in spite of the wars that were involved. The masses of the people were not in a position to win a real freedom by their own efforts without years and years of bitter experience and suffering. Nor were the methods of Bismarck and Cavour much, if any, worse than those of other European statesmen. They were merely more skilful. But sometimes one wonders whether the very skill in using the mixed material at hand enabled them to work so fast that the states that they created lacked the solid qualities of healthy growth. It was also a little difficult for the rest of Europe to adjust itself readily to such rapid changes. The balance of power was apt to quiver and statesmen were a little nervy. At any rate, it is pretty clear that the result was a

good deal different from what the earlier leaders had worked for.

* § A.16. BRITISH POLICY AND THE UNION OF ITALY.—Among British people there was much sympathy with the demand for reform in Italy and much indignation against the graver abuses of government. Gladstone, for instance, after a visit to Naples in 1851 described the rule of King Ferdinand as “the negation of God erected into a system of government.” The desire for greater freedom of trade among the progressive business men of northern Italy also appealed to the British mind of the time. Cobden on a tour of Italy in 1847 was much fêted. But the British government was not anxious to give any actual help. It was reluctant to see Austria weakened and suspicious that France might meddle, if there were any upheaval in Italy, and gain influence there. Reform of the existing governments would have pleased the British government rather than a movement for Italian unity. Then the balance of power would have been left undisturbed.

It was after the collapse of the revolutionary movements of 1848–1850 that Cavour began his work as Prime Minister in the kingdom of Sardinia. After building up the resources of this state, in 1858 he succeeded in getting Napoleon III secretly to promise French support, if Austria could be provoked into declaring war. A union of the northern part of Italy was then to be made. In 1859 Cavour’s skill and Austrian blundering secured the war and Napoleon’s help. Britain, with other Powers, had striven for a conference to avoid an upset. Now the main purpose was to watch lest Napoleon feathered his own nest.

* Napôleon, however, became alarmed at the strength of the movement he was letting loose; he found that instead of creating a grateful dependent state he was raising up a new power on his flank and on the Mediterranean. He also feared a Prussian attack in support of Austria if he went too far. He made peace, though still insisting on the price of his help. But

things could not stop here, and soon Garibaldi was preparing his adventure to assist a rising in Sicily. He helped to liberate southern Italy from its tyrannous ruler. Would he hand it over to King Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia, thus putting most of Italy under his monarchy? Or would he fight for the republic that he personally believed in? Would he attack Rome and so bring intervention by other Powers? Cavour scarcely dared let him go on unchecked; but if he took action he would be threatened with interference by the other European Powers. This he could not have resisted.

Napoleon III was by this time trying to bargain that any increase in the growing kingdom of Italy should be offset by gains of influence in the Mediterranean for himself. It was now that British policy became active and helped to bring about the very considerable amount of unity that was achieved in Italy in 1860. Things obviously could not be stopped. It would be better to have a kingdom such as Cavour wanted, rather than the schemes of the romantic Garibaldi. For Cavour had a great admiration for Great Britain and its constitution, while the enthusiasm of Garibaldi was scarcely the kind of thing to appeal politically to the governing class. Above all, if there was going to be change, France must be prevented from reaping the advantage. If Austria must lose something, let it be her influence in Italy, which had scarcely been a source of strength to Austria. And let the whole thing be done as quickly and painlessly as possible.

It was in such circumstances that the British government, which was at the time dominated by Russell, Palmerston, and Gladstone, who were pleased enough to support a movement of this kind when it could be done with advantage to British interests, took some bold actions. The other Powers were warned not to interfere. Cavour was thus let to know that it was safe for him to act. On a very flimsy pretext he ordered Victor Emmanuel II's armies to march through the Papal territories and join Garibaldi's forces. Garibaldi generously gave way to the King and went off to his island home of Caprera. The

kingdom of Italy was thus practically made, Napoleon checkmated, and the balance of power in the Mediterranean kept favourable to Great Britain (NA.7).

Until 1935 Italy generally supported British interests. Even as a member of the Triple Alliance from 1882, Italy made it clear to the other members of the Alliance that in no circumstances would war with Great Britain be considered. To France, on the other hand, Italy was generally opposed till the end of the nineteenth century.

§ A.17. BISMARCK, PRUSSIA, AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE.—Great Britain had no such part in the making of Germany, though this had much greater effects on European affairs. Bismarck, in his service as a representative of Prussia in other countries, came to the conclusion that German unity required two things. It could not be achieved in the way that had been tried in 1848, when the liberals had succeeded for a time in establishing a parliament for all Germany and had drawn up a constitution by which the parliament would have been supreme. Germany could be made, Bismarck said, not by debates and resolutions of parliament, but only by blood and iron. He had also decided that there could be no union until Prussia and Austria had settled the question of leadership by war and Austria had been excluded from German affairs.

He was called to power in 1862 when the King of Prussia was faced with the determined opposition of his parliament and was almost resolved to abdicate. Bismarck carried through his policy unconstitutionally, his main purpose being to strengthen the Prussian army for the struggle which he thought inevitable and which he hoped to bring on at a time favourable for Prussia.

The first opportunity arose over the treatment of the mainly German population of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which were then under the King of Denmark. Great efforts were made to settle this trouble by international conference. The breakdown of these efforts was partly due to the stubborn-

ness of the Danish government, which had been led to expect British support in the event of war (N.215). The British government seems to have had little idea of the strength of German national sentiment. But Bismarck had also worked to paralyse the conference, so that the German states could take matters into their own hands. Prussia and Austria jointly occupied the Duchies in 1864. Disputes arose, and Bismarck succeeded in getting Austria to take an aggressive attitude. A short but decisive war resulted between Prussia and Austria in 1866. Britain had joined with other Powers in offering mediation, but otherwise stood aside. After the war the unity of Germany was half-won under Prussian leadership. The next stage was war with France under Napoleon III, who had badly miscalculated Prussian strength and played into Bismarck's hands by his blundering but domineering policy. Bismarck was again able to enter the war with the other side branded with aggression and to rally German national feeling round Prussia.

In this war of 1870-1871 Great Britain got each side to promise to respect the neutrality of Belgium, which had been finally guaranteed by a treaty of 1839. British sympathy was at first mainly with Prussia. But the humiliations of France, and the heroic but hopeless resistance of the French after the downfall of Napoleon III, caused a change of feeling. The way in which the war had come, as a new interference of France with Germany—from jealousy of growing German strength—enabled Bismarck to complete the union of Germany with the King of Prussia as German Emperor (NA.8). In France there were serious internal troubles and long uncertainty as to what form of government should be adopted. It was not till 1875 that a parliamentary form of republic was finally established (NA.9).

The rise of Germany had weakened the position of France in Europe. British policy, however, continued to be much influenced by suspicion of France and Russia, partly through clashes of interest in the Near East and outside Europe. But

there were strong influences in Great Britain until after 1870 in favour of a policy of limited interest in affairs of Europe. So long as the balance of power was not upset and prospects of trade expanded, Great Britain preferred not to interfere or take sides.

CHAPTER A.V

THE ARMED PEACE AND THE DRIFT TO WAR

§ A.18. GERMANY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER.—The rapid creation of the German Empire, by methods that involved much use of military power, upset the old balance in Europe. Instead of a much weaker Prussia sharing with Austria the power of the middle part of Europe, there was now a state of unrivalled military strength. The Austrian Empire henceforth declined in power until its break-up in 1918. It could no longer be the pivot on which Great Britain had relied so much. The new Italy, too, if it were to remain really independent of outside influence, had to play the part of a Great Power in the European balance.

War by this time had become much more an affair of the people than it had been in the eighteenth century. Conscription, or compulsory service for a period in the army or navy, became the usual thing on the continent of Europe. Huge armaments and an elaborate organisation for war were maintained in times of peace. Such preparations were costly and had to be met by increased taxation. Thus war touched the people very closely even before it actually came. Therefore national emotions and prejudices became important, even when the real causes of dispute had little connection with the feelings of the mass of the people. Somehow people had to be made to feel that the burdens they bore were necessary for the

protection of the things that they held precious. Thus, though there were some movements for peace during the nineteenth century, peoples still remained willing to make war, really because they were afraid that someone else might let war loose on them.

These were some of the circumstances in which grew up the two armed camps, or groups of heavily armed Powers, each bound by military alliances, and each constantly measuring its power against the other and trying to frustrate it in diplomacy. The general trend of world affairs made it increasingly difficult for Britain to hold aloof. We shall now look to see why this was so and exactly what part Britain took in the "Armed Peace" and the drift towards the Great War.

§ A.19. THE BASIS OF SPLENDID ISOLATION.—We have seen that from 1822 Great Britain had avoided entanglement in European affairs to a large degree. Yet there was never complete isolation. Some things would lead Britain to take a part in the groupings of Europe. This was especially true of the Mediterranean region, because it was regarded as of first-rate importance to British trade interests in India and the East, even before the Suez Canal was cut in 1869. Thus there had been the Quadruple Alliance of France, Britain, Spain, and Portugal in 1834 to keep what was considered a dangerous influence out of the Iberian Peninsula. The Quadruple Alliance of 1840 between Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia was largely Palmerston's work, and had been designed, first, to replace an arrangement which would have given Russia a strong hold over Turkey, and then to check independent French action. Opposition to Russian power had led to Britain's part in the Crimean War and again nearly led to war in 1878. (§§ 293, 294, 295, and §§ 312, 313).

The belief in a policy of peace was probably strongest in the sixties, when the doctrines of Free Trade Liberalism had their greatest hold on British opinion. There was a belief that the advantages to the world of a free interchange of the goods

which each part of the world was most fitted to produce would move all countries to adopt free trade as Britain had done.) The resulting interdependence of all countries for their daily needs and their prosperity, it was believed, would make war appear dangerous and futile, so that a reign of peace would come to pass. With such views there was naturally opposition to expenditure on armaments or to running risks in foreign policy. Peace and trade were the great goals.

This is how it appeared to some British eyes; but the picture did not look the same from the angle of European countries. The great advantages that Britain derived from free trade were due largely to the fact that, in the art of cheap and efficient manufacture, Great Britain was ahead of other countries and so could supply them with manufactures with which they could not compete. Britain was the workshop of the world and opened up wider and wider markets throughout the world. Further, while Great Britain could economise on the army, the navy was supreme throughout the world. To maintain both a great army and a great navy was beyond the resources of most countries, which had not the wealth derived from trade and manufactures to draw on. It was this comfortable and powerful position which made the policy of isolation from European groupings appear so splendid. In the regions outside Europe, which had increasing importance for British interests, other countries as yet had little interest because of their later economic development. In those regions Britain had the isolation of unchallenged power—a domination which could afford to be peaceful and unconcerned about adding to its strength by alliances, simply because it was unchallenged.

§ A.20. THE END OF THE SPLENDOUR OF ISOLATION.—It was impossible that such a state of affairs should continue. It might be very pleasant and profitable to British capitalists and to some extent to British wage-earners for Britain to be the workshop of the world and the mistress of the seas and of the

lands beyond Europe. But the progressive men of France, Germany, Italy, and the United States were not content to be little more than the farmers and market-gardeners of Britain.

In short, it was inevitable that other countries than Britain should become industrialised. But if they followed free trade that would be difficult; for Britain had such a start that new industries in other countries found it difficult to compete even in their own home markets. Because of this, there rose a demand for tariffs to protect home industries against outside competition. For instance, a German named Frederick List, in 1841, published a book, called *The Nationalist System of Political Economy*, in which he advocated protection of infant industries until they were able to compete with well-established ones. This, he said, was the only way to secure real freedom of competition, which was the great object of free trade. Thus, from about 1870, the manufacturers of Great Britain began to find themselves not only faced with more competition on the markets of the world, but also being shut out to some extent from existing markets; for in most of the industrial countries protection was adopted or increased in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

We can get a good idea of the increasing competition that Great Britain had to meet from figures referring to iron and cotton manufactures, two most important items in British industry. Between 1870 and 1903 the production of pig-iron in Great Britain increased by just a half, but in the United States it increased tenfold, becoming more than double that of Britain; while German production increased sevenfold, to become slightly greater than Britain's. Again, while British cotton manufactures increased only moderately after 1870, and even fell back between 1890 and 1900, in America they increased fourfold in thirty years and on the continent of Europe more than doubled.

With this keen struggle for markets going on and with the fear that more and more tariff barriers might be put round the different national markets, it was not unnatural that possible

new markets in undeveloped parts of the world should begin to attract more attention. Fear that some other country might get hold of some territory and exclude others from its advantages often led to annexation or the establishment of protectorates or of spheres of influence. The advantages of power in this scramble led to further arming and to the taking of overseas territories because of their value as naval bases or coaling stations. Thus the struggle for markets meant also a struggle for power and an increasing danger of war.

These were the main causes of the partitioning of Africa, the Pacific Islands, and South-east Asia among the Great Powers. In China, Persia, Turkey-in-Asia, Afghanistan, and South and Central America they stopped short of actual partition, but nevertheless exercised a great deal of control for the same purpose. All the great industrial Powers seemed driven to extend their control or their influence over more and more territory, until practically the whole world was shared up among them. As the room for this expansion grew less, the tendency to strife between the competing Powers increased. The whole process is called imperialism, or, because the basic causes of it seem to be economic, economic imperialism.

The causes of this imperialist expansion can be seen in another way. Modern industrialism has grown up under a system of private property in the means of production. Land, mines, factories, machinery, banks—the things necessary for producing goods on a great scale—are owned by individual men or by groups, not by the communities they serve. On the other hand there are large numbers of people who own nothing of this kind and must live by selling their labour of hand or brain to those who do own. Under this system the hope of deriving profit from ownership has been regarded as the great incentive to enterprise. Changes in profits derived from different forms of production have been regarded as the indicator to guide enterprise into the most necessary channels. Unlimited competition between private enterprises, it was held, would lead to the greatest possible good attainable.

But the process of regulation by competition cannot work quite quickly enough. The indicator of profits cannot be followed immediately. As enterprise became bigger in scale and more complicated in its organisation the readjustments became slower, for men became more reluctant to shift their capital to the ownership of new forms of production, to scrap old machinery, or to reorganise their staffs. Instead of following the indicator, they tried to fix it and find other ways of meeting the situation. The resort to tariffs, which are a check on free competition, is one example. Because of the slowness of adjustment business tends to go in waves. Booms and slumps come alternately. A period of prosperity with high profits, when owners are willing to pay better wages to workers, is followed by a period when profits fall and tend to disappear. Then, even though wages are cut, wage-earners will be unemployed and discontent with the existing economic system arises. If the system is to go on, an escape from this danger to it has to be found. Thus there arises the search for constantly expanding markets, so that as one market falls off another may take its place, and relieve the strain by keeping people employed. This has tended to happen in all the great countries that have been industrialised under a system of private ownership of capital. The profits from large masses of capital cannot all be spent by its owners. If they keep on investing the profits in new factories and machines turning out more goods, these cannot be sold because workers are not paid the full value of what they produce. Otherwise there would be no profits. Thus not only are there difficulties in providing employment—"surplus" population—but also there is surplus capital. Its owners seek to find new fields for its more profitable investment in the less developed parts of the world. This helps to keep the system going; but competition develops between the capitalists of different countries for special advantages in these colonial areas.

Cecil Rhodes, seeing the problem of unemployment and surplus capital, said in 1895 that imperialism was the alternative

to "bloody civil war," just as some fifty years before Edward Gibbon Wakefield had advocated "systematic colonisation" as an alternative to Chartism and Socialism. Imperialism thus appears as a method of escape from some of the problems that developed with capitalist industrialism in the nineteenth century. As this occurred in several countries there was increasing imperialist competition. Less and less room was left as the undeveloped regions were taken up. The struggle naturally became more acute, with increasing danger of war.

This was the kind of world in which Britain's isolation began to appear less splendid and comfortable. Because of previous footholds and of the importance of sea-power, Britain was able to get a very liberal share out of the scramble for colonies and spheres of influence. But since unchallenged command of the sea enabled Britain to dictate what should happen in this new game of power, as happened in the Fashoda incident, for instance (§ 323), it was not likely that Britain's position would go unchallenged for long. The huge armies that were being created on the Continent caused misgiving; and then, in 1899, Germany began a great naval expansion. Further, there was a tendency for the European Powers to draw together in opposition to Britain's domination outside Europe. This became clearer over the South African question, especially during the war of 1899-1902. Gradually Great Britain abandoned the policy of isolation, and became involved in the Armed Camps.

§ A.21. THE ARMED CAMPS.—After the German Empire had been created, Bismarck's policy was to avoid war. He knew that France did not really accept the Treaty of Frankfurt, by which Alsace and Lorraine had been transferred to Germany, and would seek to get the lost provinces back if a favourable opportunity came. Therefore he aimed at keeping France isolated so that that opportunity should never come. Thus Austria and Russia must be kept on good terms with Germany and prevented from turning towards France. In his steps to

make the German Empire, Bismarck had taken care to conciliate Russia by timely acts of diplomacy. After the defeat of Austria at the battle of Sadowa in 1866 he had with great difficulty persuaded the Prussian king to make a lenient peace, instead of carrying the war to Vienna. He saw that, while Austria must be excluded from the new Germany, it would be dangerous to have her as an irreconcilable enemy.

Bismarck's great problem was to keep Austria and Russia from falling out. This was not easy, because these two Powers tended to clash over Balkan questions. Thinking that the greater danger of an outbreak came from Russia, Bismarck, in 1879, made an alliance with Austria by which each state promised to come to the help of the other if it were attacked by Russia. But Bismarck still strove for friendly relations with Russia, and later made an agreement promising that Germany would not help Austria in an attack on Russia. Russia promised not to help France to attack Germany. If Russia were alienated, Bismarck feared that France and Russia would come to terms; then Germany might some day be faced with a war on two fronts. This nightmare drove Bismarck to "keep the wire open to St. Petersburg," which he did till his fall in 1890.

He could feel fairly confident that Great Britain would not join with France, especially after 1882 when relations between those two countries became very bad. In 1882 he was able further to isolate France. In the previous year France began a long period of imperialist rivalry with Italy by occupying Tunis in North Africa, which had been virtually staked as an Italian claim. Italy sought strength by approaching Germany for an alliance. The result was the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. Italy and Germany promised each other support if either were attacked by France, and Italy even got promises of German support if war arose out of French-Italian rivalry in North Africa. Italy and Austria also came to an understanding about their interests in the Balkans. Great Britain was also favourable to Italian ambitions in Africa

against the French and came to an understanding with Austria about the Mediterranean.

Thus Bismarck had secured the complete isolation of France; but this juggling with the Powers of Europe was a tricky business, and it is doubtful whether even the supreme juggler, Bismarck, could have kept the play going for much longer. In 1890 he was dismissed from office by the young, ambitious and headstrong Emperor, William II. Already the difficulty of keeping Russia and Austria in the one group was extreme. Bismarck's successor allowed the agreement with Russia to lapse, and very soon Bismarck's nightmare looked much more like becoming a ghastly reality. Friendly gestures were made between the governments of France and Russia; French money was lent for Russian development and for armaments; and in 1891 an alliance was made. This was fortified later by a secret and far-reaching military convention. France at last had a powerful ally and could play a bolder part in Europe. Then, from 1900, French policy towards Italy changed. The rivals agreed to strike a bargain about their ambitions in Africa. They would keep out of each other's way and support each other in pushing their claims in different regions, instead of hindering each other.

From then Italy was a very doubtful member of the Triple Alliance and really had a foot in both camps. When the struggle came, Italy could go whichever way seemed to promise most gain. There was no surprise when Italy took up this attitude in 1914.

§ A.22. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ARMED CAMPS.—Such was the world in which Great Britain began to find isolation less comfortable and splendid towards the end of the nineteenth century. How could additional power be found? One avenue was by making certain of the support of the self-governing colonies in the event of war. This was partly at the root of the idea of Imperial Federation, which was tentatively put forward about this time, but which met with no enthu-

siasm from the colonies (later "dominions") except New Zealand (NA.10).

But something more substantial than this was sought. Russia and France were regarded as the most likely enemies in war, so that they were ruled out. Germany was the most likely ally. Between 1899 and 1901 it seemed quite likely that some arrangement would be made. Nothing came of the negotiations, however; this seems mainly due to the fact that German statesmen were so confident that Great Britain would never come to terms with France that they made the price of their alliance higher than Britain would pay. They felt that they had little to gain by an alliance and so would give their support to Britain only in return for substantial advantages.

There had been some talk of including Japan in an alliance between Germany and Great Britain; but in the long run it was in an alliance with Japan alone that Britain broke from isolation and accepted its first "entanglement." This treaty was signed in January 1902. It provided that, if either country became involved in war through maintaining its interests in the Far East, then the other should remain neutral. If either ally found itself faced with two opponents in such a war, then the other ally would also join in. Later the alliance was extended, so that help had to be given if either ally were involved in war with *one* other country. It was also extended to cover British India, as well as the Far East.

This treaty was brought about by the opposition which both countries felt to Russian power in the East. Under its shelter Japan had more confidence. Great Britain practically kept the ring free for Japan's successful war with Russia in 1904-1905, which established Japanese dominance in Korea and South Manchuria. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, when the struggle for power in the East was growing keener, Great Britain had drawn closer to Japan as a means of checking other Powers, especially Russia.

The possession of a powerful ally in the Far East also gave Great Britain a new freedom in its relations with other coun-

tries. This has some bearing on the agreements reached with France in 1904, usually known as the Entente Cordiale. We must now see how this came about. M. Delcassé, who was the French Foreign Minister, had set himself to improve France's relations with some of its rivals. We have seen that a bargain had been made with Italy. If Great Britain could be dealt with on the same lines, France would be in a stronger position than at any time since 1871. Germany, the great rival, could be faced with far more confidence, and, if war did come, then Alsace and Lorraine might be recovered. On the British side, if a satisfactory bargain could be reached, one of Britain's chief anxieties would be removed. France would restrain Russia from a too active hostility to British interests, and Germany would no longer be able to demand a price for supporting important British interests, as in Egypt.

Thus, after years of intense friction, which nearly led to war over the Fashoda incident in the Sudan in 1898, the two rivals came to an understanding on the questions that disturbed their relations. These were scattered over many parts of the world; but the most important agreement affected North Africa. France promised to stop asking awkward questions about the British occupation of Egypt, such as when it was to be ended. Great Britain, in exchange, promised not to oppose the increase of French influence in Morocco; and a secret agreement was made for the ultimate partition of Morocco between France and Spain. On all the agreed points the two countries promised to give each other diplomatic support. In a world where diplomacy is backed by power, diplomatic support cannot fail to bring the possibility of armed support a good deal nearer.

This unexpected reconciliation of apparently sworn enemies naturally caused some suspicion in Germany, especially since certain parts of the agreement had not been made public. How far did the reconciliation go? Did it provide for military support, and, if so, under what conditions? Innocent as may have been the intentions of the British government, the

Entente could hardly fail to involve them more and more with one of the armed camps and impair their relations with the other. But, before we see exactly how far this went, we must look at the Entente which was reached with Russia in 1907.

French influence was naturally used to reconcile the new friend, Britain, to the old ally, Russia. Despite the century of fear and distrust between these two countries, agreement was reached. Where they had been rivals, as in Persia, they would agree to share what was to be had and to keep out of each other's way. Russia was no longer so powerful in the East, while Germany was tending to supplant Britain as the protector of Turkey, at whose expense Russia hoped to make gains in the event of war. The agreement was preceded by financial aid. In 1906, for the first time since the Crimean War, British financiers lent large sums to the Russian government. This aid helped the corrupt, inefficient, and repressive government to suppress the revolutionary movement with which it was faced.

Thus the Triple Alliance, in which Italy was but a doubtful member, was faced with a Triple Entente. In the Far East, too, Russia and France came to understandings with Britain's ally, Japan, so that Germany was left isolated in that region. It is true that the British understandings with France and Russia never took the actual form of alliances with definite military obligations. How near they went to that we must now see.

In 1905-1906 and in 1911 there were grave crises over Morocco. They arose from Germany questioning, in a not very tactful way, the advance which France was making there. There was real danger of war. Would Britain support France? The British government would make no definite promise; but the Foreign Minister said that, if Germany made war on France over the question, it was very likely that Great Britain would join with France. With this the French saw that they must be content. "But," they said, "would not the help that you *may* give us be much more effective if we discussed

beforehand exactly how that help should be given. Let our military experts work out plans together. You will not be bound to give help, but if you do we shall both have a plan of action ready." The British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward (later Viscount) Grey, judged that if the Entente with France were to have much value he must agree to the French request. He consulted two or three of his colleagues and then gave his approval. This was not known to the rest of the Cabinet for some years. Parliament did not hear about it till 3rd August 1914. From the beginning of 1906 till then these military conversations went on; and the British army was organised to be ready for the sending of an expeditionary force of a certain size by certain routes, to certain points in north-east France opposite the Belgian frontier, exactly as was done in August 1914. Later there were naval conversations; the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean while the British was concentrated largely in the North Sea. Even apart from the question of Belgian neutrality, Sir Edward Grey told the House of Commons on 3rd August 1914 that he had assured France that, if the German fleet came through the Channel or the North Sea to attack the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet would oppose it. Naval conversations with Russia had also been authorised in May 1914.

When the crisis came in 1914 Grey claimed that Britain still had a free hand. Was this statement justified? It is true that Great Britain was bound by no written word to take any particular course. Yet it seems pretty clear that Britain's policy had been too long based on co-operation with France and Russia to leave any real freedom. It is quite clear that French and Russian policy had been much influenced by their understandings with Britain and they had come to regard the arrangement as little short of an alliance. One powerful French statesman said that France was united with Britain at least as closely as with Russia, an actual ally.

§ A.23. WHY THE NATIONS WENT TO WAR.—There was much talk during and after the war about the responsibility for starting it. In the Treaty of Versailles there is a statement that Germany and her allies were solely responsible. Most historians would now say that this is not a fair judgment. Can we really decide? It is not enough to find out that some government took fatal steps at a certain time. For all had been preparing for war for years and all were prepared to go to war over some matters. There was a growing feeling that war could not be continually postponed. We must certainly look back behind the last few weeks of peace.

Even then we may not get any very satisfactory result. We should probably be safest in saying that all the governments decided on war for the same reason. The great difference is that some felt it safe to postpone that decision longer than did others. Each government thought in terms of the security of the state for which it was responsible.¹ They all came to the point where they judged that the risks of not going to war were greater than the risks of going to war, or of taking steps that meant a big risk of war. Some may have judged more wisely than others; but it is misleading to talk of one being more morally right than others. Their morals were all much the same—the safety of the state was their moral law.

The Austrian government made demands which it knew would almost certainly involve war with Serbia and might easily lead to a big European war. Why was this? Austria-Hungary contained many Slav peoples, akin to the Serbs. Serbia had grown in strength during the Balkan wars and there was a movement for a greater Serbia to include all the south Slav peoples. This movement often deliberately stirred up trouble in Austria-Hungary. Serbia was also supported by Russia and felt confident. Earlier attempts by Austria to get this Pan-Serb agitation quietened had had little result; if it went on it would almost certainly lead to the destruction of the weakening Austro-Hungarian state (NA.11). When the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was murdered by Serbs the

more militant party in Austria got its way. The only way, they said, to save Austria was to chastise Serbia, and run the risks of Russia coming in.

In Russia, too, the militant party got control. Russia had given way on earlier occasions; they could not afford to do so again. Moreover, control of the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean was regarded as a vital Russian interest, and the "way to Constantinople lay through Berlin" by means of a general war. Russia must not be caught unawares and so mobilisation of the armies was decided on. Germany had only one reliable ally, Austria. Austria was growing weaker and had been held back in earlier crises. Russia and France were growing stronger. Austria had to be "kept sweet," or she would no longer stand by Germany in a crisis. At any rate, Austria would be too weak to be a valuable ally unless something were done to save her. Thus the German government first gave a free hand to Austria, then tried to restrain the Austrian attitude when a general war threatened, but dared not offend Austria too deeply. Finally, when the Russian mobilisation brought war much nearer, the risk of allowing Russia and Russia's ally, France, to choose their own time seemed too great. Security demanded that Germany should take the initiative. Germany was in the most dangerous position in Europe if war did come, with powerful enemies on each flank and a weak ally. The need for a swift blow against the French decided Germany in favour of the road through Belgium. Moreover the nature of German unification had left the military in a more dominant position than in Western countries.

France and Britain could afford to wait longer. France was certain to come in if Russia were involved; but delay would upset the German military plans. Avoidance of any aggressive action would also make Britain's support more likely, especially as public opinion was such an important factor in Britain. In Britain the government was somewhat divided. In his speech of 3rd August, Sir Edward Grey did not base his case on the moral issue of the promise of 1839 to defend Belgium's neu-

trality. Rather he argued that Great Britain could not afford to let the Netherlands fall under German control. Apart from that, he felt that if Britain did not support France now, Germany might win and then Britain would be left isolated before a powerful victor. It would be better, he implied, to fight now, even though there was no immediate threat to British territory, and whether Belgium were invaded or not, rather than to be faced with a war later on under less favourable conditions. There were many who shared his views, especially among the Conservative opposition. But the moral issue of Belgian neutrality was one that appealed strongly to public opinion, which Grey knew he must take into account. German action gave the government an issue on which it knew it could obtain popular support for a war policy. This saved it from the difficult question of deciding whether war should be made on other grounds. But it is quite clear that that decision might well have been—almost certainly would have been—in favour of war on the grounds of security, in spite of the fact that no British territory was likely to be attacked.

CHAPTER A.VI

BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

§ A.24. A SHAKEN WORLD.—The Great War—or the First World War as it may now be more convenient to call it—opened a period of instability and change. The war was not the primary cause of this, but rather the first unmistakable sign that the basis of our civilisation was not altogether sound and secure. Four years of war had made many people much less certain about the world in which they were living. Economic troubles in later years added to their uncertainty, and some of them began to feel that we must find new and

more solid foundations if we were to build a more secure future. Naturally people did not all agree about this. Those, for instance, who were in the most comfortable position thought the old foundations were really good and that the trouble arose from the evil or folly of those who tried to change them. Those who suffered, and those who sympathised deeply with suffering, tended to feel that for the mass of men happiness could be found only in change. Among these, some thought that the necessary changes could be made gradually by a process of reasoning and persuasion; others believed that since the efforts for change would probably be resisted at some stage by the champions of the old order, force and violence might be involved.

This difference of opinion about the future still exists. What can we do about it? The study of the past may give clues to the future; but different people will reach different conclusions. We cannot try them out in a laboratory. Our experiments have to be made in living action; it is the course of history itself as we live it that shows whether we are right or wrong. We can, however, be reasonably certain that the world of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in which many of our cherished ideas were formed, has been shaken. We can at least try to form our ideas intelligently from the facts before us, with really open minds and without being blinded by what has been accepted as truth in the past. Ideas are not necessarily good because they are old, any more than merely because they are new.

§ A.25. A DAWN OF HOPE.—During the war there was born the hope of a better world afterwards. The forces that were believed to have caused the war would be eliminated, and a world of peace, freedom, and prosperity built out of the sacrifice and suffering of the war. Men believed that they were fighting "to make the world safe for democracy," in a "war to end war," and that afterwards they would dwell in lands "fit for heroes to live in." These hopes were encouraged, with vary-

ing degrees of sincerity, by the statesmen whose job it was to keep the mass of the people screwed up to the maximum effort to win the war.

There can be little doubt that only such hopes would have produced in the British people the will to endure the suffering of the war. There was among them a strong aversion to war and militarism, to conscription, and to all the other forms of regimentation and restriction that large-scale war means. The war, too, assumed much greater proportions than they could have anticipated. We must also remember that the sacrifice was borne by ordinary men and women whose usual life involved little enough to make them rise to such unexpected heights of endurance. The general solidarity and determination to carry on seem to show that the ordinary man believed that he was fighting for civilisation and a better world against militarism and oppression.

In America, under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson, it is clear that such ideas were widely held. Without them the American people, secure in their geographical isolation, the vast opportunities of their own territory, and their belief that they were well clear of the dirty power-politics of the Old World, could never have been induced to support the war.

Even more significant were the revolutions which overthrew the governments of the chief enemy states—Germany and Austria-Hungary. These movements were in favour of parliamentary government on a basis of universal franchise, social reform, national self-determination, and international co-operation. The peoples seemed to show their hope for a new and better world by a response to the aspirations of their enemies, as voiced by President Wilson, and by a repudiation of the dangerous elements in their own countries. All these hopes seemed to be crowned by the establishment of the League of Nations, their natural fulfilment in the international field.

In general these hopes, and the changes actually made, did not involve any fundamental change, but rather a reform of

existing things. They were a completion of trends that had been active over a long period. There had been progress towards parliamentary government on a widening franchise, and towards the organisation of Europe on a national basis. The idea of international co-operation, though little developed in practice, had long been held. The hopes of 1918 were largely for the fulfilment of the most progressive liberal ideas of the nineteenth century. Woodrow Wilson, their spokesman, reminds us of Mazzini and of the French Revolution. They were doomed to sad disillusionment.

§ A.26. THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION—HOPES AND FEARS.—One of the great movements of the time, the Bolshevik revolution, was different. It was to produce one of the very solid facts of the present, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. The earlier phase of the Russian revolution, beginning in February 1917, had been rather of the "liberal" type, aiming at parliamentary government without fundamental social and economic change. By November (October according to the antiquated Czarist Russian calendar) confidence in the Kerensky government had so far waned, and the Bolsheviks, who a little later took the name of Communist Party, led by Lenin, had won so much support that they were able to seize power without much difficulty. Their programme was "Peace, Land, and Bread" and the overthrow of capitalism. Private ownership of land, factories, machines, and all the means of production by which we supply our needs, was to be replaced by ownership by the people, or socialism. The great mass of the producers—the workers and peasants—and whoever would join with them were to be the real rulers in the future (NA.12).

Just as the French Revolution had done, this revolution naturally excited hopes and fears abroad. The great mass of workers in other countries gave it their sympathy and support. Even when they felt that it was in some respects alien to their own ways, they were at least strongly against any interference

with it from the outside. In the few years that followed there was a great rise in the working-class movement throughout the world, and it seemed as if revolution might reach a world scale. Later it subsided. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. has generally retained a strong attraction for the workers of other countries, as well as for the colonial peoples who still remain under the restrictions of foreign imperialism.

On the other side, those with the biggest interests in the existing capitalist form of society feared that the Bolshevik revolution might threaten their own position, just as the feudal aristocracy of Europe had feared the effects of the French Revolution. Their influence is shown by the fact that for some years Great Britain and France spent much blood and treasure in active intervention and in helping counter-revolutionary movements. These failed, and the capitalist world had to reconcile itself to the continued existence of a great socialist state, just as the Bolsheviks, some of whom had expected the triumph of world revolution, had to accept a predominantly capitalist world. Nevertheless the capitalist-socialist cleavage, with its foundation in economic classes, remained one of the major factors in the world between the wars.

In some countries the opposition to Communism took the form of Fascism, which also criticised the liberal supporters of parliamentary government, because, said the Fascists, their system gave scope to the Communists. The more conservative interests in other countries too were somewhat attracted to Fascism as a "bulwark against Bolshevism." There was thus a tendency for people to be drawn towards, though not necessarily into, one of two schools of thought.

§ A.27. THE LIBERAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES.—In countries with a strong liberal tradition, such as Great Britain, France, the United States, and the British Dominions, there was a tendency to insist that there was a middle way. Neither Communism nor Fascism, it was argued, "could happen here," since there was an open path to ordered progress within

the nation and no fundamental barrier to better relations between nations. This outlook was present even in predominantly working-class movements, such as the British Labour Party and the trade unions.

The strength of this liberal parliamentary tradition springs from the fact that these countries, or, in the case of the British Dominions, the one of which they are offshoots, developed economically on modern lines earlier than those of Central and Eastern Europe or the rest of the world. With economic development there grew a new enterprising middle class. They led the liberal movement because it gave them the kind of freedom and opportunity for economic development that they sought. Thus the liberal parliamentary idea developed strong roots under favourable conditions. Great Britain became the workshop of the world and could expand its trade with little competition on a free-trade basis. France was next in order of development in Europe. The United States, beginning from the Atlantic seaboard, had a huge hinterland of vast resources that could be developed without interference. Thus when in these countries economic conditions were difficult, causing social discontent, they could find relief by outward expansion. America expanded across the continent; Britain and France developed great empires with little opposition from other countries, which till late in the nineteenth century were far behind. Thus their early development in a world where there was yet not much competition, and still vast undeveloped spaces, relieved them from some of the sharpness of social discontent and cleavage of ideas that has appeared in other countries. With the safety-valve of expansion the liberal parliamentary system as an all-sufficient means for meeting all the needs of social development has not been subjected to the pressures of class-conflict that have been felt elsewhere. But it must be remembered that these very favourable conditions no longer exist on anything like the old scale (§ A.20).

§ A.28. THE PEACE TREATIES.—The peace settlement made at the end of the First World War has been criticised from quite different angles. It has been condemned as the source of much subsequent trouble because it did not more fully express the desire of the peoples for a better world. A peace really inspired by the ideals of Wilson's Fourteen Points, it has been argued, would have been the basis for the reconciliation of all peoples, including the Germans, and would have prevented the rise of Fascism. Others have condemned the peace because it was too lenient to Germany, thus paving the way for the aggressive action of the Nazis and the Second World War.

A third criticism is that the settlement and the policies that followed it were weak because they were neither one thing nor the other, but attempted to combine two conflicting aims. One was the punishment and weakening of Germany and its allies, the other reconciliation with Germany. There is probably a good deal of truth in this; and it may be added that in practice the policy of reconciliation was largely inspired by a third factor—the fear of Bolshevism. Germany must be kept part of the capitalist front against the one socialist country. This purpose was apparent in many statements. For instance, at the close of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, made a strong plea for moderation of the peace terms in favour of Germany. "The whole existing order," he said in a memorandum setting out his views, "... is questioned by the masses of the population, from one end of Europe to the other." "In another year Russia, inspired by a new enthusiasm, may have recovered from her passion for peace and have at her command the only army eager to fight, because it is the only army that believes that it has any cause to fight for." "If we are wise," he argued, "we shall offer to Germany a peace which, while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism." He viewed the League of Nations, too, as an "alternative to Bolshevism," and thought it might be safer that Germany should be inside the League rather than outside.

The settlement, then, was a mixture of concessions to popular idealism, crude power-politics, and anti-Bolshevism. National sentiment was taken into account in fixing boundaries, but in doubtful cases favour was shown to countries that could be expected to oppose Germany or the Bolsheviks and to look for support to the victorious Allies. The League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation were established, but the treaties also contained much that savoured of the secret treaties made during the war.

While governments took pains by propaganda to uphold popular faith in the righteousness of their cause, they did not show much scruple in their secret bargainings to get or hold allies. Italy, after several months of neutrality, had been tempted into joining the Allies by the promise of increased territory in Europe, Asia Minor, and Africa. Austrians and Slavs were to be placed under Italian rule whether they liked it or not. Czarist Russia had been promised Constantinople (though now Bolshevik Russia was to be restricted as much as possible) and a free hand with the Poles. France and Britain had marked out spheres in Africa. These agreements, to which President Wilson was often opposed, could not all be carried out; but they did influence the settlement.

The more promising elements in Germany, who had responded to Wilson's statements and believed that the peace would be a fulfilment of the Fourteen Points, were embittered by the severity of the treaty terms. The clauses regarding disarmament, rivers, shipping, reparations, and economic affairs held out little hope for the future. The "war guilt" clauses, which proved a great asset to Hitler, offended liberal opinion in Britain so soon as wartime propaganda was succeeded by calmer investigation of the causes of the war. The failure to carry out these harsh terms completely was generally a concession to conservative interests in Germany who would help to keep the world safe from Bolshevism and who later contributed to the emergence of a more powerful and aggressive Germany.

§ A.29. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.—Many people hoped that the League of Nations would make up for those features of the peace settlement that they disliked. Whatever their party, label, they may generally be described as those with a liberal outlook. They saw things as did the nineteenth-century idealists. With international co-operation in both political and economic spheres capitalism could work peacefully or be peacefully transformed into socialism.

Then there were also the conservative supporters of the League already mentioned, who saw it as a necessary means of keeping the capitalist world together against the challenge of Communism from the U.S.S.R.

Thus both the idealist and the realist supporters of the League thought of it functioning successfully without any fundamental change in the existing social and economic order. But this order was already boldly challenged by the success of the Bolshevik revolution, with which millions of men throughout the world sympathised, and was soon to reveal in a world economic depression that it was far from working smoothly. In this respect the League resembles the conservative Congress System after 1815.

The Covenant of the League, which formed Part I of all the peace treaties, was based on a number of previous proposals drafted by various people; but the hand of the British and Americans predominated. They had worked together and agreed on most points before the official drafting began.

The Covenant contained the three things that we noted in § A.5 are necessary to an organised international system. These are a set of rules as to what may or may not be done, collective agreement to enforce them, and means of making changes peacefully. The whole Covenant was a set of rules and, with small and doubtful exceptions, banned war. Articles 10 and 16 referred to collective action against a Covenant-breaker. Article 11 provided for consultation which might lead to agreed changes. Article 15 provided for collective advice as to what changes should be made. Article 19 also referred vaguely to

the need for change (NA.13). It is important, however, that in its final form the Covenant did not provide for the enforcement of change against a state that did not agree. It is interesting in view of what happened later that the Italian Government sought for some such system of enforcing changes. Though the Covenant seemed to offer a fairly complete system for international organisation, it was not difficult to find different interpretations of the obligations involved. The fact that America did not join also made a difference to what could be expected from the League.

We may notice the difference between the views of the League cherished by France and Great Britain. France was moved by a fear lest Germany should become powerful again and use force to upset the treaty arrangements. Therefore the French leaders tried to develop the system of collective action against aggression. "If," they said, "we can be guaranteed that we shall not be left to meet an attack alone, but that League members will come to our aid, then we will disarm and rely on the League system—and will also help others; but until we get that promise we must look to our arms and those with whom we have alliances for our security, as we have done in the past."

The British generally maintained that the Covenant did not bind League members so definitely to give armed support against attack. They wanted to retain a certain freedom to decide in each case whether or not, and in what way, they should act. Peace, they argued, could not be maintained by a rigid system; there must be elasticity and change. Therefore the great function of the League was consultation and conciliation. Though the British Government spoke much of collective security about the time of the Abyssinian crisis, its policy was based on a limited interpretation of collective security. Even those who were more favourable to collective security were inclined to argue that the confidence that it required would be encouraged by prior steps towards reduction of armaments. The French said disarmament came afterwards.

The French maintained that the uncertainty as to what Great Britain would do in any particular case made it impossible for them to rely on the collective system, as they would have liked. Moreover, though Britain may have gone further than other countries in reducing armaments, the strength of the British Navy was not based on faith in collective security, but on the old idea of what was necessary to meet any likely threat.

The British and French views each emphasised an important point; the difficulty was to bring them together. It is unfortunate that just at the time, in 1935, that the British Government seemed more disposed to back collective security, the French Government of the day, with Laval as Foreign Minister, was seeking security by other methods. Faced with the growing power of Germany, in which Britain seemed to acquiesce, France turned to Italy and got a promise of support against Germany in return for tolerance of Italian expansion in Abyssinia. Nor was the attitude of the British Government perfectly clear; for it had shown a willingness to negotiate on the matter with Italy, and it was only the wide public indignation at the Hoare-Laval proposals, after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, that ensured a firmer stand.

§ A.30. ECONOMIC TRENDS.—Just after the First World War there was a boom followed by a slump in 1921-1922. Then there was a period of recovery up to 1929. The wave of working-class discontent subsided—though there was the important General Strike in England in 1926—and capitalism not only restored the ravages of war but also reached a higher level of production. This made international relations among capitalist countries somewhat easier and the League of Nations seemed to be growing in importance and influence. In addition to dealing more or less successfully with a number of disputes and threats of war it did much useful, if not very spectacular, work in economic, social, and humanitarian fields (NA.14). In 1925-1926, after considerable difficulty, agreements were

reached and put into effect between the four principal European Powers, but not including the U.S.S.R. These Locarno agreements provided for a renunciation of war, the guaranteeing of France and Germany, as well as Belgium, by Britain and Italy against the attack of one on the other. Germany entered the League and became a Permanent Member of the Council. It seemed that a real reconciliation had been achieved and that co-operation between the former enemies might lead to effective measures of disarmament. Yet it must be remembered that Locarno also had its anti-Bolshevik aspect.

Bright expectations were clouded by what we may call the Great Slump, beginning in America in 1929 and affecting sooner or later the whole capitalist world. Conditions were worst about 1932-1933. Governments naturally took short-range measures to deal with the acute distress and growing discontent with which they were faced. These re-emphasised the nationalist economic tendencies that had appeared in the war and made international co-operation more difficult. In Britain, where Free Trade had so long survived, at last a considerable measure of protection for industry was introduced, while by the Ottawa agreements of 1932 not only was preference between Great Britain and the Dominions extended, but for the first time the markets of the dependencies were sheltered for the benefit of British industries. These changes in British policy were clear evidence that world conditions were changing and that further development along familiar lines would be difficult. Old faiths were being weakened by grim facts.

§ A.31. THE RISE OF FASCISM.—A new faith, Fascism, flourished on the slump. It had already appeared in Italy in the first post-war slump; but Italy alone did not count very heavily in the international scale. When Fascism in the form of Nazism under Hitler triumphed in Germany, the most highly developed part of Europe, it was a different matter. Fascism was a criticism of both the old liberal way and of the

new socialist way (NA.15). In the major countries that had developed late but relatively rapidly, as compared with Britain, France, and the U.S.A., the slump made it increasingly difficult for liberal parliamentary institutions to function properly along with capitalism. In the case of Germany, colonies had been lost in the war and the peace treaties had imposed economic disadvantages; in Italy the gains expected from the war had not been forthcoming; in Japan, a country of poor resources with a large and increasing population, there was a lopsided capitalism linked up with feudal survivals, militarism, and an allegedly divine Emperor.

Fascism appeared largely as an alternative to the Socialist-Communist way of solving the problems of capitalism. While Hitler might try to attract the small middle people who felt themselves being squeezed out by the struggle between the big financial interests and the organised working classes, he was actually financed and helped by the big industrial and landlord interests, and his path made easy by the attitude of conservative interests in other countries. They might not altogether like him, but he was a less evil to them than the Red bogey. Without him and his party the big German conservative interests feared that they could not be saved.

But the Nazi Fascists could not have gone far without some popular backing. Economic chaos, unemployment, the failure of parliamentary methods to find remedies, had destroyed faith among many people who hesitated to embrace the socialist faith. Hitler, with his stress on emotional conceptions like the nation—the *Volk*—getting together as a community, and his appeal to the wide range of conflicting discontents, seemed to give an alternative way out to people who felt lost. Actually Hitler attracted not only thugs and bandits but also young idealists. The German grievances connected with the peace treaty—the “war guilt” clause, the failure of other countries to redeem their promises that the disarmament of Germany would be but the first step to their own—gave Hitler excellent material to use. Even Liberals outside Germany who hated

most things connected with Fascism felt that Germany had had a raw deal and that the German people were not altogether to blame for turning to Hitler.

Suppressing all opposition within by ruthless violence, and enjoying a certain sympathy abroad, Hitler's government broke through the restrictions of the peace treaty without any more opposition than idle protests. By defiant boldness he won concessions that had been denied to more liberal German governments. He gambled and won. Each success strengthened his position at home and made it more difficult for other governments to counter him abroad.

Thus from 1933 on Fascist Germany grew more and more powerful and aggressive in its policy. Eventually close relations were established with Fascist Italy and already aggressive Japan.

§ A.32. THE STRUGGLE FOR A PEACE FRONT AGAINST FASCISM.—The triumph of Fascism in Germany greatly changed the international situation. Formerly Germany was on relatively good terms with the U.S.S.R. even after the Locarno agreements. Now Hitler stood out as the champion of Europe against Communism. He strove to get a four-power pact, excluding the U.S.S.R., the presumption being that this would ensure him a free hand, and possibly some help, against the Bolsheviks. But Nazi Germany, with its increasing pressure both politically and economically on other countries, and its claim for a revision of the colonial share-out, was also bound in the long run to become a threat to Britain and France and their empires.

It was in these conditions that the U.S.S.R. entered the League in 1934 and became the great champion of collective security as a means whereby the Fascist Powers might be checked. M. Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, consistently urged this policy and proclaimed the doctrine that "peace is indivisible." France and the U.S.S.R. joined in an alliance expressly based on League obligations,

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and open to all countries that were prepared to enter. Czechoslovakia made a similar alliance with the U.S.S.R.

The counterpart of this anti-Fascist movement in the international field was the movement within countries for a grouping of all the more liberal and progressive parties against Fascism or those who might be suspected of any goodwill towards Fascism. In this move the Communist Parties took a leading part. The term United Front was used when Communists and Socialists joined forces. When non-socialist Liberals were added, the name was Popular or People's Front. Fascism, it was held, was a terrible danger; all the anti-Fascist forces must sink their differences for the time in order to defend what had been won in the past. Popular Front governments were elected in Spain and France in 1936. In Great Britain, in spite of a good deal of effort, no agreement was achieved between the three groups concerned.

§ A.33. APPEASEMENT.—International and national unity against Fascism was not achieved till after the Fascist Powers had plunged the world into war. In Spain the Popular Front Government was defeated, after a long struggle, by rebellion powerfully aided by Fascist Germany and Italy. In France opposition in the Senate to its financial proposals brought about the downfall of the Popular Front Government led by Léon Blum. Later French governments lacked its definitely anti-Fascist character. The British National Government seemed reluctant to recognise any division of Europe on an anti-Fascist basis or to commit itself definitely to future action, a tendency which also developed in France.

The result was the somewhat wavering and indecisive policy that became known as appeasement. It was hoped that concessions to the Fascist Powers might remove their sense of grievance and hence their aggressive tendencies. As has been pointed out, Liberals felt that there were some legitimate German grievances which should have been redressed before Hitler rose. At the same time there were fears that the Fascist

Powers, with their imperialist ambitions, might become strong enough to threaten Britain's imperial interests and the strategic points—for instance, Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, and the Middle East—connected with them. This uneasy combination of hope and fear the Fascist countries were able to exploit. Hitler ran risks in opposition to the views of the German General Staff in the belief that the Western Powers would never fight.

A stand against Fascism would also have involved close relations with the U.S.S.R. and close relations on the part of conservative groups with the more radical forces at home—a compromise with the social enemy which might endanger the position of capitalism. Some Conservatives, such as Winston Churchill, were willing to take this risk and advocated the policy of alliance with the U.S.S.R. against the Fascist danger. But both British and French conservative capitalist interests were in something of a dilemma between the devil of an imperialist competitor in the Fascist Powers and the deep sea of their social enemy in the Left Wing and the U.S.S.R. In the face of this dilemma they could not pursue a policy either of decisive opposition to or of hearty co-operation with the Fascist Powers. In Great Britain this indecision was strengthened by the partial detachment of Great Britain from the Continent and the tradition of non-commitment that was connected with it. There was always the lurking hope that things might be patched up or that in the event of trouble Great Britain might possibly keep clear of it.

§ A.34. MUNICH AND AFTER.—The peak of appeasement was reached in the Munich agreement of October 1938, when the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia was handed over to Hitler. The U.S.S.R. was not included in the Four-Power conference that arranged this; Czechoslovakia was also left out and the decision dictated to it. Hitler had triumphed in getting a Four-Power agreement which conceded his demands and accepted his assurances of future peaceful intentions.

Prior to this there had been weakness in dealing with Italy over Abyssinia in 1935-1936, for which the way had been paved by the failure of the League Powers and America to take effective action against Japan's aggression in China in 1931-1933. In the Spanish Civil War the cautious policy of non-intervention had actually permitted extensive intervention by the Fascist Powers. Great Britain had made a naval agreement with Germany in 1935 without consulting France and in spite of the armament restrictions of the peace treaty. Japan had renewed large-scale aggression against China in 1937; Austria had been seized by the Nazis in March 1938. Munich had been a severe blow to the hopes of an anti-Fascist front. The occupation of the main Czech territory in March 1939, however, discredited appeasement. The British Government gave guarantees to Poland, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey, undertaking to make war on any Power that attacked them. But the change was not complete. Without co-operation with the U.S.S.R. it would be difficult to give real effect to these guarantees; yet the British Government continued to parry Soviet proposals for possible joint action. It was not till the end of May that the British and French Governments agreed to discuss a pact for joint action by the three countries. Not till the middle of June did a special envoy, without power to make important decisions, reach Moscow—he was described by Lloyd George as "a clerk in the Foreign Office." He was followed in August by a tardy and unauthoritative military mission.

The negotiations were hung up over two main points in succession. The U.S.S.R., fearing that the Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—in which there were important pro-German elements, might be occupied by the Nazis and used as bases against the U.S.S.R., desired that these countries should be included in any guarantee, just as Britain and France insisted on continuing their guarantee of Belgium, even after Belgium had proclaimed a policy of neutrality. The British Government refused to press the Baltic states to agree.

The second point was the refusal of the semi-Fascist Polish Government of the day to accept any effective assistance from the U.S.S.R. if the Nazis attacked. They wanted assistance to be limited to technical matters such as munitions and planes. In view of the past intervention and hostility of the Western Powers against the U.S.S.R., of the recent policy of appeasement, and of the reluctance of Britain and France to join in a collective front to resist aggression through the League of Nations—successive French governments had not shown any wish to implement the Soviet alliance by a military agreement—it is not surprising that the Soviet leaders were losing faith in the policy they had pursued since the rise of the Nazis. They wanted a really effective watertight agreement; failing this they would feel obliged to seek temporary security by other means.

Warnings had not been lacking. Already, in March 1939, Stalin in an important speech had criticised the Western Powers for acquiescing in Nazi aggression; he suspected that some people hoped that the Nazis would ultimately attack the U.S.S.R. He warned his countrymen to "be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them." Then on May 3rd Litvinov, the exponent of collective security, was replaced as Commissar for Foreign Affairs by Molotov. On May 31st, addressing the Supreme Soviet or parliament of the U.S.S.R., Molotov said that though there were "certain changes in the direction of counteracting aggression," it could not be said "whether these countries are seriously desirous of abandoning the policy of non-intervention, the policy of non-resistance to the further development of aggression"; and he repeated Stalin's warning. From Berlin the French Ambassador from May on was warning his government that there was a possibility that Hitler would abandon his anti-Bolshevik attitude and make attractive offers to the U.S.S.R. He repeatedly urged his government to speed up the negotiations. On August 18th he said it was "imperative to

bring the Russian negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion as soon as possible."

On August 22nd Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R.

Freed from the bog of a war on two fronts, Germany attacked Poland on September 1st. Great Britain and France, fulfilling their treaty obligations to Poland, declared war on Germany on September 3rd.

CHAPTER A.VII

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND AFTER

§ A.35. **CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY.**—The Second World War went through three phases. The first, up to the fall of France, was one of some confusion and uncertainty among those who had opposed the appeasement of the increasingly aggressive Fascist Powers. The second was marked by the Battle of Britain and the rising resistance movements of the people in occupied Europe. There was more certainty; the old leaders of appeasement had been largely forced into the background and the war became more of a people's anti-Fascist struggle. The attack on the Soviet Union opened the third phase, in which there was increasing unity behind the war effort, both nationally and internationally. In the period since the war this unity has been more difficult to maintain.

The German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 caused confusion among those who had worked for a collective front against further Fascist expansion. The U.S.S.R. was the state which had most championed this cause; its inclusion in such a front was a keypoint. Through lack of support the U.S.S.R. had changed its policy, and this change made the war almost inevitable. Germany would attack Poland, and even

the appeasers in Britain and France were now pledged because of popular pressure, whatever Hitler and von Ribbentrop might think, to take up such a challenge. So it happened. What kind of war was it—a people's struggle for a world freed from Fascism, or a struggle for revision or maintenance of the existing share-out of imperialist advantages? Leaders of progressive anti-Fascist opinion took different views. Some, though critical of official leadership and purposes, held that the war must be supported, while every effort should also be made to convert it into a genuinely anti-Fascist struggle by getting rid of doubtful leaders. Others, after some hesitation, opposed the war as a predominantly imperialist struggle which would increase Fascist tendencies rather than get rid of them. The Communist Parties, which even where small had taken a leading and active part against appeasement of Fascism, took this attitude. In France, where they had polled a million and a half votes and won seventy-two seats in the 1936 elections, their paper had been suppressed before war broke out, and as early as July 1st the French Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, had assured the German Ambassador, as an alleged sign of French unity, that "elections would be suspended; public meetings would be stopped; attempts at foreign propaganda of whatever kind would be suppressed; and the Communists would be brought to book." This helps to explain why they and many others had doubts about the kind of war their government had embarked on.

Subsequent events did not clarify matters. The U.S.S.R., when its policy of collective security had failed, took more direct means of trying to strengthen its security and ensure that world decisions should not be reached without it. The predominantly White Russian and Ukrainian parts of East Poland were occupied when the Polish government had already left its country; mutual assistance treaties providing for Soviet-occupied bases were made with the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—which later became constituent Republics within the U.S.S.R.; and finally, failing to get

strategic concessions from Finland, the U.S.S.R. made war on it. At the time these actions alienated much sympathy for the U.S.S.R.

On the other hand the very ineffective action by Britain and France to save Poland, and the long period of little activity following, gave rise to doubts as to the reality of the struggle against Nazi Germany. Some of the Left alleged that the appeasers were still at work and that they would willingly compromise with Germany and turn the war into one against the U.S.S.R. The unusual speed with which the League of Nations worked to expel the U.S.S.R. under a clause of the Covenant that had never been invoked before, the preparation of expeditions to assist Finland in spite of the lack of success in the war against Germany, and the discussion of attacks on the Baku oilfields in the U.S.S.R., gave some ground for such suspicions.

§ A.36. FROM THE FALL OF FRANCE TO HITLER'S ATTACK ON THE U.S.S.R.—At length the war began to move. The Nazis swamped Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium, and broke French resistance in a short campaign. These swift Nazi successes revealed that there were indeed Quislings and collaborators in these countries, sometimes in high places, who seemed to regard the progressive forces of the people as more dangerous enemies than Fascist foreign invaders. At great cost these pro-Fascists were brought into the open. The fall of these countries acted as a kind of purge. It did in some measure clarify the situation and open the way for a popular resistance, freer of doubts and anti-Fascist in character.

Great Britain was not yet submitted to such a drastic trial by fire; but change had taken place. The crisis resulting from ineffective conduct of the war had brought a change of government; it was now more strongly representative of anti-appeasement elements, though not entirely purged of those who had supported Munich. Faced with the threat of invasion, and with depleted equipment, the people of Britain felt moved to

a great effort. Their tenacity of purpose and will to endure through the air blitz later in 1940 showed that the people were solid against Fascism. A real people's resistance had arisen. On the part of the new National Government the sending of Sir Stafford Cripps, well known for his Left views, as Ambassador to Moscow was a sign that the relations with the U.S.S.R. were not being neglected.

Failing to break Britain by air blitz and foiled in his attempts at invasions by sea, Hitler turned south-east. Yugoslavia, for long a prey to semi-Fascist forces, was overrun, while other states became satellites. The Greeks, having so long checked the Italian Fascists in spite of their own semi-Fascist government, at length fell before Hitler's panzers. But as in the west, Nazi occupation revealed the weak elements and cleared the way for more basically democratic anti-Fascist movements. In Yugoslavia in particular appeared a people's resistance movement. Using guerrilla methods and gradually gathering strength to itself, in spite of harsh reprisals and incredible suffering, it developed into a National Liberation Movement with its own army under the leadership of the formerly persecuted Communist worker and trade unionist, Tito. The Greeks and Albanians too organised popular resistance.

In France, the capitulation of 22nd June 1940 opened a new period of struggle. Outside France, General de Gaulle organised those who were able to get away; within France various resistance movements appeared and were ultimately linked as the French Forces of the Interior. It is significant that in July 1940 the French Communist Party which had been persecuted during the war period issued an appeal: "France, though still bleeding, wants to live free and independent; a great people like ours will never become a nation of slaves . . . it is with the people that the great hopes of national and social liberation lie." So it was in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia. Later in Italy the same forces appeared, and small bands of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians joined with the

Balkan resistance movements. Poles organised resistance under Nazi occupation, as well as building up forces in Great Britain and later in the U.S.S.R.

§ A.37. THE U.S.S.R. AND THE U.S.A. ATTACKED.—After a period of tension in which the U.S.S.R. showed unwillingness to meet German claims, Hitler suddenly attacked on 21st June 1941. Some who were regarded as experts foretold that Soviet resistance to the ever-victorious Nazi war machine would not last much more than six weeks. But the people of the U.S.S.R. belied them—in the army, in the guerrilla bands behind the enemy lines, in the factories and on the farms. Moreover, the sympathy of workers in other countries infused a new enthusiasm into the war effort. Any lingering doubts about the meaning of the war were cleared away, for they believed that the partnership of the U.S.S.R. in the struggle against Hitler guaranteed that it was indeed a people's anti-Fascist war.

A further sign that the old hindrances to unity against Fascism were gone was Winston Churchill's instant assurance of full co-operation with the U.S.S.R. and President Roosevelt's extension of Lend-Lease aid. Anglo-Soviet unity culminated in the Treaty of Alliance of 26th May 1942, pledging the two countries not only to full co-operation to secure victory but to twenty years' mutual assistance against any future attack by Germany or its allies, and to co-operation for peaceful reconstruction after the war on the basis of the Atlantic Charter. At last in war there was achieved the unity that suspicion and prejudice had prevented in peace.

Less than six months later the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the Philippines, as well as British Hong Kong, brought the U.S.A. into a world war linking East and West. American policy under Franklin D. Roosevelt's leadership had up till that time been to give to the countries at war with Germany the maximum aid that could be given without open war. The government had to take into account the strong sentiment against involvement in a war, especially one connected with Europe. Legislation had to be designed not to offend this

sentiment; but actually the system of Cash-and-Carry was favourable to Britain, with its large merchant fleet and its external investments that could be realised to pay for imports. When these external resources were practically exhausted, Lend-Lease provided a cover for continued shipments of arms, food, and other essentials, for ordinary loans to countries at war had been banned in the interest of American neutrality. Britain thus received essential assistance without being obliged to divert production from war purposes to goods for export to America, which might have meant disaster for Britain and increased danger for America (NA.16).

This close relationship was further developed by the meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt which resulted in the signature on 14th August 1941 of the Atlantic Charter, designed "to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they based their hopes for a better future for the world" (NA.17). The attack by the Japanese enabled Roosevelt to carry public opinion, including the isolationists, with him in entering a struggle which he had long recognised as of vital interest to his country.

§ A.38. "BIG THREE" UNITY.—The past could not be undone in a moment; increasing unity of purpose and action was not achieved without difficulty. High-ranking spokesmen of the three countries did not meet until the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers in October 1943, nearly two years after America's entrance into the war. They not only pledged themselves to make war till unconditional surrender was secured but also to continue their united action "for the organisation and maintenance of peace and security, including the establishment of an international organisation open to all peace-loving states on a basis of sovereign equality."

There soon followed the meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Teheran at which complete agreement was reached "as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west, and south." The leaders declared

that they recognised fully "the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations." The development of new differences as increasing areas of Europe were liberated and the problems of reconstruction, settlement, and future development drew nearer, gave importance to the next meeting of the heads of the "Big Three" at Yalta in the Crimea, in February 1945. Agreement was reached on various matters affecting Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, and liberated Europe, and on important questions connected with the proposed international organisation, for which a draft charter had been drawn up at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference during 1944. The determination was again reaffirmed "to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war."

The defeat of Germany and a host of European problems gave rise to a further meeting at Potsdam, near Berlin, in July-August 1945. Far Eastern problems arising from the defeat of Japan were included when the Foreign Ministers of the "Big Three" again met in Moscow at the end of 1945. These meetings were at once the sign of the existence of difficulties in co-operation and of the will to solve them.

In April, May, and June 1945 over forty states, meeting at San Francisco, had revised the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and signed the Charter of a new United Nations Organisation. In July 1944 important agreements had been reached in a conference at Bretton Woods, U.S.A., relating to economic affairs after the war. The agreements, said Mr. Henry Morgenthau, president of the conference, provided "machinery by which men and women everywhere can exchange freely, on a fair and stable basis, the goods which they produce through their labour . . . the initial step through which the nations of the world will be able to help one another in economic develop-

ment to their mutual advantage and for the enrichment of all." Other conferences had given birth to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, whose general purpose was to relate food production to the adequate nutrition of people throughout the world, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to deal with the more immediate problems that it was foreseen would arise from the devastation and dislocation wrought by war and from Fascist policy in occupied countries (N.A.18).

Thus it may be seen that actually during the war a considerable degree of co-operation had been achieved between the "Big Three" for winning the war and for peace and security after the war, while other nations had joined in planning international agencies to deal with important post-war problems.

§ A.39. VICTORY AND AFTER.—Victory left the "Big Three"—Great Britain, U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R.—immensely more powerful than other countries. France and China were both recognised as Great Powers and accorded permanent seats in the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation; but in actual power they were far behind the others. Decisions on vital questions that might affect future developments and the peace of the world therefore depended very largely on agreement between the "Big Three." This did not mean that there would be no minor differences but that divergence in really important matters would hamper the laying of foundations for long-term peace and the working of the international organisations that had been planned.

The need for agreement among the Great Powers was recognised in the United Nations Organisation. Decisions on important matters by the Security Council, on which the main responsibility for keeping the peace was laid, had to be approved by the five permanent members. In other words, any one of them by disagreeing could exercise a veto on decisions. Some regard this as a weakness; but it is a recognition of

actual facts. If, when there was disagreement between the Great Powers on matters that they regard as of vital importance, one could be overruled by the others, it would cause friction and start the trends from which wars come. In the last resort the attempt of two of the "Big Three" Powers to coerce the other would mean a new world war in which most countries would be ranged on one side or the other. It would not make any difference to call this a police war. It was just to avoid this that U.N.O. was established, and it was recognised that it could function effectively only when the Great Powers, and especially the "Big Three," were in agreement. This gave the "Big Three" the responsibility of giving leadership to the progressive peaceful forces of the world. It did not mean world domination by the "Big Three," for it would be difficult to imagine that three such Powers, with important differences in their organisation, could agree on measures that would be oppressive to the peoples of the world.

Yet within a short time after victory, differences began to appear between the countries that had pledged themselves to co-operate. It is relatively easy to agree when there is a common enemy to defeat; when that particular danger is removed differences that have been kept in check tend to appear. In this case the differences were naturally along the same lines as had existed before the war, and reflected the different social-economic organisation of the countries. This decline in unity naturally disappointed some of the high hopes born in wartime, but it was almost inevitable. If the trend were allowed to go too far, however, then a common enemy of all peoples, war and Fascism, might again take us unawares.

§ A.40. DIFFERING VIEWS.—On many questions that came up at the first meeting of the U.N.O. General Assembly, at sessions of the Security Council, and at conferences of the Foreign Ministers, there were differences between Great Britain and America on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other. These were largely due to a broad difference of view

as to how enduring peace could be attained—on how U.N.O. should work, and on how to deal with the defeated countries and those that had changed from Hitler's satellites to Allies in the final stages of the struggle.

Many people in America and Great Britain believe that real and enduring peace can be achieved without fundamental change in the present social and economic system—capitalism. Some who would like to see the advent of socialism still do not regard this as essential to peace. We are reminded of those who were really optimistic about the League of Nations and who argue that the failure to make the most of the League was due to human folly and weakness rather than to defects in the economic system. They look on the United Nations Organisation in much the same way. It is regarded as a means of establishing the rule of law among nations, on the assumption that the conditions of a peace based on justice and freedom already exist.

The U.S.S.R. was founded roughly at the same time as the League of Nations, but behind it was a different philosophy. The Bolsheviks, as the followers of Karl Marx, held that permanent peace was impossible among capitalist countries and could be achieved only when a great part of the world adopted Socialism. The Soviet Government has never changed its belief in spite of the close co-operation with the liberal capitalist countries against Fascism. Hence, it has seen the problems of post-war settlement and the working of the U.N.O. in a somewhat different light from the United States and Great Britain.

The same difference is revealed in the conception of democracy. During the war it was easy to talk of the three great democratic countries, without inquiring too closely what was meant by democracy. After victory, when it was a question of influencing development in Germany and Japan and in liberated countries, some of which had never known much democracy of any kind, the difference became more important. Many people in the West, especially in the U.S.A., hold that

their system is completely democratic, but that the Soviet system is not really so. Some would say that capitalism, where the control of industry is in private hands, is an essential part of democracy and that increasing State activity is a threat to democracy. Some others would be prepared to get rid of capitalism but hold that the existing political parliamentary machinery gives the means of getting rid of it quite peacefully. The people of the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, believe that their own system is far more really democratic than the capitalist democracy of the West, and that capitalism at a certain stage will tend to move in the direction of Fascism. In any case it is important to remember that the more eastern and southern parts of Europe adjacent to the U.S.S.R. did not have the long liberal period characteristic of France, Britain, Belgium, and Holland. The struggle to achieve government of the people, by the people, for the people may therefore quite naturally take forms unfamiliar to the West and more like those of the U.S.S.R.

§ A.41. THE "BIG THREE" AFTER THE WAR: (1) U.S.A.—America and the U.S.S.R. stood at the extremes among the victors and the greatest possibility of cleavage lay between them. Belief in capitalism as a liberal and peaceful system was strong in America, with a corresponding opposition to socialism. Isolationist sentiment had declined and the American Government had many times proclaimed its willingness to use America's huge power for world peace. At the same time, in the interests of American security, footholds in distant areas, such as the Western Pacific, were sought as bases for the exercise of this power. America emerged from the war the strongest single country in the world, with greatly increased power of production and undamaged by the ravages of war. From America chiefly the world looked for help in the form of liberal loans for reconstruction. America also needed markets abroad, as well as at home, if unemployment and discontent were to be avoided. Loans to other countries would help to

create this market: for war-stricken countries were not in a position to pay for imports with their own products.

Nevertheless, there was some misgiving in other parts of the world lest the strong American position, backed by a belief in a world mission, might lead to something like American domination. There was also a certain fear that if America were troubled with acute internal economic and social problems there might be resort to some form of imperialism as an escape from them. The American policy of retaining the secret of the atomic bomb seemed to weaken Soviet faith in the possibilities of equal co-operation for peace.

§ A.42. (2) GREAT BRITAIN.—When compared with the advance of America and the U.S.S.R., Great Britain emerged from the war in a relatively weaker position as a Great Power and with a difficult task in recovering from the losses of the war. Under the Labour Government the movement towards self-government in the Empire was speeded up, but Britain remained an imperial Power governing dependent peoples with world-wide capitalist interests, and bases from which power could be used. This, coupled with the use of British troops in Java and Greece, probably had an effect on Britain's relations with the U.S.S.R.

Through the expenditure of overseas investments to buy war materials, Britain's economic position was made very difficult. It was estimated that, to maintain accustomed standards, Britain would have to export half as much again as before the war. Not only was Britain's industrial equipment damaged by the war, but the export trade had necessarily been let slip in favour of war production, while Lend-Lease had supplied many necessary imports without corresponding exports. Obviously Britain could not at once produce and find markets for exports on the required scale to buy essential imports. It was this that made necessary a large loan on liberal terms from the only country that could provide it—America. Many Americans saw that it was in their own interest to help British

recovery. Some also felt, however, that they were not only building up a market for their own exports, but also a future competitor on the world's markets. We have already seen that with its expanded and undamaged industrial capacity America needs external markets to keep up employment. Thus there is a certain element of conflict in American and British economic interests. The Bretton Woods agreements and the various international agencies in the economic field, such as the Economic and Social Council of U.N.O., may help to get over some of the difficulties, but difficulties there are.

§ A.43. (3) U.S.S.R.—The relative power and world importance of the Soviet Union was much greater at the end of the war than at any previous time. Moreover, plans were immediately begun for a great programme of reconstruction and industrial development that would further enhance its place in the world. In the period immediately after the war Soviet policy caused some misgiving to people in the West. Were the Soviet leaders really desirous of peace or were they becoming aggressive?

We have seen that the Soviet view is that capitalism and permanent peace are incompatible. How does this fit in with the pledges of co-operation for peace with capitalist powers given many times during the war, and with membership of U.N.O.? The Soviet view is that there are times when such co-operation is good and necessary. Soviet leaders sought it through the League after Hitler-Fascism rose in Germany to threaten both East and West. Soviet leaders welcomed it in the war; they held that it should continue after the war because of both the dangers and the opportunities that would exist. Thus, while they did not think that the conditions for a permanent and real peace would exist after the war, they did think that co-operation could secure a long period of peace during which much might be achieved. It was thus that they supported the establishment of U.N.O., not as anything like a parliament of man.

This was the view expressed in the declaration agreed on by Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin, at the Crimea Conference in February 1945. "Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organisation will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace"—"a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, 'afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.'" They said the essential conditions had to be *created in the years to come*. It is of interest that in an important statement in March 1946 Generalissimo Stalin used similar language. "We are confronted by the most wonderful opportunity in history. Let us take full advantage of it," "The work of U.N.O.," he also said, "will be heavy and difficult . . . we know there is a difference of outlook among the great Powers. There are also differences of interests. It is the first purpose of the United Nations to prevent these differences resulting in armed conflict between nations."

The U.S.S.R. joined the League as a means of combating, by co-operation among non-aggressive, liberal countries, the dangerous growth of Fascism. The war was the great anti-Fascist war. U.N.O. and co-operation between the "Big Three" were necessary, from the Soviet view, to extirpate the last remnants of Fascism and prevent its regrowth from the same causes as existed before the war. The Teheran Conference had recognised the responsibility of making a peace that would command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and of eliminating tyranny, slavery, oppression, and intolerance. According to the Crimea declaration, a great purpose was to "enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism, and to create democratic institutions of their own choice." The test by which the Soviet leaders judge actions is whether they tend to destroy the last vestiges of Fascism and liberate the mass of the people. They seem to have doubted whether the British

and American Governments were sufficiently animated by the same purpose, and whether their methods would exclude the possibility of Fascism again growing up and becoming a danger to the U.S.S.R. and the peoples of the world. These fears may sometimes seem exaggerated, but they are partly a product of the past bitter experience of the Soviet Union from the hostility of many in the capitalist world, the refusal to co-operate in the critical period in the growth of Fascist power, and the tolerance of anti-Soviet pro-Fascist sympathies. For Western appeasement of Fascism the Soviet paid a bitter price. Nowhere was Nazi savagery worse than in the Soviet Union.

Because of this past experience and misgivings about the future the Soviet Government has sought to have friendly governments in neighbouring states. It has also sought to improve its strategic position to make sure that it should have a really equal voice with the other big Powers on all questions affecting world peace.

Thus the problem of co-operation between the "Big Three," on which the hopes of prolonged peace and construction will so much depend, is fraught with real difficulties. The precautions taken by any one of them lest co-operation should fail are apt to beget counter-precautions. Therein lies the danger that suspicion will mount, and prevail against the efforts at co-operation.

CHAPTER A.VIII

WHERE EAST MEETS WEST

§ A.44. EARLY CONTACTS IN THE PACIFIC.—A century ago the Pacific was remote from the most active centres of the world. To-day it is recognised to be of increasing importance in the world's affairs. If you look at a map showing how the population of the world is spread, you will find that one of the regions

where population is dense is the western side of the Pacific Ocean. On the eastern side, too, in North America, the centre of population tends to move from the Atlantic to the Pacific. What is more important, the peoples of the Pacific are now closely linked with the other peoples of the world in their daily life, through the things that they produce and the exchange that takes place between them. The industrialism of the West is now established in the East, and in China, for example, there is certain to be great expansion. The most modern means of transport and travel link up the opposite shores of the Pacific, and the Pacific with Europe, air communication being an important factor. The arts of peace are also turned to war. It was in the Pacific that the atomic bomb was used for the first time—let us hope for the last.

Indeed, so great is the change in this region, which formerly seemed cut off from the rest of the world, that it may well be that the future of civilisation depends on what happens on the western shores of the Pacific.

The Pacific was first opened to European interest by the voyages of Spanish, Portuguese, English, and Dutch navigators during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were mainly concerned with the spices that were to be had in the East Indies. There was a little trade with China and Japan, and Christian missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church also went to these countries. Europeans, who have, during the last century, often regarded themselves as the rightful lords of the world and the owners of a vastly superior civilisation, may be shocked to know that the Chinese had a similar feeling about their civilisation. The Chinese Emperor looked on his Empire as the centre of the world, with a far higher civilisation than the West. The intruders who came from Europe he regarded as barbarians, who came to get from China the things they could not produce for themselves. Out of generosity to their backwardness they might be tolerated; but they must be kept strictly within bounds lest they disturb the order of the Celestial Empire.

The Japanese rulers took more drastic steps. After a while they shut the country up almost entirely from outside intercourse. Japanese were prohibited from travelling abroad. Christianity, which had made a good many converts, was ruthlessly suppressed. Only the Dutch were permitted to keep a small trading factory under humiliating conditions at Nagasaki. Thus Japan was locked up in 1638; it remained so till the force of the Western Powers compelled a change in the middle of the nineteenth century.

§ A.45. THE PRESSURE OF THE WEST AND ITS TRADE.—The changes that were going on in Europe and the development of the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century had their effects in the Far East. There was a new type of trade developing which might find a market in China. Whalers and traders began to ply in the waters of the Pacific and among the island peoples. The ships and crews were sometimes cast on the shores of Japan or sought shelter there, only to meet with an ill reception. In 1813 the East India Company lost its trade monopoly in India and looked to China as a new field, especially for the sale of opium grown in India.

These were some of the things which led to the resort to force by the Western Powers. In force they were much superior to the East. A number of wars, in which Great Britain and France played the chief part, forced China to agree to the opening of several ports—often called Treaty Ports—to trade and to make many important concessions to European residents. China was also bound to keep the tariffs on important trade goods very low. These privileges were shared by all the European Powers, by the United States, and later by Japan (NA.19).

In Japan, America played the leading part, beginning with the visit of a naval squadron in 1853. The European Powers took part in later displays, or use, of force. After a period of uncertainty and internal disturbance, Japan at length made treaties with the Western Powers on somewhat the same terms

as China. But in Japan something else also happened of the greatest importance in the later history of the Pacific and of the world. Japan, in 1867, began a period of purposeful change. The government was remodelled, Western methods of manufacture and transport were introduced. Men were sent abroad to study other countries to see what might be successfully used in Japan. The great purpose was to save Japan from falling completely before the pressure of the West. Japan must be brought to a condition where the Western Powers could be met and resisted in their policies by the methods of force and power that they themselves used. By this path Japan had become a great Power by the twentieth century (NA.20).

§ A.46. BRITISH COLONISATION.—A very different form of European penetration was also developing in the early part of the nineteenth century. The future British self-governing Dominions, Australia and New Zealand, were being established, while in Canada settlement was also pushing westward to the Pacific coast. Captain Cook had claimed both Australia and New Zealand for the British Crown. It was the need of a new area to which to transport the many victims of the harsh laws of England, now that the American colonies had been lost, that decided the British government, in 1788, to act on Cook's claim in Australia (§ 241). The increasing number of ex-convicts and the coming of free settlers gave a new character to the colony in the nineteenth century, especially as the growing of wool became an important industry (§ 299). We must link this up with the Industrial Revolution. The new methods of cheap manufacture made it worth while to grow wool at the other side of the world, while the unsettlement and distress produced in England by the changes in industry also meant that there were many people not unwilling to seek a better life overseas. The discovery of suitable land later made wheat-growing a profitable industry for the same reason. Gold discoveries in 1851 led to a new influx of population, especially to Victoria. Many of the newcomers were men eager to govern

their own affairs and hostile to the claims of some of the older settlers, who regarded themselves as an aristocracy.

Whaling, trading in flax and timber, and escapes from the Australian convict settlements also brought a number of European settlers to New Zealand. But, as we have seen (§ 300), Europe had also sent thither a different influence in the missionaries. They were anxious, for the sake of the natives and of the influence that they themselves wanted to bring to them, to keep out settlement; and British governments of the time generally shared their sympathy for native interests. But economic forces were pressing. Wakefield thought he saw in his "systematic colonisation" a solution of the social problems that were connected with the industrial revolution. A carefully selected cross-section of British society should be sent out. Land should be sold at a fairly high and uniform price, so that only men with some capital would be able to buy it, leaving others to work for wages, and so that settlement would gradually work outwards from the best land, instead of being rapidly scattered over a great area. The money from the sale of land should be used largely to assist new immigrants to provide a continual supply of labour. Wakefield saw in New Zealand a fertile region, practically free from any other form of colonisation. It seemed ideal for his plans.

When the government at last decided on annexation in 1840, it acted as much to uphold native interests as to provide for colonisation. But, once settlement on a considerable scale had been begun by Wakefield's Company, the pressure of settlers for access to land largely shaped the government's policy. The inevitable conflict with the Maori ended in his defeat and the loss of more lands. New Zealand was to be a European community, though not the replica of English society that Wakefield intended. The drive of economic forces was too strong for the humanitarian ideal of the missionaries.

The granting of responsible government to these British colonies in the 'fifties was an important step (N.234). It meant that in the future they were to have some voice in influencing

British policy in the Pacific, even before they achieved their present position of practical independence as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

§ A.47. TRADE AND MISSIONS IN THE TROPICAL ISLANDS.—The many tropical islands of the Pacific, inhabited by primitive native communities, were too hot for extensive white settlement. Their soil did not produce things that were then in great demand; nor did they offer extensive markets. They were visited, however, by small traders and attracted the work of the missions. Where the missionary came, even though he wished to guard the native people against ordinary European influences, he often opened the way to them. He could not fail to bring some European things with him. The natives naturally sought to have a greater contact with this new world, especially when it brought them things that added variety or convenience to their lives. The missionaries, too, often sought to root out native customs that seemed to them barbarous, but which might have some important part in the social organisation of the native life. In this way the former ways of native life were often broken up without any new organisation that the native understood being put in their place. This, as well as the introduction of diseases to which the native had little resistance, has had a profound effect in the islands. Despair and decline of population have been prevalent, though later efforts have done something to improve the position. These problems have arisen wherever European civilisation has come in contact with peoples of a primitive civilisation.

In trade and missionary enterprise, the British, French, and Americans were most active. There was some rivalry between the French and the British. As early as 1848 Sir George Grey, as Governor of New Zealand, and Bishop Selwyn had urged the British government to annex some of the Pacific Islands. Grey's plea was based on a curious mixture of desire to protect the natives and consideration for future economic development. His immediate object, however, was to prevent the

French from gaining New Caledonia and using it as a convict settlement. This actually did happen in 1853.

There were also disputes between France and Great Britain over a mixture of missionary and trade rights in Tahiti. Ultimately, this was settled in 1846 by France's protectorate over Tahiti being recognised. Annexation did not come till 1880. We should also remember that French projects for settlement in New Zealand had some part in bringing about British annexation of that country.

For the most part, until the last quarter of the century, the British government was opposed to increases of territory. In the middle of the century the ideals of Free Trade were at their height; and along with them was the belief that there was no advantage and perhaps much trouble and expense to be had from increases of territory. In some cases, native rulers sought some shelter from the troubles which came to their people through the rivalries and unscrupulousness of traders or from "blackbirders" who recruited natives by violence and fraud to work on plantations, such as the Queensland sugar-fields. They asked the British government to take them under their protection. But in a number of cases such requests were declined.

One factor in the British policy was the supremacy of British sea-power and the lack of any very serious rivalry of the Powers for interests or dominion. Even the French pressure was not very strong or very insistent. There was nothing to gain by annexation. In fact, if many islands were acquired, it might excite the suspicions and jealousies of other Powers and make them less ready to acquiesce in the development of British trade, missionary enterprise, and influence which was actually going on.

CHAPTER A.IX

RIVALRIES IN THE PACIFIC

§ A.48. IMPERIALIST EXPANSION IN THE PACIFIC.—The period of the partition of Africa saw also the partition of the Pacific islands. At the same time, too, the Western Powers began to press more closely on China. Germany and Russia began to play a bigger part in this game of power. The United States became more deeply involved. Soon Japan also joined, no longer a subject of pressure, but a rival to the Powers of the West.

We must soon look more closely at the situation that thus arose in Eastern Asia. For the moment let us keep our attention on the islands and the British communities in the south. After 1880 it became clear that Great Britain no longer had such a strong position. French activity continued. American trade interests were being extended. Large German trading concerns were seeking the help and protection of their government. Even the Russian bogey took life in these remote regions. The question of Asiatic immigration arose. Warships of other Powers than Britain began to be seen more often in Pacific waters.

The Australian colonies—they were not federated into the Commonwealth of Australia till 1900—and New Zealand began to feel less secure than they had been, remote from the great centres of conflict. The growing power of other countries and the possible sources of war seemed to be coming nearer. British troops had been withdrawn in the 'sixties and 'seventies and the bulk of the navy was stationed elsewhere. These colonies began to press the British government to take more energetic steps in the Pacific. They urged that many islands should be annexed before they fell into the hands of other Powers. Part of New Guinea, the New Hebrides, Fiji

(annexed in 1874), Samoa, and the Cook Islands were among the territories that Britain was urged to acquire—a circle of outposts which would have kept other Powers well away from the British communities. In 1883 Queensland, on its own account, proclaimed the annexation of the part of New Guinea not claimed by the Dutch, in order to forestall possible German claims. This, however, was repudiated by the British government. The New Zealand government was anxious to take similar action in regard to Samoa and actually had a small steamer ready to leave with a military force for the scene.

These southern colonies also pressed for the concentration of more warships in the South Pacific. Something in this direction was actually done, the colonies making a small contribution to the cost of maintaining the navy. Later, however, in 1909, Australia began to build its own navy, while New Zealand, in 1912, undertook the maintenance of a squadron.

The British government did not respond to the colonial requests for wholesale annexations. Partly there was a continuance of the old reluctance to increase territory. But there were other factors at work. Britain was feeling the increasing pressure of international rivalry in other places more keenly than the Pacific. The dangers had to be met at the most critical points. In fact, the best defence of Australia and New Zealand might be in some other part of the world.

In the 'eighties and 'nineties France and Russia were still the great rivals of Britain and there were a number of incidents that caused the British government much anxiety. The occupation of Egypt was followed by difficulties in the Sudan. At a critical time Russia took steps which were regarded as a threat to British power in India. In 1884 and 1885 there was a danger of war. These troubles seemed enough; the British government did not wish to risk more or to disperse British strength. Moreover, Germany was, at the time, the chief competitor in the Pacific, and it was vital not to lose German goodwill at such a time. Thus there were good grounds for the

British government's policy, though sometimes it seems to have courted misunderstanding by not keeping the representatives of the colonies sufficiently well informed. In any case, it is possible, even probable, that wholesale annexation by Great Britain would have so antagonised the other Powers as to bring about a powerful alliance bent on ending the British domination of the world. The policy of partitioning the Pacific Islands by agreement left the way open for escape from the increasing perils of isolation.

§ A.49. TENSION IN THE FAR EAST.—Towards the end of the nineteenth century it seemed likely that China would be partitioned. Western capitalists were seeking fields for the more profitable investment of their capital. China had vast resources which the Chinese government and people showed little capacity to develop. Thus, this region offered an excellent field. Large sums were put into railways and the working of mineral and coal deposits. There was intense competition between different financial groups to get authority from the Chinese government to carry out these developments or to provide loans to the Chinese government itself. Frequently the financiers sought the support of the governments in getting their share of the opportunities that were offering. This resulted in severe pressure on the Chinese government and possibilities of strife between the competing Powers. It seemed that China could scarcely survive and that the Powers would end by carving up Chinese territory among themselves. Actually, they did agree on exclusive "spheres of interest," and in 1898, as we shall see later, some important pieces of territory were leased from China for long terms.

§ A.50. AMERICA TAKES A HAND.—American interest in trade and investment of capital in the Pacific regions was increasing during the century. American policy, on the other hand, had always aimed at keeping out of what were considered the rather dirty affairs of the European Powers. Ameri-

can people did not think that their country should join in the imperialist scramble that was going on and they did not like to think of imposing their will on weaker countries by the use of force. But they did not want to be shut out of the benefits of what they considered peaceful and innocent trade. It may be that American policy has not really been so very different from that of other countries and that they have on occasions resorted to force or the threat of force to maintain American interests. Like other peoples, they have found moral reasons to excuse these incidents. But for a long period the United States had had a huge undeveloped area at its back door into which to expand with little opposition. This had produced a greater aversion to the use of power abroad than there was in other countries and a strong feeling that America was morally superior in international affairs.

How could American interests be safeguarded without joining in the rather crude dog-fight for advantages that was going on? First of all, several important island groups came into American hands. In 1898 the Hawaiian Islands, where there was much American enterprise, were annexed. In 1899 an agreement was reached by which the Samoan group was shared between Germany and America. In 1898, after the war with Spain, which had begun over friction in the Spanish possession Cuba, the Philippines and Guam passed to America. One of the reasons for this last step was the fear that in any case the islands would fall into the hands of one or more of the European Powers and so increase their dominant power in the Far East. Germany had actually bought the Carolines, the Ladrões or Mariannas, and the Marshalls from Spain. America was thus becoming an Asiatic Power.

In regard to China, John Hay, the American Foreign Minister, in 1899, got the Powers to agree to the policy of the "Open Door." This meant that all countries should have equal opportunities for trade and other economic enterprises in China. The policy was intended to protect American interests without a fight, rather than to protect China; but it

probably did help to stave off the partition of China. At any rate, it showed that in future America had to be reckoned with in the Far East.

§ A.51. "CHRISTIAN" POWERS AND THE "YELLOW PERIL."
—Great Britain and Japan had been pleased to support the "Open Door" policy because it was likely to favour their position as well as America's. France, Germany, and Russia had been less favourable. If we look back to what was already happening in the spheres in which they were interested we shall see more clearly the danger that was threatening China. France and Russia, as we have seen, had become allies in 1891. But Germany continued to seek friendly relations with Russia. In fact, the Kaiser had a vision of a Yellow Peril, gathering like an ugly storm to overwhelm European civilisation. He had a cartoon representing this engraved for public use. He wanted the Christian nations of Europe to "unite in resisting the inroad of Buddhism, heathenism, and barbarism for the defence of the Cross." Thus he wrote to the Czar. France and Great Britain were to be brought in as well as Russia.

French financiers were lending large sums to Russia. Some of this money was being used in the Far East. Ever seeking a free outlet from a shut-in position, Russia began the great Trans-Siberian railway, which was to terminate at Vladivostok on the Pacific coast. Manchuria, a region of undeveloped possibilities, lay across the straight path, and Russian interests began to penetrate. Meanwhile a struggle was going on in Korea, which was claimed as a dependency of China, between rival groups. Eventually war came between China and Japan in 1894. The Japanese successfully carried the war into Manchuria and seized Weihaiwei in China proper. Among the terms they exacted in 1895 was the transfer to Japan of the peninsula of Liao-Tung, which juts down from Manchuria towards North China. Korea was also to be recognised as independent.

You will see from a map the importance of Liao-Tung.

Held by a strong power it could be a means of exercising great pressure on China, whose government was centred at Peking. The European Powers, caught unawares by the increased strength of Japan, were unwilling to see a new rival seated in this key position. Germany, France, and Russia, therefore, joined in a protest, "recommending" Japan to forgo this claim. Although Great Britain and America did not support this move they were unwilling to take any active steps against it and Japan had to yield.

Within a year or two the three Western Powers had shown their hand. Russia secured from China, which looked to Russia as a check on Japan, the right to build a railway across Manchuria to shorten the distance to Vladivostok. Much French capital was used in this undertaking. In 1897 two German Roman Catholic missionaries were murdered by Chinese robbers in the course of a plundering raid on a Chinese village. This was made the pretext for the use of force, and eventually the Chinese government had to pay a stiff price for something it had no hand in doing and which it had actually tried to punish. Germany got a long lease of Kiaochau Bay, with the port of Tsingtau as a naval base, and extensive mining and railway rights in the province of Shantung, in addition to a money payment. Within a week of the German action a Russian squadron appeared at Port Arthur in the Liao-Tung Peninsula. Russia got a lease of the peninsula from which Japan had so recently been warned off. Port Arthur became a naval port. The right to construct a railway southwards to the leased territory from the railway across Manchuria was also secured, with special rights regarding the working of minerals. France, too, must have a share for having "saved" China from Japan. A lease of a naval port and a railway concession were secured in South China. Great Britain claimed that the balance of power in the East was being upset and must be readjusted—of course at the expense of China. Great Britain, in 1898, leased a considerable piece of territory at Kowloon, opposite to Hong Kong, and, in the north, leased

Weihaiwei as a naval port to balance Russia's Port Arthur.

The Yellow Peril seemed no more than a silly fairy-tale so far as European civilisation was concerned; but the European pressure seemed to the Chinese a very real threat to *their* civilisation. In North China anti-foreign societies were formed and attacks began to be made on missionaries and other Europeans, and on Chinese Christians. The Chinese government did little to prevent these and was even suspected of supporting the violence of the anti-foreign organisations, of which the most famous was the Society of Boxers, or "Fists of Righteous Harmony." Ultimately the plight of Europeans and the attempts to reach them by contingents from the warships of a number of Powers led to open war. With difficulty the Europeans shut up in Peking and Tientsin were relieved. A horrible vengeance of looting and slaughter was taken by the relieving forces. The Chinese government had never been so much humiliated. Its part had little in it to praise. But the masses of the Chinese population, who suffered from the depredations of the Boxers and the Chinese army and then the vengeance of the foreign Powers, were for the most part innocent sufferers.

§ A.52. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.—Russia had taken advantage of the unsettlement to put large forces into Manchuria. They were not withdrawn when the trouble was over. In fact, Manchuria was becoming practically a province of Russia. Russian influence also began to penetrate into Korea. Both Great Britain and Japan viewed this with alarm. Japanese interests were beginning to spread like those of the Western Powers. Japan was becoming industrialised and there was a demand for markets and places in which to invest capital. Great Britain, as we have seen, was feeling the need of an ally, and Russia was regarded as the great danger to British imperial interests.

We have already noticed how this situation led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 (§ A.22). We get an interesting

light on the nature of diplomatic "friendship" when we discover that there was an influential party in Japan at this time, that favoured coming to an understanding with Russia in opposition to Great Britain. Feelers were actually being put out with this object at the same time as negotiations were going on with Great Britain. The final decision of the Japanese government might easily have gone the other way.

The alliance paved the way for the war of 1904-1905. Japan's success was even more startling to the Western Powers than the victory over China ten years before. Japan had entered as a powerful factor in world affairs and especially in the Pacific. A good deal of the war was fought in Manchuria and by the peace settlement Japan took over all Russian interests in the southern part of Manchuria. While promising to maintain the independence of Korea, Japan actually secured a great deal of control there, and in 1910 the country was annexed to the Japanese Empire.

§ A.53. JAPAN AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR.—This last step was made easier by prior agreements with the Powers of the Triple Entente, which have been mentioned before (§ A.22). Great Britain first, and then the Powers with which Britain had made agreements affecting other parts of the world, had called in Japan to help them in the balance of power. Japan had used the opportunity to secure a strong position in the region most important to Japanese interests. When the war came, Japan gave much help to the Western Allies by joining under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The addition of Japan's naval power in the Far East and the Pacific greatly limited the freedom of German warships and merchantmen there, and made it easy to sweep the seas of German ships in a short time. Assistance was also given in conveying troopships from the British Dominions in the Pacific.

At the same time, the preoccupation elsewhere of the European Powers and, to a large extent, of the United States, together with their need of Japanese support, was a great

advantage to Japan. The German-leased territory at Kiaochau was captured after a siege, in the course of which Japan violated Chinese neutrality without compunction. China, unlike Belgium, was not able to resist. Perhaps that is why we heard less of it. The Japanese also seized the German islands north of the Equator, while Australia and New Zealand were doing the same south of the line. Other ways in which Japan sought during the First World War to strengthen its hold in the Far East will be dealt with later.

By the Peace Treaties of 1919 Japan, in spite of much opposition from China, was left with substantial gains. These included the former German-leased territory at Kiaochau and various German rights in Shantung. Japan also hoped for full possession of the captured Pacific Islands. Secret agreements with Great Britain, France, and Russia had promised support for all these claims. This was in conflict with President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and, at the Peace Conference, the Americans opposed the Japanese claims. The only point that they won, however, was that the islands should be held by Japan as Mandates under the League of Nations. This was not a very big point and Japan continued to control the islands even after ceasing to be a member of the League.

CHAPTER A.X

THE PACIFIC AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

§ A.54. THE DECLINE OF EUROPE IN THE EAST.—Some Chinese called the First World War "the civil war in Europe." In the nineteenth century European states had spread their power over a great part of the world and Europeans were inclined to take it for granted that they should rule over other peoples. As the peoples of Asia realised what was happening,

they began to make changes in their own countries in order to challenge this dominating European attitude. In this they were, helped by the divisions among the European Powers. The failure of Europeans to solve the problem of living peaceably⁷ among themselves culminated in two world wars of terrible destruction. The force with which they had dominated the East they turned against one another; and in so doing they destroyed their prestige in the East. It took them some time to realise this and they sought to maintain their old position. But the facts have been too strong and they have had to retreat.

Increasing antagonism among the European Powers clearly helped Japan to establish itself as a rival to these Powers themselves. Canning said when he decided to recognise the independence of the Spanish colonies in America that he "called in the New World to redress the balance of the old." It might be said of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 that Great Britain called in Asia to redress the balance of Europe. We have seen how Japan profited by the value of its support to the Entente Powers in the subsequent period to extend its influence in the Far East. The crisis in Europe after the rise of Hitler permitted Japan to follow an ever bolder policy and eventually attack with great initial success America and the British Commonwealth. In doing this Japan was not only acting as one of a number of rival Great Powers but as an Eastern Power challenging the dominance of the West and paying off old scores, such as the American Immigration Act of 1924 and the refusal to include in the League of Nations Covenant a declaration of racial equality.

China was slower to act, but after the First World War brought increasing pressure against foreign imperialist interests. Though various concessions were made by the Powers, it was not till the midst of the Second World War, when the Western Powers were glad to have Chinese co-operation, that China's equal place in the world was fully recognised. The British and American governments renounced the last of the

rights that they held under the "unequal treaties"; China joined in the declaration of the Foreign Ministers from Moscow in October 1943 on post-war collaboration; soon after, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt met in conference with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo, thus virtually recognising China as one of the major countries of the world. China took part with the "Big Three" in drafting the proposals for the United Nations Organisation at Dumbarton Oaks and, like them, was to be a permanent member of the Security Council.

Before we discuss the development of particular Pacific countries, two other changes may be noted. Though Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands remained interested in the West Pacific and East Asia, America gradually became the Western Power most able to exercise influence in that area. This was clearly revealed in the Second World War, and post-war policy indicates that America will continue to regard this as a vital region in its world interests. The other change is the great development of the U.S.S.R. as an Asiatic and Pacific Power. Great economic progress and population growth has been taking place in the more eastern regions, while the formerly backward non-Russian peoples there are being helped to develop rapidly in their economic, political, and cultural life. Japanese imperialism was a threat to Soviet development, and the U.S.S.R. is bound to be interested in the future of the countries bordering the West Pacific.

§ A.55. THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN.—Japan under any form of government would have certain difficulties which are also affected by conditions in other parts of the world. Japan proper is about half as big again as Great Britain or New Zealand; it is not richly endowed with natural resources, except water for hydro-electric power; it has a dense population of about eighty million. The rate of increase is still high, though it has fallen from the peak figure of about a million in one year. Much of the country is mountainous and only about five-sixths

is suitable for cultivation. Countries with a higher standard of living restrict Japanese immigration; only relatively small numbers of Japanese will be attracted to countries with a lower standard of living. In any case migration could not be on a scale great enough to produce very big results.

Thus the Japanese people can have only a low standard of living unless they can buy imports with exports. There is no food surplus for export. Raw silk, mainly exported to America, helped to fill the gap; but the export of manufactures or such services as shipping is also necessary on a considerable scale. For manufactures Japan needs to import raw materials. It is clear, then, that Japan must depend a good deal on external trade. This is affected by the willingness of other countries to buy Japanese goods, by the prices offering, by the cost of raw materials and the possibility of developing new sources. Other countries have had their own difficulties, and their methods of dealing with them—for instance, by trade restrictions—make the Japanese problem more difficult. The Ottawa agreements of 1932 limiting markets for foreign goods in the British Empire were an example.

Japan's development has been likened to Great Britain's a century before. But there were great differences. British industry had the advantage of good supplies of coal and iron ore on the spot and a lead in time over the rest of the world. There were abundant fields for opening new markets, for investing surplus capital, and for sending migrants to establish new European communities beyond the sea. These conditions no longer exist (§ A.20). Japanese imperialists argued that they only sought to do what other countries did under similar conditions. If they were prevented from expanding their markets and getting favourable opportunities for developing raw materials by peaceful methods, then they claimed a right to get them by force.

In view of past practices and the theory of competition under which industrialism developed in other countries, it is not easy to find a complete answer to this claim. This does not

mean that concessions to Japan at the expense of other countries, whether the empires of the Western Powers or China and the U.S.S.R., would have brought peace or been just. It is rather the sign of the general crisis in the world's affairs—of the problem of relating our human organisation to our power over matter. On our answer to this problem, in the Pacific and elsewhere, depends the future of peace.

The real problems of Japan have not been made easier by the nature of the government or by the economic and social arrangements within Japan. This takes us back to the great changes made in Japan after foreign pressure became strong. First we may contrast what happened in Japan with the later changes in China. Some of the Japanese leaders very quickly realised that old Japan could not stand up against the Western Powers. To save Japan from what they saw was beginning to threaten China—virtual foreign domination—they decided that Japan must be changed so that it could meet the West on equal terms. They must develop the means of power that the West used. With this purpose they succeeded, in a relatively short time, in transforming Japan. But it was a change arranged from the top; it was not a revolution. Hence the Japan that rose to the rank of a Great Power was a mixture of the most modern Western methods and old interests and ideas, of science and superstition.

China was much later in challenging Western domination; but when change did come it was much more of a movement from below, overturning the old rulers. We can with truth talk of a Chinese revolution. Much remains to be done and there are very conservative interests in China trying to check the liberation of the Chinese masses from oppressive landlord and merchant interests. But the Chinese revolt against the West involved much that was absent from the earlier Japanese transformation.

§ A.56. INTERNAL INSTABILITY.—When Commodore Perry's American squadron came to Tokyo Bay in 1853 Japan was

already ripening for change, apart from outside pressure. Japan, as we have noted, had been almost wholly sealed up from outside influences for over two centuries. The nominal head of the country, the Emperor, had long before that been pushed into a kind of sacred seclusion at Kyoto, where he lived with a court aristocracy known as the *kuge*. He was supposed to be of divine origin. Japan was ruled in his name by an official called the *Shogun*, who lived in Tokyo, then known as Yedo. Since early in the seventeenth century the office had been held by the head of the Tokugawa clan. But the Tokugawas were but one of over two hundred clans—some great, many small—at the head of each of which was a lord or *daimyo*. These *daimyos* had considerable local power like the feudal barons in medieval Europe, but had been obliged to recognise the supremacy of the Tokugawa Shogun. Each clan was feudal in its organisation, its members being in different classes with special rights and responsibilities. At the top were the *samurai* or warrior class, forbidden to engage in any profession but war. Their code of honour, *bushido*, stressed loyalty to their lord and their superiority over other classes. On slight provocation they would cut down their inferiors. At the bottom were the *eta* or outcasts who did the most degraded kinds of work. The peasants held the land as feudal subjects of their clan lord. The merchant class, known as *chonin*, came below the tillers of the soil in the social scale.

The long period of peace enforced on the other clans by the Tokugawa Shogun had produced discontents and a desire for change. This was due both to the methods that the Shogun had used to keep the other clans in submission and to the economic development that peace had brought. The old feudal organisation of society had lost much of its point and various groups wanted to break through the restrictions it had imposed. The *daimyos* of some of the stronger clans, such as the Satsuma, the Choshu, the Tosa, and the Hiizen, were not unwilling to break the power of the Tokugawa. In prolonged peace the *samurai* no longer had their old significance. They

became restless and sometimes disorderly. Meantime, with increased industry and commerce, the merchants had risen in real importance, just as had the merchants in England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They accumulated money which could be used as capital for new development or for lending at interest to their feudal superiors. Both *daimyos* and *samurai* became indebted to the merchants, while the merchants were anxious to have their place in society improved. Sometimes they were adopted into the ranks of the *samurai*, while some *samurai* were anxious to enter into business or other occupations. Some of the *kuge* or court aristocracy, with plenty of leisure for thought and study, began to indulge in new ideas, some of which filtered through the cracks in the seclusion from the outside world.

§ A.57. CHANGE IN JAPAN.—On this unstable situation came the summons from outside to open the doors of Japan. The Shogun, with whom the foreigners dealt, was powerless to resist their demands, but was opposed by those who demanded a defiant attitude. There was a period of uncertainty and conflict, while the foreign Powers continued to assert themselves, twice sending naval expeditions against the strongholds of the anti-foreign, anti-Shogun clans of Satsuma and Choshu. From these conditions came the realisation that Japan could meet the West only by a reorganisation. In this an important part was played by the *samurai* of the Satsuma and Choshu clans. The central feature was the restoration of the Emperor to real power and the surrender to him of the powers of the Shogun and the rights of the *daimyos*. The forms of feudalism were supplanted by a centralised government; Western methods of industry and transport were introduced, especially in fields related to armed power. This restoration, the beginning of the period known as Meiji or "enlightened government," took place in 1867–1868. There was naturally some confusion and conflict, as the interests of those who helped to break down the old arrangements were not all alike.

There was, for instance, an important rebellion of the Satsuma *samurai* in 1877 (NA.20).

In 1890 the Emperor granted a constitution setting up a parliament or Diet, consisting of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The franchise for the latter was at first very limited, but in 1925 all men over twenty-five got the vote. On the surface it might appear that Japan had changed into something very like Britain or France. It is important to understand how far this is from the truth. Much of the old order survived within the new framework, with the addition of highly monopolistic forms of capitalism. This new factor derived partly from the *chonin* or merchants of the feudal period, who had financed not only *samurai* and *daimyos*, but also the Imperial Court in carrying through the restoration. Some big capitalists had also arisen through the new opportunities offered when the changes were being made, for instance in military contracts. The *zaibatsu*, or great family groups of capitalists, got a stranglehold on Japanese economic life, having vast interests in banking, light and heavy industry, transport and commerce. Naturally their influence penetrated into politics. The chief of these family trusts were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, the first two being the largest. It has been said that Japan was ruled by an oligarchy of sword and yen—militarism and money.

Any tendency towards government on the principle of a cabinet of ministers responsible to parliament was checked by an Imperial decree dating from 1895. By this the Ministers for the Army and the Navy had to be officers actually serving in the forces, not civilians. As such they had direct access to the Emperor, who was nominally supreme commander of the forces. They thus did not share in the idea of the joint responsibility of the whole cabinet and were outside its control. In a crisis the army and navy could dictate to and control the cabinet, a tendency which appeared clearly after 1931. The sacrosanct position of the Emperor and the stress laid in education and propaganda on loyalty and implicit obedience to

him also worked against the development of anything like popular control over the government.

In 1871 feudalism was abolished. For the loss of their former rights the *daimyos* and *samurai* were given pensions payable in rice by the government. In 1873 they were allowed to exchange this rice-pension for a lump-sum payment. In 1876 this was made compulsory. In the case of the higher ranks this compensation was very handsome. Much of it was invested in industry, banking, and land. Thus the old feudal nobility became linked up with the *chonin* and the new capitalists. Moreover, when the *daimyos* had been deprived of their old powers of local government in 1869, they had often been appointed as prefects or other officers of the new central government.

The *samurai* who had received the highest compensation often did as the *daimyos* and became capitalists. Many others became officials in the new government machine or officers in the new conscript army. Those who did not get on sometimes became centres of discontent, longing for the good old days before the corrupting influence of foreign ways and capitalism had come in. They helped to keep alive some of the old ideas as well as the cult of Emperor worship. They sometimes provided useful implements for the bigger interests and formed a part of Japanese militarism.

New industries, especially those related to military power, were often established by the government. Later, many of these were handed over on very liberal terms to private capitalists, among whom figured *daimyos*, *samurai*, *chonin*, and new men. Much corruption attended these and other transactions.

The revenue to pay the compensation, to finance the new industries, and to organise the army and the machinery of government came largely from a land tax which bore very heavily on the peasantry. This brings us to the one class that did not gain anything from the transformation of Japan. Though the peasants in 1871 were freed from the feudal pay-

ments they had formerly had to make for the land they cultivated, they lost some of the security that feudalism had given them, while the government's land tax was a crushing burden. Instead of being better off, the peasants often found themselves unable to meet their obligations; they might lose their land or become heavily in debt. They were largely at the mercy of landowners and rice merchants who had no interest in the land but the exploitation of its cultivators. Thus the Japanese peasant has remained poor, working his small plot of land by primitive methods, occasionally bursting out in fierce violence against his oppressors, but generally politically backward.

The poverty of the peasantry, in addition to the government's repression of everything that seemed at all dangerous to the established order, has affected the working class of the industrial towns. There is an abundance of labour, particularly that of girls, to be recruited from the overpopulated rural areas. Thus the organisation of trade unions to struggle for better conditions has been weakened and the working class left largely at the mercy of militarists and industrialists.

Thus we can see that there was no revolution in the transformation of old Japan into a Great Power, but rather a reshuffle of old interests with some new ones which left the mass of the people no better off and with little means of revolt. But could Japan have been equipped quickly enough to save itself from Western domination by any other means? One writer sums up thus: "One might indeed say that Japan saved herself from becoming a colony at the cost of treating her peasantry and working class as colonials." For some of the contradictions of aggressive Japan—the combination of science and superstition, of love of beauty and savagery—the West must share some of the responsibility with those who held power in Japan.

§ A.58. THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.—The Chinese were a people with an ancient civilisation which had laid stress on stability and harmony rather than progress. The preservation

of unity over centuries, among such a large population in such a vast area, was a contrast to the disunity within Europe. But China was not so tightly knit together as a modern Western state. Communications were very bad; dialect differences made the people of the north and south unintelligible to each other; the bulk of the people knew only their own village; there was little contact between the government—originally alien conquerors—and the people; in the nineteenth century there was an increasing amount of oppression by practically feudal landlords; science and the mechanical arts had not been pursued beyond a certain point. Thus, despite much that was great in its civilisation, China could offer little resistance to the West but skilful delaying tactics. If China were not to be submerged there had to be change. Few at the top showed any sign of realising this, despite the stream of concessions extorted by the Western Powers. Would pressure from below produce results?

The first movement of this kind was the Taiping rebellion, which lasted from 1851 to 1864. It affected many areas and sought to root out many oppressive abuses and to improve the lot of the masses. It was ultimately suppressed with the assistance of foreigners, including the famous Colonel (later General) "Chinese" Gordon.

Towards the end of the century another reform movement appeared, this time within government circles. It aimed at learning something from the West without sacrificing all that was Chinese. It was ruthlessly suppressed by the powerful old Dowager Empress Tsu Hsi, who in 1898 banished or executed its supporters. She then helped to divert discontent by supporting the anti-foreign Boxer Movement. But the humiliations of the next few years, and the example of what Japan could do in the 1904-1905 war against Russia, again quickened the demand for reform. It came chiefly from those Chinese who had had a Western education, either in the missionary schools and colleges in China, or abroad in the universities of America and Japan.

Widespread troubles broke out in 1911 and early in 1912

the young Emperor abdicated. His predecessor and the old Dowager Empress had both died in 1908. The greatest reform leader was Dr. Sun Yat-sen of Canton, who aimed at making China a democratic parliamentary republic, united, and independent of foreign domination. Among a people who had taken little interest in politics, who had managed their local affairs without much heed of the central government, and who lacked much sense of national citizenship or unity, it was not easy to establish such a system. Dr. Sun retired into the background and a former government official, Yuan Shih-kai, was made President. He had little sympathy with real reform, but he was supported by the foreign Powers, who promised large loans in return for valuable economic concessions. Yuan Shih-kai was really a military dictator. In 1917 his attempt to become Emperor brought about his downfall and death.

China fell under the control of local war-lords, who fought and bargained among themselves, enriching themselves at the expense of the people against the day when they would have to retire with their spoils—often to one of the foreign-controlled ports. Whoever for the time held Peking figured as the central government; but it had little control over the provinces and was helpless against any foreign pressure.

§ A.59. THE KUOMINTANG.—Meanwhile Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been at work in the south. He established a government at Canton and organised the Kuomintang, or National People's Party, on the basis of his Three People's Principles. These were national unity and independence, democratic government, and social and economic reform. In 1923-1924 Dr. Sun also came to an understanding with the Chinese Communist Party, which had likewise been organised in Canton. Failing to get sympathetic support from Great Britain and America, he turned to the Soviet Union, which had renounced the old treaty rights of Czarist Russia. Soviet military and political advisers came to Canton.

Sun Yat-sen died early in 1925, but his influence lived on

and he has become something of a patron saint to the new China. Leadership of the Kuomintang fell to Chiang Kai-shek. It was clear that the time was ripe for a forward movement. The year 1925 was marked by intense anti-foreign feeling, aimed particularly at Great Britain and Japan. There was bloodshed in both Shanghai and Canton; strikes and boycotts were widespread.

In 1926 Chiang Kai-shek led his armies north to bring all China under the control of the Kuomintang, to which many Chinese were sympathetic. All but the north had been won by March 1927. In June 1928 Peking was captured. It was renamed Peiping or Northern Peace, while the capital was moved to Nanking on the great Yangtsi River. At the end of the year Chang Hsueh-liang, the "Young Marshal," who controlled Manchuria and was regarded by the Japanese as subservient to them, gave his allegiance to the Nanking government.

The process of unification had involved trouble with the foreign Powers, whose existing rights were threatened by the Nationalist Government's policy of ending the "unequal treaties" (NA.19). Feeling against the British was very strong in the Yangtsi valley, where British interests predominated. The tense feeling led to some violent incidents. On the whole, the British government showed a good deal of patience, in spite of criticism from British residents in China. Compromises were made, such as the agreement to return the concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang to Chinese control. Relations between Great Britain and Nationalist China improved considerably.

Thereafter anti-foreign feeling was turned chiefly against the Japanese, who hindered the northward advance of the Nationalist armies by using troops to protect Japanese property at the important railway junction of Tsinan in Shantung and along the Shantung railway. More will be said about the growing conflict between China and Japan later.

· § A.60. RIGHT AND LEFT IN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.—The progress of the Nationalist movement also opened up the differences between its more conservative and radical wings. Should their policy be one of drastic reform favourable to the peasants and workers, or was it to protect the bankers, merchants, and landlords? Chiang Kai-shek threw in his lot with the Right; the Left was violently suppressed. The foreign Powers supported Chiang as the less evil and gave him some assistance in destroying the more anti-imperialist opposition.

This happened in 1927, mainly on the Yangtsi. But the more radical side of the revolution could not be disposed of in this way. The control of the central Kuomintang government over vast territories remained uncertain and the Communists were able to establish themselves in various parts, carrying out reforms among the peasants and organising armed forces that had close contact with the people. The most important area was in Kiangsi in south-east China. Chiang Kai-shek was able to subdue or come to terms with the surviving war-lords, though they often retained a good deal of independence within their own provinces. But he was unwilling to come to terms with the Communists, and he could not subdue them, even though he might sometimes force them to move from one area to another. He sent campaign after campaign against them. The breach was not healed till 1937 in the face of new Japanese pressure. The later halting of the Japanese advance led to renewed friction, which increased with the surrender of Japan in 1945, in spite of many negotiations aimed at unity. This will be further discussed later.

CHAPTER A.XI

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

§ A.61. THE CONSTITUTION.—America's great power in the world to-day has already been noted. America has generally been more active in the Pacific side of world affairs than in Europe. American dependencies—Hawaii, the Philippines, Eastern Samoa—were there. America had taken a leading part in opening up Japan, had sought to keep China open to the trade of all nations on equal terms, and had important educational, missionary, and medical contacts there. It was a Japanese attack after a period of strained relations that brought America into the Second World War. We should know something of the background to the present America whose policies can do much to help or harm the world.

The American Constitution is of great importance because in some ways it limits what the government can do and has a strong place in American affections. It came into operation in 1789 to replace the very loose arrangements made between the thirteen colonies that proclaimed their independence from Great Britain in 1776. Within the framework of this Constitution, the thirteen original states on the Atlantic coast have grown into forty-eight, stretching across the continent (NA. 21). The Constitution is a single written document. It cannot be easily changed, for before an amendment becomes part of it it must be approved first by two-thirds of each of the two Houses that make up Congress—the Senate and the House of Representatives—and then by three-quarters of the states. There have been only twenty-two amendments, and ten of these were adopted in a batch in 1791, and three after the Civil War. There was no amendment between 1870 and 1913.

The powers of the federal government remain limited, though greater than they were before 1789. If the Constitution does

not say that a particular power is given to the federal government then it remains with the individual states. The final word on such matters rests with the Supreme Court, which may declare, when a case is brought before it, that some law passed by Congress and signed by the President is null and void because the Constitution has not given the federal authorities power to deal with such a matter. Many of the measures that Congress had passed as part of President Roosevelt's plan for dealing with the slump after he assumed office in 1933 were afterwards declared invalid by the Supreme Court; and determined, but unsuccessful, efforts were made by interested parties to get the court to block the great Tennessee Valley scheme.

Treaties made by the President or his agents have to be approved by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. As the Senate is made up of two representatives from each of the forty-eight states, irrespective of their population, a minority representing the less populous states could block approval. Thus after the First World War a minority of the Senate actually prevented America joining the League of Nations for which President Wilson had been the great advocate.

From these examples we see how the hands of the federal government are tied from doing things in both home and foreign affairs which a majority of Americans may want done. This aspect of the Constitution seems to have arisen from a fear of giving too much power to anyone. This is further seen in the relations of President and Congress. Both Houses of Congress are elected; but so is the President. He is the active head of the government and appoints ministers, such as the Secretary of State (Foreign Affairs) and the Secretary of the Treasury (Finance), who with him form the cabinet. But these ministers must not be members of either House of Congress. This is very different from the British idea of a Prime Minister and cabinet composed of members of Parliament and holding office only so long as they retain a majority in the Lower House. For in America the President is elected for a

definite term of four years. The House of Representatives on the other hand is elected every two years, while Senators are elected for six years, the terms of one-third of their number expiring every two years. These terms are fixed by the Constitution and there can be no dissolution of Congress. Thus the President and his ministers, the majority in the Senate, and the majority in the House may hold different views on important matters; for there is no opportunity of restoring harmony by a fresh appeal to the electors or a change of government.

The President may veto Bills passed by Congress, but his veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House of Congress.

§ A.62. *THE LAND OF LIBERTY AND OPPORTUNITY.*—In America there is still a very strong attachment to what may be called "individualism"—a set of ideas that flourished in Great Britain about the middle of the last century in the period of great industrial expansion, the heyday of Free Trade. Individualism sets store on private enterprise in economic life and is opposed to much action by the state in that or any other field. Let each man have his chance on the open market and those who are worthy will make good—such is the creed of individualism. It was natural that this view should gain a strong hold in a country like America, with its space and resources awaiting development; there actually was more scope for everyone than in old countries. But conditions are changing; there is no longer so much room for development within America; huge business interests have grown up in all fields; the tension between large-scale capital and organised labour has become more acute. It is no longer so easy to practise the best side of individualism and it is now sometimes identified with the interests of the powerful rather than those of the common man. Yet the idea is still strong. In no great country is there so much opposition to the idea that democracy may mean more collective action or even socialism.

- The American idea of democracy goes back to a time when there were many small holders of property in the land. One of its champions was Thomas Jefferson, who had much to do with the writing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776, with the passing of the ten constitutional amendments of 1791, known as the Bill of Rights, and was President in 1801-1805 and 1805-1809. He believed that democratic freedom required limitation of the federal government's powers in favour of the states, for he feared that bankers and capitalists, oppressive to the small man on the land, might control federal affairs. In this he was opposed by Alexander Hamilton, a federalist and defender of the capitalist interests that were growing up in the north and east.

This tussle between democratic and conservative views, with the former generally supporting state as against federal rights, was important in the first half of the nineteenth century. Andrew Jackson, President 1829-1833 and 1833-1837, was one of the outstanding champions of democracy, supported by the pioneers of the west and the workers of the growing industries of the north-east. He successfully attacked the Bank of the United States, representing the eastern capitalists, as a menace to the pioneer who wanted cheap land and cheap money.

§ A.63. LAND LORDS FIGHT MONEY LORDS.—But a new conflict of interests was rising between North and South. The North was becoming more industrialised, with wealthy capitalists and a growing population, including many immigrants from Europe and supplying many of those who moved west to take up land. The growing working class might suffer at the hands of capitalists, but it also hated the slavery of the South, which might be used to undermine its position. In the South the industrial development of Great Britain had given a new importance to cotton-growing, for which black slave labour was used. It was a backward, out-of-date method, but the more aristocratic South clung to it.

Further, while the industrialists of the North favoured

tariffs to protect their industry and the shipowners liked subsidies for American shipping lines, the Southern planters, who sold their cotton mostly in Europe, wanted the cheaper manufactures of the Old World to come in free of duty and by whatever shipping lines gave the cheapest freights. Nor were they interested in railways running from east to west in which Northern capitalists saw profits.

The South on the whole had had greater political influence, supplying the majority of the Presidents before 1860. As the North grew more populous and wealthy the planters of the South feared that they would lose their power and that the country would be dominated by the interests of the capitalists of the north-east. They feared that their whole way of life, with its basis in slavery, would be threatened; they therefore opposed attempts to set limits to slavery, especially as their methods were exhausting their old land and they wanted to keep new areas open. In the election of 1860 Lincoln, as presidential candidate of the new Republican Party with most of its backing in the North, took the stand that if slavery were not interfered with where it was already lawful, but limits were put to its further expansion, it would eventually die out. When he was elected, a number of the Southern states broke away and formed a new Confederacy. When in 1861 they attacked Fort Sumter the great American Civil War began (NA.22).

The greater resources and population of the economically progressive North secured victory after a bitter struggle. Slavery was made unlawful; but an equally important result was the removal of checks on the expansion of Northern interests. As one writer has put it, the struggle was rather one between land lords and money lords than between bad men and good men. The North had no interest in slavery and could afford to be moral about it. The Northern capitalists did have an interest in tariffs, shipping subsidies, east-west communications, and a free field for the investment of their capital. They also won the support of the pioneers and the

land-hungry workers of the cities by a free-land policy, the Homestead Act of 1862 providing a grant of a hundred and sixty acres of public land to anyone who would cultivate it for five years. However, they balanced this by the encouragement of immigrant labour from Europe, generally used to a lower standard of living. These two factors worked against a strong labour movement. Tariff protection was pushed up. Credit was supplied on liberal terms, and generous grants of land and other rights made to railway corporations. Mineral rights were conceded on very easy terms. The banking system was reorganised on lines favoured by the big financial interests. Red Indians were forced off their land with little regard for past pledges. The money lords of the North, in fact, made good use of their triumph.

§ A.64. THE GROWTH OF TRUSTS.—The free-land system would have rejoiced the hearts of Jefferson and Jackson, and hundreds of thousands of people did go on to the land in the next thirty years. But the real gains were to the interests that Jefferson and Jackson had fought—the bankers, industrialists, and shrewd business-men. The doctrines of individualism, freedom of enterprise, and opposition to government action, became connected with those who made fortunes out of the new opportunities and built up huge monopolistic business organisations called trusts, with control over great sections of American economic life. The Carnegies, Rockefellers, Morgans, Vanderbilts, Duponts, Swifts, Armours—these were the men who talked of freedom for the individual and opposed workers' organisation. To Carnegie this was "triumphant democracy."

The danger of these trusts to real freedom was recognised; but it is significant that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 was applied more against the activity of workers' organisations than against the trusts themselves. Later attempts to use the law against the trusts had little real effect on them. There are many other instances of the continued opposition to govern-

ment activity, such as the rejection of a proposed amendment to the Constitution designed to give the federal authorities power to legislate on a national scale to deal with child-labour.

* Freedom of opportunity as Jefferson and Jackson had thought of it also receded further as most of the worth-while land was taken up. Farming began to take more capital than the small man could afford and he tended to fall heavily into debt or lose his land. This absorption of the available land is sometimes referred to as "the closing of the frontier." It came about 1890.

§ A.65. ROOSEVELT'S NEW DEAL.—The conditions under which such ideals as the American conception of democracy were formed were changing. Though development still went on, capital began to seek investment abroad. The First World War speeded up this process and left America the great creditor nation of the world. There followed a boom period. Much American money was lent or invested abroad, including Europe, while at home credit was easily obtained, business was brisk and expanding, wages, at least for the skilled workers, were high. It seemed as if prosperity would never cease. Elected President in 1928, Herbert Hoover claimed that "we in America are nearer to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of any land."

Then in 1929 there was a sudden loss of confidence. People who had lent money wanted it back, business activity was checked, workers were dismissed or their wages cut, industries closed down, banks collapsed. It would be difficult to exaggerate the speed and extent of the change from previous optimism. The Great Slump, which was to spread over the world, had begun.

Hoover's attempts to deal with the situation were hampered by his adherence to old faiths. In vetoing a Bill that was a very modest forerunner of the great Tennessee Valley project, he claimed that for the federal government to enter into such a business was "to break down the initiative and enterprise of

the American people; it is destruction of equality of opportunity of our people; it is the negation of the ideals on which our civilisation is based." Unemployment by the end of 1932 had mounted to some fourteen million. It was, therefore, not surprising that his opponent, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democrat candidate, was elected President. Taking office in 1933 he initiated his "New Deal" to cope with the depression. Later he had to face the growing international crisis and world war. No previous President had held office for more than two terms. Roosevelt's completion of four terms was cut short only by his death in 1945.

Roosevelt applied new ideas. The government spent money even when it meant increasing the national debt, to help those who depended on employment and so to keep up purchasing power. It provided money at the other end to help to keep industry going. It encouraged trade unions and collective bargaining instead of opposing them. It legislated to improve working conditions. It passed social legislation, such as old-age and unemployment insurance, which had been largely lacking before. It aided farmers to recovery by more control of production as well as by providing cheaper loans. It set going the great Tennessee Valley scheme, commonly known as T.V.A., for flood control, irrigation, power production, and manufacture of fertilisers. These are but a few of the many measures comprising the New Deal. When the Supreme Court nullified some of them, some of the same results were attained by slightly different Acts. Moreover, when several of the old judges retired and were replaced, the Court took a rather different view.

The New Deal checked the downward trend and greatly aided recovery. Yet unemployment remained high right up to the Second World War, while some of the improvement in business during that period was due to the demand for armaments arising from the growing international crisis. Roosevelt was fiercely criticised by conservative interests, and he sometimes had to trim his programme to suit them. But it is

clear that the Roosevelt administration marked a new phase in American history. It revealed the rise of a different idea of American democracy and freedom, based on the support of the common man—the workers, the small farmers, and the housewives—and accepted more vigorous government action as necessary to protect their freedom from the domination of private enterprise in the form of big business. We must not, however, overestimate the change. Roosevelt himself declared that he believed in “the system of private business, private property, and private profit,” and claimed that his administration had saved it “after it had been dragged to the brink of ruin.” Most Americans would appear to share his belief in the system; some of them would question his services to it and the methods he used.

Stress has already been laid on the intensification of America's problems by the Second World War. Will Roosevelt's methods be continued and extended, or will Hoover's ideas be reasserted? Will Roosevelt's ideas themselves be adequate? These are questions which concern not only Americans but the whole world.

§ A.66. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.—When the Americans won their independence from Great Britain they felt that they were breaking away from a tyrannous and backward Old World. They were going to build a new, better, and freer world for themselves. Their belief in the superiority of their system has remained strong among Americans and has influenced their foreign policy. At first America was relatively weak and a sort of protective isolation seemed the best safeguard. Europe would be prevented from endangering the American ideal by its power on the American continents; America would avoid entangling alliances and the low-principled brawls of Europe. That was the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823; it has never wholly died. American isolationism was also due to the great scope for development within American territory; nothing could be gained and much might

be lost by entanglement with world politics. Further, just as the Channel served Britain, so the Atlantic and the Pacific were, in greater measure, an adequate defence to America. These factors still influence the American outlook, although weakened by changing conditions.

As America became strong the sense of superiority remained but could produce a different effect. A strong America had a responsibility to help the world to a better order; isolation was selfish. A very thin line might divide isolationism from the idea of an American world mission, according to whether it was felt that American action would really be effective or would be used by others for their more sordid purposes. In any case America by mere growth of its interests was becoming involved in world questions; but without the presentation to them of a high purpose many Americans would have been reluctant to take part in world wars. Presidents Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt were the great spokesmen of this new conception of America's rôle in world affairs. To Wilson the American flag was "also the flag of humanity." On the way to the Peace Conference of 1919 he maintained that the American government alone represented the will of the peoples of the world; The American delegation would have to fight against the baser purposes of other governments. He was the great champion of the League of Nations. Roosevelt, with much more political ability, proclaimed the same faiths as Wilson in his doctrine of the Four Freedoms and in the Atlantic Charter.

Anti-imperialism is strong in America, but imperialism is also a factor in American policy. The settling of the country from the Alleghanies to the Pacific was very similar to the settlement of British colonists overseas, and the Red Indians were dispossessed with little regard for their future. The war against Mexico in 1845-1846 added territory and opportunity. The increasing penetration of American capital and business interest into the other countries of the American continents towards the end of the nineteenth century was often followed by political pressure known as "dollar diplomacy." The war

against Spain in 1898 had an imperialist aspect. In the period after the First World War American forces at times occupied countries such as Nicaragua, Haiti, and Cuba to suppress disorders threatening American capitalist interests.

While American opposition to an easily recognisable imperialism remains strong, the pressure of internal problems may lead entrenched interests to favour some kind of imperialism. As in the case of other countries, the idea of a world mission may be enlisted in support of movements which would in fact be driven by less lofty motives.

American foreign policy in the period between the world wars reflected the conflicting influences that we have noted. The attempt to undertake the burdens of a world responsibility was limited by isolationism. The growth of American material interests abroad also had its influence. It was a combination of isolationist opposition to the obligations involved in the possible international coercion of an aggressor, and a moral repugnance to some of the less liberal aspects of the peace treaties, that kept America out of the League of Nations, though Wilson's unskilful handling of the question was also a factor. The Kellogg Pact or Pact of Paris of 1928 revealed the continued quest for a way of fulfilling a world mission. War as an instrument of national policy was banned; but isolationism was seen in the absence of any corresponding obligation to enforce the ban. With the increasing deterioration in international relations both Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State in Hoover's Republican administration, and the Roosevelt administration sought to find ways of joining more closely in plans for safeguarding peace, both in the general discussions of the World Disarmament Conference which opened in 1933 and in the particular case of Japan's aggressions against China. But isolationist feeling in America made it impossible for any government to undertake beforehand a definite obligation to take part in collective action against an aggressor. Instead a number of measures were passed to safeguard America's neutrality (NA.16).

The Second World War undoubtedly weakened isolationism and strengthened the idea of co-operation for world peace, as shown in the full participation in the United Nations Organisation, whose headquarters are set up in America. But the old influences in American policy were not wholly destroyed, and the very real problems of American internal development will have an influence on the rôle America plays in world affairs.

CHAPTER A.XII

THE PACIFIC WAR

§ A.67. *JAPANESE IMPERIALISM.*—It might be said that the Second World War really began in 1931, when the Japanese seized Manchuria; for thereafter, until the German attack on Poland in 1939, there was a series of aggressions which ultimately led to collective resistance on a world scale. Japan, Germany, and Italy became closely connected in this disturbance of existing arrangements. They, especially Germany and Japan, were countries which had developed late and rapidly. It was therefore perhaps natural that in the struggle for markets and control of resources that went on in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they should be somewhat more aggressive than those Powers that had expanded earlier. This was further connected with the fact that, again especially in the case of Germany and Japan, non-liberal elements had survived in their political and social systems, coupled with large and powerful capitalist groups. The top-heavy nature of the "sword-yen" domination in Japan exaggerated the Japanese tendency towards aggressive imperialism.

Imperialist rivalries in the West Pacific were affected by the emergence of China. China, with its vast population to provide a market for cheap manufactures and with its consider-

able resources awaiting development, was the obvious field for Japanese ambitions; but Japan's power to subordinate Chinese development to Japanese interests was challenged by the growing Chinese struggle for real independence and freedom from imperialist domination. As Japan grew stronger, largely through the divisions among the Western Powers, the issue in the Far East became more and more between China and Japan, while the increasing Japanese domination drove the other interested Powers more towards China.

The First World War had given Japan an admirable opportunity for an active policy (§ A.53). In 1915 the Twenty-one Demands were presented to China with the purpose of bringing China largely under Japanese political supervision and controlling China's economic resources (NA.23). The existing Chinese government could offer little resistance and had to accept. This, however, produced more widespread and popular protest than had ever been manifested in China before. Thereafter the Chinese frequently resorted to boycotts and other popular, non-military methods of resisting unpopular policies and foreign pressure. In this the Chinese students played a leading part.

The Japanese position was strengthened by an understanding with America in 1917, when the latter joined in the First World War. America recognised Japan's special interests in China, especially in the parts nearest to Japan. This implied a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for the Far East. In the confusion which followed the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the Allies decided to intervene in Eastern Siberia in the hope of checking Bolshevism. The Japanese took advantage of this to establish themselves strongly there. When other Allied troops were withdrawn in 1920 the Japanese remained in large numbers. Manchuria also fell more under Japanese control.

The situation held ugly possibilities. To try to avert them, the American government invited the Powers interested in the Pacific to a conference at Washington at the end of 1921. Here agreements were reached for the limitation of naval arma-

ments and of fortifications in the Pacific. This checked for the time a race in armaments between the three great naval Powers—Great Britain, America, and Japan. There were also agreements to respect the integrity of China, to maintain the "Open Door," and to confer on any questions that might threaten good relations. As a result the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not renewed beyond 1921.

On the whole the Washington agreements seemed to promise well for better relations between the Great Powers and for a more helpful attitude to China. Japanese policy took a more conciliatory turn, the leased territory of Kiachau being handed back to China. The naval agreements, however, while they permitted Britain and America each to have five capital ships for every three Japanese, actually gave Japan virtual control of the seas near Japan and China.

§ A.68. JAPAN, MANCHURIA, AND NORTH CHINA.—After the frictions in 1927–1928 during the advance of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang army (§ A.59), relations between China and Japan seemed to improve. In fact, it was in this period that some believed that the Japanese government was becoming really responsible to the Diet, and through it to popular opinion. However, in 1931 new problems arose over Manchuria.

Ever since Japan took over Russian rights in South Manchuria, much Japanese capital had been invested there, resulting in considerable development in some parts. Minerals, food supplies, and markets were the great attraction of Manchuria. So much importance was attached to this region that it was commonly said by Japanese that "Manchuria is our lifeline." Conditions in China were still unsettled and the authority of the National government at Nanking was uncertain. Under various treaties Japan had many privileges in Manchuria. It was not unnatural that friction should arise, and a large number of "incidents" took place during 1931 which caused irritation on both sides.

Tho two governments seemed to be approaching a friendly

settlement when the Japanese army suddenly, on the night of September 18-19, seized Mukden, the capital of Manchuria. They alleged that the railway had been blown up and Japanese troops attacked. From this beginning, during the next two years the whole of Manchuria and the neighbouring province of Inner Mongolia or Jehol were occupied. They were made into the nominally independent state of Manchukuo; actually this was a mere puppet of Japan. There was also an expedition against Shanghai and an invasion of the territory in north China inside the Great Wall. The Tangku truce in May 1933 ended hostilities.

At the time Great Britain and the United States, as well as most other countries, were in the throes of the great economic crisis and hence much occupied with urgent internal problems. China appealed to the League of Nations as soon as the Japanese attack began. A commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton, was appointed to examine the question on the spot and report to the League. Their report, which was not presented till October 1932, was on the whole a condemnation of the Japanese action. Early in 1933 the League Assembly at last drew up its report, as provided by Article 15 of the Covenant, containing recommendations for the settlement of the dispute based on the Lytton Report. This was accepted by all the members except Japan, which continued its aggressions. The moral pressure of the League produced no effect and Japan remained in possession of the spoils of force. Japan decided to withdraw from the League.

Great Britain's part in all this has been severely criticised. A definite stand in the early stages might have had some effect; but once the Japanese had been permitted to taste the success of military action, they felt confident in risking a good deal more. The longer they went on with impunity, the more drastic League action would have to be, involving heavier obligations on those who might participate in carrying it out. Actually there were powerful influences in Great Britain that upheld the Japanese action and favoured Britain coming to terms

with Japan to safeguard British interests in China. Even Sir John Simon, then Foreign Minister, seemed to concede the Japanese case. There was little realisation that Japan was threatening British imperialism. Japan's action was regarded rather as a welcome curb on Chinese nationalism and a bulwark in the East against the U.S.S.R.

The American government at first sought to avoid any action that might give a pretext for Japanese annoyance and so weaken the position of what were regarded as the more moderate members of the Japanese cabinet. When it was realised that this had the opposite effect of encouraging the militarists, the American government took a firmer tone, and in January 1932 declared that it would not recognise "any situation, treaty or agreement" brought about by force. This sentiment was later endorsed by the League Assembly, and an American representative acted closely in conjunction with the League committee that handled the case. At times the American government felt that it lacked the support of Britain for a somewhat stronger line; on the other hand the British government could not get a promise beforehand that America would take its share in any unpleasant consequences which might follow.

The failure to take any collective action beyond passing resolutions made the risks of aggression seem safe. From the successful defiance on the part of Japan dated a decline of the hopes that the League had inspired and a new period of militant aggression. The Disarmament Conference failed, Germany was emboldened to repudiate treaties and withdraw from the League, while the way was opened for the Italian aggression in Abyssinia.

In Japan the less aggressive ministers were obliged to resign and real power passed more openly to the military leaders. Enormous expenditure on armaments went on, absorbing half the government's revenue. There were protests from parliament; but in the last resort the army leaders could get their way in spite of parliamentary opposition. Signs of discontent

outside parliament were harshly repressed, thousands of young men being imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts."

In China Japanese pressure continued, and in 1935 the Chinese government agreed to the setting up of a Political Council with Japanese advisers in the two northern provinces of Chahar and Hopei, in which lie Peiping and Tientsin. By smuggling which deprived China of much revenue, by currency manipulation, and by spreading opium and other drugs, the Japanese sought to undermine the possibility of Chinese resistance to further pressure. Chiang Kai-shek, however, though he avoided open resistance, also conceded less than the Japanese demanded and played for time. Eventually a new "incident" near Peiping occurred in July 1937, vast Japanese reinforcements were poured in, and after attempts at settlement, a further "incident" led to open war which was to last till August 1945. The two "incidents," like that which set off the seizure of Manchuria, occurred at night and appeared to have been devised by the Japanese as pretexts for more aggressive action.

Meanwhile Japan had linked up with the European Fascist Powers. An increasingly hostile attitude to the U.S.S.R. and closer relations with Germany culminated in the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact at the end of 1936. Though this agreement on the surface was directed against Communism, a device intended to disarm the suspicion of the Western Powers, it probably was the cover for secret military agreements threatening to America, Britain, and other European Powers, as well as the U.S.S.R. and China.

§ A.69. CHINESE UNITED FRONT.—The situation in China was also changing. While making concessions under Japanese pressure, Chiang Kai-shek was also trying to build up Chinese unity and strength. But he would not give up his attacks on the Communists, in spite of their plea that all Chinese should unite to resist the Japanese. Many patriotic Chinese agreed with them in this—the courageous students, for instance, who

demonstrated in Peiping shouting "Stop the civil war!" Chiang's attacks at length compelled the Communist forces in Kiangsi to move. In mid-1934 they broke through the threatening encirclement and began the "Long March," first west, then north, and north-east, which took them to Shensi province in the north-west, where headquarters were established at Yen-an towards the end of 1935. This march of at least three thousand miles, involving much fighting and terrible privation, as well as the transport of some industrial equipment, was an amazing achievement—one of the great heroic epics of modern times.

Fresh appeals for unity brought no result. Eventually the troops sent against the new Communist area took matters into their own hands. One army was composed of soldiers from Manchuria who had been withdrawn when the Japanese first attacked, under Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal. They wanted to fight against the Japanese and get back to Manchuria, not against fellow-Chinese, especially those who were calling for unity and a great rallying of the Chinese people against further Japanese aggression. A truce developed between the Red Army and those who were supposed to be exterminating it. Chiang Kai-shek twice went to the area to stimulate more action against the "red bandits." The second time, just before Christmas 1936, he was kidnapped near Sian by officers of the Manchurian and a local provincial army. He was held for twelve days and urged to change his policy. Some wanted to put him on trial, which might have meant death. He was eventually released, largely through the influence of a Communist delegate from Yen-an, who held that Chiang Kai-shek alone could head a national movement.

This famous "Sian incident" seems finally to have convinced Chiang that he must modify his policy, especially as the Japanese were resuming military pressure in the north-west. The anti-Communist military campaigns were stopped. Although the Communist Party still remained nominally illegal, the Chinese Red Army was recognised as part of

the national forces, becoming the Eighth Route—later the Eighteenth Group—Army. The north-west provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia were recognised as a Special Border Region, where the democratic form of government organised by the Communists on the basis of the people of the villages was allowed to continue. Some of the patriotic political prisoners were released, but many remained in prison. Young Marshal Chang, whose punishment for his part in the Sian incident was expected to be nominal, was not released till after the Japanese surrender in August 1945. A formal agreement for a united front between the Kuomintang government and the Communists was not reached till after the Japanese attack in July 1937, but virtually it came in the first half of that year.

§ A.70. CHINA'S RESISTANCE.—The ill-equipped Chinese forces were no match for the mechanised Japanese armies supported by an air force. Nearly everywhere they were driven back. Even the heroic stand at Shanghai was of doubtful military value, some of the best troops being sacrificed who might have made a valuable stand further back. But there was something new in the general support of the war by the Chinese people, whose spirit was further roused by the treatment they received from the invaders. One great victory of the Chinese at Taierchwang early in 1938 showed that the Japanese were not invincible and that the Chinese had generalship as well as heroism. Yet though the Japanese were stubbornly held up in several places, they got control of great lengths of railway, of the main industrial areas, and of the chief ports, including Canton in the south.

The capture of Hankow, the great Yangtsi river centre, in October 1938 virtually brought the first phase of the war to an end. The Japanese could not advance further; the Chinese as yet could not drive them back. In the regions where the Communists had influence much was achieved in rallying the people and developing the power to resist, even with few resources, by means of guerrilla tactics. Forces operated and govern-

ment functioned in between the long lines of Japanese communications, which were constantly harassed. A New Fourth Army was organised on the same lines as the Eighth Route and operated south of the Yangtsi. Similar methods were adopted to some extent by the National armies; but because of reactionary influences in the government there was not the same success in rallying and organising the mass of the ordinary people as under Communist guidance in the north-west. One great new development was the organisation of the industrial co-operatives to try to make good the loss of the great industrial areas, as well as to give the people an organisation in which they themselves really shared. The great moving spirit in this work, which has inspired many European and American observers to the warmest expressions of admiration, was a New Zealander, Rewi Alley.

We must not forget that for over four years China, despite its losses of men, territory, and supplies, kept up the struggle alone against the power of Japan. China's new appeals to the League of Nations brought nothing but an expression of moral support and a recommendation that members should refrain from action likely to weaken China's power of resistance and also consider how far they could individually extend aid. The U.S.S.R., Spain, and New Zealand unavailingly protested against the failure to undertake any collective action. Great Britain and America did give China some assistance by loans to help China to pay for much-needed imports and to maintain the Chinese currency, but this was far offset by the continued export of war materials to Japan, which was much more easily able to purchase them than China. There was some bitterness among the Chinese that, despite expressions of sympathy, they were being bombed by planes whose engines and fuel came from the Western Powers. China actually received most help from the U.S.S.R.

Great Britain during this period had been increasingly embarrassed by the situation in Europe. The outbreak of war there in September 1939 made Britain's policy in the East

even more cautious, and the lead tended to pass to America. The growing boldness of Japanese policy, such as the virtual domination of French Indo-China after the fall of France and an increasingly aggressive attitude to European interests in China, brought about a gradual stiffening of the American attitude, though there was clearly a wish to avoid too much risk, at least till American war preparations were further advanced and the European situation more favourable. Meantime there were signs of increasing co-operation between Great Britain, the Dominions, and America in the Pacific. When war came it was revealed that Winston Churchill had already promised Roosevelt that Britain would immediately join in if America were attacked by Japan. In the second half of 1941 it was clear that war might easily come, and although negotiations were actually going on when the Japanese made their attack without warning on Pearl Harbour, America had already stated conditions for a settlement which it was very unlikely that Japan would accept.

§ A.71. THE WAR SPREADS.—The gaining of allies against Japan brought little relief and much disappointment to the Chinese. The rapid fall of all the British, American, and Dutch territories in south-east Asia deprived China of most of the scanty military and medical supplies that had formerly gone in. The painfully constructed Burma Road route was lost. The Allied strategy of treating the European side of the war as the one of primary importance, while it was probably sound, naturally caused some misgivings in China. Moreover the Soviet Union, while continuing to send what supplies were available to China over the long inland route, and also keeping the flower of the Japanese army idle along the Manchurian frontier, remained neutral in the Pacific War until its final stage.

We may turn back to look at the Soviet part in Far Eastern affairs. The Soviet government viewed Japanese policy against China as an unwarranted aggression. Japan refused to agree to

a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R., and after the occupation of Manchuria there were a number of border incidents. In March 1936 the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic, whose connection with China was nevertheless still recognised. This Republic bordered the Japanese-controlled territory of Inner Mongolia and the pact was a barrier to further expansion in that direction by Japan, whose ultimate designs against the U.S.S.R. in the event of a favourable opportunity were taken for granted. The Japanese-German Anti-Comintern pact at the end of 1936 threatened the U.S.S.R. with a war on two fronts.

In early August 1938 there was a clash between Soviet and Japanese forces at Changkaifeng, where Manchuria and Korea border Soviet territory; from May to September there was fighting on a considerable scale on the frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo, Soviet forces aiding the Mongols. In both cases the Soviet government took a very determined stand against Japanese claims and the army demonstrated its quality to the Japanese. It would appear the Japanese had been trying out the chances and thought better of going further.

The Soviet-German agreement of August 1939 seems to have taken the Japanese by surprise and upset their calculations. It did not affect the Soviet's attitude in the Far East, which remained friendly to China. Even after the neutrality agreement was eventually concluded between Japan and the U.S.S.R. in April 1941, the Soviet government made it clear that its relations with China were not to be disturbed. The pact was probably a continuation of the Soviet's efforts to maintain a real neutrality in its relations with what it regarded as imperialist Great Powers. Possibly there was already fear of a German attack. For Japan it probably indicated a decision to turn its expanding imperialism first against the British, Dutch, and American possessions to the south rather than the Soviet Union in the north. When both the U.S.S.R. and Japan became involved on opposite sides in the one world war, the

strategic balance is enough to account for their remaining at peace with each other for so long. Each would run grave risks by a divided effort, and in the case of the U.S.S.R. this risk would have extended to its allies. Actually at the time of the Crimea conference in February 1945, Stalin agreed that the U.S.S.R. should declare war on Japan not more than three months after the end of the war with Germany, thus giving time for the necessary redistribution of forces—a promise which was duly carried out.

Despite their close relations there was not a perfect unity between Japan and Germany, Japan probably realising the risks of being too closely tied to the German chariot. Hitler would have welcomed a Japanese attack on the Soviet at the time of his attack on Stalingrad in the autumn of 1942. But the Japanese leaders were fighting the war for Japan, not Hitler.

§ A.72. VICTORY AND AFTER: (1) THE FUTURE OF JAPAN.—In the first few months of their attack the Japanese made enormous gains in resources and population that could be subordinated to their war machine. This was a serious blow to their opponents; but so great a dispersion of effort also imposed a strain on Japan. In spite of the loss of vast oil and rubber resources, provided the Allies could hold bases for later action, their capacity for war production was practically a guarantee of ultimate victory. America, almost wholly secure against damage to its industrial equipment, was the main base of this war production and had the main responsibility in this holding war. Australia and New Zealand became great training bases and supplied food, while Australian forces played an important part in keeping a foothold in New Guinea. American naval and air power proved equal to the strain, much depending on the victory in the Coral Sea battle on 8th May 1942.

Though we should remember the importance of the British campaign in Burma, America still played by far the biggest part in the Pacific war when it came to the time for taking the

offensive. Air power, naval power, and abundance of equipment, combined with skilful strategy, ousted the Japanese from their island bases, which then became bases for further American action, till the Japanese mainland was within striking distance. The importance of the atomic bomb is that it brought surrender while the main Japanese armies were still undefeated in battle and the best of them concentrated in Japan. The attack of the U.S.S.R. deprived the Japanese government of the possibility of a last refuge in Manchuria and Korea.

The surrender of Japan under these conditions opened up great problems, not the least of which was the future of Japan. Stress has already been laid on the effects of the past in Japan. A people cannot be wiped off the face of the earth, nor is it likely that a number of countries will agree for an indefinite time on playing the part of military policemen to keep another country down. Peace must ultimately depend on changes in Japan itself; but the policies of the victorious Powers can help or hinder the growth of a new, democratic, and peaceful Japan.

If Japan is to be peaceful, the old ruling groups, military, political, and economic, must be excluded from power, while movements springing from the mass of the people, such as trade unions and peasant organisations, must be encouraged to develop and find their own leaders. The Japanese have so long been kept under a strict control by force and propaganda that this must take time. Democratic organisation does not grow in a day, and there is a danger that the old forces, though nominally disposed of, may still exercise control. Just as, for example, in America anti-trust laws have not killed monopolistic tendencies, so in Japan the formal dissolution of the great "zaibatsu" firms may not really mean that the same controls are not reconstructed in a different form.

America, having borne the main burden, assumed that the control of Japan should be its responsibility. The British Dominions of the south-west Pacific and the U.S.S.R. objected to this and at the Moscow conference of Foreign Minis-

ters at the end of 1945 it was agreed that a form of joint control should be established. The final channel of the control, however, remained with the American supreme command in Japan. The real conflict is between the American and the Soviet views on the problem. The former seeks to build up something like American democracy in Japan without any real social revolution. Such a Japan would be an offset to Soviet influence in the Far East. The Soviet leaders fear, on the other hand, that such a policy might work only superficially and be the cover for the revival of Japanese imperialism; they hold that, for a real break with the past, a much deeper social change is necessary.

The issue cropped up over the date of the first post-war elections in Japan, at which the franchise was broadened and women voted on an equal footing with men. The Soviet representative on the Far Eastern Commission, supported by the New Zealand representative, urged that the elections be postponed in order that the more radical parties, some of whose leaders had been political prisoners of the old regime for up to eighteen years and some exiles, might have a better chance of getting the voters to understand their long-suppressed views. The American view in favour of earlier elections prevailed, and conservative parties, though labelled Progressive and Liberal, won the majority of seats.

On the progress of change in Japan depends the safety of allowing Japan greater opportunities of trade. It would be folly to permit the building up of a strong trade position and interests abroad by a Japan still animated by the old influences. Yet a peaceful Japan requires trade. Military control may be a necessary feature of any policy for a considerable time after the war, but this alone cannot solve the Japanese problem on which so much depends.

§ A.73. (2) THE FUTURE OF CHINA.—China, whose development is a matter of world importance, was also left at the end of the war with its future uncertain, and threatened with civil

war. During the early years of the struggle against Japan the united front of Kuomintang and Communists held. After stalemate developed in 1939, it weakened. The withdrawal from the more industrialised coastal areas into the great agricultural province of Szechwan threw the Kuomintang government more under the influence of the very conservative landowners on whose tax-payments, since the customs revenue at the ports was lost, it now depended. The landlords feared that if the democratic tendencies of the Communist area were allowed to spread the peasants would become strong enough to threaten the landlords' interests. Though Chiang Kai-shek still held together within the Kuomintang a wide coalition, from the progressives who tended to sympathise with the Communists to the virtually feudal landowners, he had to yield to the pressure of the latter.

A blockade of the Communist area was established and it was alleged that the best government troops were employed on this rather than fighting the Japanese. Actual conflict occasionally occurred and early in 1941, as it was crossing the Yangtsi, part of the New Fourth Army was attacked by one of the government armies, with a loss of some four thousand. However, in spite of such incidents, an open breach did not take place. As British and American successes brought the end of the war in sight the friction became more serious, though negotiations for a solution continued.

The Japanese surrender did not improve matters. The Communists expected that, in the area where they had done most of the fighting, their forces would take the surrender of the Japanese and occupy the towns. The government, on the other hand, using American transport, rushed troops north to forestall the Communists. Conflicts broke out in North China and Manchuria, though they were not accepted as constituting civil war, negotiation for a basis of unity still going on.

The issue is not between capitalism and Communism but whether the future of China shall be on progressively democratic lines, freeing the people from the hold of oppressive

landlords, merchants, moneylenders, and rapacious exploiters of labour. China can scarcely get stability on any other basis, and as security for this the Communists feel that they and other parties outside the Kuomintang should have a legal existence and a share in the government, and that part of their forces should be kept intact, though as a portion of the national armies.

So long as China remains divided by conflicting forces there is a danger that it may become the centre of similar world conflicts, should co-operation between the Great Powers break down.

§ A.74. THE CHALLENGE TO IMPERIALISM IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.—South-east Asia, lying between the two great centres of Asiatic nationalism in China and India, became in the period before the world wars one of the great colonial areas of the world, rich in resources and containing nearly a hundred and fifty million people. Siam alone remained independent, perhaps because it was a useful buffer between the British and French spheres of expansion. But even Siam was in a semi-colonial condition, and resentment at the growing control of British and Chinese over its economic life made Siamese nationalism turn a good deal towards Japan in the years before the Second World War.

Opposition to imperialism, however, both by the dependent peoples and by Leftist opinion in imperialist countries, was growing. In the growing friction between the Fascist Powers with their claims for expansion and the older imperialist Powers the latter felt it necessary to try to show that their empires were not maintained for selfish reasons but were on the way to the liberation of the dependent peoples. Yet progress was slow and when war came important sections of the colonial peoples were far from satisfied. One of the most striking things in the war was the rapid collapse of the Western imperial structure before the Japanese advance. It was revealed that imperial rule by Britain, France, and Holland had given to the subject

peoples neither the material means, such as industrial development, nor the spirit to fight for its preservation. In the Philippines, where independence was already guaranteed for 1946, this was not so evident. In some cases, notably Burma, there was active assistance to the Japanese, but generally there was indifference. Later, when anti-Japanese resistance movements developed, they were certainly not intended merely to restore the old imperialist rule, but rather to gain an increased measure of self-government, if not complete independence.

The imperialist governments had realised that they must make concessions; among the more advanced colonial leaders there was a suspicion that these concessions would leave their destiny, political and economic, still very much under alien control. The whole problem was complicated by the need for arrangements to deal with the surrendered Japanese armies, with Allied prisoners and internees, and with the distribution of much-needed supplies. Out of such conditions rose the troubles in Indonesia and Indo-China. In Malaya and Burma discontent and distrust assumed less active forms but were real, while in the Philippines independence, following on popular resistance movements, was accompanied by the growing struggle of peasants against absentee landlords.

Since the end of the war the British government has taken important steps to speed up the move towards self-government and economic development, while the Dutch government has been willing to compromise on the question of Indonesian independence. The whole problem is complicated by the presence in many parts of an important Indian and Chinese element, partly brought in in the first place to serve European needs, but now forming a business middle class. Will the concessions produce confidence among the dependent peoples that they are really being freed from the outside interests to which their lot has in large measure been purposely subordinated? Will they feel that they are being helped—for help is probably necessary—to a position where the mass of the people may shape their own destiny? Until this is so there will be dis-

content. Some of this discontent will be attracted towards the Soviet Union, where great strides have been made in the political, economic, and cultural development of the backward non-Russian peoples; but some of it could be fertile ground for the work of any reviving Japanese imperialism.

§ A.75. ONE WORLD.—In southern and eastern Asia there are over a thousand million people—half the world's population—all in a state of change and uncertainty. Japan, a defunct Great Power, at the crossroads; China just emerged from a semi-colonial state, with an uncompleted revolution; India not far behind; the clash of rising colonial nationalisms with the survivals of imperialism in the south-east corner. About this vast question-mark lie the "Big Three" Powers whose agreements or disagreements matter so much to all the peoples of the world. The Soviet Union, developing rapidly, a symbol of hope to some, of fear to others; the United States, rich and powerful, but with huge problems ahead, anti-imperialist in sentiment but with powerful economic interests that may not be squeamish in their methods of self-preservation; the retreating but still existent imperialism of Great Britain, leaving to those other British communities, Australia and New Zealand, a larger responsibility for the future of the Pacific and its adjacent lands. Here is a challenge to the European peoples of the world to find a way of harmonising their own development with that of the rising peoples of Asia.

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